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PART III.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

11

From September 1853 to January 1854.

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Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

No. 1.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 26.)

(No. 478. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 13, 1853.

YOUR Lordship will not fail to have observed that Count Nesselrode (except on the occasion of his communicating to me his last despatch to Baron Meyendorff) has manifested repugnance to speaking to me of the evacuation of the Principalities, or to listening to anything which I might have to say on the subject.

The subject, and those connected with it, he has indeed avoided in a marked manner.

This I may remark has not been the case with some of the Emperor's officers, two of whom, and men at the very head of the army, have taken occasion to observe to me that the season has all but arrived when the troops could not undertake their homeward march without such exposure and suffering as would quite disorganize an army.

Upon any of the occasions in which I find myself in conversation with persons who I know to be in the confidence of the Government, I am more desirous of hearing what they have to say than of expressing any opinion of my own, and I think it right to state to your Lordship that I must have grossly misunderstood the sense of what I heard from the persons in question, if I am mistaken in supposing that if the troops are not ordered to fall back within the next fortnight or three weeks they will not receive the order till next spring.

Supposing that my impressions be, as I believe them, correct, the Emperor, in the event of the Sultan giving a tardy assent to the Vienna propositions, will be ready to state that he considers his quarrel with Turkey at an end, to declare his resolution of evacuating the Principalities as soon as can be, and possibly to fix the day on which orders for their withdrawal shall be given; but I apprehend the greatest repugnance will be shown to allowing this march to be undertaken as soon as the roads have been broken up by the autumnal rains which are to be so soon looked for.

This fresh difficulty, easily as as it was to be foreseen, must I apprehend have been overlooked by the Sultan's advisers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 2.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 26.)

(No. 480. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 13, 1853.

AS it is my bounden duty to state to Her Majesty's Government, not what it may be acceptable to them to learn, but what the real state of affairs is, in so far as I am able to form an opinion, I do not hesitate to express to your Lordship

my belief that the despatch addressed to Baron Meyendorff on the $\frac{20 \text{ August}}{1 \text{ September}}$ expresses correctly the intentions of the Emperor, and that His Majesty, as at present advised, is firmly resolved not to abate a particle of his pretension of expecting that the note prepared and presented by the Four Powers, to which he gave a ready assent, shall be accepted without the slightest alteration by the Sultan.

My opinion is founded upon the language of the persons the most in the Emperor's confidence, and more especially of those who are usually the most distinguished by their moderation.

One of these persons, after reminding me of the concessions already made by the Emperor, who had begun by declaring to myself that the only reparation which he would receive from the Porte was the note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff, *sans variante*, observed, that if the humiliation of the Emperor were not the object sought, the allied Cabinets would not propose to His Majesty to give in to the wishes of the Turkish Government; but that such a course could not possibly be in their contemplation, since it was obvious that the terms of composition had been mutually weighed, deliberately drawn up, and finally proposed in good faith, with the resolution of causing them to be accepted by the parties whose differences it was desired to bring to a conclusion.

Your Lordship will, I trust, have the kindness to excuse me if I add that, having never been alarmed at the idea of an appeal to the *ultima ratio* as long as Russia was running counter to those principles of justice and equity which England is bound to uphold, I should consider such an appeal as the most grievous misfortune, if made when the Emperor had so far retraced his steps as to have shown himself willing to accept that limited amount of reparation which Her Majesty's Government had signified their opinion of being his due.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 3.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 482. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 13, 1853.

IN more than one despatch which I have had the honour of addressing to your Lordship during the course of a painful negotiation not yet brought to a conclusion, I ventured to state my suspicion that the Emperor was speculating upon a revolutionary movement at Constantinople, which might give him an opportunity of coming forward as the Protector of the Sultan.

What I then suspected I now know with certainty; and the fact is so positive that when intelligence (false as the event proved) arrived here of a revolution having broken out in Turkey, great satisfaction was manifested at Peterhoff, where it was held that an occasion presented itself for dissipating the suspicions which were entertained of the Emperor's intentions, and for making an honourable exit from a false position.

Your Lordship may be assured that I should not make this statement without full warrant.

The fact is in so far of value as it throws considerable light upon Russian policy, and goes far to proving that for Russia the great point is to be the arbiter of the destinies of Turkey—to be her most strenuous supporter or her most dangerous enemy.

I venture to request that this despatch may be considered as strictly confidential, the information upon which it is grounded having been received, as your Lordship will at once perceive, from one of the few persons who are admitted into the confidence of the Emperor.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 4.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 486. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 16, 1853.

IF the Turks have not been ill advised when they determined upon rejecting, or (which comes nearly to the same thing) upon altering the Projet de Note recommended to their adoption by the Representatives of the Four Powers, there must be an identity between Turkish and Russian interests, of which no one had suspected the existence.

Certain it is that no course more agreeable to those of the Emperor's advisers, who would recommend the adoption of extreme measures against Turkey, could have been devised than that which has been taken by the Porte; and none, I may add, could be less calculated either to stimulate the exertions of sincere friends, or to guard against the falling off of those less devoted to the cause of Turkey, who for a time found themselves (probably to their great concern) in opposition to the views of Russia.

As I have already had the honour of stating to your Lordship, the language of the Russians, even of those habitually the most moderate, is that concession has been made hitherto only on the side of the Emperor, and that it has already been carried to its extreme limits.

To this they add, that the Vienna Projet de Note, besides being drawn up by the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers, derived an additional sanction by having been referred to London and Paris, where it received some amendments, and that under these circumstances it must be considered as offering that amount of satisfaction to which the Emperor is fully entitled, even in the opinion of England and France.

I do not then hesitate to state to your Lordship that had he remained at his own capital, His Imperial Majesty would not have abated an iota of these pretensions, which he considers to have received the sanction of the Allied Governments.

It remains to be seen whether His Majesty will show himself more pliant in Germany, where he will be brought into contact with those whose friendship he so highly values, and where he will perhaps hear those truths which in his own country are never allowed to reach him.

Supposing His Imperial Majesty to be induced to lend himself to the modifications proposed by the Turks, or to some of the same nature, all for the present will be well; in the contrary event I trust your Lordship will pardon me if I express the necessity which I feel would exist for urging the Turkish Government to adopt those terms which in the opinion of the Allied Governments it was considered might be safely subscribed to by them.

It may be presumptuous in me to pronounce an opinion, but it appears to me that a point of very great importance has been overlooked by the Sultan's Government. They have failed to perceive that less favourable terms of composition prepared by the Four Powers, and accepted in deference to their advice, are more advantageous to them than would be better conditions if settled by themselves.

In the one case they have a right to look to the Four Allies for protecting them against any evil consequences which may arise from their own work; in the other they may be left by some of their nominal friends to extricate themselves as best they can from any fresh difficulties which may come upon them. The point would be one of great importance in the case of any Government: it is peculiarly momentous with regard to one which must be kept up by the exertions of its friends, or which will cease to have any existence.

I am aware that diplomatic agents are accused of being too frequently tinged with the opinions of the Court at which they reside, and unconsciously I may be open to the reproach; I would nevertheless take the great liberty of observing to your Lordship that it appears to me that it would be a serious misfortune were we to take our stand against Russia upon any difficulty connected with terms of arrangement to which we ourselves have been parties, and that all our energies should be exerted towards guarding (it may be hoped in

concert with our allies) against those future encroachments upon a defenceless neighbour, which it is probable will be continued by Russia as occasion may serve.

Such a bulwark might be constructed when the political gale has spent itself, but is not to be undertaken while so much swell still prevails.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 5.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 487. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September* 16, 1853.

BY the arrival of the messenger Blackwood I have been put in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. inclusive.

I am sorry to say that from some inadvertency Count Nesselrode left St. Petersburgh without calling to mind that it had been settled that I was to see him before his departure; it appears, however, that he held a conversation with General Castelbajac which is not without interest.

The French Envoy has received (amongst others) two despatches from his Government, the one expressive of great regret at the non-acceptance by the Sultan of the Vienna note; the other stating that the advance of autumn renders it necessary that the fleets should be prepared to seek more secure anchorage than is offered by Besika Bay, and directing General Castelbajac to ascertain what would be the feelings of the Russian Cabinet if they were to enter the Dardanelles.

To obtain this information my colleague has addressed himself, as he has been obliging enough to inform me, to Count Nesselrode himself.

Upon my expressing a hope that this reference had not been made in an apologetic form, General Castelbajac observed that I might feel quite easy upon that point; that he had said to Count Nesselrode, "I had been directed to sound you, now I take upon myself to consult you more openly; I do so because, while we should have had no explanations to give of our movements if the Emperor had maintained his reserve with respect to the Principalities, we can show more confidence now that His Majesty has made known through the despatch addressed to Baron Meyendorff on the 27th ultimo, his intention of giving orders for their evacuation as soon as a Turkish Plenipotentiary shall have arrived here with the note which His Majesty had been led to expect."

There appear to have been two conversations in which this subject was approached. When the first took place Count Nesselrode had not seen the Emperor, and could not speak of his feelings; at the second, as I learn from my colleague, the Chancellor gave him to understand that no great objections would be entertained by His Majesty to the entry of the fleets into the Dardanelles, if it were clear that this movement had a nautical and not a political character.

Having again observed that I would not conceal from General Castelbajac that my feelings would have led me to deprecate anything like an appeal to the forbearance of the Emperor upon this question; he replied that I might dismiss all misgivings, as he had explained clearly that it was only an approach to confidence and conciliation on the part of the Emperor which had enabled him to make advances in the same direction.

A statement which is worthy of attention was made by Count Nesselrode in the course of this conversation; some allusion having been made to the future, respecting which so much uncertainty prevails still, his Excellency remarked that one point was at least certain, that no military operation could be undertaken during the winter, "here," he said, "we are met by a physical impossibility."

I will only add that my French colleague requested me to consider the communication which he had made to me as strictly confidential, as he had no authority to open himself to me upon this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR

P.S.—A Russian officer well acquainted with the Principalities, with whom I have been conversing, states that the Imperial troops are well supplied with meat and grain, and that the only difficulty experienced with regard to their supplies is that which arises from the want of mills.

G. H. S.

No. 6.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received September 26.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 23, 1853.

IN an interview I had this morning with Baron Manteuffel his Excellency informed me that he had just received a telegraphic despatch from Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, dated yesterday afternoon, stating, that "Lord Westmorland had read to the Conference a telegraphic despatch, according to which the English Cabinet approves of the declaration; but says, that as the Cabinet of Russia, according to its last despatches, did not interpret the Vienna note as the British Government did, they could no longer counsel the Porte to accept the Vienna note."

His Excellency seemed much surprised at this intelligence, and was evidently anxious for some explanation of the despatch which Lord Westmorland had received from your Lordship, and which he had communicated yesterday to the Conference at Vienna. As his Excellency informed me that he was about to communicate this telegraphic despatch to the King, I deemed it of importance that his Excellency should be enabled to convey to His Majesty a correct view on the subject, and I judged it would be in accordance with your Lordship's wishes that I should communicate, confidentially, to Baron Manteuffel, any information which would relieve his mind of doubts or prevent false deductions.

Your Lordship's despatch No. 308,* to the Earl of Westmorland (which I received yesterday under flying-seal), enabled me to give the following explanations to Baron Manteuffel; but I was careful in not giving to this statement the character of an official communication.

I commenced by stating to his Excellency, that he had been aware of the moderate and conciliatory course which Her Majesty's Government had pursued from the commencement of this tedious and difficult negotiation; that Her Majesty's Government had had deeply at heart the pacific solution of the differences between Russia and Turkey in a manner consistent with the honour of the Sultan and the independence of Turkey; that with this view the note drawn up at Vienna had been recommended to the acceptation of the Porte; and further, that the modifications to that note which had been proposed by Turkey, had been considered as unimportant, and as bearing the same interpretation as contained in the Vienna note; whilst Her Majesty's Government in adopting these views had placed confidence in the declaration which the Emperor of Russia had repeatedly put forth, viz., that he sought for no new right and no increase of power in Turkey. I then observed to his Excellency, that the reasons put forth by Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Baron Meyendorff for the rejection of the modifications proposed by Turkey, were of a nature to awaken fears that the interpretation of the Vienna note was viewed otherwise by Count Nesselrode than by the framers of that note, and that Russia seemed to put a different construction on the terms of that note than the one entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

I remarked to his Excellency, that the object which the Four Powers have been labouring to attain, is to establish, both now and hereafter, permanent friendly relations between Russia and Turkey, and that it was obvious that the interpretation of the note, which was to be considered as the basis of reconciliation, should be one and the same; that it should bear the same sense in the opinion of both parties, and that it was highly important that no difference of interpretation should hereafter arise which might lead to fresh disputes. His Excellency would, therefore, doubtless acknowledge that in the interest of peace it was most desirable, nay, of paramount importance, that all cause for future misunderstanding should be avoided, and that for this purpose it was impera-

* See Part II, p. 334.

tively necessary that any doubts which might be entertained by either party as to the interpretation of this note should be cleared up, and that it was expedient that this understanding should be arrived at previous to its signature by Turkey.

I added, that after the repeated declarations of the Emperor of Russia that he seeks no new right and no further extension of power in Turkey, it might confidently be hoped that His Imperial Majesty would not hesitate to give those assurances which would quiet the present fears of Turkey, and which, if happily the present differences were adjusted, would tend to consolidate on a firmer and surer basis the future friendly relations of the two States.

His Excellency listened carefully to my observations, and, without expressing any decided opinion, seemed to assent to the justice of the views I had exposed.

His Excellency was good enough to give me a copy of the telegraphic despatch, which I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in original and in translation.

I trust your Lordship will approve of my having made this communication to Baron Manteuffel, as well as of the substance of my observations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 6.

Count Arnim to Baron Manteuffel.

(Telegraphic.)

(Translation.) *Vienna, September* 22, 1853, 4½ P.M.

THE French Chargé d'Affaires declared in the conference held to-day, that he was empowered to sign the declaration which had been lately drawn up. Lord Westmorland read a telegraphic despatch, according to which the English Cabinet approves of the declaration, but says that, as the Cabinet of Russia, according to its last despatches, did not interpret the Vienna note as the British Government did, they could no longer counsel the Porte to accept the Vienna note.

Under these circumstances, the transmission of the declaration to Constantinople has been for the present postponed, until the English Cabinet has expressed its opinion more decidedly.

(Signed) ARNIM.

No. 7.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 28.)

(Télégraphique.) *Olmütz, le* 26 *Septembre*, 1853.

JE m'attends à recevoir une déclaration analogue aux paroles qui se trouvent vers la fin du quatrième paragraphe de votre dépêche.

No. 8.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 26.)

Milord, *Londres, le* 13 *Septembre*, 1853.

LE 21 Août / 2 Sept. vous m'avez annoncé que Lord Stratford avait reçu l'autorisation éventuelle d'appeler l'escadre Anglaise dans le détroit des Dardanelles, si Constantinople était attaqué.

Je vous ai fait observer que si l'entrée d'une escadre étrangère dans le détroit avait lieu avant que le cas de guerre prévu par le Traité de 13 Juillet, 1841, ne fût arrivé, cet acte constituerait une infraction au dit Traité.

Afin de m'assurer de l'exactitude avec laquelle j'avais rapporté vos paroles, j'ai eu l'honneur de placer le même jour sous vos yeux la dépêche que j'ai adressée au Cabinet Impérial pour lui rendre compte de notre entretien.

Jusqu'ici, l'éventualité que vous m'aviez signalée, ne s'est point réalisée.

Constantinople est resté de notre part en pleine sûreté et par mer et par terre.

Notre escadre s'est abstenue de toute démonstration qui pût mettre en péril la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman.

Son repos est demeuré également à l'abri de toute atteinte du côté de terre ferme. Car je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler, M. le Comte, qu'à l'époque où les troupes Russes sont entrées dans les Principautés, vous avez été informé des limites prescrites par l'Empereur à leur mouvement. Elles n'ont point franchi le Danube. Sans vue d'hostilité, l'Empereur a renfermé son action dans une mesure de sûreté temporairement prise pour gage d'une réparation qui lui fût offerte, dans les voies de la conciliation et de la paix.

Il dépendait du Gouvernement Ottoman, vous me l'avez dit, de considérer alors cette mesure comme un cas de guerre. Il ne l'a point fait.

Les conseils du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, je ne l'ignore pas, ont eu une part méritoire à ce résultat, accompli dans l'intérêt bien entendu de la paix, surtout dans celui de la Porte elle-même.

Le Divan appréciant cette vérité, d'autant plus qu'à cette époque il avait le sentiment de sa faiblesse, a suivi les conseils qui lesaient sa sûreté.

Malgré l'interruption de nos relations diplomatiques, malgré l'occupation temporaire des Provinces Danubiennes, la paix a continué à subsister entre la Russie et l'Empire Ottoman.

Les relations commerciales entre les deux pays n'ont point été interrompues. De plus, toute chance de conflit a été prévenu entre les troupes Russes et Ottomanes par une entente établi entre les commandants respectifs. Dans ce but, le Prince Gortchakoff a annoncé à Reshid Pasha qu'il avait pour instruction de ne point se porter à des mesures offensives sur la rive droite du Danube, et qu'il dépendait du Gouvernement Ottoman de munir ses officiers de directions conçues dans le même esprit, pour empêcher toute collision. En retour de cette communication Reshid Pasha a répondu que les commandants Turcs avaient l'ordre de s'abstenir de toute hostilité, tant que les troupes Russes resteraient sur la rive gauche. De part et d'autre cette entente formellement établie a maintenu les relations réciproques sur le pied de paix. Cet état de choses, reconnu par la Porte, à subsisté jusqu'au 19 Août / 31 Août, date de la dernière communication officielle, qui m'est parvenue hier, du Prince Gortchakoff.

Enfin, une négociation conduite d'après le désir de l'Empereur, sous les bons offices de l'Autriche, a continué jusqu'à ce jour à nous inspirer l'espoir d'une solution pacifique de la crise actuelle.

Déjà un arrangement à l'amiable proposé par le Cabinet de Vienne, avec le concours des autres Grandes Puissances, avait obtenu l'assentiment franc et cordial de l'Empereur.

Tandis que ce plan fesait l'objet d'un échange de communications amicales entre les Cabinets et la Porte; tandis que celle-ci était invitée à envoyer à St. Pétersbourg un Ambassadeur comme l'organe d'une réconciliation qu'on aimait à croire prochaine, il n'y avait assurément pas lieu d'admettre que le Gouvernement Ottoman considerât la paix comme déjà rompue. Elle restait intacte. Elle durait, je le constate, tout à l'avantage de la Porte; car aussi longtemps qu'elle se prolongeait, les Turcs augmentaient de jour en jour leurs armements, sans que la Russie, forte de ses propres intentions pacifiques, en demandât compte ou qu'elle cherchât à y mettre obstacle.

Mais, de bonne foi, la guerre en droit public, ne se présume point. Avant qu'elle éclate, elle se déclare.

A ma connaissance, nul acte de déclaration de guerre n'a eu lieu de la part de la Porte. Et, en ce qui regarde les déterminations de ma Cour, vous savez, M. le Comte, que tout récemment encore j'ai été chargé de vous exprimer combien Sa Majesté l'Empereur tenait à cœur d'accélérer la conclusion d'un arrangement à l'amiable qui lui permît de faire cesser toute cause de mésintelligence avec la Porte, et de faire rentrer aussitôt ses troupes dans nos frontières.

C'est ce moment même que le Divan paraît avoir choisi pour élever contre cette œuvre de conciliation de nouveaux obstacles, en appelant le pavillon de guerre étranger dans le détroit dont la fermeture avait été placée, par le Traité de 1841, sous la sauvegarde d'un Acte Européen.

Cette transaction, dont les termes précis me sont d'autant mieux connus que j'ai été appelé à y concourir, renferme un double engagement.

D'une part le Sultan a déclaré "la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, en vertu duquel il a été de tout temps défendu aux bâtiments de guerre des Puissances Etrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, et que tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits détroits."

De l'autre, les Cinq Grandes Puissances se sont engagées "à respecter cette détermination du Sultan et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé."

S'il est vrai, comme je l'apprends, que le Sultan ait appelé dans le détroit des bâtiments de guerre étrangers, tandis que la paix continuait à durer, sans qu'elle fût déclarée rompue par un acte formel, public, patent, je dirai que le Sultan a manqué à un engagement qui lui était imposé par un Traité dont je suis signataire.

C'est avec un vif regret que je devrai dire en même temps que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique en se rendant à une invitation du Sultan, contraire à cet engagement, sans délibération préalable avec les autres Puissances Contractantes, ne s'est point conformé au principe que le Traité du 13 Juillet nous imposait l'obligation de respecter.

J'attends, M. le Comte, que vous me fassiez connaître, pour l'information de ma Cour, les circonstances qui ont précédé et accompagné un fait si grave. Il demande explication.

Je la réclame de la loyauté du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Lorsqu'il l'aura donnée, l'Empereur, de concert avec les autres Hautes Parties Contractantes, sera en mesure de se prononcer sur les conséquences d'une situation contre laquelle j'élève mes remontrances et je prends mes réserves, dans l'accomplissement strict de mes devoirs, dès l'instant où ce fait parvient à ma connaissance.

Je remplis ce devoir en invitant formellement votre Excellence à prendre acte de ces réserves, que j'établis, par la présente, au nom de ma Cour.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 9.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 213.)

Foreign Office, September 29, 1853.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED yesterday evening your Excellency's despatch No. 272* of the 15th instant, reporting the circumstances under which your Excellency and the French Ambassador had severally called up from Besika Bay a portion of the British and French ships of war stationed at that anchorage.

Your Excellency will have learned by my despatch No. 205 of the 23rd instant that Her Majesty's Government approve the course which you have pursued in this respect, under the critical circumstances which existed at Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 10.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 30.)

(*Transmise de Vienne par M. Fane le* 29, *à* 8 *heures et demi du matin.*)

Olmütz, le 28 *Septembre*, 1853.

(Télégraphique.)

LE projet d'une note contenant la déclaration dont je vous ai averti dans ma dépêche télégraphique d'hier et qui serait adressé à la Porte par les Représentans des Quatre Puissances à Constantinople, vous sera remis par le Comte Colloredo auquel il sera immédiatement expédié.

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* See Part II, p. 316.

No. 11.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 222.)

Foreign Office, September 30, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE already informed you that two despatches from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff were communicated to me by Baron Brunnow, announcing that the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note had been rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and stating the grounds upon which that decision was founded.

These despatches would appear to preclude the hope of an amicable arrangement between Russia and Turkey, and as their effects may consequently be disastrous to Europe, they have received the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government; and I shall now proceed to state the opinion that has been formed of them with reference to the intentions of the Conférence of Vienna in framing the note, to the motives of the Ottoman Government in proposing amendments, and to the repeated declarations of the Emperor that he desired no new right nor any extension of influence in Turkey.

In his first despatch Count Nesselrode alludes to the terms on which the note had been accepted at St. Petersburgh, and the understanding that if any changes were introduced at Constantinople, the Russian Government would be at liberty to withhold its assent.

The Russian Government had of course a right to make this condition, or to suggest amendments to the note. The Turkish Government possessing a similar right, exercised it by proposing certain modifications. The Conference had no power to impose the note on either party: its position was that of a mediator endeavouring to do equal justice to both parties, and its intention was to guard the honour and independence of the Sultan, and secure to Russia what she was entitled to claim, but no more, viz., the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in matters of religion. The Conference, therefore, could not refuse to entertain the modifications of the Porte, although regretting the loss of time which they occasioned. They were not looked upon as altering the sense of the note, nor at variance with the intentions of the Conference, and they were unanimously recommended to the acceptance of the Russian Government, the Russian Minister at Vienna, it is understood, concurring in the recommendation.

They have been rejected, but the Russian Government did not take its stand upon the condition on which the note had been accepted, viz., that of no change being made, but has fully entered into the objections to which it considered the modifications were liable, and which showed that inferences were drawn from the note, and claims were to be established by means of it hereafter, altogether inconsistent with the views and intentions of the Four Powers.

The frankness of this proceeding on the part of the Russian Government, and the determination that its intentions should not be misapprehended, are doubtless very proper; but on the other hand Her Majesty's Government feel, that even while retaining their own original interpretation of the note, it would now be highly dishonourable to press its acceptance on the Porte, when they have been duly warned by the Power to whom the note is to be addressed, that another and a totally different meaning is attached to it by that Power. And even if this were not dishonourable, it would be in the highest degree impolitic for the reasons stated in Count Nesselrode's first despatch with reference to admitting of any amendments, viz., that the Emperor would expose himself "to renew political relations with Turkey under unfavourable auspices, which would deprive them of all solidity for the future, and inevitably bring about a fresh and more decided rupture."

Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire to see the relations between Russia and the Porte re-established on a friendly and permanent footing, and they consequently can be no party to an arrangement which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has shown would frustrate the object which they have at heart.

Count Nesselrode declares that the modifications are by no means so insignificant either in their spirit or their "arrière pensées," as might at first sight be supposed; but he appears not to be aware that this declaration goes far to

justify the Turkish Government in proposing them; and his Excellency altogether fails to show by what right, or in reparation of what injury Russia claims admissions and concessions from the Sultan, who is unwilling to make them, and whose independence Russia, together with the other Powers of Europe, have determined to respect.

With regard to the first objection in Count Nesselrode's note, I have to observe, that the Conference at Vienna, in adverting to the active solicitude at all times displayed by the Emperor of Russia for the maintenance of the privileges and immunities of the Greco-Orthodox Church, simply intended to record the anxiety which every Sovereign must feel for the welfare in a foreign country of the religion he himself professes; but the Conference by no means intended to affirm that the immunities and privileges in question were solely due to the solicitude of the Emperors of Russia; and the Porte is justified in asserting that many of these privileges are of a date anterior to the existence of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Count Nesselrode alludes to other grievances, but specifies none except that regarding the Holy Places, which has been satisfactorily settled; nor have any other grievances connected with religious matters at any time been put forward by Russia, and it was not for the Conference to assume the existence of wrongs of which they had no knowledge.

But Count Nesselrode asks, where then was the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission?—and the answer to that is the assurance repeatedly given, that it was to settle the question of the Holy Places, and to obtain a guarantee for its not being again disturbed. That question has been settled to the satisfaction of all parties, and the Vienna note contains a guarantee against which Russia raises no objection.

The modifications proposed by the Porte with reference to the Treaty of Kainardji appeared to Her Majesty's Government wholly uncalled for, until they read the objection made to it by Count Nesselrode's note. Her Majesty's Government considered that the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, and the maintenance of religious privileges, had been disconnected in the note in a manner not to be mistaken, and indeed this is admitted by Count Nesselrode; but the Russian Government, while disclaiming all pretension to exercise a Protectorate, yet affirms that all these religious privileges and immunities are direct consequences of the Treaty, which was doubtless a solemn engagement taken by Turkey towards Russia; and the fulfilment of that engagement, but no more, it was the object of the Conference to secure. By Count Nesselrode's interpretation of the note, however, Russia would, under the seventh Article of the Treaty, be entitled to superintend all these privileges and immunities, which are of that peculiar character that she would be constantly able, if so minded, to interfere between the Sultan and his subjects; and thus the religious Protectorate, which is abjured, and the new rights and extended influence, which are equally disclaimed, would be established.

It is superfluous to say that no such intention was entertained by the Conference; nor can the Treaty of Kainardji, by any subtlety of reasoning, be so construed. By the seventh Article of that Treaty, the Porte promises to protect the Christian religion in all its churches throughout the Ottoman dominions; but by the same Article the Ministers of Russia are permitted to make representations in favour of a new church and its ministers; and this clause would have been wholly unnecessary if Russian diplomacy had also been allowed to make representations on every matter connected with religion. If the Article bore the sense that Count Nesselrode now seeks to attach to it, and if the two Contracting Parties had been agreed upon it, it is reasonable to suppose that at the signing of the Treaty a stipulation so important as that of maintaining the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church would not have been omitted.

The third objection raised by Count Nesselrode is even more than the two which precede it at variance with the intention of the Conference, which assuredly was not that the Sultan should enter into an engagement with Russia, to concede to the Greek Church all such advantages as might be granted to other Christian denominations, but only those advantages which were conceded to communities who, like the Greeks, were Ottoman subjects.

The spiritual head of the Roman Catholics in Turkey, as elsewhere, is a foreign Sovereign; and if it pleased the Sultan to enter into a Concordat with the Pope, conferring privileges upon Roman Catholics not subjects of the Porte,

surely that ought to confer no right upon the Emperor of Russia to claim all the benefits of that Concordat for the Greek community, subjects of the Porte, whose spiritual head, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is also a subject of the Sultan.

No Christian community being subjects of the Sultan would have any right to participate in the privileges and advantages that the Sultan might confer upon Russian convents, ecclesiastics, or laymen, such, for example, as the Russian church and hospital about to be built at Jerusalem; and in the same manner the Greek community, consisting of many millions, would have no right to participate in advantages granted to foreign convents or ecclesiastics, and which might not, for many and obvious reasons, be fitting for a Christian community subject to the Porte.

In fact, if the Sultan has at any time, in the exercise of his sovereign authority, conferred religious privileges upon a community not subject to him; or if he at any future time should think proper to do so, Count Nesselrode claims that Russia should have a right to demand that several millions of Greeks who are subjects of the Porte should at once be placed upon the footing of foreigners, and should enjoy, through the intervention of Russia, all the advantages which the Sultan, for reasons of which he is the only competent judge, may have granted to such foreigners.

How such a claim can be reconciled with the professed desire for the maintenance of existing Treaties and the strict *status quo* in religious matters, it is not for Her Majesty's Government to explain; but they consider that it exhibits a total disregard for the feelings and interests of the European Powers, who, in common with Russia, have declared that they will uphold the independence of Turkey, and who cannot therefore see with indifference that Russia should thus surreptitiously seek to obtain a virtual Protectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte. And with respect to Count Nesselrode's supposition, that some new privilege, not mentioned in the recent firmans, might be granted to the Roman Catholic establishment in Palestine, to the prejudice of the native communities, his Excellency appears to have overlooked that by the Vienna note the Porte engages that no change shall be made in the order of things lately established at Jerusalem, without previous communication with the Governments of Russia and France.

I have now fully stated in what spirit and with what intentions the Vienna note was framed; but in interpreting it as Count Nesselrode has done, by his objection to the modifications, his Excellency not only does not prove, but he does not even advert to any obligation by which the Porte is bound to make concessions utterly irreconcileable with its independence. But Her Majesty's Government are compelled to consider that the claims put forward by Russia are equally irreconcileable with the assurance that no extended power or influence is sought in Turkey. They deeply regret that such claims should have been made; for even were they successful, they would be useless to Russia if she sincerely desires the independence of the Ottoman Empire; but under any circumstances they must produce feelings of suspicion and distrust on the part of the Porte; and differences between the Two Powers will thus in future, as of late, be a source of anxiety to Europe, and expose the general peace to constant danger of disturbance.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Nesselrode, or to M. de Sénfavine, should Count Nesselrode be still absent, and also give him a copy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 12.

The Earl of Clarendon to Baron Brunnow.

Foreign Office, October 1, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 25th ultimo, in which you express your opinion that if the Sultan has admitted foreign ships into the Straits of the Dardanelles while peace continued to exist, and without its having been declared broken by a formal, public, patent act, he has violated an engagement imposed upon him by the Treaty of 13th July, 1841

You add that Her Majesty's Government in complying with the request of the Sultan, contrary to that engagement, and without previous deliberation with the other Contracting Powers, has not conformed to the principle which the Treaty imposed upon them the obligation to respect.

And you further say that you expect to learn from me, for the information of your Court, the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied a fact so grave, which demands explanation.

The foundation upon which you rest your right to make this inquiry is the Treaty of July 13, 1841, which, as you correctly state, binds the Sultan not to admit, and the other Contracting Powers not to send ships of war, not Turkish, into those Straits as long as the Porte is at peace; and you allege that this engagement has been broken by the Porte and by the British Government.

But the Porte has ceased to be at peace from the moment when the first Russian soldier entered the Danubian Principalities, and from that moment the Sultan had a right to invite the British squadron into the Straits, and Her Majesty's Government had a right to send the British squadron into, and if necessary, through those Straits.

It is true that on entering the Principalities war was not declared by Russia, but a country whose territory is forcibly invaded and retained in contravention of a special Treaty engagement, for the purpose of compelling it to submit to conditions which it considers incompatible with its political independence, whose functionaries are forbidden to hold intercourse with its Government, and whose tribute is suspended,—that country cannot consistently with international law or usage, or with common sense, be considered at peace with the Power that so acts towards it; and I repeat, therefore, that from the day on which the Principalities were occupied, the Treaty, in accordance with its own provisions, has been suspended, and it rested with the Sultan and with Her Majesty's Government to determine at what time, and for what purposes, the British squadron should enter the Dardanelles.

It is not necessary to pursue this subject further, as Her Majesty's Ambassador has called up a portion of that squadron to Constantinople, not, as you appear to suppose, to favour an object on the part of the Divan of opposing fresh obstacles to the work of conciliation, but exclusively from apprehension of local dangers to British life and property; his proceedings have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who, with the same object in view, have instructed him to send for the whole of the squadron.

That the apprehension was well-founded there can exist no doubt, because the protracted occupation of the Principalities, the military preparations which the Porte has lately been compelled to make on that account, and in consequence of the vast number of Russian troops that for a long time past have been assembled on the frontier of Turkey, have led to a state of things in Turkey which is natural, and must have been calculated upon, but which, on the other hand, is viewed with deep concern by those who desire the preservation of peace, and who regard the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as an essential feature of European policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 13.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 491.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 23, 1853.*

THE messenger Robins arrived at St. Petersburgh on the 20th instant, and I am thus in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 208 inclusive.

With reference to your Lordship's, No. 203, which reached me on the 13th instant, your Lordship will have learned the circumstance which prevented my expressing to Count Nesselrode the earnest hope entertained by Her Majesty's Government that the modifications proposed by the Porte to the Vienna note may receive the Emperor's assent.

I regret not having had an opportunity of making known this wish in your Lordship's name; but the attempt to change the Emperor's decision would, I am convinced, have been made in vain.

This, I would state to your Lordship, is likewise the belief entertained by the Prussian and French Ministers; while as to the hopes that were to have been expressed on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, that the Emperor would not withhold his approval of the Turkish alterations, these hopes have, as I understand, been made known in a feeble tone.

The French and Prussian Envoys, and, I believe, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, lay great stress upon the forward position taken up by the Emperor in the two Circulars and the Manifesto, upon the abatement subsequently made in the Imperial pretensions, and upon the difficulty which a fair regard for his own interests would place in the way of much further concession on the part of His Imperial Majesty.

I would take the liberty of stating to your Lordship that the impression left upon my mind by the conversations which I held with the Chancellor, and by the hasty perusal of the despatch of $\frac{\text{August}}{\text{September}}$ 26 to Baron Meyendorff, which was placed in my hands, is that the Emperor, by refusing the Turkish amendments, was not to be understood as closing the door against arrangement or negotiation, but as declining to concede to the Sultan a faculty which he himself had not exercised, as considering his assent to the Vienna note cancelled so soon as the Sultan's refusal to agree to it became decided, and in this manner as reserving to himself perfect freedom as to the future course of diplomatic action.

Unfortunately the warlike disposition manifested by the Turks, together with the idea which has been encouraged by the public press of the Emperor's consent having been extorted from him under pressure, are certain to increase the difficulty of obtaining concessions on the side of Russia; and the chances of a favourable issue are further diminished by the belief indulged (as I know upon certain grounds) by the Russian Cabinet of its being impossible that the Turkish armies should hold together until the spring.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 14.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 494.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 23, 1853.*

THE French Minister was good enough to call upon me on the 20th instant, to acquaint me that he found upon reflection, that he had omitted to mention a very striking part of the conversation which he had held with the Chancellor immediately before his Excellency's departure from St. Petersburgh.

He had omitted to report that Count Nesselrode had informed him that the Emperor, upon being informed that the fleets might be compelled to enter the Dardanelles, had observed that for his part he should be distressed if those ships were exposed to danger from their continued anchorage in an open roadstead.

I regret not having been sooner made acquainted with this circumstance, but am perfectly convinced that the omission proceeded from simple inadvertency. In fact, from the commencement of the present Eastern difficulties, the conduct of General Castelbajac towards me has been all that I could have desired of a colleague with whom I am called upon to act in concert.

In conversing with General Castelbajac upon his communication, I remarked to him that much as I approved and admired a great part of the acts of the French Government, I thought it perhaps unfortunate that an idea should have suggested itself at Paris of making the departure of the fleets contingent upon the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians.

Such a condition I thought a little at variance with previous declarations, and calculated to establish a parity of situation between an army which takes

forcible possession of a portion of a friendly country, and a fleet which enters some inland water at the invitation or by the permission of the Sovereign.

General Castelbajac appeared to assent to the justness of this observation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 15.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 495. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, September 23, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Swedish Envoy, upon taking leave of the Chancellor, observed that, as he was upon the point of leaving St. Petersburgh, it would be agreeable to him to hear his Excellency's opinion with regard to Eastern affairs. Count Nesselrode replied that he could only say that it was obviously impossible that the Emperor should carry concession any further; but, at the same time, that he felt sanguine as to the tone which affairs would take.

That, upon being pressed, the Turks, he felt assured, would think better of their refusal to subscribe to the Vienna conditions, and that unless the season should be so far advanced as to render a long march impossible, the Emperor was prepared to give orders for the evacuation of the Principalities as soon as the note should be signed. In the mean time, as Count Nesselrode proceeded to remark, the state of the country during autumn and the defined position of the armies, rendered it probable that no collision would be brought on by the impetuosity of which the Turks were beginning to show symptoms.

I cannot learn that there is any truth in the statement made by some of the public papers as to the Russian army of occupation suffering from want of supplies, nor do I well understand how that should be the case, the fertility of the Danubian Provinces being well known, and the facilities very great for obtaining all necessary supplies from Odessa.

The good fortune which commonly attends the Emperor appears to me likely to turn the neglect which has been shown by the Russians in allowing the navigation of the Danube to be obstructed, to their advantage in this manner, that large quantities of grain are collected on the river which it is impossible to export by vessels at Sulina, and that plentiful and very cheap supplies of food have been thus provided by persons who little contemplated acting as purveyors for a Russian army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 16.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 496. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, September 23, 1853.

My Lord,

VERY shortly before the Emperor left Peterhof, as he was conversing with Count Nesselrode and General de Rochow, His Majesty observed that all he hoped was that he should bear no political subjects discussed ("pas un mot de politique") during his approaching visit to Warsaw and Olmütz.

In a society as well drilled as that of St. Petersburgh, it is hardly necessary to remark that what is said by the Emperor is repeated by those about him, and passes by degrees into general circulation.

At this moment then it is understood in the Russian capital that the Emperor has undertaken a journey of pleasure, which is not to be disturbed by any mention of political subjects.

The choice of His Majesty's attendants renders this assertion even stronger than it at first appears; His Majesty being accompanied by the Chancellor and Count Orloff, and having directed Baron Meyendorff to meet him at Olmütz. Notwithstanding the statement so commonly made, I would, however, venture to affirm that the Emperor's journey (as far as Olmütz is concerned) has none

but a political object, and that this is no other than to cement if possible that alliance which differences of opinion during the late events of the East had slightly troubled.

This appears to be self evident, and as little, I think, can it be doubted to what use will be applied the fresh influence which the Emperor desires to obtain over the mind of his august ally.

The Emperor is possessed, I really believe conscientiously possessed, with the notion of the fall of the Turkish Empire being inevitable, and the idea is one which is so uppermost in his thoughts that he appears unable to restrain himself from speaking of it to all those who approach him.

I have heard of His Majesty broaching the subject with many persons who have no political character. He has never failed to speak of it or allude to it in the few conversations which I have had the honour of holding with him, and I cannot therefore doubt for an instant that it will be that which will be brought the most constantly under the notice of the Emperor of Austria.

Upon this point my opinion is so decided that I would take upon myself to put down in writing, not only what will be the statements which will be made by the Emperor Nicholas, but several of the expressions and figures of speech which he will employ.

With all this, although the Emperor may have ulterior views upon the possessions of his comparatively weak neighbours, and although his late acts unquestionably justify such a suspicion, my wish to represent matters in their true light impels me to state to your Lordship my conviction that the present feelings, not only of the Chancellor, but of his Imperial master, are those of annoyance and disappointment at the refusal of the Porte to subscribe to the terms which had been arranged at Vienna.

To reconcile this and other apparent contradictions, it must be assumed that the Emperor (as I before observed) is impressed with the belief that the fall of Turkey is at hand and inevitable, and that he is as ill disposed to the independence of Turkey, as he would be ready to tolerate and even to favour her bare and dependent existence.

As I ventured to observe upon a former occasion, my conviction is that the Emperor desires to show himself either the powerful protector or the implacable enemy of a country which he has brought himself to consider in a state of helpless decrepitude; and were the choice open to him, I am disposed to believe that he would prefer being the *de facto* Suzerain of the Sultan to being the possessor of his dominions.

The opinion which I thus venture to submit to your Lordship is that, I may remark, of those persons who have had the best means of judging, and in whose impartiality the greatest confidence is to be placed.

As to the intention of the Emperor in the event of the Porte's adherence to the note having been given, these at least appear beyond doubt.

His Majesty stated positively to General de Rochow that orders had been sent to Prince Gortchakoff to hold himself in readiness to fall back upon the first intimation, and that these orders would have been sent off the day after the news of the Sultan's acceptance of the note had been signified to him; whilst, as I learn from General Castelbajac, he has seen the orders prepared at the War Office, with the various days' march which had been laid down for the army on its homeward progress.

I suspect, however, that the withdrawal of the Imperial army and the reception of a Turkish Plenipotentiary, would not have put an end to the demands which the Emperor had purposed making upon the Sultan.

Before his hand had been extended in renewed amity, I imagine that demands with respect to the refugees who have found an asylum in Turkey would have been brought forward, which would have been very embarrassing to the Porte, and very distasteful to Her Majesty's Government.

Upon this point I have nothing but conjecture to offer to your Lordship; I surmise, however, that England, when the present crisis is surmounted, would be desirous of concerting such measures with her allies as would protect Turkey against any fresh encroachments, and that the Russian Government are anxious to raise a question which may have the effect of inverting these positions, and of ranging the European Cabinets in opposition to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 17.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 498. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 24, 1853.*

THE Marquis de Castelbajac has been kind enough to read me a despatch dated the 13th instant, which he received yesterday from Paris. He requested me to consider the communication as confidential.

The despatch struck me as being an important one, as it appears to establish that France does not consider herself pledged to any particular course by the projet de note assented to by the Emperor and refused by the Porte, and that in the event of the existing difficulties not being surmounted, she regards herself as free to follow that course which she shall consider suited to her interests and to those of Europe.

At the same time, M. Drouyn de Lhuys manifests his deep regret at the Sultan's refusal, and expresses his intention of urging the Porte to reconsider what he considers an imprudent resolution.

He accordingly incloses a projet de note, which it is his wish should be addressed by the four missions at Constantinople to Reshid Pasha, in which, in friendly but energetic terms, he is called upon to recall a hasty determination, and to subscribe to terms which the Powers interested in the independence of Turkey have, in a very friendly spirit, judged it expedient to press upon his acceptance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 18.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, Septembre 25, 1853.*

LA Porte ayant appris le refus de la Russie, et ne voulant pas accepter la note de Vienne sans ses modifications, se dispose à prendre la partie de la guerre malgré les conseils des Quatre Représentans. Demain la question doit être formellement décidée en Conseil Général. C'est le Sultan lui-même qui a ordonné que Conseil fût assemblé. Il se (query, peut?) que la Porte demande l'entrée des escadres aux Dardanelles, soit pour venir jusqu'à Constantinople, soit pour s'abriter entre les châteaux. Je dois avoir des instructions à cet égard, pour l'un comme pour l'autre cas.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 19.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 27, 1853.*

IT may not be without interest to your Lordship to learn the feeling of public opinion, and of the public press, in this country, at the present moment, when so important a change has taken place in the complexion of Eastern affairs.

I am happy to report to your Lordship, that I have learnt from persons capable of forming a correct opinion on these matters, that the great mass of reflective men, persons of the commercial and industrious classes, and of that influential class here termed the bureaucratic, view with alarm the aggressive policy of Russia, and are opposed to her ambitious designs in the East; and it is my duty further to add, that they have hitherto viewed the moderation which

has been evinced by the Western Powers towards Russia with surprise and regret.

The higher classes of the nobility, and more especially of those immediately attached to the Court, are, on the other hand, devoted to the Emperor and to Russian interests. These inclinations are accounted to me as possibly owing their origin in gratitude for favours already conferred, or in expectation of future distinctions; whilst, I am led to believe, that continual alarm of revolutionary changes inspires them to look to the Emperor of Russia as Europe's surest bulwark against the inroad of democratic principles.

I am happy to inform your Lordship, that since the publication of the Russian objections to the Turkish modifications, the whole Berlin press, with one exception, strongly denounces the policy of Russia, and represents in its true light the ambitious projects she has in view.

The one exception to which I allude is the "Kreuz Zeitung," which, until an article appeared in to-day's newspaper analysing the armies of Russia and Turkey, and their respective chances of success in the event of war, has maintained a profound silence on Eastern affairs, and has abstained from inserting any leading articles in matters of foreign policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 20.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September 27, 1853.*

I WAITED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, when his Excellency informed me that he had received a telegraphic despatch from the Chevalier Bunsen, stating that in consequence of a communication from the Grand Vizier, the English and French Ambassadors had called up from Besica to Constantinople four war-steamers, for the protection of the subjects of their respective States. I confirmed to his Excellency this intelligence, adding that it was possible that the combined fleets might shortly follow; and I took occasion to observe to his Excellency, that in such event the presence of the English fleet at Constantinople must not be construed in any sense but in that of supporting the Sultan and protecting His Majesty's subjects in case of need. I took this precaution in order that this step might not be viewed as a measure to coerce the Sultan into the acceptation of the Vienna note.

On inquiry I found that his Excellency had received no report from Count Arnim, which he accounted for by the absence of Count Buol from Vienna. In reply to a further inquiry whether Count Arnim had repaired to Olmütz with his other colleagues, his Excellency replied in the negative, adding that he was very glad he had not done so. I then asked his Excellency what instructions he had addressed in the present altered circumstances of the Eastern Question to the Prussian Ministers at Constantinople and Vienna: he replied that he had forwarded no new instructions to Baron Wildenbruck since that reported in Lord Bloomfield's despatch No. 339 of the 27th ultimo, in which he had been directed to press on the Porte the acceptation of the Vienna note: that since I had last seen him, he had only instructed Count Arnim (in the event of no new arrangement being concluded at Olmütz), to propose to the Conference at Vienna "to communicate to Russia and the Porte the declaration which had been previously agreed upon," and which his Excellency seemed to think would be viewed as bearing a satisfactory assurance to Turkey; while it could not but be distasteful to Russia. That was the only plan which he could devise for alleviating the present difficulties.

I observed to his Excellency, that since Russia had expressed her objections to the Turkish modifications, and in opposition to the sentiments of the Conference, had declared them to be of importance, it appeared to me that it became the dignity of the Conference, who had framed the note, to express their own interpretation of it, and in failing to do so they could scarcely call upon the Porte to accept it. In this sense, perhaps, some such proposition as his

Excellency proposed might be productive of good, as it would place on record the sense and spirit in which the Vienna note had been framed. His Excellency then said, "What can we do? To ask the Emperor to accept the modifications would be illogical; we have no grounds for doing so." I rejoined that "the very fact of the misinterpretation of the note by Russia offered sufficient grounds for that misinterpretation to be cleared up, and that there was the same reason now to disapprove of the objections raised by Russia to the modifications, as there had been at the commencement to censure the views put forth in Prince Menchikoff's demands."

Before taking leave of his Excellency, I inquired what were the intentions of the Prussian Government under existing circumstances, and what line they would pursue?

I remarked to his Excellency, that His Majesty had lately expressed to Lord Bloomfield his desire to act in concert with England on this question; that the position of Prussia entitled her to exercise a great moral influence; that it behoved her to maintain her independence of action, and not to be carried in the wake of Russia; and that I hoped she would remain free and unfettered to pursue that course which her own interests dictated.

His Excellency replied that His Majesty still maintained the same desire to act with England; that it was difficult for Prussia to move further in this matter; and that it was clearly her policy to hold aloof, as far as she was able, and to await the moment when perhaps her offices might be of service; in short, he said that Prussia would endeavour to remain as neutral as possible, and keep watch over her own internal safety.

I did not further press his Excellency on this point. I inquired, however, if he was informed what course Austria was likely to pursue. His Excellency replied that he could not say, but that he knew that the occupation of the Provinces weighed heavily on her.

In conclusion, I have the honour to state that my general impression from what fell from his Excellency at this interview is, that he foresees that hostilities in the East are unavoidable; that it is the wish of the Prussian Government to maintain a strict neutrality, but that no decision has been taken by His Majesty or will be taken, until after the Conference at Olmütz. I may likewise remark confidentially to your Lordship, that I observed that his Excellency is imbued with fears lest an European war should arise out of these Eastern difficulties, and that to these fears may be somewhat attributed that ardent desire for neutrality which has ever been a marking feature of Prussian policy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 21.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 30, 1853.

I CALLED upon Baron Manteuffel this evening, and inquired what intelligence he had received from Olmütz. His Excellency informed me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister, had confidentially communicated to him the copy of a proposition which had been concerted and drawn up by Count Buol and Baron Meyendorff for the settlement of the differences between Russia and Turkey, "with the Emperor of Russia's assent."

This document will probably be already in your Lordship's hands.

His Excellency stated to me that the proposal was "that the Vienna note should be signed, and that a declaration should be given to the Sultan of a much stronger and of a more explicit nature than the one previously agreed upon, which in some degree would answer the modifications proposed by Turkey, and also correct the objectionable passages in Count Nesselrode's late memorandum."

His Excellency was unable to read to me the precise terms of this declaration, as that document was not then in his possession.

I inquired whether the terms "with the Emperor of Russia's assent," implied that this declaration was to bear the character of a Russian paper. His Excellency replied, "No, it will be a declaration of the Four Powers to Turkey."

I then observed that in this sense the Emperor's assent was scarcely required, as the Four Powers might fairly give their own declaration. I further pointed out to his Excellency that this proposal did not appear to me (after the interpretation of the Vienna note by Russia) calculated to meet the exigencies required. The Porte had positively refused to sign the Vienna note without modification, and the English and French Governments could not honestly, after the publication of Count Nesselrode's memorandum, counsel her to do so. To meet this difficulty, it appeared therefore to me that some more satisfactory explanation was required on the part of Russia herself, for the present proposition of Count Buol and Baron Meyendorff would not virtually alter or affect the interpretation which Russia had given to the Vienna note.

His Excellency said he had never approved of the Russian memorandum; neither had he approved of the note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Four Powers; but that he was of opinion that the Vienna note should not be altered. It was the only ground which we had to stand on. His Excellency told me that instructions had been forwarded to Count Arnim strongly to support this proposal ("de l'appuyer fortement").

His Excellency expressed himself little sanguine as to the success of this endeavour. He thought, however, that the Emperor was really desirous, even more so than six weeks ago, for a settlement of this painful negotiation; and he believed that Austria, who perhaps was the Power the most vitally interested, would use her best endeavours with Russia to attain an harmonious agreement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 22.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 15. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, September* 30, 1853.

SUBSEQUENTLY to the communication which Baron Manteuffel made to me this evening, and which forms the substance of my previous despatch, his Excellency entered into further conversation on the Eastern question, and I remarked that he was not sanguine that any satisfactory result will be attained at Vienna. He openly avowed his regret that Prussia had taken part in the Vienna Conferences, being under the opinion, that had she kept aloof she would have now been in a better position, when she could have more freely tendered to all parties her good offices; in the actual state of those Conferences Prussia feels herself in a difficult and embarrassing position.

His Excellency then most confidentially imparted to me an idea with which he seemed much preoccupied, and which he had this day submitted to the King. His Majesty, he said, was most anxious to act with England in this question, and with this view, if all modes of arrangement failed at Vienna, his Excellency had thought of proposing to remove the negotiations to London, or at least to resume them in that capital, and had drawn up a project of the basis on which an arrangement might be proposed.

His Excellency seemed to think that there would be more freedom and latitude for discussion in London than at Vienna. He remarked that Austria was too closely allied with Russia, their interests were too much associated, they were too near neighbours, and that Austria was too deeply indebted to Russia to act as freely and unreservedly as the delicate and difficult nature of the Conferences there required. Without referring to persons, I suspect his arguments applied to the very intimate relations existing between Count Buol and Baron Meyendorff; and it is, therefore, that his Excellency is of opinion that a Conference in London, if all other means fail, would be more likely to lead to a successful issue.

I inquired of his Excellency, whether he thought that Russia would agree to any such proposal. He replied, that he did not know; but seemed to think

that both Russia and Austria would gladly avail themselves of any mode of a peaceful solution.

His Excellency has promised to communicate to me his ideas and projects more fully on Monday or Tuesday, when His Majesty will probably have expressed his decision upon them. He requested me to consider this communication as most confidential, and appeared unwilling even that I should report to your Lordship his contemplated project until it had assumed a more defined shape. I have therefore to request that your Lordship will consider this as secret and confidential.

His Excellency specially charged me to convey to your Lordship the ardent desire of His Majesty to co-operate with England in this question; and his Excellency further expressed his confidence in the steadiness and firmness of His Majesty's views.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 23.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(Separate.)
My Lord, *Olmütz, September 27, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of transmitting herewith the inclosed report of the conversations held with me this day by their Imperial Majesties the Emperors of Austria and Russia, which I have thought it my duty to submit to your Lordship's consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 23.

Memorandum of two Conversations held at Olmütz on the 27th of September, between the Emperors of Austria and Russia and the Earl of Westmorland.

THE Emperor of Austria came up to me after dinner and said, "When shall we bring this Turkish question to a conclusion? I have the most distinct assurances from the Emperor Nicholas that he desires nothing so anxiously as to put an end to it, and to evacuate the Principalities, but he insists upon receiving from the Government of the Sultan what he has required from them, and what the Four Powers in a decisive manner recommended them to grant; he requires no more, and aims at nothing beyond the fair interpretation of the document proposed to him, and which he accepted; he seeks to obtain nothing but what he is already entitled to by existing Treaties, and wishes only to maintain the *status quo* in religious matters. These objects appeared to him to be sufficiently secured by the note the Four Powers recommended the Turkish Government to address to him, and he accepted it. The Powers themselves are the guarantees that there was nothing in the note which could be prejudicial to the honour and independence of the Sultan, nothing which could be interpreted as conferring new powers on Russia. The Emperor Nicholas, therefore, adheres to that arrangement, and I cannot but most anxiously desire it should be obtained for him; because I am persuaded of the loyalty of his intentions, and of his desire by the evacuation of the Principalities to put an end to the existing differences and to a state of thing onerous to the Porte and dangerous to us all. If I was not entirely persuaded of the sincerity with which the Emperor Nicholas has made me these declarations, I would not recommend to you to transmit to your Government the decisions he has thus announced; but being so, I beg you will state them, and on my part call upon the Queen's Ministers to assist in securing their attainment."

I told His Majesty that I had communicated to Count Buol the difficulties which had lately prevented Her Majesty's Government from recommending the Government of the Sultan to sign the original note after the interpretation

which with reference to the bearing of the modifications proposed by the Porte had been given to it by the last despatch of Count Nesselrode; that I would, however, now faithfully transmit to my Government the assurances His Majesty had on the present occasion given of the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas, assurances which, I needed not to add, would be considered and judged of with all the respect and attention so justly due to anything emanating from His Majesty. The Emperor terminated the conversation by saying that he relied upon my doing so, as he felt the greatest anxiety for the cooperation of my Government.

Shortly afterwards I had the opportunity, whilst conversing with the Emperor Nicholas, to refer to the Turkish question, and said, "that I had profited by his permission to speak upon the subject to Count Nesselrode, and that I had submitted to him the despatches from Lord Clarendon, which I had already mentioned to His Majesty, and with the contents of which I hoped he was satisfied." He said he was so with the one addressed to Lord Stratford, which, he observed, was very ably drawn up. It remains however, he added, with Lord Stratford to obtain the adhesion to it of the Porte. For his part, he went on to say, he had very little to do beyond what he had already done; he had long ago communicated to our Government what were his intentions; he had from the beginning stated that he only looked to obtain what he felt he had a right to require, and to that he adhered; he asked for no new rights, no increased authority; he desired nothing but what was conceded to him by Treaties, and the *status quo* established by these Treaties, for the protection of his co-religionaires. He said Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon were perfectly aware of his intentions, and that he could not bring himself to believe that they could doubt his being "un honnête homme," or his adherence to his word; that he had reposed confidence in them, and that he expected in return the like confidence from them. He now could do nothing but remain passive, and wait till the just pretension he had put forward, as a security for the rights he possessed by Treaties, were accorded to him.

I told His Majesty that he might be well assured that Her Majesty's Government would not be a party to withholding from him the rights which belonged to him, but that he must have seen from despatches which had been submitted to Count Nesselrode, what were the grounds of doubt which had led Her Majesty's Government to ask for explanations, and had induced them to tender their recommendations. I expressed the hope that His Majesty would allow these considerations to weigh with him, as he might be convinced they were dictated by no unfriendly feeling, but by a sense of duty, which I felt satisfied would be favourably interpreted by him. He said he could not but regret those doubts in the face of his declarations; that he would however leave it to me to explain to my Government what he had now stated; and he added that from his long acquaintance with me, and from what he knew of me, he felt confident I would favourably report and interpret what he had said; and with the most cordial expressions he brought the foregoing conversation to a close.

I have endeavoured thus to state with the greatest possible fidelity the substance of these conversations, and as far as I have been able, to quote the very words which were used. They were held after dinner, in the room where the company was assembled, but apart from other persons. The two Emperors were most anxious in the expression of their sentiments, and of their desire that they should be communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND

No. 24.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 356.)
My Lord, *Olmütz, September 28, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has communicated to me the draft of a note, approved by Count Nesselrode, which it is his intention to propose as well to Her Majesty's Government as to those of France and Prussia, with a view to its being

addressed to the Porte, as a security and guarantee upon which the latter may be called upon to adopt the original Vienna note.

In the anxious desire to find some means by which the Turkish Government could be induced to give such assurances to the Emperor of Russia as might terminate the present differences, Count Buol would have given up the Vienna note, and have sought some other means of attaining that object, had he not found an invincible repugnance on the part of Count Nesselrode to abandon the only basis which by the Emperor of Russia's acceptance of that note had been established amongst the Five Powers. These considerations had induced Count Buol to adhere to the original note, and to adopt the project which he now proposed, and of which he showed me the draft, informing me at the same time that it would be transmitted without delay to the Austrian Ministers in London, Paris, and Berlin, to be by them brought before the Governments to which they are severally accredited.

The general substance of this note, into the details of which I have not now time to enter, is as follows:

"The Representatives of the Four Powers, upon the promise being given by the Porte that it will sign in its original form the Vienna note, are ready to deliver to the Turkish Government a declaration, founded upon the assurances given by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, to the effect that His Majesty asks only for a general guarantee of the immunities already granted to the Greek Church, and for nothing which could in any way prejudice the independence or rights of the Sultan, or which would imply a desire to interfere (ingérer) with the internal affairs of the Porte.

"That what the Emperor desires is the strict maintenance of the *status quo* in all matters appertaining to the 'Orthodox Greek Church,' and the promise to make that Church participate in any future advantages which at a time subsequent to the present the Sultan may be disposed to grant to any other denominations of Christians."

This claim, as your Lordship will observe, is very different from that implied in the interpretation which has been given to the paragraph in the Vienna note, objected to by Reshid Pasha as conferring upon several millions of the subjects of the Porte religious privileges granted at different times to the subjects of other Powers residing within the Ottoman territory. The pretension now put forward is only that in future if any additional immunities are granted to Christians of any denomination, they shall not be withheld from members of the Greek Church; it is therefore prospective in its operation, and as such it is not believed that it ought to be considered in any way a condition onerous to the Porte, or unfitting for it to grant.

It is the intention of Count Nesselrode to instruct the various Representatives of Russia to confirm the declarations of the Emperor Nicholas, put forward in the present project of note.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 25.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 2.*)

(No. 357.)

My Lord, *Olmütz, September 28, 1853.*

IN pursuance to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 308, I waited upon Count Nesselrode soon after his arrival in Olmütz, and communicated to him that despatch, together with its inclosures.

Count Nesselrode stated that having received the orders of his Sovereign to enter fully with me into all such questions regarding the affairs of Turkey as I might be desirous of bringing before him, he should be most happy to do so, and that it gave him pleasure to be able at once to say that the despatch I had read to him, addressed by your Lordship to Lord Stratford (No. 184),* was satisfactory to him. He looked upon the explanations your Lordship had given of the bearings of the original Vienna note, and the way in which you point out

* Part II, p. 304.

the want of importance in the modifications which had been introduced into it, as unanswerable, and he stated he should submit these observations of your Lordship to His Majesty the Emperor, by whom, he was convinced, they would be most favourably received.

With regard to your Lordship's despatch to me, Count Nesselrode stated that the former declaration of the Emperor, which you cited, "that he sought for no new right, and no increase of power in Turkey, but only desired the maintenance of existing Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters," was the one to which His Majesty most strictly adhered; and that no act of his, no interpretation of any document which had emanated from his authority or with his sanction, could give a colour to the supposition that he had swerved from the determination he had so unequivocally announced. Count Nesselrode, in remarking upon the rest of the despatch, distinctly stated that the Emperor sought no new rights, no further extension of power, but that His Majesty could not be expected, because suspicions were entertained of his holding views in opposition to his declarations, to abandon the decision he had announced of implicitly adhering to the note of the Four Powers which had been proposed to him, and which he had unhesitatingly accepted. Count Nesselrode said that he would submit to the Emperor the substance of the documents I had communicated to him, and would announce to me the decision which should be taken with regard to them.

I this day by appointment had a second interview with Count Nesselrode, when he stated that His Majesty the Emperor had expressed his satisfaction with the views and reasoning so ably put forward by your Lordship in the despatch addressed to Lord Stratford; but that he had been annoyed and hurt at the doubts which seemed to be expressed in the one addressed to me, as to whether he intended to adhere to the policy he had so distinctly and so unreservedly declared to be the one by which he would be ruled.

His Majesty, while giving expression to these feelings, had, notwithstanding, authorized Count Nesselrode to confer with Count Buol as to the adoption of any proposal by which a still further guarantee might be offered to the Porte, that he would maintain inviolate the assurances he had given; that he sought no new right, no further extension of power; and that he looked to nothing but the maintenance of Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters. His Majesty had directed Count Nesselrode to report, for his approval, any recommendation which, in furtherance of his object, he might, in conjunction with Count Buol, consider it advisable to adopt.

Count Nesselrode stated that in consequence of these directions he, together with Count Buol, had drawn up the form of a note which contained the assurances above referred to, and which might be delivered to the Government of the Sultan by the Representatives of the Four Powers, upon the understanding that it should be received by the Porte as a sufficient guarantee for the acceptance of the original Vienna note, the signature of which, and the appointment of an Ambassador to convey it to the Emperor, should immediately follow upon the delivery of the declaration now projected.

Such having been the result of communications with Count Buol, Count Nesselrode informed me that he had reported it to the Emperor, and that His Majesty had sanctioned the adoption of the proposed measure. Count Buol would therefore immediately transmit this project to the Allied Governments, and an instruction would be forwarded to the Russian Ministers at the different Courts to support and recommend it.

His Majesty the Emperor Nicholas, previous to his departure from Olmütz, which took place this evening, was pleased, on taking leave of me, to refer to the decision he had taken with reference to this measure, and to assure me that he had thus endeavoured, by allowing his former declarations to be strengthened by repetition, to give an additional proof of his desire to meet every legitimate wish which was expressed to him by those Powers, whom he believed to be animated by a desire that his own just rights should be upholden, in common with those of every independent State.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 26.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 3.)

(Transmis par Lord Westmorland de Vienne, 2 Octobre, 8 heures du soir.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, 26 Octobre,* 10½ du soir.*

LE Conseil Turc s'est prononcé aujourd'hui pour la guerre après avoir déclaré la note de Vienne, telle quelle est, à jamais inadmissible. La déclaration [de] la guerre, et les mesures à prendre, sont laissées au Sultan et à ses Ministres. Les décisions ont étés unanimes. Cette réunion [fût] composée de plus de 120 personnes. Les efforts des quatre Représentants pour obtenir une solution pacifique ont manqué d'effet, de même que ceux que j'ai fait de matin à la suite de l'arrivée pendant la nuit de vos dépêches expédiées par le "Triton." Je me propose de vous envoyer un exprès au plutôt par Marseilles.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Expédié de Semlin 2 Octobre, à 3 heures de reveille, par M. de Fonblanque.

No. 27.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 733.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 3, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received intelligence from Odessa, that the Russian army in the Caucasus had been reinforced by 12,000 men, and that 12,000 more were shortly to follow.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 28.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 739.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 4, 1853.*

ON Friday last, the 30th ultimo, M. Drouyn de Lhuys received a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, stating that a fresh proposition for the settlement of the Eastern Question had been sent from Olmütz, for the consideration of the Cabinets of London and Paris. In mentioning this to me M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, in reply to a question which I put to him, that he did not know the exact tenour of the proposition, but he seemed inclined to augur favourably of it, as he had been told that it was based on the declaration which your Lordship, on learning the rejection by Russia of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note, had proposed should be made by the Conference of Vienna, in order to induce the Porte still to sign that note, a proposal to which the Cabinet of Vienna had not then given its assent. I thought it necessary to remind M. Drouyn de Lhuys that, when your Lordship made that proposal, the motives which induced Russia to refuse the modifications had not been made known, and that the whole question had assumed a very different aspect now that Russia had so openly declared the interpretation which she gave to the work of the Vienna Conference.

On Sunday M. de Hubner made the communication which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been led to expect, and he left with his Excellency copies of the note which it is proposed that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople should address to the Porte, and of Count Buol's despatch urging the French Government to adopt this course. As your Lordship must be in possession of these papers, I need not attempt a description of them. M. Drouyn de

* Error, for "Septembre."

Lhuys stated at once to M. de Hubner that he must confine his official answer for the present to a promise to examine the proposition attentively, and with a sincere desire to find in it a solution of the present very critical juncture of the Eastern Question; that before he could say more he must take the Emperor's orders, and must know the impression which the communication from Olmütz had made upon the British Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys saw the Emperor the same day. On the following morning (yesterday), M. de Hubner called upon his Excellency again, and was told that no decision would be taken by the French Government until Her Majesty's Government had been consulted.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys later in the day, when he read me the Olmütz communications, and related to me what had passed between himself and M. de Hubner. He then said that the Emperor was inclined to view the proposed declaration favourably; that His Majesty thought that it guarded the points on which the French and English Governments had the most insisted, viz., the non-interference of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, or any assumed right of Russia to obtain privileges for the Greek, other than those enjoyed or to be conceded to other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. That His Majesty had directed a communication to be made in this sense to Count Walewski, who would be instructed at the same time to request your Lordship, if, in your opinion, there were objections to the proposed declaration which had escaped the eyes of the French Government, to have the goodness to point them out.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then asked me, as was natural, what I thought of the proposal? I replied, that having as yet no knowledge of the impression produced by it upon my Government, any observation I made must not be considered as carrying with it official weight.

There were, I said, several points to be considered; the nature of the declaration, the value of it; and, supposing these to be resolved satisfactorily, the time and manner of making it known to the Porte. With regard to the nature of the declaration, it seemed to me that we were required to give assurances as coming from Russia, of which we had no official knowledge, while care had been taken to make us well and officially acquainted with a Russian document of a very different character and meaning. In fact, the declaration would rather convert us into advocates for Russia than recognize us as friends of the Porte. With respect to its value, there were no doubt valuable admissions apparently made by Russia, but the fourth paragraph seemed to me so obscurely worded, that its meaning might be doubted. The first part of it which explained the *status quo*, was satisfactory enough. It was clearly laid down that nothing was asked for the Greek community which was not enjoyed by other Christian communities, subjects of the Porte. But the latter part, which regarded the future, was not so clear, for then the stipulation ran in favour of concession to the Greeks of all privileges which might hereafter be granted to other Christian rites. No mention was here made of Christians, subjects of the Porte; and as this was a point on which the Ottoman Government was peculiarly susceptible, the paragraph would hardly prove satisfactory to them. However this, as well as other objections which I had ventured to signalise, admitted of correction. But then came the question, would the Porte, after all that had happened, and with the knowledge, which no doubt the Turkish Ministers possessed, of the interpretation given by Count Nesselrode to the Vienna note, would the Porte be satisfied with this declaration on the part of the Conference? And, if she was not, how far would the two Governments be prepared to go in combating the Porte's continued objections to sign the Vienna note? I felt certain, I said, that Her Majesty's Government would not go the lengths recommended by Count Buol, or abandon the Porte to her fate, because she maintained a right to have an independent opinion respecting an engagement so important as that into which she was called upon to enter. I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether the Emperor had considered this part of the question, and the position in which the two Governments would find themselves, if, with their fleets before Constantinople, they pressed the acceptance of the Vienna note upon the Porte, and the Porte persisted in her refusal, and war was the consequence? M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that he certainly had not put the question categorically to the Emperor, but that he felt (and he had stated as much to M. de Hubner) that France could not abandon Turkey, because she

took her own view of her own interests, while the act of aggression on the part of Russia remained the same; and he added that the general tenour of the observations which had fallen from the Emperor, in the course of these long negotiations, would lead him to suppose that His Majesty entertained the same opinion.

At the end of a long conversation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seemed inclined to think that the Cabinets of Paris and London might reply to the Austrian proposal, by saying that they had no objection to submit it to the Porte, and recommend the Ottoman Ministers to examine it and see whether they could not find in it assurances sufficiently explicit to enable them to sign the Vienna note, and the two Governments might reserve to themselves, as indeed Austria herself had done, perfect liberty of action, should the Porte persist in her refusal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I find that M. de Kisseleff has seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and informed him that he is able to certify that the Emperor of Russia gave the assurances referred to in the note which Austria proposes should be addressed to the Porte. C.

No. 29.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

I HAVE to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Baron Manteuffel on the Eastern question, as reported by you in your despatch No. 14, of the 30th ultimo. I now transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh on the same subject, and I have to instruct you to communicate that despatch to Baron Manteuffel, and to state to him that it is quite impossible for Her Majesty's Government now, under any circumstances or conditions whatever, to recommend the adoption of the Vienna note to the Porte, for Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Meyendorff leaves no doubt that Russia intended by that note to establish rights and influences that she never before possessed in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 30.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 12.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatch No. 15, marked secret and confidential, of the 30th ultimo. Her Majesty's Government learn with great satisfaction that the desire of the Prussian Government to co-operate with this country upon the Eastern question remains unchanged, and I have to instruct you to assure Baron Manteuffel that on the part of Her Majesty's Government the wish is sincerely reciprocated. There can be no doubt that if the Conference were transferred to London, discussion would be more free and impartial, and more likely therefore to lead to a practical result than at Vienna; and Her Majesty's Government will consequently be glad to learn that Baron Manteuffel has been able to give effect to the views he entertains on that subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See No. 11, p. 9.

No. 31.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 320.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has placed in my hands a despatch from Count Buol, in which he refers to the effect produced on the Cabinets of London and Paris by the confidential communication made by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in support of its rejection of the modifications required by the Porte in the Vienna note, and to the explanations which the British and French Government have considered indispensable, in consequence of the interpretation given to that note by the Government of Russia.

Baron de Bourqueney, at the moment of Count Buol's departure for Olmutz, received instructions to invite Count Buol to declare, in conjunction with the Representatives of the Three Powers, the true sense of the Vienna note to be opposed to the interpretation put upon it by Count Nesselrode; and although Count Buol could not entirely agree to this proposition, he availed himself of the occasion afforded to him in his interview with Count Nesselrode to devise some means of giving renewed action to the Conferences which had been for the moment paralysed.

The explanations of Count Nesselrode have confirmed Count Buol in the conviction that Russia does not aim at any interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and that the demands of the Emperor of Russia do not involve anything derogatory to the sovereign rights of the Sultan. And Count Buol regards the declaration of this conviction as it is embodied in the inclosed projet de note to be the exact and authentic expression of the meaning of the Emperor of Russia, the more especially as His Imperial Majesty has seen and approved this note as expressing his real intentions; and Count Buol is of opinion that the proper method of offering a guarantee against any false interpretation being put on the Vienna note, and of overcoming the scruples of the Porte, would be to make known these intentions by a simultaneous declaration of the Representatives of the Four Powers.

The Austrian Government is ready to authorize the Internuncio at Constantinople to make the declaration contained in the annexed *projet de note* as soon as his colleagues shall have received a similar authority from their Governments, and shall have been assured that the presentation of this note will be followed by the immediate signature of the Vienna note, and its transmission by an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol hopes that this *projet de note* is calculated to efface the impression produced on the English and French Governments by the last communication from the Russian Government, and is of opinion, that as the Cabinet of Russia disavows all intention of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey, and gives a more satisfactory definition of the rights which it wishes to see guaranteed, as well as an unconditional adherence to the projet de note, the objections to the Vienna note appear groundless. It appears to Count Buol to be of great importance to adhere to the Vienna note, notwithstanding the difficulty of getting it accepted at Constantinople, and he hopes that the resistance of the Ottoman Government will give way before the united and energetic representations of the Four Powers. Should it be otherwise, and should the Porte obey the dictates of impulse rather than the advice of its friends, such conduct would lead the Austrian Government to suppose that the Porte has decided to adopt a course which Austria is not inclined to follow.

But the Austrian Government does not anticipate the occurrence of such an extremity, if the Porte is made to understand that should it remain deaf to the representations of its allies, it will lose all title to their support. Nothing would have more effect, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, in making the advisers of the Porte aware of the dangers to which the Ottoman Empire is exposed, than language held by the maritime Powers proportioned to the gravity of the occasion. If the Porte should push their blindness so far as to desire to

take the initiative in hostilities, then the Austrian Government considers it time to declare openly to the Porte that it will be reduced to the complete isolation of which it can easily foresee the consequences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 31.

Projet de Note.

EN conseillant unanimement à la Sublime Porte l'adoption du projet de note concerté à Vienne, les Cours d'Autriche, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse sont pénétrées de la conviction que ce document ne porte nullement atteinte aux droits souverains et à la dignité de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Cette conviction est fondée sur les assurances positives que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a données quant aux intentions qui animent Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie en demandant une garantie générale des immunités religieuses accordées par les Sultans à l'Eglise Grecque dans leur Empire.

Il ressort de ces assurances qu'en demandant en vertu du principe posé dans le Traité de Kaïnardji, que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs privilèges spirituels sous l'égide de leur Souverain le Sultan.

L'Empereur ne demande rien de contraire à l'indépendance et aux droits du Sultan, rien qui implique une intention d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman.

Ce que veut l'Empereur de Russie c'est le maintien strict du *statu quo* religieux de son culte: savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Eglise Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes de la Porte, par conséquent la jouissance en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque des avantages déjà accordés à ces communautés. Il n'entend point ressusciter les privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque tombés en desuétude par l'effet du temps, ou des changements administratifs, mais demande que le Sultan le fasse participer à tous les avantages qu'il accordera à l'avenir à d'autres rites Chrétiens.

Le Cabinet Impérial d'Autriche aime, par conséquent, à ne pas douter que la Sublime Porte en pondérant encore une fois avec toute la sérieuse attention que la gravité de la situation exige, les explications données par la Russie, dans le but de préciser la nature et l'extension de ses demandes, ne se décide à l'adoption pure et simple de la note de Vienne. Cette adoption tout en assurant au Gouvernement Ottoman de nouveaux titres à la sympathie et à l'appui des Puissances qui la lui ont conseillée, lui offre à la fois un moyen aussi prompt qu'honorable d'opérer sa franche réconciliation avec l'Empire de Russie, réconciliation que tant d'intérêts majeurs reclament si impérieusement.

No. 32.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 327.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 5, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has communicated to me a confidential despatch from Count Buol, stating that the impression which his interview with Count Nesselrode has left on his mind, resolves itself into a conviction that Russia sincerely desires a pacific solution of her differences with the Ottoman Empire, but that having advanced too far to recede, she cannot forego the engagements to which she is pledged without having obtained her demands, which, circumscribed as they are by the solicitude of the Four Powers within just limits, the Ottoman Porte could accede to without prejudice to its honour or interests.

If the note, the project of which is inclosed in my despatch No. 326, is agreed to by the Mediating Powers, and supported at Constantinople with that energetic unanimity which is the indispensable condition of success, it will, in Count Buol's opinion, be possible to re-establish harmony between the contending parties, and consequently to secure the evacuation of the Principalities before the winter renders that evacuation very difficult, if not impossible, and Count Buol urges the necessity of acting with promptitude.

Count Buol then alludes to the decision of the Representatives of Great Britain and France at Constantinople, to call up a portion of the fleets anchored in Besika Bay; and states that the Cabinet of Russia have no present intention of raising a question on this subject.

Count Buol points out that whatever may be the international question to which the appearance of the English and French vessels before Constantinople may give rise, a powerful weapon is placed in the hands of the two Powers, and one which, according to the use made of it, will tend either to facilitate or to obstruct the solution of these differences. Count Buol is convinced that Her Majesty's Government cannot but recognize the importance of taking from the fanatical party all pretence of regarding the presence of the foreign ships of war as an encouragement given to their schemes, and considers that if the Representatives of Great Britain and France know how to take advantage of the naval forces at their disposal, to strengthen the credit and influence of the moderate advisers of the Porte and the friends of peace, and to free the Sultan from the influences which endanger his freedom of action, they offer by such an attitude the best justification of the step they have thought necessary to adopt.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 33.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, October 6.)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 4 Octobre, 1853.*

JE vous ai fait connaître dans la dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire avant hier, l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sur la proposition du Cabinet de Vienne. Vous avez vu que nous rendions justice aux efforts tentés par M. le Comte de Buol pour maintenir les affaires d'Orient dans la voie des négociations, et que tout en trouvant le projet de déclaration qui nous était soumis susceptible de quelques modifications, nous pensions néanmoins qu'afin de nous montrer conséquents avec la politique de conciliation que nous n'avons cessé de suivre depuis l'origine du différend survenu entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Sublime Porte, nous devions examiner avec soin toutes les combinaisons de nature à empêcher l'explosion des hostilités.

Cette manière de voir, M. le Comte, est toujours celle de l'Empereur; mais les évènements marchent plus vite que les volontés, et les nouvelles que je reçois de Constantinople révèlent une situation qui semble incompatible, pour le moment du moins, avec l'espoir d'une solution pacifique, et qui commande aux Cabinets, pénétrés de la nécessité de maintenir l'indépendance et l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman, des résolutions plus arrêtées.

En effet, à cet état mitoyen, qui n'était ni la paix ni la guerre, qui plaçait déjà les armées en présence, mais qui suspendait entre elles tout engagement, dans l'espoir d'une heureuse issue des négociations entamées à Vienne, ont succédé depuis quelques jours des faits sur le caractère desquels il serait imprudent de se méprendre.

Pendant que l'armée Russe se rapproche du Danube, la Porte, malgré les efforts unanimes des Représentants de la France, de l'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, et sans connaître encore le nouveau commentaire que M. le Comte de Nesselrode a donné de la note émanée de la Conférence, a persisté, pour la seconde fois, dans sa résolution, et déclare que cette note, dans son texte original, était à jamais inadmissible. Le Divan, à l'unanimité, a remis au Sultan le soin de déclarer la guerre. Les hostilités sont donc imminentes: peut-être même sont elles commencées.

A côté de l'intérêt qui s'attache à la réconciliation de la Russie avec la Turquie, but que nous ne voulons pas perdre de vue, s'il existe encore un moyen de l'atteindre, vient aujourd'hui se placer une autre préoccupation non moins sérieuse; je veux parler des dangers qui menacent un Empire dont l'existence est indispensable à l'équilibre de l'Europe. Nous avons loyalement servi le

premier de ces intérêts; toutes les traditions de notre politique nous font un devoir de ne pas négliger le second; et l'envoi de l'escadre Française, d'abord à Salamine, plus tard à Besika, indique assez la vigilance du Gouvernement de l'Empereur.

Le moment est venu de donner suite aux instructions remises à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale à la veille de son départ pour Constantinople, puisque nous touchons aux extrémités que ces instructions prévoyaient, et que nous avons vainement essayé de conjurer.

Dans ces graves conjonctures, M. le Comte, nous sentons le besoin de nous entendre avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et de lui faire connaître nos intentions.

L'Empereur, vous le savez, s'est déjà décidé à transmettre à M. de la Cour l'ordre d'appeler notre escadre à Constantinople et de se concerter à cet effet avec Lord Stratford.

Il s'agit maintenant de déterminer l'usage qui sera fait de ces forces navales. Leur présence dans les eaux du Bosphore témoignera de l'union intime de la France et de l'Angleterre. Cette preuve éclatante de l'accord des deux Grandes Puissances Maritimes, et de leur commune sollicitude pour les destinées de la Turquie, donnera à la Sublime Porte une force morale qui lui permettra de se tenir dans les conditions d'un Gouvernement régulier, de compter sur la tranquillité de ses populations, et de ne faire appel ni au fanatisme des sentiments religieux, ni à de funestes auxiliaires.

Mais ce n'est pas à ce résultat, si important qu'il soit, que notre démonstration doit se borner; dans l'opinion de l'Empereur notre flotte serait également destinée à jouer un rôle dans la défense de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle servirait particulièrement à couvrir Constantinople et à opérer au besoin, sur les côtes occidentales de la Mer Noire jusqu'à la hauteur de Varna. A ce point, en effet, commence la chaine des Balkans qui forme une première barrière fortement occupée par l'Armée Turque et offrant des garanties suffisantes contre une invasion par terre. Dans les limites que j'ai indiquées, au contraire, les moyens naturels de défense contre un débarquement sont presque nuls, et des surprises sont possibles. C'est à ces périls soudains qu'il nous appartient de pourvoir.

Je proposerais donc, M. le Comte, de munir M. le Vice-Amiral Hamelin et M. le Vice-Amiral Dundas d'instructions qui leur enjoindraient, après avoir consulté nos Ambassadeurs, de distribuer les forces qu'ils commandent de façon à ce que la ville de Constantinople se trouve, autant que possible, à l'abri des hostilités, et, dans cette position, à attendre, mais sans la rechercher, l'occasion d'accomplir leur devoir. Faire plus, ce serait donner à notre attitude un caractère agressif qu'elle ne doit point avoir; faire moins, ce serait exposer tous les intérêts que notre but est de sauvegarder.

Veuillez me faire connaître, sans retard M. le Comte, si ce plan de conduite a l'approbation du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique et remettre à Lord Clarendon une copie de cette dépêche, après lui en avoir donné lecture.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 34.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 6.)

Chesham House, $\frac{21 \text{ September}}{3 \text{ October}}$, 1853.

M. le Comte,

LA note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 1er Octobre m'est parvenu le 3ème.

En reponse à ma communication du $\frac{19}{31}$ Septembre, elle établit que l'entrée des bâtiments de guerre, appelés par M. l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, dans le détroit, a été uniquement motivé par la nécessité de mettre la sûreté des nationaux Anglais à l'abri d'un danger local; et écarte la supposition que la présence de ces bâtiments devienne pour le Divan un encouragement à élever de nouveaux obstacles à l'œuvre de conciliation.

Je rendrai compte de ces informations au Cabinet Impérial.

Après avoir rempli ce devoir, je partage avec vous l'opinion qu'il serait inutile de suivre plus loin un sujet de discussion sur lequel nous différons d'avis en ce qui regarde le Traité du $\frac{13}{1}$ Juillet 1841.

Cette discussion s'arrête pour moi à l'instant où le Sultan, comme je l'apprends, met fin à ce Traité par une déclaration de guerre. Elle constitue, à mes yeux, un acte nouveau sur lequel je ne suis point appelé à me prononcer avant d'avoir reçu les ordres de ma Cour.

Cet acte, je le constate, est survenu du chef de la Porte, trois mois après l'occupation des Principautés. Si des conseils plus sages ont déterminé le Sultan à ne point en faire un cas de guerre, cette situation, je le maintiens, n'a pas été insolite et contraire aux principes établis en saine logique, et en droit international, comme vous paraissez le croire à mon vif regret.

Votre Excellence en trouvera un exemple si elle veut bien se rappeler qu'après la journée de Navarin la Turquie ne s'est point reconnue en état d'hostilité avec la Grande Bretagne; bien que celle-ci, de concert avec ses alliés, eût détruit la flotte Ottomane, chassé Ibrahim Pacha de la Morée, et soustrait la Grèce à l'autorité de la Porte.

Si le Gouvernement Britannique n'a pas été censé se trouver en guerre avec la Turquie, malgré ces faits accomplis avec effusion de sang; à plus forte raison la Russie, sans acte d'hostilité commis de part et d'autre, pouvait-elle compter sur la continuation de la paix, tandis que se prolongeait une négociation, qui, jusqu'à ce jour, laissait heureusement la voie ouverte à un arrangement à l'amiable.

J'ai eu l'honneur de communiquer dans le temps à votre Excellence la dépêche du $\frac{30 \text{ June}}{12 \text{ July}}$, qui a déterminé l'attitude prise alors par l'Empereur sans vue d'hostilité ni d'agression envers l'Empire Ottoman.

Je me fais un devoir de me référer à ce document, jusqu'à la réception des ordres ultérieurs que pourrait réclamer la situation, sous l'aspect nouveau que les déterminations actuelles de la Porte peuvent lui faire prendre.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 35.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 740.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 5, 1853.*

ON the receipt, yesterday morning, of the copy of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's telegraphic despatch of the 26th ultimo, with which your lordship was so good as to furnish me, I went immediately to M. Drouyn de Lhuys. His Excellency had received a communication of a similar nature from M. de la Cour, though the latter hardly represented the declaration of war on the part of Turkey to be so imminent as was intimated in the intelligence received by your Lordship. Indeed the tenor of Lord Stratford's despatch was so alarming, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys went directly to St. Cloud, to communicate it to the Emperor.

I saw him after his return, and again this afternoon, after the Council of Ministers had discussed the present critical position of the Eastern question, and the conduct which it would behove France to adopt in consequence; and I am happy to state that the propositions which Count Walewski will, with the Emperor's sanction, be instructed, by to-night's mail, to make to Her Majesty's Government, appear to me to be in unison with the opinions expressed by your Lordship to that ambassador, and with those which the heavy pressure on your time has alone permitted you to convey to me in a hasty private communication.

By my despatch, No 739, your Lordship will have learnt that the Emperor's Government were not disinclined to accept the proposition emanating from Olmütz. Under the impression produced by Lord Stratford's intelligence, they now recognize that it would have no chance of success at Constantinople, and that they are called upon to consider the eventualities of war, rather than to discuss the meaning and value of a diplomatic document.

The following is the substance of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations to me:—

"The Emperor's object in sending the French fleet in Turkish waters, was to aid in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

That object is still uppermost in his mind, and although His Majesty regrets the failure of the negotiations which have taken place, and would willingly have pursued them further had there been a chance of a successful issue to them, His Majesty recognises that a persistance in them would be useless in the present temper of the Turkish Government. He acknowledges at the same time that this failure does not put Russia more in the right, or alter the aggressive character of her conduct towards the Porte, and under these circumstances His Majesty is willing and anxious that the French fleet should co-operate with that of Her Majesty for the defence of Turkey. He thinks with your Lordship that it should be distinctly understood that in the first instance the two Governments do not meditate an offensive war with Russia, leaving themselves however full latitude to act in future as circumstances may require. In taking a defensive position the first care which the two Governments must naturally have is the safety of Constantinople, and to insure this His Majesty is of opinion that the line of defence must be taken at some distance from the capital, and he thinks the line of the Balkan is that which naturally presents itself. He would propose, therefore, that instructions should be sent to the Ambassadors at Constantinople and to the Admirals commanding the fleets, authorizing them to take such measures as they may think expedient for the defence of Turkey within the Bosphorus and upon the eastern coast of Turkey within the Black Sea, as far as Varna."

I said to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that I presumed he did not mean to act upon this proposition until he had received the answer of Her Majesty's Government; he replied "certainly not," that he considered his proposition to be made in a confidential shape, and subject to any modifications which the wisdom of Her Majesty's Government might suggest, and which the French Government after consideration might agree in.

Before leaving M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I asked him whether he had yet returned any answer to M. de Hübner's last communications, observing how essential it was that at this very critical period the language of the two Governments should be as identic as were their views, and that your Lordship waited for further advices from Paris before replying to Count Colloredo. I suggested that it might perhaps be advisable, that the two Governments should reply in a despatch, a copy of which should be left with the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, by the respective envoys of the two Governments at Vienna. That this would ensure identity of language, and prevent any misinterpretation of the real sentiments of the two Governments. M. de Lhuys said he was quite willing to adopt this plan, and that he would only inform M. de Hübner in general terms, that the French Government could not act upon the Olmütz propositions, and that he would state his reasons in a despatch, which M. de Bourquency would be charged to communicate to Count Buol. His Excellency added, that he would draw up a project of despatch, and wished that your Lordship would do the same, and one or the other might be adopted. He thought that something like the following form might be taken: That the Cabinet of Vienna might be thanked for the communication from Olmütz—that regret might be expressed that Austria had hesitated so long before agreeing in the necessity of a declaration of the kind, and more particularly that she had not acquiesced in that proposed by your Lordship, when the refusal of Russia to accept the Turkish modifications became known to you. Had the Conference come forward without delay at Constantinople, with this declaration, the Porte might have been induced to sign the Vienna note. Now that she knew the reasons of Russia for rejecting the modifications, the Olmütz Declaration, which under the circumstances, and with certain alterations (of which, however, no specifications should be made), France might have been willing to offer to the Porte, could have no chance of success.

Unfortunately, it was the eventualities of war rather than the efforts of diplomacy which now required consideration, though France would gladly avail herself of any truce or suspension of hostilities, to assist in promoting any feasible plan for the reconciliation of the contending parties.

Perhaps your Lordship will be pleased to inform me, at your earliest convenience, whether you are inclined to adopt this suggestion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 36.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 403.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 7, 1853.*

ON the 4th instant Count Walewski informed me that the assurances as to the intentions of Russia contained in Count Buol's project of note appeared satisfactory to the French Government, who were prepared, with the concurrence of Her Majesty's Government to agree to the signature of that note by the Four Representatives at Constantinople; and that it should be offered to the Porte in exchange for the note originally sent from Vienna.

I told Count Walewski that Count Buol's despatch and project of note had not yet been considered by the Cabinet, but that I knew enough of the opinions of my colleagues to assure his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government could not concur in a measure which they must know beforehand would be useless, and which would not be justifiable even if it were not useless.

It was unnecessary, I added, now to revert to the nature of the modifications proposed by the Porte. The Porte had a right to make them; we had recognised that right, and the Turkish Government was pledged not to accept the note without them. It would therefore be imprudent on the part of the English and French Governments, and unfair towards the Porte, to offer advice in favour of the Vienna note, which must beyond all doubt be rejected.

I desired moreover to observe that if we accepted Count Buol's project of note, we should at once admit that the assurances given on the part of Russia were complete and satisfactory, that the Emperor had offered sufficient guarantees of his intention, and that no further resistance to his demands on the part of the Porte could be sanctioned by our respective Governments; but a despatch from the Austrian Government containing these assurances (supposing them to be satisfactory, which I was far from admitting) would offer no real security to the Turkish Government, and would not neutralize the despatch of Count Nesselrode, which disclosed the views of Russia, and justified the fears of the Porte.

The proposed collective note would, therefore, as a matter of course, be refused; and the position of the English and French Governments would then be false and embarrassing.

Count Walewski concurred in these views, which, he said, he should immediately submit to the consideration of his Government; and in the meanwhile he requested me to give no definitive answer to Count Colloredo.

Count Walewski yesterday informed me, that his Government had renounced all idea of again recommending the Vienna note to the Porte, and his Excellency placed in my hands a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, copy of which is herewith inclosed, stating the course which the Government of the Emperor proposes to pursue.

This despatch which in substance is similar to that of your Excellency's, marked No. 740, has been attentively considered by the Cabinet; and I have to inform your Excellency, that the views of Her Majesty's Government coincide generally with those of the French Government.

It is to be hoped that the combined fleets are now at Constantinople, and prepared to act in defence of the Sultan; but it is to be borne in mind, that our information as to the actual state of things there is confined to a telegraphic despatch of the 26th ultimo, announcing that the Supreme Council had determined in favour of war, but had left the declaration of war, and the mode of carrying it on, to the Sultan and his Ministers; and it therefore appears advisable to Her Majesty's Government, that general instructions should be given to the Ambassadors and Admirals to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, and at whatever place, they may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against direct aggression. If the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol the fleets would, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus, but a descent, such as that contemplated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, upon a place now so strongly fortified as Varna, and which the Turkish fleet could of itself effectually protect, appears very improbable; and Her Majesty's Government

consider therefore; that at the present moment, and in the absence of precise information, it would be expedient that the fleets should be stationed at Buyukderé, as the point from which they could most readily be employed for the protection of Constantinople, or of any other part of the Sultan's dominions which might be in danger of attack. The fleets would thus be in the position desired by the French Government, of waiting, without seeking, for the occasion of performing their duty; they would neither assume the aggressive attitude which they ought not to have, nor expose the interests which it is our object to protect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 37.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 502.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 28, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH a great variety of opinion exists with regard to Turkey and her relations towards Europe, there are certain points upon which I believe all rational men of all parties and nations are agreed.

All admit that the power of the Turk is diminished and diminishing; that of Russia much increased and on the increase; that the policy of Russia has been ever that of encroachment upon her declining neighbours; that if carried on much longer this system must end in the total destruction of the weaker of the two; and, above all, that from circumstances that are known to every one, the whole of Europe, with the exception of this country, are deeply interested in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire within the limits that remain to it after a long series of aggressions.

These data lead, it appears clear, to the conclusion either that Turkey will be saved through the goodwill and the good offices of Europe, or that her doom is clearly fixed.

If this be admitted, it follows that the only course to be pursued with regard to Turkey is that it never should be permitted that her differences with her eternal enemy should be settled with her alone, but that they should be submitted to a general council of the Great Powers, whose competency rests upon the general nature of the interests for which they have to provide.

In the case of the late demands made upon the Porte by Prince Menchikoff, a precedent had been established which, if its value had been justly appreciated, might have given very increased stability to the Ottoman power.

The Emperor calls for a note to which he was certainly in no ways entitled, and calls for it in so imperious a tone that it signified that not the slightest alteration even in its text will be admitted.

The demand is objected to by the Sultan, and upon being laid before the Great Powers, is modified to such an extent as in their opinion to take away all danger from compliance; when at the eleventh hour the award is put aside, not by the party against which they had come forward, but by that in whose behalf they were prepared to exert themselves strenuously.

Had the differences between the Emperor and the Sultan been left for settlement by an Act to be agreed upon between their two Cabinets, the responsibility would have rested with the Porte, while the power of interpreting that Act would have remained with the stronger of the Contracting Parties, who, as has been seen by the construction which they place upon the Treaty of Kainardji, are not backward in founding very extensive demands upon very slight grounds.

With a note prepared by the Allied Governments, and by their advice signed by the Sultan, the case would be widely different.

Those who drew up the instrument would best know the value which they intended to attach to it; those who tendered this advice to the Sultan had by so doing contracted the engagement of providing that its effects should prove salutary.

In a word, less favourable conditions obtained by the Porte at the hands of the Great Powers would have been more to her ultimate advantage than any,

even if apparently more beneficial, which she could have obtained by direct negotiation with Russia.

If this line of argument be not wholly fallacious, it would tend to prove that the Sultan has been extremely ill advised in not abiding by the decision of the Vienna Conference, and that even now he would do well to revise his hasty resolution.

But it may be said that the Emperor is likely to reconsider his determination, and that upon reflection he may give in to the modifications proposed by the Porte.

I should deceive your Lordship if I were to say that I entertain any such expectations. There is a chance of his giving way in deference to the wishes and interests of his Austrian ally, but it is but a chance, and the probability is much greater of his continued refusal to allow any alterations of conditions to which he himself has unhesitatingly subscribed.

In his own opinion, at least, the Emperor has already carried concession very far, and as I have before remarked, he is the less disposed to pursue that course from having been considered to have yielded under compulsion; besides which upon one point at least, there are limits beyond which His Majesty's authority cannot be safely exerted.

He might order half the nobles of the country into exile; he might add to his enormous army; double his navy; break old alliances and enter into new ones; increase the burdens of the people; all this and much more he might do without raising discontent—almost without raising a murmur; but there are questions which it is not safe even for an Emperor of Russia to tamper with, and of this kind are those which relate to the interests of the Church, and the prejudices of the clergy.

A hatred of the Turks and their religion is a feeling which animates every Russian, and it is one to which most unfortunately the Emperor thought proper to appeal, as was seen by the crusading manifesto, the publication of which closely followed that of the first circular.

These fanatical words were not allowed to fall unheeded; they have been stored up by the clergy, and, as your Lordship will see by the inclosed address of the Metropolitan of Moscow, upon the Emperor's late visit to one of the cathedrals of that town, the Russian Church are but too well disposed to recognize their Czar as invested with a divine mission, the carrying out of which would somewhat clash with the political interests of the rest of Europe.

Before concluding a despatch which is already too long, and in which possibly strong opinions may have been too strongly expressed, I would venture to remark to your Lordship that those few impartial persons who look with indifference to the fall of Turkey, justify that feeling by the probability which exists that the ruin of the Ottoman Power would be followed by the rise of an empire like that of Byzantium, or of States whose institutions might be modelled upon those of some of the most civilized countries of Europe.

The archives of Her Majesty's mission could furnish evidence as to the utopian nature of these notions; they show, upon good authority, that Russia would be the irreconcileable enemy of the regeneration of Turkey, whether attempted by the reconstruction of a Western Empire, and extended and powerful Greece, or a constellation of small and free States.

The Emperor may tolerate the continued existence of an enfeebled Turkey, more or less under his dependence, but he would never allow the construction of a Power having the extent and advantages of Turkey without her principles of weakness, and as little would he ever be brought to admit that close to his out-frontiers, small States should arise under those institutions the very knowledge of which he would keep away if possible from his own people.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 37.

Address of the Métropolitan of Moscow to the Emperor of Russia.

Très-pieux Monarque,

"TOUT a son temps sous le ciel," dit le sage.

L'Eglise orthodoxe te possède toujours comme son défenseur; mais en ce temps elle se voit particulièrement occupé à cette tâche.

Pour son sanctuaire dans l'Orient et pour la sécurité et la tranquillité de nos co-religionnaires tu t'es levé avec l'arme de la parole forte par le droit; l'inquiétude craintive qui s'en est repandue dans les Etats d'une autre origine, nous est garanti que ta parole sera aussi victorieuse contre les forces opposées que le seront tes armés.

Pénétrés de ta pensée nos âmes adressent pour toi de tout leur élan cette prière au Souverain Dispensateur du Salut: "Seigneur, que le Tsar se réjouisse de ta force!"

No. 38.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No 507.)

St. Petersburgh, September 30, 1853.

My Lord,

I THINK it right to state to your Lordship, with reference to your despatch to Lord Westmorland of the 20th instant, No. 308, that neither myself nor the French Minister are acquainted with the despatch to Baron Meyendorff, explaining the interpretation put by the Russian Government upon the note prepared for the signature of the Porte at Vienna. The despatch which I read, as far as a very hurried perusal of it enables me to speak of it, dwelt rather upon the objections entertained by the Emperor to allowing any alterations of a note to which he had acceded in its original form, than upon the nature of the proposed modifications themselves.

Your Lordship will readily understand that I have very little intelligence to offer you which may tend to throw light upon the involved question upon which public attention is almost exclusively fixed, the fact being that all Cabinet messengers have received orders to proceed with their despatches to Warsaw.

One only circumstance has come to my knowledge, which is deserving of mention, and the more so as it may entirely alter the situation of Eastern affairs.

A letter from Odessa, dated the 19th instant, acquaints the French Mission that six steamers, three English and three French, have been detached from the combined fleets, and have arrived before Constantinople for the purpose of affording protection to the Sultan and to the Christian population, both in some danger from the warlike and fanatical spirit which prevails in the capital; while according to accounts which have been received from the same port by M. de Sémiavine, five vessels of each fleet are now anchored in the Bosphorus.

It may be well that I should observe to your Lordship that a reference to my correspondence will show that I had taken various opportunities for pointing out to the Russian Government that an appeal made to over-excited religious feelings in this country would be tolerably certain to light up a corresponding flame in Turkey, whilst for some time past it has been the object of the Russian Cabinet to exhibit the fanaticism and violence observable among the Turks as the natural consequences of the injudicious support which their resistance to very legitimate demands had met with from the English and French Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 39.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 18. Most Confidential.)

Berlin, October 5, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17, reporting the departure of the King of Prussia for Warsaw, I have now the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the following details connected with this precipitate journey. In an interview I had this morning with Baron Manteuffel, I referred to this unexpected event, remarking to his Excellency that it was of a nature calculated to create a very unfavourable impression both in London and Paris.

His Excellency said he would communicate to me frankly and truthfully the circumstances which had occasioned this journey; but he requested that in conveying them to your Lordship I would provide for their being kept strictly secret and confidential, as there being no one but himself to whom they were known, any betrayal of confidence would be attributed to him.

His Excellency then stated to me that the King of Prussia had addressed a letter to the Emperor of Russia when at Olmütz, through the medium of Count Munster, in which His Majesty had expressed his anxiety that a good understanding should be arrived at between England and Russian, counselling His Imperial Majesty to evince a conciliatory and pacific spirit, and further proposing to him to send Count Nesselrode to London for the purpose of removing all misunderstanding between the two Governments on Eastern affairs.

To this letter the Emperor replied in the most friendly terms, that, both in consideration of Count Nesselrode's age and of other circumstances, this proposal was not practicable. His Imperial Majesty indulged in professions of peace and conciliation, and in the warmest manner invited His Majesty to Warsaw.

The King sent for Baron Manteuffel to consult him as to this acceptation of the invitation. Baron Manteuffel at once advised the King not to go to Warsaw. He stated to the King that as His Majesty was anxious to act in the Eastern question with England, his visit to Warsaw at this moment would not fail to be viewed with suspicion, if not displeasure, in London; that His Majesty should at all risks seek to maintain a neutral position free from all engagements; and that besides, that it was not becoming the interests of Prussia, or her dignity, to be dragged into any concert or alliance with Russia; that a visit to the Emperor of Russia would be unfavourably viewed by the public opinion of this country; and that for his part he could never consent to advise His Majesty to take such a step.

His Excellency here told me that he stood alone in tendering this advice to His Majesty; that even the Queen observed that a refusal to go to Warsaw would create coldness and displeasure with the Emperor, that it would reopen those sores which had only lately been healed; and that although she was no politician, yet on family grounds and out of personal regard to the Emperor of Russia, she wished the King to accept His Imperial Majesty's invitation.

All the Court party united their opinions to that of Her Majesty, amongst them the General Gerlach, Count Stolberg, and Count Munster.

Baron Manteuffel maintained his opinion unflinchingly, and His Majesty consented to follow his advice. He desired Baron Manteuffel to draw up his letter of reply to the Emperor.

This his Excellency did; but the King not approving of it, remarking that he was not in the habit of addressing the Emperor in the terms employed by Baron Manteuffel, His Majesty indited one himself.

In this letter His Majesty expressed his unwillingness at this moment to take a step of that nature which might bear an important political sense in the eyes of Europe; that His Majesty rather wished to maintain a position of neutrality, when perhaps his influence might at a later period be of service to the Emperor in tendering his good offices and impartial advice in the differences between England and Russia; and he therefore deeply regretted on these grounds to be obliged to decline His Imperial Majesty's invitation.

On despatching this letter the King informed Baron Manteuffel, that if the Emperor again urged him, he should feel himself called upon to accede to the Emperor's request.

The Emperor Nicholas, in reply to this letter, stated that nothing political would be agitated at Warsaw; that it was but a visit of a brother-in-law; and expressing himself in the tenderest terms, renewed again his invitation to the King, adding that he had especially invited the Emperor of Austria to meet His Majesty.

This letter was conveyed to His Majesty by Count Munster, and on its perusal (as I am informed from a private source) His Majesty, in a somewhat impatient tone, said "Eh bien, je partirai ce soir pour Varsovie."

Baron Manteuffel most distinctly stated to me his conviction that the King is fully determined to take no engagements and give no assurances whatever of a political nature. His Excellency repeated this several times; and finally added, "J'y réponds de mon existence."

His Excellency stated his regret that His Majesty had accepted the invitation; "for," said he, "it has already created a bad impression here."

He seemed to fear the effect which this visit would produce in London and Paris, and told me that he would write this evening to Chevalier Bunsen to offer the same explanations to your Lordship as his Excellency had already communicated to me. Baron Manteuffel further informed me that the King had given him to understand that his great object at Warsaw would be to prevent the Emperor of Austria from engaging himself too deeply with the Czar.

His Excellency does not fear that His Majesty's visit, whatever false interpretation may be given to it by the press and others, will prove of any importance to Prussia, neither that His Majesty will be seduced from his position of expectancy and of neutrality into any secret alliance or engagement with the Emperor of Russia.

From the tone and manner in which Baron Manteuffel conversed with me this day, I am convinced that so long as his Excellency holds the position of Prime Minister of Prussia, there will be no danger of her according any moral or physical support to Russian policy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 40.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 21. Confidential.)

Berlin, October 5, 1853.

My Lord,

THE intended visit of the Emperor of Russia to the Prussian Court, as reported in my previous despatch, is an event of perhaps more striking importance than the precipitate visit of His Prussian Majesty to Warsaw, and is calculated to impress the uninitiated with an opinion that a cordial alliance has been concluded between the two Monarchs.

The devotees of Russia will not certainly fail to describe this event in the most glowing terms, and to imbue the public mind with the conviction that in the face of passing events the three northern Courts are intimately allied in mutual support and for mutual protection.

The union of the three Sovereigns at Warsaw has, no doubt, been intended by the Czar as a counter-demonstration to the appearance of the allied fleets at Constantinople, and may indeed momentarily succeed in imposing on the credulous and timid sensibilities of the public mind.

There is no doubt entertained but that the Emperor has in view to resuscitate the Holy Alliance, and that no efforts have been or will be spared on his part to inveigle His Prussian Majesty into some treaty or arrangement with Russia.

Your Lordship will have remarked that His Prussian Majesty was neither attended to Warsaw by any member of his Ministry, nor even by any person of his household of a political tendency. All possibility, therefore, of signing any positive engagement was frustrated.

I am privately and confidentially informed from an authentic source that

His Prussian Majesty has stood firm in refusing to take any engagement or to give any assistance at Warsaw.

Under these circumstances, it appears evident that the only chance left to the Emperor of carrying through this scheme was to accompany the King here, for the purpose of endeavouring, with the aid of the Queen and the Court party, to gain over Baron Manteuffel; and in default of this, to resort to any other means by which he might attain this object.

It is therefore of the highest importance that I should inform your Lordship, and it is with the greatest satisfaction that I am enabled to do so, that Baron Manteuffel is steadfastly resolved and determined to oppose to the utmost any proposals of the Emperor of a nature to deprive Prussia of her free action, both now and hereafter, or which may lead her to abandon the position of neutrality which she is determined to maintain.

I am perfectly convinced that no artifices of the Emperor—no power of seduction or of menace, will avoid his inducing or forcing Baron Manteuffel to swerve from that line of policy which he has adopted, and on which the happiness and welfare of his country depend.

In the firm maintenance of his duty he will be supported by the public opinion of his country; he will be supported, I have reason to hope, by his Sovereign; and he will find a warm advocate in the Prince of Prussia, who, I am informed, sent a telegraphic message to His Majesty advising His Majesty not to go to Warsaw.

The policy of Prussia in the present crisis is evident and unmistakeable. She has nothing to gain by an alliance with Russia. She has everything to risk and to lose. Her finances would not allow her to engage in war, except at great sacrifice; her commerce and her industry would be ruined. She might be dragged into costly and deadly struggles in Hungary, Italy, and even Poland, from which she could reap no future compensation; whilst the alliance with Russia would be so anti-national, so unpopular, and would weigh so heavily on the nation, that internal disorders would soon be added to her other misfortunes.

On the other hand, her natural alliance is with England. It is dictated by two great principles, which in the present day are all-powerful. First, that of supporting Protestantism, and the furtherance of civil and religious liberty; and secondly, by the community of commercial and material interests.

At the present conjuncture, when the success of the Emperor's schemes might produce the gravest consequences, I have taken every means in my power, through influential friends of Baron Manteuffel, to convey to him the vital importance to Prussia of separating herself from Russian policy, of maintaining her neutrality. The strongest arguments have been laid before him, and I have the conviction that he will submit them to the highest quarter. I conceive that at the present moment all that we can ask of Prussia is neutrality. Our gain will even be considerable in keeping her detached from Russia. Of a successful issue in this respect I have no doubt, so long as Baron Manteuffel can hold his position; and at this present critical moment, and on a question in which he would be supported by public opinion, his secession from office would be too dangerous and embarrassing an object for his opponents to aim at.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 41.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 22.)

Berlin, October 5, 1853.

My Lord,

AT my interview with Baron Manteuffel this day he told me that the great object of the Emperor was to separate France from England; and that at Olmütz His Imperial Majesty had paid marked deference and attention to the French General, going the length of expressing his regret at not seeing the Emperor of the French, while he was as cold and reserved towards the English.

I replied to his Excellency, that the most perfect accord and unanimity

existed between the English and French Governments; that in every new phase which the Eastern question assumed, their identity of ideas was more apparent, and that the two Governments were perfectly decided as to the line which they should pursue.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 42.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 7.)

(No. 363.)
Vienna, October 4, 1853.

My Lord,

I TRANSMITTED to your Lordship, the day before yesterday, the two telegraphic despatches which had reached me from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Constantinople, the 25th and 26th ultimo, the last of which contained the important intelligence of the decision in favour of a declaration of war against Russia, which had been adopted by the Great Council of the Ottoman Empire.

I communicated this intelligence to Count Buol, who had not as yet received it from the Internuncio, although from his previous despatches he was prepared to expect it.

Fully aware of the gravity of such a decision unanimously adopted by the Divan, Count Buol still did not consider it as precluding all hopes of a peaceable arrangement. He looked upon the statement in Lord Stratford's despatch "that this decision had been taken notwithstanding the efforts of the Representatives of the Four Powers, and more particularly of his own," as affording some reason to expect that the counsel of the Sultan's allies might still have weight in preventing immediate hostilities, an expectation which was fortified by the decision of the Council that the declaration of war, and the measures to be adopted, were to be left to the Sultan.

Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the united action of the Four Powers would be employed to obtain this object, and should a term be fixed (as reported by M. de la Cour) for the evacuation of the Principalities previous to the commencement of hostilities, he thought that the time so gained might be taken advantage of to present to the Government of the Sultan the project of declaration submitted for your Lordship's approval, and which had received the sanction of the Russian Government, so as to induce the Turkish Ministers to pause before they brought upon their country the incalculable evils and dangers inseparable from a state of war.

Count Buol reiterated his conviction, that the statement contained in that declaration gave such assurances as ought to be a guarantee to the Sultan's Government, that the Emperor Nicholas only required the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, and sought for the exercise of no new right in Turkey; and upon these grounds he rested his hopes, that the ultimate recourse to arms might yet be averted.

I confess I do not feel as sanguine as Count Buol appears to be at the result to be expected from the course he recommends; but there can be no doubt that, with his sanction, every means will be resorted to that offers a chance, however slight, of obtaining the recall of the decision taken at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 43.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 237.)
Foreign Office, October 6, 1853.

Sir,

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday to inquire whether any decision had been taken by Her Majesty's Government upon Count Buol's despatch, which, as he learned from Count Nesselrode, was to be communicated to me by Count Colloredo.

In reply, I told Baron Brunnow that no final decision could be taken on that despatch until it had been submitted to the Cabinet; but in the meanwhile I should not hesitate to inform him that, under no circumstances would Her Majesty's Government recommend the Turkish Government now to accept the Vienna note: 1st, because it would be useless, as the Porte had determined not to accept it without modifications; and 2ndly, because a despatch from the Austrian Government, containing assurances as to the intentions of Russia, could not, in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, neutralize the despatch of Count Nesselrode, in which those intentions were disclosed in a manner to leave no doubt as to the interpretation that would hereafter be put upon the Vienna note by Russia.

I added that, assuming that Russia only asked what she had a right to claim, and what, consequently, Turkey was prepared to concede, it appeared incredible that all Europe should be kept in a state of suspense and excitement respecting a form of words which, under the circumstances, I assumed ought to present no difficulty whatever; but that no settlement of differences was possible by notes requiring explanations, and accompanied by vague assurances.

Baron Brunnow subsequently alluded to the letter he had received from me, and begged I would receive a remark he was about to make with the same friendly spirit and sincere desire to avoid misunderstanding between our Governments in which it was offered; and he then, after reciting the passage in my letter respecting the right of the British fleet not only to enter the Dardanelles, but to pass through the Straits, said, that if the British fleet entered the Black Sea, it might be regarded by the Russian Government as a serious proceeding, that would impart a new character to the question at issue. But Baron Brunnow again requested me to understand that he had no instructions from his Government on the subject, and had merely wished to record his own opinion.

I said that the passage of the letter to which he referred was a statement of the right possessed by Her Majesty's Government in consequence of the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, and the suspension of the Treaty of 1841; and that the manner of exercising that right would depend upon circumstances into which I should not then enter, as he had received no instructions from his Government to make the inquiry, and had confined himself to giving his own opinion in a tone and spirit that were unobjectionable.

Baron Brunnow informed me that it would be his duty to send a reply to my note, but he hoped it would not render a rejoinder necessary, as he should regret that the correspondence was prolonged. I said that would entirely depend upon the nature of his reply.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 44.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 221.)
Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency's despatches by telegraph, of the 25th and 26th ultimo, have been received. By the latter it appears that "Le Conseil Turc s'est prononcé aujourd'hui pour la guerre, après avoir déclaré la note de Vienne, telle qu'elle est, à jamais inadmissible. La déclaration (de) la guerre, et les mesures

à prendre sont laissées au Sultan et à ses Ministres. Les décisions ont été unanimes. Cette réunion (fut) composée de plus de 120 personnes. Les efforts des quatre représentants pour obtenir une solution pacifique ont manqué d'effet, de même que ceux que j'ai faits ce matin à la suite de l'arrivée pendant la nuit de vos dépêches expédiées par le 'Triton.' Je me propose de vous envoyer un exprès au plutôt par Marseille."

No later intelligence having since arrived, Her Majesty's Government are uninformed whether the Sultan has adopted the recommendation of the Council, and has actually declared war.

The continued occupation of the Principalities, the great efforts made, and the vast expense incurred for defence, the enthusiasm of the army, and the excitement of the people, and lastly, the rejection by Russia of the modifications of the note proposed by the Porte, are circumstances which may have rendered the determination of the Council a measure of indispensable necessity, but Her Majesty's Government observe that your Excellency more than once endeavoured to bring about a different result, and until they learn the grounds upon which your advice was rejected, or whether it may subsequently have been acted upon by the Sultan, it is difficult to send you precise instructions upon a state of things so critical, but with respect to which so much uncertainty still prevails.

Assuming, however, as the event most probable, that war has been declared, Her Majesty's Government would learn with satisfaction that your Excellency, acting either upon your original instructions, or upon those which were sent to you on the 23rd of September, had, in conjunction with your French colleague, called up the British and French fleets to Constantinople; but as it is possible that your Excellency may not have taken upon yourself this responsibility, I have to instruct you, after concerting with M. de la Cour, whose instructions will be to a similar effect, to request that Admiral Dundas will bring the British fleet to Constantinople, whether war has been declared by the Sultan or not, provided that this course should not meet with objection on the part of his Highness.

Her Majesty's Government have at present no means of judging whether the Porte, by declaring war, renounces all hope of a peaceful arrangement of its differences with Russia, or whether active hostilities are immediately to be commenced; but even though hostilities should unfortunately have commenced, Her Majesty's Government do not yet despair of amicably terminating the question at issue, towards the settlement of which their anxious efforts are still directed.

You will observe that the instructions now given to your Excellency authorize the employment of the British fleet only in defensive operations. You are authorized, acting in concert with Admiral Dundas and your French colleague, to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, or at whatever place, your Excellency may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against direct aggression; but if the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol, the fleets would then, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosphorus.

I inclose the copy of a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which was placed in my hands by Count Walewski, and the copy of a despatch I have addressed to Lord Cowley.

I have to observe that a descent such as that contemplated by M. de Lhuys upon a place now so strongly fortified as Varna, appears very improbable.

Her Majesty's Government are far from intending to impose upon your Excellency any responsibility that they can properly take upon themselves, but having explained the reasons which render precise instructions impossible, they think it advisable to leave to your Excellency and to Admiral Dundas, in concert with the French Ambassador and Admiral, to determine upon the best mode of giving effect to their views for the defence of the Ottoman dominion against direct aggression. I shall only add that Buyukderé appears to Her Majesty's Government to be the station from which the fleets could most readily be made available for any service that might be required of them for the protection of Constantinople, or of any other parts of the Turkish territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, that might be in danger of attack.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 45.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 220.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.*

IT will be necessary that Admiral Dundas should inform the Russian admiral commanding at Sevastopol that if the Russian fleet should come out of that port for the purpose of landing troops on any portion of the Turkish territory, or of committing any act of overt hostility against the Porte, his orders are to protect the Sultan's dominions from attack, and he will express a hope that no measures will be resorted to by the Russian Admiral that would endanger the peaceful relations between Great Britain and Russia.

A similar communication will probably at the same time be made by the French Admiral.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 46.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

No. 328.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.*

IN my despatch No. 326, I stated to you the substance of a despatch from Count Buol, which had been communicated to me by Count Colloredo, and which contained a project of note to be signed by the Four Representatives at Constantinople, and delivered in exchange for the original note sent from Vienna.

Your Lordship will express to Count Buol the regret of Her Majesty's Government at being unable to concur in a measure to which the Austrian Government attaches so much importance, but which Her Majesty's Government are convinced would be attended with no other result than fresh disappointment and further loss of time.

The Turkish Government have declared that they cannot accept the Vienna note without the modifications, which they had a perfect right to propose, and which were adopted by the Conference, but which were unfortunately rejected by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. Her Majesty's Government know, therefore, that it would be useless to recommend the note in its unaltered form; and they know, moreover, that it would be dishonourable to do so with reference to the interpretation put upon it by Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Meyendorff, which the project of note now proposed by Count Buol would not neutralize, nor would it afford any real security to the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government will not doubt that the assurances contained in that note were given with a desire to remove the apprehensions felt by the Turkish Government; but there is reason to fear that by such means the object desired will not be attained, for the note appears to adopt the sense in which Russia persists in construing the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Kainardji, and thus, by maintaining that the privileges and immunities of the Greek Church have been conferred in consequence and in fulfilment of that Article, to assume a protectorate over the Greek subjects of the Sultan.

But the Seventh Article, by which the Sultan promises protection to the Christian religion in all its churches, confers no protectorate upon the Emperor of Russia. A new right is therefore sought, and it is one that the Sultan, with due regard to his independence, cannot concede. The Emperor of Russia, however, disclaims all desire of acquiring any new right, and it is impossible therefore to comprehend why a point that could so easily be made clear should so perseveringly be left in doubt.

Count Buol's note renews the assurances that are to be found in the circular of Count Nesselrode, that the Emperor asks nothing contrary to the

rights and independence of the Sultan; but if His Imperial Majesty obtains a protectorate over the Greek Church, he will acquire a right of interfering between the Sultan and his subjects that must be contrary to the independence of the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction that Count Buol's note contains an assurance that, as regards the present, the Emperor of Russia demands only in favour of the Greek Church the advantages already granted to other religious communities subjects of the Porte: but for the future His Imperial Majesty would seem to demand that the Sultan should grant to the Greek Church every advantage accorded to other Christian communities.

If the omission of the words "subjects of the Porte" after the words "other Christian communities" is intentional, a new right would be established by which the Emperor might demand for twelve million subjects of the Porte every advantage that the Sultan by agreement with the Pope or any other Catholic Power might choose to grant to Catholics residing in his dominions.

Count Buol will therefore perceive that in addition to the reasons I have already stated, which render it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to advise the Porte to adopt the original Vienna note, there are also objections to his own project of note which they cannot overlook. But in the interest of peace, which we are all so deeply concerned in maintaining, and possibly as the last hope of averting the crisis which we all deprecate, Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire that the influence of Austria may be exerted to induce the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to adopt a form of words that shall leave no doubt of the Emperor's intentions, and no cause for alarm on the part of the Porte, nor of those Powers who desire to maintain the independence of Turkey.

It seems impossible that the Emperor of Russia should think that his personal dignity, or his position, either at home or in Europe, requires him to insist upon a form of note which the Sultan affirms is inconsistent with that independence which the Emperor has declared his wish to uphold; or that His Imperial Majesty, who since his accession to the throne, has laboured for the preservation of peace, should now seriously contemplate war upon a strained construction of the Treaty of Kainardji, and a claim for religious privileges to the Sultan's subjects which they have not hitherto enjoyed; while the Emperor at the same time disclaims all desire for further influence, while the only grievance he had against the Porte has been satisfactorily settled, and a guarantee against its recurrence is given, and while the Sultan renews his Treaty engagements and solemnly promises to maintain inviolate every privilege and immunity granted to the Greek Church by himself or his ancestors.

If Europe is for such causes to be exposed to the calamities of war, they will be without parallel in history; and I again express the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government, that the Austrian Government will not attempt to obtain the concessions contained in the Vienna note, which the Porte cannot grant; but that it will spare no effort to persuade the Cabinet of St. Petersburg frankly and at once to give effect to the reiterated declarations of the Emperor.

You will communicate this despatch to Count Buol, and give him a copy, should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 47.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 9.*)

Vienna, October 8, 1853.

(Télégraphique.)

JE viens de recevoir de Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, en date de Constantinople, le 1er du courant, ce qui suit.

Il paraît hors de doute que toute négociation ayant pour but un arrangement agréable aux deux parties est pour le moment sans espoir.

Je ne m'aperçois que de deux manières d'agir l'une et l'autre à peine possible, par lesquelles on pourrait éviter la guerre.

Chacun de ces expédiens dépendrait pour son succès d'une entente complète entre les Quatre Puissances, et d'une intervention décidée de leur part.

La première peut être ébauchée dans ces termes:

Une nouvelle rédaction pure de la note de Vienne, renfermant en substance les modifications proposées par la Porte et communiquées aux Cabinets Russe et Turc par les dites Puissances, accompagnée d'une déclaration portant qu'elle a été adoptée par elles comme portion du Traité Sextuple de 1841, dans la conviction qu'elle ne diffère pas essentiellement quant au sens du droit original, et que les droits des traiteurs Russes et les droits souveraines de la Porte se trouvent par elle également garantis.

Une pareille manière d'agir serait mutuellement basée sur les principes déclarés en 1841, ainsi que sur assertions respectives de la Turquie, que la première n'exige aucune nouvelle concession, et que la dernière ne cherche à éluder aucune obligation existante.

Le seul expédient qui semble rester serait un arbitrage auquel les Quatre Puissances prendraient part de concert avec une cinquième choisie par elles.

La question en litige devrait être résolue d'après les principes annoncés ci-dessus dans les limites dans la note de Vienne, et des modifications proposées à la majorité de voix de cinq arbitraires.

Si l'une ou l'autre de ces idées était approuvée comme susceptible, elle devait être mise en pratique sans le moindre retard.

L'évacuation des Principautés devait être la suite immédiate de la décision qui serait emise.

No. 48.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 8, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Chevalier Bunsen this morning made to me a communication precisely similar to that which is contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 18, of the 5th instant, and in the name of Baron Manteuffel assured me, that he never would sanction such a Treaty as he had reason to believe would be proposed to the King of Prussia by the Emperor Nicholas, and which had already been agreed to by the Emperor of Austria.

The Chevalier Bunsen could not inform me what was the precise nature of this Treaty, but said that it probably had reference to the Eastern question, and was intended, by uniting the Three Powers more closely together, to counterbalance the intimate alliance of England and France, which the Emperor of Russia now felt he could not disturb.

I did not disguise from the Chevalier Bunsen, that the visit of the King of Prussia to Warsaw, particularly when it was known that he had declined the first invitation of the Emperor of Russia, was calculated to produce a very unfavourable impression in this country.

On the part of Her Majesty's Government I requested Chevalier Bunsen to thank Baron Manteuffel for the communication he had been instructed to make to me, and to assure him that so long as he remained in his present position, Her Majesty's Government felt confident that Prussia would not support the ambitious policy of Russia in the East, nor enter into any engagement that would alienate her from England and France, and render her dependent upon Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 49.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 7, 1853.*

THE messenger Webster delivered to me this day, at 2 o'clock P.M., your Lordship's despatches to No. 12 inclusive.

After hastily perusing them, I waited on Baron Manteuffel, and was fortunate to have a few moments' conversation with his Excellency previous to his departure for Potsdam, to receive His Prussian Majesty and the Emperor of Russia.

His time was too limited (and more particularly as his Excellency is not conversant with English) to allow of my communicating to him *in extenso* (in obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 11) the despatch No. 222, which your Lordship had addressed to Sir H. Seymour, pourtraying with such force and clearness the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government could no longer counsel the Porte to accept the Vienna note, when I expressed to his Excellency the absolute necessity, under the present altered circumstances, of devising some fresh mode of arrangement.

His Excellency said that if the Porte persisted in her refusal to sign the note without modifications, he did not well see how Russia could accept the note with modifications, and that in this case the Vienna note would become a dead letter.

I stated to his Excellency that the declaration lately proposed to be given to Turkey as an equivalent for her modifications, offered no guarantee for the future, on the part of Russia; that the Russian name would pass down to posterity in indelible characters ready to be produced as a living document on any favourable occasion, whilst the declaration of the Four Powers, after having undergone a tardy conception and a hurried birth, would, unless duly signed and ratified by the Russian Government, bear no stamp of legal value; that it might hereafter be subjected to as dubious a construction as had now been offered to the Vienna note.

I further remarked to his Excellency that there was no use in discussing this point further, for the Porte positively would not sign the note as it now stood, and therefore if any amicable arrangement was to be attained, it must be sought for through another channel.

I then read to his Excellency with emphasis the instructions embodied in your Lordship's No. 11.

I could perceive that his Excellency was impressed with the decisive tone of your Lordship's despatch, but he did not offer any further remark.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 50.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 26. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 7, 1853.*

I WAS anxious to profit of the few moments of my interview with Baron Manteuffel this day to impress him deeply with the grave importance to Europe and to his own country of the interview which his Excellency would shortly have with the Emperor of Russia; and I thought it my duty to express to him my conviction that attempts would be made to induce him to enter into promises or engagements which would materially change the system he had hitherto expressed his intention to pursue, and prove of the most disastrous consequences to the present and future interests of Prussia. I repeated to him again the arguments I had used in favour of Prussia maintaining an independent line, as reported in my No. 21, and the danger that must result to her from an

alliance with Russia, and I quoted to his Excellency the words of the Great Frederic, "that the quarter from which Prussia has most to fear was Russia."

His Excellency listened with attention, and I could well perceive is perfectly prepared to withstand any attempt that may be directed against him. He seems to place reliance on the King, and to be assured that His Majesty will remain steadfast to the policy he was pursuing, and to the views he has so often expressed. It must also be borne in mind that the King has personally since 1848 no great feeling or predilection for the Emperor Nicholas.

Baron Manteuffel remarked to me that there was only one idea which appeared to weigh on His Majesty's mind; it was the continual fear of France and French invasion.

I told his Excellency that this fear ought rather to bind him more closely to England; that in the event of war his greatest security would be in not allying himself with Russia.

Baron Manteuffel told me in the most resolute manner that they would never get him to sign any engagement with, or make any promises of whatever nature to, the Emperor of Russia.

I trust, my Lord, that in lieu of having achieved a victory, His Imperial Majesty will quit the Prussian capital with having sustained a moral defeat, the greater for having sought his end in person.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an article in original and translation from the "Kreuz Zeitung," (the Russian organ,) with respect to the visit of the Emperor of Russia, at the end of which is very ambiguously expressed a doubt that it will attain any political object.

His Imperial Majesty will remain at Potsdam until Monday next, and will return on the morning of that day to Warsaw.

I shall hope on Tuesday to be informed of what has passed at Warsaw and here, and shall not fail to report to your Lordship all details of interest and importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 51.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 10.)

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 7, 1853.*

I HAVE thought it important, previous to the arrival of the Emperor of Russia, that there should be no delusion as to the cordial unanimity existing between the English and French Governments.

I therefore took occasion to express this in the strongest manner to Baron Manteuffel, and at my suggestion the same assurances were given by the Marquis de Monstier, the French Minister at this Court.

M. de Monstier informed me, a few days ago, that he had received a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, complaining rather of the seeming backwardness of the conduct of Baron Manteuffel; I told him that he must make some allowances for the position of Prussia at Vienna, placed as she was between Austria and Russia, and wishing to maintain a neutral policy; that I did not think it desirable to press her too far, as, with my knowledge of the Prussian character, it might have the effect of exciting their alarm and suspicion, and thus would tend to an unfavourable rather than a favourable issue.

I told him that it would be useless to seek from Prussia anything more than her neutrality, and that we should gain a considerable point in detaching her from Russia.

M. de Moustier has since informed me that he has seen Baron Manteuffel, and that he was most satisfied with the assurances which he had given him.

I take this opportunity of informing your Lordship, that I am on the most friendly terms with M. de Monstier, and that we are cordially united in furthering the views of our respective Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 52.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 743.) *Paris, October 9, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 404 inclusive.

I have read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the latter part of your Lordship's despatch No. 403, and the instructions to the Earl of Westmorland and to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, inclosed in No. 404. The French Minister read to me in return two despatches which he had addressed on the 7th instant to M. de Bourqueney. The first of these, intended for communication to Count Buol, has I believe been made known to your Lordship by Count Walewski, and is in substance what I informed your Lordship in my despatch No. 740 M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposed addressing to the French Envoy at Vienna: the second, a despatch of great length and great merit, was read to me in so hurried a manner by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that I should not do justice to it by attempting to analyse it.

It contains a recapitulation of what has been the conduct and motives of France in the Eastern question, and shows the dangers to which Europe, and Austria in particular, will be exposed, should war be the result.

The instructions for M. de la Cour are not yet ready. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not in his late conversations with the Emperor, contemplated the possibility of the fleets being employed on the Asiatic coasts of the Black Sea, and he is unwilling to send instructions to the French Admiral "to employ the combined fleets in whatever manner, and at whatever place, they may think necessary for defending the Turkish territory against direct aggression," without a further reference to His Imperial Majesty. He did not, however, after the explanations which I gave him of the value of Batoom and Trebizond, appear to doubt that he should be empowered to extend M. de la Cour's powers, and as he has an extraordinary occasion for communicating with that Ambassador by a steamer which will leave Marseilles on the 14th instant, and which is intended to arrive at Constantinople before the ordinary steamer which leaves on the 11th, nothing will be lost by the delay.

With reference to that part of your despatch No. 403 to me, and of your despatch No. 221 to Viscount Stratford, commenting on the improbability of an attack by the Russians on Varna, which appeared to be apprehended by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I beg to observe that when the French Minister for Foreign Affairs proposed that the line of the Balkan with Varna should be considered to be the rayon of defence for Constantinople, and that the operations of the fleet therefore should be confined to the defence of the coast between the entry from the Bosphorus into the Black Sea and the fortress of Varna, I did not understand him either to propose that the fleets, or any part of them, should necessarily and immediately enter the Black Sea, or to express fears for the safety of Varna. I have inquired of his Excellency this morning whether my interpretation of his words is correct, and I find that it is so; that he had no contemplation of exposing the fleets at this season in the Black Sea, unless the Russians should cross the Danube and attempt to turn the Balkan by Varna, or, what was still more in his thoughts, unless a Russian expedition should attempt to land between Varna and the mouth of the Bosphorus,—at Bourgus, for instance. He quite agrees with your Lordship that there cannot be a better spot than Buyukderé for the present rendezvous of the combined fleets.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 53.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Télégraphique.) *Foreign Office, October 10, 6·45 P.M.*

FAITES-MOI savoir tout de suite l'opinion du Cabinet Autrichien sur la première proposition contenue dans la dépêche de Lord Stratford du 1er Octobre. Elle a été favorablement accueillie ici comme la seule solution possible.

No. 54.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 15. Confidential.) *Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.*

My Lord.

I HAVE to inform you, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on the Eastern question, as reported in your despatch No. 21, of the 5th instant; and I have to instruct you to continue to hold the same language upon the important subjects to which your despatch relates.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 55.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 16.) *Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 22, of the 5th instant, reporting your conversation with Baron Manteuffel relative to the object of the Emperor of Russia to separate England and France on the Eastern question, I have to inform you that the opinions which you have expressed are quite correct, and you will lose no opportunity of making it known that the views and policy of the English and French Governments are identical on this question, and will be firmly carried out.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 56.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 17.) *Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.*

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 25 of the 7th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you have held with Baron Manteuffel on the Eastern question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 57.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 26 of the 7th instant. Her Majesty's Government learn with great satisfaction that the meeting of the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia is not likely to have the results that were to be apprehended from it. The firmness of Baron Manteuffel must in no small degree have contributed to the maintenance of that independent policy in which the best interests of Prussia are involved.

You may confidentially assure Baron Manteuffel that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Prussia has nothing to fear from France, and that the policy of the Emperor of the French is essentially pacific; but on that account, if it were on no other, it is of the utmost importance that the peace of Europe should not be disturbed, for in the event of war it is impossible to calculate upon the course that France might be compelled to take. The Prussian Government should therefore spare no effort to induce the Emperor of Russia to terminate his differences with Turkey by not insisting upon demands to which the Sultan cannot yield; and it appears incomprehensible that His Imperial Majesty should still keep Europe in a state of painful excitement and suspense, when by the alteration of a form of words he could obtain all he is entitled to ask, and give effect to his own repeated declarations of not wishing to acquire new rights or increased influence in Turkey.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 58.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 19.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 28 of the 7th instant, reporting the assurances which you had given Baron Manteuffel of the cordial understanding which exists between the British and French Governments on the Eastern question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 59.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 234. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1853.

Sir,

SINCE the date of your despatch No. 507 of the 30th ultimo, you will have received my despatch No. 221, marked "Confidential," of the 29th ultimo, in which I inclosed copies of two despatches, dated the 7th of September, from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.

I have already stated to you that these papers must be considered as confidential, Baron Brunnow having discovered, after he left them with me, that he was only instructed to communicate them. I have now to instruct you to report to me whether Count Nesselrode read to you his second despatch to Baron Meyendorff, containing the analysis of the objections of the Russian

Government to the Turkish modifications, or only the first despatch to Baron Meyendorff, stating in general terms the reasons why those modifications were rejected.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 60.

Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, October 11.)

(Traduction.) 22 *Zilhidjé*, 1269. (25 *Septembre*, 1853.)

NOTRE Ambassadeur à Paris vient de nous écrire qu'on y était porté à soupçonner que Lord Stratford de Redcliffe était disposé à la guerre, et que, dès-lors, il ne remplissait pas strictement les instructions de son Gouvernement dans la question actuelle. Le fait est que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, conformément à ses instructions, non-seulement n'a exprimé à la Sublime Porte rien qui l'encourageât à la guerre, mais qu'au contraire, d'accord avec ses collègues, il a fait tous ses efforts pour exhorter et déterminer la Sublime Porte à accepter, sans modifications, le projet de note de Vienne.

La non-acceptation par la Sublime Porte de la note de Vienne n'est que l'effet de son propre jugement. Les imputations donc dirigées contre la personne de l'Ambassadeur de la Grande Bretagne, ne sauraient être considérées que comme des inventions émanant des ennemis de la Sublime Porte.

Comme j'ai reçu l'ordre de Sa Majesté de faire connaître à notre Ambassadeur à Paris combien ces imputations sont dénuées de fondement, je suis autorisé à vous en faire également part, afin que vous ayez à tenir à Londres tel langage que les circonstances exigeraient.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) RESHID.

No. 61.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October* 11, 1853.

OFFICER from "Fury" arrived. Report of the Council in favour of war confirmed by the Sultan. Course to be adopted. Omer Pasha to inform Russians they must evacuate in fifteen days; refusal on their part to be considered a declaration of war and hostilities declared.

No. 62.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, October* 11, 1853.

Tuesday.—M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has no objection to Lord Stratford's first proposition. He will desire M. Bourqueney to support, if made by Lord Westmorland.

No. 63.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 277.)

Therapia, September 25, 1853.

My Lord,

ON the morning of the 22nd instant I received from the Earl of Westmorland a telegraphic despatch dated the 16th; a copy of it is inclosed herewith. It informs me of what had occurred in the conference at Vienna subsequently to the arrival of a negative answer from Russia, and to the receipt of your Lordship's instruction thereon to Lord Westmorland. That instruction in its application to me was neutralised by Count Buol's declaration respecting M. Drouyn de Lhuys' note, and by Lord Westmorland's reference to your Lordship for fresh instructions, all collective action being found, as he affirms, impossible for the time at Vienna.

The messenger with your Lordship's despatches to the 8th, arrived on the afternoon of the 22nd. I have nothing to acknowledge on the subject of the pending difference, except the correspondence with the Courts, communicated in copy.

My colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia have received telegraphic despatches from Vienna, announcing the total refusal of the Porte's modifications by Russia, and recommending anew the acceptance of Count Buol's note without amendments. The idea of Austria and Prussia appears to be that the Porte should send its acceptance by an Ambassador to Olmütz, in the hope that the Emperor of Austria being there with the Emperor Nicholas, His Majesty might prevail upon the latter to evacuate the Principalities at once, and remove the Porte's distrust by satisfactory assurances.

The Ottoman Ministers, on the other hand, persist in their previous determination. They continue to attach a vital importance to the modifications of the Austrian note demanded by their Government; and notwithstanding various rumours of successful intrigue and of a change of counsels, sometimes at the Seraglio, sometimes at the Porte, their intentions, since they received from the Sultan's Ambassador at Vienna a confirmation of the Russian negative, assume more and more a character of resistance even to war.

My impression is, that they have it in contemplation to address a direct summons to Prince Gortchakoff for the evacuation of the Principalities by the troops under his command, allowing a certain term for compliance; that, in case of refusal on his part, they will order an incursion on the side of Georgia, and also perhaps an attack on the Russian gun-boats on the Danube, if not an attempt beyond. It is also, I suspect, in contemplation to lay an embargo on the Russian shipping, to send passports to the Russian Consuls and agents remaining in Turkey, and to explain these proceedings to the nation and foreign Powers by means of a public manifesto.

It cannot be necessary for me to assure your Lordship, that I have not waited for fresh instructions in order to check these tendencies by admonishing the Porte of their perilous consequences, by repeating the former advice of Her Majesty's Government as to the acceptance of Count Buol's note, and by holding out the prospect of guarantees affording more security than the proposed modifications of that note. Unfortunately, for the admission of your Lordship's arguments, the importance attached by the Porte to its own view of the question has derived additional strength from the indifference shown to its ultimatum, from the silence maintained by the allied Powers with respect to its protest against the Russian occupation of the Principalities, from the expensive preparations which it has made for war; and, finally, from the excited state of mind prevailing among the Mussulman population, and more especially among the religious classes and corporate tradesmen of the capital.

Yesterday morning, to my surprise, and, indeed, to that of every one not in the secret, the Sultan, whose firmness had been doubted of late, commanded the attendance of his principal Ministers at the palace: and, after establishing in their presence the facts of the refusal of the Porte's amendments by Russia, and the Porte's determination not to give them up, directed a meeting of the General Council to be called for this day.

According to the information which has reached me, I have reason to believe that war in principle will be the result of its deliberations, and that an actual declaration of war will be delayed awhile in order to afford time for some additional preparations, and for giving effect to some auxiliary measures that cannot be dispensed with. It is reported that about 100 individuals are invited to the Council, and that among them is an unusual number of the Ulema.

I have now to state, with respect to me and my colleagues, that much embarrassment has arisen from the want of any positive instructions, owing, apparently, to some unexplained accident in the case of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, for whom despatches of the 13th instant have been officially announced, and to distance, no doubt, and to consequent slowness of communication, with respect to the French Ambassador and myself.

The day before yesterday, on the receipt of telegraphic despatches from Vienna of the 17th, the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives had a separate meeting at Pera, and I was informed that they intended to meet again in the same manner, and, when agreed among themselves, to seek a conference with me. A passage in Lord Westmorland's telegraphic despatch to your Lordship of the 16th, suggested, at the same time, a suspicion of something like intimidation to be employed by M. de Bruck in support of Count Buol's note, and its unconditional acceptance by the Porte.

I thought it best to meet these appearances at once with becoming frankness. I told M. de la Cour that I would not consent to a conference in which I should stand on any other than equal terms with him and our colleagues. I received in reply from his Excellency a solemn assurance that there was no truth whatever in the report which had reached me of a separate understanding between them. I also gave M. de Bruck distinctly to understand that, far from taking part in any language of an intimidating tendency towards the Porte under present circumstances, I should feel it my bounden duty, in the absence of instructions, to mark my repugnance to any such mode of proceeding by a total separation from those who adopted it. Baron de Bruck admitted that the passage, which I had pointed out to him in Lord Westmorland's report, might fairly warrant an unfavourable inference, but that he expected nothing of the kind from his Court, and certainly was not authorized as yet to employ any language of an intimidating character. He stated, however, that he had instructions to complain of the treatment experienced by Christians in Bosnia, and to remonstrate against the employment of refugees in the Turkish army.

It is obvious that representations of this kind may be addressed with perfect fairness and in no unfriendly spirit to the Porte; but it is also evident that much depends upon the tone which is given to them, and upon the extent to which in the sequel they may be carried.

This morning, at an early hour, the three Representatives came in a body to my house. After the explanations which had taken place I received them with confidence, and raised no further question as to their intentions. Having learnt, the evening before, that a General Council was to take place at the Porte to-day for the purpose stated to your Lordship, I had already prepared a letter to Reshid Pasha, with the twofold view of making another attempt in favour of delay on the ground of our expected instructions, and of diverting the Porte, if possible, from its inclination to substitute a hostile attitude for any further endeavour to attain its object by means of the Four Powers. The draft of my letter was founded on such indications of your Lordship's views as I could extract from the imperfect or unofficial elements within my reach; and I tried to make it as impressive in admonition and as attractive in point of assurances as I could possibly venture to do without exposing myself to the hazard of being disavowed by Her Majesty's Government.

Being thus prepared, and time being as precious as the circumstances were urgent, I declared without reserve, but with every consideration for my colleagues, that, if they would unite with me, I was ready to send in the proposed letter; but, with the exception of mere verbal alterations, that, if they were not at liberty to go so far, I should myself abstain from addressing the letter to Reshid Pasha. To prevent mistakes, I read to them the whole of Lord Westmorland's telegraphic despatch of the 16th.

The French Ambassador declared at once that he accepted the letter without reserve. The Internuncio and M. de Wildenbruch, after much hesitation and sincere endeavours, I believe, to overcome their scruples, declined to follow him, unless the declaration, constituting a future guarantee for the Porte, and sent

with your Lordship's concurrence to M. de Bourqueney, were withdrawn. Such a mutilation of this essential point of my letter could not possibly receive my assent, the more so as the guarantee in question had been recommended by your Lordship, and was essential to a step proposed with the view of turning the Porte from its hostile propensities, and obtaining, against every probability, one more chance for a pacific settlement.

The issue of the meeting was that the French Ambassador decided on signing the letter, and sending it to Reshid Pasha, whether I did so or not; that M. de Bruck and his Prussian colleague stated it as their intention to make use of the letter, with the substitution of a more general paragraph instead of the guaranteeing declaration; and that I reserved the right of acting as I had declared at the commencement of our interview.

My draft of the letter is inclosed herewith in copy, and the alteration adopted by the Austrian and Prussian Ministers is annexed to it for your Lordship's more complete information.

It remains for me to explain the course which I subsequently adopted for the purpose of uniting a proper degree of consistency with the exigencies of the case. I addressed an instruction to M. Pisani explaining the circumstances which had just occurred, and inclosing to him a copy of the above-mentioned draft, with directions to communicate both in full, but without my signature to the letter.

I hope to have made by this simple expedient as much impression on the Turkish Government as the circumstances admit of, without overstepping the line which seemed to be traced in your telegraphic instruction to Lord Westmorland. I cannot, however, conceal my persuasion that the Porte has made up its mind to reject every suggestion involving the signature of the Vienna note without modifications, and consequently to seek an escape from its present embarrassment in the hazards of war directed more immediately to the evacuation of the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 63.

The Earl of Westmorland to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienne, le 16 Septembre*, 1853.

VOICI la dépêche que j'ai reçu aujourd'hui de Lord Clarendon :

"J'ai attendu une réponse de Paris. Elle n'est pas arrivée. M. Drouyn de Lhuys étant absent, j'ai tout lieu de penser que Bourqueney recevra une dépêche semblable à ce qui suit. Les Quatre Puissances ont engagé la Russie à accepter la modification parcequ'elles n'ont pas pensé que ces modifications altérassent le sens de la note. La même considération les détermine à conseiller au Gouvernement Turc de la signer, en lui faisant savoir que les Quatre Puissances sont disposées à déclarer, en réponse de la note de Reshid Pasha, qu'elles considèrent que la note de Vienne ne confère à l'Empereur de Russie aucun droit d'ingérence entre le Sultan et ses sujets, et qu'elles adhéreront en toute occasion à cette interprétation. Une semblable déclaration est pour la Porte un bien meilleure garantie que les modifications à la note de Vienne proposées par le Divan. Si la Conférence y adhère, transmettez-la à Lord Stratford sans délai. Le Sultan ne pourrait guère écrire à l'Empereur sans savoir d'avance quelle réponse."

A Lord Clarendon, datée 16 Septembre, 6 heures du soir :

"J'ai reçu votre dépêche d'hier. M. de Bourqueney a soumis à la Conférence le projet de note de M. Drouyn de Lhuys auquel votre dépêche réfère. Le Comte Buol a exprimé la crainte que ce document ne suffit plus à conjurer les périls de la situation, et il a fait observer que les démarches prescrites à M. de Bruck par ses dépêches du 13, allant beaucoup plus loin que celles qui lui étaient proposées, il ne pourrait pas les faire suivre par un Conseil plus affaibli. Le Cabinet Autrichien adjure les Puissances Occidentales d'adresser sans délai à leurs Représentants les instructions les plus

péremptoires dans le sens de l'acceptation pure et simple de la note de Vienne. L'action collective n'est plus possible en ce moment, mais l'action individuelle dans le même sens la remplace, et chaque Puissance peut y joindre les garanties qu'elle jugera convenables d'offrir à la Porte. Le Comte Buol a aussi tenu un langage satisfaisant sur la date de l'évacuation. Le Comte Arnim s'est associé à l'opinion du Comte Buol. Dans cette position j'en avertis Lord Stratford en lui disant que je réclame de nouvelles instructions de mon Gouvernement. M. de Bourqueney reçoit de Paris datée d'aujourd'hui les mots suivantes : 'Le point essentiel est d'arriver ensemble à Constantinople et d'y tenir le même langage en insistant sur l'acceptation pure et simple de la note de Vienne.' M. de Foublanque est prié de faire passer immédiatement cette dépêche par Tartare à Lord Redcliffe."

(Signé) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 63.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

Therapia, le 25 Septembre, 1853.

Altesse,

LES circonstances critiques dans lesquelles se trouvent actuellement la Sublime Porte, me prescrivent le devoir de fixer votre attention sur le danger qu'il y aurait pour elle si les voies de la négociation venaient à lui être fermées par quelque résolution précipitée de sa part. J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous communiquer les motifs qui m'ont fait désirer que la réunion du Conseil fût remise de quelques jours, et je viens d'apprendre avec peine que ma suggestion à cet égard n'a pas eu de suite. Il me reste encore l'espoir que la Porte reconnaitra l'importance, dans son propre intérêt, de prendre en considération de la manière la plus sérieuse les conseils des Quatre Puissances ses amies, avant de s'arrêter à un parti définitif par rapport à son différend avec la Russie. Quant à mon Gouvernement, je dois répéter à votre Altesse que tout en appréciant les motifs qui ont induit la Porte à demander certaines modifications dans le projet de note envoyé de Vienne, j'ai raison de présumer qu'il est encore de l'opinion que la Porte pourrait signer cette note sans mettre en péril soit les droits de sa souveraineté, soit son indépendance nationale. On s'attache d'autant plus à cette opinion que la note ne confère à l'Empereur de Russie aucun droit d'ingérence entre le Sultan et ses sujets, et qu'en toute occasion mon Gouvernement adhérerait, de concert toutefois avec ses alliés, à cette interprétation.

Je supplie votre Altesse de bien péser, avec la sagesse qui lui appartient, tout ce qu'il y aurait de rassurant pour la Porte dans une telle déclaration, et combien son avenir en serait garanti. Il ne saurait échapper à votre pénétration que le refus d'un moyen conciliateur aussi favorable qu'il est sûr ne laisserait au Gouvernement Ottoman d'autre choix que de prolonger indéfiniment un état de tension qui épuise ses forces et menace de lui créer mille embarras, ou de plonger l'empire dans toutes les horreurs de la guerre, en ne tenant pas compte des périls qui s'y rattachent et des sacrifices qu'elle ne manquerait pas d'entraîner.

Il est bien entendu que l'évacuation complète des Principautés ne souffrirait pas le moindre retard.

En priant votre Altesse de vouloir bien porter un moment plutôt cette communication, dictée par l'amitié la plus cordiale, à la connaissance de ses collègues ainsi qu'à celle du Conseil, je profite, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 63.

Passage proposed by the Ministers of Austria and Prussia to be substituted for the concluding part of the first paragraph of Letter of Representatives to Reshid Pasha.

"LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'attache d'autant plus à cette opinion qu'il n'a agi dans cette question que dans une entente parfaite avec ses alliés."

No. 64.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 279.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 26, 1853.*

YOUR despatches to the 15th instant, forwarded from Marseilles in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Triton," reached me in the night, and at an early hour this morning I waited on Reshid Pasha, intending, with their assistance, to make yet another effort in favour of peace.

The General Council, in its sitting of yesterday, had not come to an irrevocable decision. It was to meet again to-day, and there still existed a bare possibility of its being induced to follow a less precipitate course.

With this last chance in view, I brought the whole purport of your Lordship's instruction No. 184 under his Highness's consideration. I apprised him of the friendly and attentive manner in which the Porte's modifications had been examined by Her Majesty's Government, and of your Lordship's deliberate conviction that they make no real addition to the securities implied in the terms, and particularly in the spirit, of Count Buol's note. I painted in strong colours the danger to which the Porte would expose itself by staking its resources single-handed against those of the Russian Empire. I made no secret of those circumstances which, operating generally throughout Europe, and more particularly at this moment in France, forbid the Porte to look with any degree of confidence to active cooperation from without. Admitting the unexpected and effective energy which had been displayed in preparing for the worst, I reminded the Ottoman Minister of the several obvious deficiencies, especially in point of finance, under which the Porte would have to labour in a hostile contest with Russia. I did not conceal from him our opinion that, even if the allied squadrons were to appear in the Black Sea, they could not be expected to afford any effectual aid, either for impeding the progress of an invasion in Bulgaria, or for compelling the Russian army to evacuate the Principalities.

With respect to the proposed means of arrangement I said that, although the Porte might feel a natural reluctance to sign the Vienna note unaltered, after its declared resolution to that effect, I was convinced that, if the Porte's interpretation of the doubtful passages in the note were formally placed under a guarantee, as expressed in the terms transmitted from London and Paris to Vienna, and were communicated to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as being adopted by the Four Powers engaging themselves thereby towards the Sultan's Government, the Porte would in reality be secured against every danger connected with the note, and enjoy in a great measure that kind of guarantee for the future which it had sought under a form difficult, if not impossible, to concede.

I gave the Pasha, in conclusion, a transcript of the guarantee which I had described, and, finding myself more at liberty since I came into possession of your Lordship's instructions, I signed officially the letter which I had prepared the day before, as your Lordship knows already, for joint communication to Reshid Pasha.

Providing at the same time for the almost certain contingency of a decision in favour of war, I implored his Highness to prevail, if possible, on the Council, even should it adopt the principle of going to war rather than accept the Vienna note, so far, at least, to suspend the application of that principle as to allow time for one more appeal to the Four Powers on the basis of their concurring to guarantee the Porte's interpretation of the note. I could not, on this supposition, dispute the necessity of fixing a term, perhaps even a short one, for receiving an answer from Vienna; but there was so evident an advantage in keeping open a door, even partially, for the chances of settlement by negotiation, that I was urgent with the Ottoman Minister to place my suggestion before his colleagues and the Council in its most favourable light.

Reshid Pasha assured me that he would act in the manner I requested; but he held out a very slender prospect of success, and it was evident on the whole that although he admitted the truth of my remarks, and was not insensible to the danger in prospect, he considered the decision as virtually taken, and the popular feeling so strongly pronounced, as to leave the Government no safe or satisfactory course to pursue but that of resistance by force of arms.

I did not leave the Pasha till it was time for him to repair to the Council. The decision of that Assembly, which comprised at its second meeting upwards of one hundred and twenty members, appears to have corresponded entirely with my anticipations. The Vienna note has been universally rejected as inadmissible without the required modifications, and a recourse to war has been declared indispensable; the time and circumstances of its declaration, together with such measures as are to accompany it, being left to the discretion of the Ministerial Council, confirmed by the Sultan's authority.

Reshid Pasha, in conveying this decision to my knowledge, authorised M. Pisani to assure me that he had submitted my letter, together with those of my three colleagues, and also my separate suggestion of the morning, to the Council's deliberate consideration. As it appears that his Highness addressed the assembly at no inconsiderable length, I cannot doubt his having done full justice to my argument in support of your Lordship's views, and it only remains for me to regret that the force of circumstances and the strength of public opinion have made it necessary for the Porte to maintain its consistency at every hazard on the side of Russia, and in opposition to the counsels of those who, no doubt, have the welfare and independence of the Turkish empire sincerely at heart.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I am informed that the decision of the Council was unanimous, and I must presume that my inability to give more than an hypothetical character to the suggestion of a guarantee deprived it of much of its value.

S. DE R.

No. 65.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 281.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 27, 1853.*

THE Prussian Minister sent me a message this afternoon by his Secretary of Legation, suggesting the notion of a direct appeal to the Sultan on the part of the Four Representatives, before His Majesty is committed to a formal confirmation of the decision taken yesterday by the General Council.

I replied that with every wish for peace, and acting under a strong sense of responsibility, I could not perceive the slightest chance of any success to result from the proposed step. Were the Sultan, I observed, to comply with our advice, he would thereby expose himself to no small degree of embarrassment, and even of danger. The order to summon a General Council had emanated directly from the Throne, and the resolutions submitted by that Assembly for His Majesty's approval had been unanimously adopted in accordance with the opinion of the Mussulman public. The Sultan could not, therefore, accede to our representations without placing himself in flagrant opposition to the chief notabilities of his empire, who had expressed the national sentiment, and also in contradiction virtually of his own deliberate act. We, on the other hand, if we had the advantage, which we had not, of being agreed in our language, could only hold out to His Majesty a vague prospect of guarantee to make up for the acceptance of a note unanimously condemned, whether right or wrong, by the Council as dangerous and humiliating to the Porte. Compliance might save him from the immediate perils of war, but only at the risk of disturbing the public tranquillity, and finally of losing both his throne and his life.

I learnt from M. de Wildenbruch's messenger that Baron de Bruck had not encouraged the proposed plan of proceeding, but, on the contrary, had expressed his persuasion that if anything could be done by making a direct appeal to the Sultan, it would be after a while, and when the agitation caused by a knowledge of the present intentions of the Porte shall have subsided.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 66.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 282.)

Therapia, September 28, 1853.

My Lord,

THE prospect of war beween Russia and Turkey is become so imminent, not to say certain, that, while I am anxious to overlook nothing which may afford a chance of preserving peace, it can hardly be thought premature if I bring forward some points which, in case of of actual hostilities, would probably, if not necessarily, require the attention of Her Majesty's Government.

It appears beyond a doubt that all negotiation directed to the arrangement of terms acceptable to both parties is, for the present at least, utterly hopeless. I can perceive but two ways, and they are little more than possibilities, by which a declaration of war might still be averted. Each would depend upon a complete understanding among the Four Powers, and a determined interference on their part.

The first may be thus expressed: a *new form* of the Vienna note, embodying *in substance* the Porte's modifications, to be communicated to the Ottoman and Russian Cabinets by the Four Powers, with a declaration purporting that it has been adopted by them, as parties to the Sextuple Treaty of 1841, under a conviction that it does not essentially differ in *meaning* from the original draft, and that the Treaty rights of Russia and the Sovereign rights of the Porte are thereby alike guaranteed. Such a course of action would obviously be grounded on the principles declared in 1841, and also on the respective assertions of Russia and Turkey that the former requires no new concession, and that the latter declines no existing obligation.

The sole remaining expedient would seem to be that of an arbitration, the Four Powers being the arbiters, with the addition of a Fifth selected by them, and a majority of the Five being authorised to determine the pending question upon the above-mentioned principles, within the limits of the Vienna note and its proposed modifications.

If either of these ideas were deemed susceptible of application, the utmost expedition would evidently be needed in order to secure a chance of success. The Porte's intention is not to declare war till after Prince Gortchakoff shall have refused to withdraw from the Principalities; and the approach of winter will probably put a *veto* on military operations for this season. But the Russian General may decide on crossing the Danube at once; and I will not answer for a perfect measure of forbearance on this side now that a hostile resolution is taken.

Supposing the worst to happen, it is evident that the Porte will enter upon its perilous course with the advantage, in principle, of exercising an unquestionable right. That the unauthorised occupation of the two Principalities by a Russian army constituted a case of war, has been generally admitted throughout Europe; and unless the right to take it up has been forfeited by the act of protestation referred to the Four Powers, or by the Porte's unwillingness to surrender the appreciation of her own vital interests to them, her present resolution, however its consequences may prove deplorable, can hardly be condemned. Having witnessed the whole course of pretension and intimidation to which the Sultan and his Ministers have been submitted, and the conciliatory though firm consistency with which so many vexatious proceedings have been met, I may be allowed, while lamenting the necessity of war, to admire the gallant and orderly spirit which has hitherto prevailed, with slight exceptions, in all the proceedings and preparatory measures of this Government.

It is far from improbable that Russia, when summoned to evacuate the Principalities, will display her consistent policy by continuing the occupation without declaring war. There is little doubt that in that case the Porte will proceed to exercise her right, under a sincere conviction that the responsibility of whatever may ensue will devolve upon the unjust invader of her territory. The Sultan may or may not rely on those friendly Powers who have publicly declared their determination to respect the independence and integrity of his Empire, but he can hardly fail to perceive that if the former has been insulted, and the latter violated by Russia, she is fairly entitled to their sympathy and support, if not to their active cooperation.

I have reason to believe that the Porte thinks of inviting the squadrons to pass the Dardanelles; and there is a case which, though not strictly falling within the letter of my instructions, may suggest the propriety of complying with its request. I mean a declaration of war by the Porte in consequence, as I stated above, of Russia's rejecting a summons to evacuate the Principalities. On that supposition it may fairly be alleged that the provocation would lie as much to the charge of Russia as if she had been the first to declare war, and therefore that the provisions of your Lordship's instruction No. 55 would virtually apply to the case.

Additional grounds of compliance are suggested by the advanced season of the year, and the motive which Russia may find in that circumstance for making some forward movement without delay.

Whether actual hostilities break out at once or later, the Porte, as your Lordship is well aware, has much to apprehend, and, notwithstanding her recent exertions, many weak points to guard, or deficiencies to supply. Among the latter is a signal want of officers fit to direct operations in the field. To say nothing of a commander-in-chief, who stands alone in the person of Omer Pasha, there is reason to suspect that the class of staff-officers is far from being effective. The Porte looks abroad for the means of supplying this deficiency; but as little is to be expected from Austria or Prussia, and as refugee officers will probably be kept in the back ground out of deference to the former of those Powers, I know not where, except in England or France, the Porte is likely to make a successful application. Your Lordship is a more competent judge than I am of the probable disposition of the French Government in that respect; but I presume that if Her Majesty the Queen, and the French Emperor, are prepared to support the Sultan in his present extremity, the object, as to supply of officers, might be attained without giving a just cause of quarrel to Russia, by allowing those who are subjects of either Sovereign to take service equally in the Russian or Turkish armies. The French, as I was informed at the time, have already afforded a certain degree of facility to the Porte in purchasing or procuring muskets for the use of its army. On some other matters of pressing interest the Turks have attended to my advice; and I am assured, in particular, that orders have been given in England for gun-boats to be brought out in pieces and transported from the Black Sea overland to the Danube. I am also informed that a line of telegraphic communication, though only on the old principle, has been established in parts of Bulgaria, communicating with the head-quarters at Shumla.

I have, &c

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 67.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 283.)

Therapia, September 28, 1853.

My Lord,

I SENT M. Pisani yesterday to inquire of Reshid Pasha whether certain points, of which I had obtained *confidential* information, were now to be regarded as *officially* communicated to me by the Porte.

His Highness stated in reply to M. Pisani, who was unable to see him till to-day, that the General Council, which had met on the 25th and 26th instant, had decided irrevocably that the Vienna note can by no means be accepted by the Porte without modifications, even if accompanied with a guarantee on the part of the Four Powers.

The Pasha added that war had been resolved by the unanimous votes of 172 individuals, who, being present at the meetings, had all subscribed the report addressed to the Sultan; that a manifesto to be conveyed to the Four Powers by their respective Representatives here, and a proclamation to the Empire, with other details, were left to His Majesty and his Ministers; that the Ministerial Council is to deliberate on these matters as soon as the Imperial

pleasure shall be signified; that Omer Pasha will be instructed to summon Prince Gortchakoff, by letter, to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days from the receipt of his letter; that the Prince's refusal will be considered as tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of Russia; that hostilities will be declared thereupon by the Porte; that all persons now here in the employment of Russia will then be requested to withdraw; and, finally, that all merchant-vessels under Russian colours will also be required to leave the port of Constantinople.

I have learnt from the same authentic source that all direct communication between the Porte and the Russian Government is closed from the present; and that on war being declared, the Dardanelles and Black Sea will be open to all ships of war belonging to friendly Governments and destined to assist the Sultan.

I have reason to believe that the question suggested by me, of opening the Turkish ports for the free exportation of grain, will be discussed in Council to-morrow; and that the Sultan having at length consented to entertain the question of a loan, as I recommended more than three years ago, the sense of the Council will be taken at the same time upon that important subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 68.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 284.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 29, 1853.*

I BEG to request your Lordship's attention to the accompanying report addressed to me by M. Pisani on the 24th instant. It relates the substance of a conversation between Reshid Pasha and the Internuncio's principal interpreter respecting the position of the Turkish Government as to war with Russia, and its intentions on some points of interest. The communication proceeds from the Pasha himself. The points in question are, first, the necessity of war in the present state of public opinion here; secondly, the character of the war as free from any religious colour; thirdly, the employment of refugee officers in the Turkish army.

Under the first head I have to state, that among the individuals of the class of Ulema, who took part in the last general Council, was the Chaplain or Preceptor to Prince Aziz, the Sultan's brother, and that he expressed himself strongly as to the danger which would have threatened the Sultan and his Ministers, if the resolution of declaring war had not been adopted. I had heard before that the same individual had been with difficulty dissuaded from signing the war petition addressed to the Sultan about a fortnight ago.

Under the second head I have to record that some of the Ulema attempted at the late meeting of the Council to give a religious character to the impending war, and that their intention was effectually thwarted by the good sense and enlightened spirit of Reshid Pasha and others. It appears that among the latter was Sarim Pasha, formerly Ambassador at Her Majesty's Court, and Grand Vizier, who did himself honour by the sentiments which he expressed in opposition to the fanatics.

Under the third head I wished to mention the plan adopted by the Porte for employing refugee officers without giving offence to Austria, namely, that of sending none of them to the army in Bulgaria, but employing a few of them, and General Guyon among others, on the Asiatic frontier. It is also the Porte's intention to apply to France for officers, having rank as high as that of Colonel. It may be presumed that the cause of this preference is the adoption of the French system of exercise and formation in the Turkish Infantry.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 68.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Therapia, September 24, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. de Steindl called on Reshid Pasha to tell him that Baron de Bruck requested that the General Council should be postponed until Wednesday or Thursday; that your Lordship and M. de la Cour, whom the Internuncio had seen this morning, also concurred in the same opinion, and that he was instructed strongly to advise the acceptance of the Vienna note "purement et simplement."

To this Reshid Pasha replied, that he had not in his power to defer the meeting of the General Council any longer, since he received peremptory orders from the Sultan that the Council should not be delayed any further, and assembled for to-morrow, Sunday. He asked M. de Steindl whether Baron de Bruck had any communication to make to the Porte, or whether it was merely to urge them to accept the note? M. de Steindl's answer being that he had no new proposal and confining himself to what he had already stated, his Highness observed to him, that he was authorized to tell Baron de Bruck that from the Sultan down to the last Turk, all were firmly resolved to run the risk of being annihilated rather than sacrifice their independence and sovereign rights by acceding to the proposed note. That even supposing, said he, that guarantees will be offered to us, those guarantees will never be of a nature to safeguard our sovereign rights, and prevent Russia from directly interfering in our internal affairs.

M. de Steindl having told Reshid Pasha that Austria entertained apprehension that the Porte might turn to account the national feeling, and give the character of a holy war, his Highness said, that far from contemplating any such idea, the Porte was most careful to declare, both verbally and in writing, that if she was compelled to fight she would do so for the sacred rights of the Sovereign and the independence of his Government; whereas Russia did not fail to proclaim to the world that she was to undertake a holy war against Turkey, and made all sorts of publications to rouse the national feeling against us.

M. de Steindl having brought the conversation about the refugees said, that he understood they were to be enlisted in the Turkish army, and that if such were the case Austria would be exceedingly displeased with such proceeding. Reshid Pasha returned for answer, that the Porte is certainly at liberty to employ any one and any means against Russia; but he could assure him, meanwhile, that the Porte will be cautious to avoid doing anything which might be disagreeable to Austria; and as long as Austria will behave as a friendly Power towards Turkey, she might depend upon the good faith and good will of the Porte to abstain from giving umbrage to a neighbouring and friendly Power; but in the contrary case she will be free to act according to circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 69.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 286.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 30, 1853.*

THE Sultan has confirmed the report of the last two meetings of the General Council by a hatti-scherif.

The Sheik-ul-Islam has also issued his fetva for going to war.

Old Hosreff Pasha, an object of particular attention to Prince Menchikoff when he was here, being too weak to attend the Council, has, nevertheless, signed the report at his house.

I have received information, from a confidential but authentic source, that the levies for the Turkish army will be raised to 300,000 men.

A number of the muderris, or theological students and professors, are to

be sent to Shumla, where they will be gratified with opportunities for the display of their zeal in return for the relief which their departure affords to the capital.

Chekib Effendi, formerly Ambassador in London, who was to have been sent to Shumla with the view of lightening Omer Pasha's labours in the financial department, has declined the offer, and I have not yet heard of any fresh appointment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 70.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 287. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 1, 1853.*

LAST night I sent to apprize the French Ambassador of my intention to forward despatches to-day by way of Marseilles, and to offer to take charge of his Excellency's correspondence.

This morning I learn that he went at an early hour to Reshid Pasha, of whom he inquired what object I had in sending off a vessel with despatches. The Pasha naturally replied that he supposed I meant to send an account of the Porte's decision, which did not satisfy M. de la Cour, who remarked that I had already written on that subject by the telegraph.

I beg to observe that my object in writing by express is to afford your Lordship full information of the state of affairs at this juncture, which I could not do by telegraph, and to submit my ideas as to the only perceptible modes of still avoiding the calamities of war. I have also to express my regret that M. de la Cour should not have shown more confidence in me than to go to a third party in search of information which I would cheerfully have given to him myself.

It appears that the French Ambassador expressed to Reshid Pasha his persuasion that the Porte intended to close every door to negotiation, and that the Pasha assured him of the Porte's continued willingness to re-open negotiations, and to accept any proposal consistent with its sovereign rights and independence. His Highness added that France having originated the religious discussion, was bound more than any other Power to assist the Porte in case of need, both morally and materially; he went on to express a similar reliance on the friendly and consistent sentiments of England, intimating, in reply to M. de la Cour's inquiries, that he did not reckon on similar proofs of friendship from Prussia and Austria, the latter Court especially being unwilling, as he conceived, to displease the Emperor of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 71.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon..—(Received October 12.)

(No. 288.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 1, 1853.*

THE Prussian Envoy, who called here a few minutes ago, informs me that the Prussian Consul-General in Wallachia, who lately went from Bucharest to Shumla, cannot sufficiently express his astonishment at the state of efficiency in which he found the Turkish army, adding that the Russians had not a conception of the force which was opposed to them on this side of the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 72.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(Télégraphique.) 11 *Octobre*, 1853, 8 P.M.

J'AI communiqué votre dépêche télégraphique de hier au Comte de Buol en l'engageant d'accueillir favorablement, comme elle était par vous, la première proposition contenue dans la dépêche de Lord Stratford du 1er Octobre. Il a répondu que comme les Cabinets de Londres et de Paris n'ont pas cru devoir appuyer l'acceptation de la note de Vienne, le Cabinet Autrichien croyait aussi de son côté de la laisser tomber de manière qu'elle ne pourrait plus recommander des modifications de cette même note.

Un moment après cet entretien une dépêche télégraphique est arrivée de l'Internonce de Constantinople en date du 5 du courant, qui annonce un courier qui porte le manifeste de la Porte et la copie d'une note qu'Omer Pasha doit adresser au Prince Gortchakoff qui déclare que l'état de guerre doit commencer 15 jours après sa réception à moins que les provinces ne soient évacuées. Le commerce de la Mer Noire restera ouverte excepté au pavillon Russe. La flotte Turque se placera à Batschik.

Ces nouvelles ont décidé le Comte Buol à déclarer qu'une proposition faite à la Russie au moment que la Porte lui déclare guerre ne serait d'aucune valeur.

No. 73.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Télégraphique.) 12 *Octobre*, 1853, 6·15 P.M.

COMMUNIQUEZ ce qui suit à M. Fonblanque, qui doit l'envoyer sans le moindre délai à Lord Stratford de Redcliffe:

"La première proposition contenue dans notre dépêche télégraphique du 1er Octobre et de notre No. 282 a été favorablement accueillie par l'Angleterre et la France; mais si les hostilités commencent, cette solution paisible du différend deviendra fort difficile, si non impossible. Tâchez d'en empêcher le commencement. Vos dépêches par le 'Fury' sont arrivées."

No. 74.

Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, October 12.)

(Traduction.) 28 *Zilhidji*, 1269. (*October* 1, 1853.)

LA Sublime Porte a reçu la nouvelle de la non-acceptation par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg des modifications qu'elle avait proposées au projet de note de Vienne.

Quoique les Puissances amies eussent recommandé à la Sublime Porte ce projet de note, et l'eussent pressée de l'accepter, le Gouvernement Impérial, tant à cause de l'impossibilité d'agréer un semblable document sans les modifications proposées, qu'à cause des inconvénients résultant de la prolongation de l'état de choses actuel, a dû, bon gré malgré, se décider pour la guerre.

En me bornant à vous informer à la hâte de cette résolution, je me réserve à vous en communiquer par la suite tous les détails.

Le Gouvernement Impérial compte, dans les circonstances actuelles, sur l'appui moral et matériel de l'Angleterre et de la France; et c'est là que doit tendre le langage que vous aurez à tenir à Londres.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) RESHID.

No. 75.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 753.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 11, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the several despatches marked in the margin,* which have reached me under flying-seal, to your Lordship's address, from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received despatches by the same occasion from M. de la Cour. The intelligence which they convey appears to agree in substance with that communicated by Lord Stratford. The only additional fact which has been told me as coming from the former is, that Reshid Pasha intended, in a Council which was to be held on the 1st or 2nd instant, to propose that the English and French fleets should be invited to come to Constantinople to support morally and materially the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire.

I inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he has received an application from the Porte to send some French officers to assist Omer Pasha, as is related by Lord Stratford. He assured me that as yet no application of the kind had been made to him, or, as far as he knew, to the Minister of War. He said that some French officers had applied to Vely Pasha for permission to join the Turkish army, but that nothing had come of it; and he added, that if a regular application were now made, he should be disposed to advise the Emperor to comply with it, provided that the officers did not wear the national cockade, and were to be considered as belonging to the Turkish service.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 76.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 755. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 11, 1853.*

COUNT HATZFELDT, the Prussian Minister, appears to have adverted in a conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the visit of the King of Prussia to Warsaw, and to have hinted that it was not to be considered in the light of a political demonstration. M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that without exactly nourishing suspicions of the object which the Northern Powers had in view in meeting at Warsaw, he must confess to have learnt the fact with a certain degree of displeasure. Meetings of the kind had taken place before, and were not in their results of good omen to the present meeting. He knew but of two questions which now occupied the attention of European Governments—the cause of order and the state of affairs in the East. Both these questions were of the highest interest to all the Great Powers, and had until now formed the object of their common deliberations; but if the Northern Cabinets made a league apart, they must expect to see other nations leaguing apart also; and he was not sure that the former would not, in such a case, find themselves in a considerable minority. He repeated he did not wish to throw suspicions on the meeting at Warsaw; but he thought it right to call the attention of Count Hatzfeldt to the reflections which it suggested.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

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* Nos. 63 to 71 inclusive.

No. 77.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 508.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 3, 1853.*

A LETTER from Odessa of the 23rd ultimo, states that 12,000 Russian soldiers have been embarked at Sevastopol for the Caucasus, and that further reinforcements for the district are to be sent from Odessa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 78.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 510. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 4, 1853.*

WITHOUT stating that his information was received either from previous conversations with the Emperor or with Count Nesselrode, the Prussian Minister has acquainted one of my diplomatic colleagues that hitherto it had been His Imperial Majesty's intention to take upon himself the expense of the occupation of the Principalities; but that in the event of the Porte persisting in their refusal to sign the Vienna note, he will order an advance of fresh troops into the Principalities; will throw the whole expense of his armaments upon the Sultan; and will not withdraw his armies until the uttermost farthing of this sum, whatever may be its amount, shall be paid.

I have no hesitation in saying that this resolution is very much what is to be expected from a Sovereign as impatient under any contradiction of his will as the Emperor Nicholas; but, at the same time, the doubt crosses my mind whether General Rochow may not have spoken of a decision which he considers probable as one which has actually taken place.

My Prussian colleague has the failing of being a little too Russian in his feelings and sympathies, and, if I am not unjust by him, would be well pleased to hold the language which would be the most likely to promote the objects which the Imperial Cabinet have in view.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 79.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 13.)

(No. 511.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 4, 1853.*

IT has been with the greatest satisfaction that I have read a despatch dated the 24th instant, which General Castelbajac has received from Paris, and which he has had the kindness to read to me.

The language of this despatch corresponds closely with that of your Lordship on the 20th ultimo to Lord Westmorland.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys states that the French Cabinet had made conscientious efforts to overcome the reluctance manifested by the Porte to the signature of the projet de note prepared at Vienna, but that subsequent explanations given at Paris and London by M. Kisseleff and Baron Brunnow having shown that this note is held by Russia to bear a very different sense from that attributed to it by the French and English Governments, it is no longer in their power to press its acceptance upon the Sultan.

Any circumstance which tends to render probable an interruption of that peace which Europe has enjoyed for the last forty years, is undoubtedly very

deplorable. It is, however, to be borne in mind, that the language held by the Chancellor, and alluded to in various of my reports, justified the apprehension that any arrangement made at present between Russia and Turkey would bear the character rather of a truce than of a renewed peace, and the hostilities which might be averted in the autumn would in all probability break out in the ensuing spring.

If these words did not announce a settled purpose, it is not the fault of the person to whom they were addressed, if they conveyed to his mind an erroneous impression.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 80.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 14.)

(No. 289.)

Therapia, October 4, 1853.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's steam-ship "Caradoc" being on the point of starting, by the Admiral's order, for Malta, with the view of catching the Indian home-bound mail, I was preparing to avail myself of the opportunity when your Lordship's despatches to the 24th instant arrived. A hasty perusal of the correspondence has absorbed so much of the short time at my disposal that I can only forward the important papers which I have this moment received from the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. They consist of an explanatory declaration or kind of manifesto addressed to the Four Representatives, a summons to be addressed by Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff, and an official note accompanying these two papers.

The originals are in Turkish, the French translations transmitted herewith were sent to me from the Porte. The English translation of the note was made by Mr. Alison.

My previous correspondence will have prepared your Lordship for this decisive communication.

M. Pisani informs me that the papers now forwarded have received the Sultan's formal sanction; and that the letter for Omer Pasha will be transmitted to Shumla early to-morrow morning.

I learn, moreover, on the same authority, that the Sultan has directed Reshid Pasha to apply to the French Ambassador and myself by note for the assistance of the respective squadrons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 80.

Circular addressed by the Porte to the Four Representatives.

Foreign Office, Moharrem 1, 1270.
(*October* 4, 1853.)

(Translation.)

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Excellency copies of the manifesto setting forth the motives which have obliged the Porte to come to its present decision concerning the Russian question, and of the letter which is to be addressed by his Excellency Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff. I beg to request that you will communicate this manifesto your Government, and to express the earnest hope that the illustrious Government of Great Britain will acknowledge the just grounds on which the Porte has issued that manifesto.

Inclosure 2 in No. 80.

Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff.

M. le Général,

C'EST par l'ordre de mon Gouvernement que j'ai l'honneur d'adresser cette lettre à votre Excellence.

Tandisque la Sublime Porte épuisait tous les moyens de la conciliation pour maintenir la paix de même que son indépendance, la Cour de Russie n'a pas cessé de faire naître des difficultés jusqu'à ce qu'elle a violé les Traités par l'envahissement des deux Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, parties intégrantes de l'Empire Ottoman.

Fidèle à son système pacifique, la Sublime Porte, au lieu d'user de son droit de représailles, s'est bornée alors à protester sans s'écarter de la voie qui pouvait encore mener à un arrangement.

La Russie, au contraire, se gardant bien de montrer des sentiments analogues, a fini par rejeter des propositions recommandées par les augustes Cours médiatrices, et nécessaires à l'honneur comme à la sûreté de la Sublime Porte.

Il ne reste par conséquent à celle-ci que l'indispensable obligation de recourir à la guerre. Mais puisque l'invasion des Principautés et la violation des Traités qui l'accompagne sont les causes inévitables de la guerre, la Sublime Porte pour dernière expression de ses sentiments pacifiques, propose à votre Excellence par mon intermédiaire l'évacuation des deux Provinces, et offre pour votre décision un terme de quinze jours à dater de la réception de cette lettre. Si, dans ce délai, une réponse négative me parvenait de la part de votre Excellence, le commencement des hostilités en serait la conséquence naturelle.

C'est ce que j'ai l'honneur, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 80.

Manifesto.

1 *Moharrem*, 1270.

(Traduction.)

DANS les circonstances actuelles il serait superflu de reprendre, dès l'origine, l'exposé du différend survenu entre la Sublime et la Russie, d'entrer de nouveau dans le détail des diverses phases que ce différend a parcouru, ainsi que de reproduire les opinions et appréciations du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qui ont été rendue notoires par les précis officielles publiées en temps et lieu.

Malgré le désir de ne pas revenir sur les motifs pressants qui ont déterminé les modifications apportées par la Sublime Porte au projet de note élaboré à Vienne, motifs exposés aussi précédemment dans une note explicative, de nouvelles sollicitations ayant été faites pour l'adoption pure et simple du dit projet, à la suite de la non-acceptation de la Russie à ces mêmes modifications, le Gouvernement Ottoman, se trouvant aujourd'hui, quant à l'adoption du projet de note en question, sous l'empire de la plus grande impossibilité et forcé d'entreprendre la guerre, croit de son devoir de faire l'exposé des raisons impérieuses de cette importante détermination, ainsi que de celles qui l'ont obligé à ne pas conformer pour cette fois sa conduite aux conseils des Grandes Puissances ses alliées, bien qu'il n'ait jamais cessé d'apprécier la nature bienveillante de leurs observations.

Les points principaux que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan relevra d'abord sont ceux-ci: c'est que, dès le principe, il n'a existé dans sa conduite aucun motif de querelle, et qu'animé du désir de conserver la paix, c'est avec un remarquable esprit de modération et de conciliation qu'il a agi depuis le commencement du différend jusqu'à présent. Il est facile de prouver ces faits à tous les esprits qui ne s'écartent pas de la voie de la justice et de l'équité.

Quand même la Russie aurait eu un sujet de plainte à élever relativement à la question des Lieux Saints, elle aurait dû circonscrire ses démarches et ses sollicitations dans les limites de cette seule question et ne pas élever des prétensions que l'objet même de ses réclamations ne pouvait comporter. Elle aurait dû,

en outre, ne pas prendre des mesures d'intimidation, comme celles d'envoyer ses troupes aux frontières et de faire des préparatifs de force maritime à Sévastopol, au sujet d'une question qui aurait pu être résolue amicalement entre les Deux Puissances. Or, il est évident que c'est tout-à-fait le contraire qui a eu lieu.

La question des Lieux Saints avait été résolue à la satisfaction de toutes les parties ; le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan avait témoigné de favorables dispositions au sujet des assurances demandées pour cette question, et pour certaines autres demandes relatives à Jérusalem. En fin, il n'y avait plus lieu, de la part de la Russie, d'élever aucune réclamation. N'est-ce pas chercher un prétexte de guerre que d'insister, comme elle la fait, sur la question des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque, octroyés par le Gouvernement Ottoman, privilèges qu'il croit de son honneur, de sa dignité et de son autorité suzeraine de maintenir, et au sujet desquels il ne peut admettre ni l'immiscion ni la surveillance d'aucun Gouvernement. N'est-ce pas la Russie qui a occupé avec des forces considérables les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie, en déclarant que ces provinces lui serviraient de garantie jusqu'à ce qu'elle eût obtenu ce qu'elle exige? Cet acte n'a t'il pas été justement considéré par la Sublime Porte comme une violation des Traités et par conséquent comme un *casus belli?* Les autres Puissances elles-mêmes ont-elles pu en juger autrement? Qui donc pourra douter que la Russie ne soit l'aggresseur?

La Sublime Porte, qui a toujours observé avec une fidélité notoire tous ses Traités, a-t-elle pu les enfreindre au point de déterminer la Russie à une démarche aussi violente que celle d'enfreindre elle-même ces mêmes Traités? Ou bien contrairement à la promesse consignée explicitement dans le Traité de Kainardjé, s'est-il produit dans l'Empire Ottoman des faits pareils à ceux de démolition des églises Chrétiennes ou d'obstacles apportés à l'exercice du culte Chrétien?

Le Cabinet Ottoman sans vouloir entrer dans de plus long détails sur ces points, ne doute pas que les Hautes Puissances ses alliées ne trouvent et ne jugent tout-à-fait juste et véridique ce qui vient d'être mentionné.

Quant à la non-adoption sous la forme pure et simple du projet de note de Vienne par la Sublime Porte, il est à remarquer que ce projet sans être tout-à-fait conforme à la note du Prince Menchikoff, et tout en contenant, il est vrai, dans sa composition, quelques-uns des paragraphes du projet de note de la Sublime Porte elle-même, n'est point dans son ensemble, soit dans sa lettre, soit dans son esprit, essentiellement différent de celui du Prince Menchikoff.

Les assurances récemment données par les Représentants des Grandes Puissances au sujet du danger d'interprétations nuisibles du projet de note en question, sont une nouvelle preuve des bonnes intentions de leurs Gouvernements respectifs pour la Sublime Porte; elles ont par conséquent causé une vive satisfaction au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Il faut remarquer cependant, au moment où nous avons encore sous les yeux le début des privilèges religieux soulevé par la Russie, qui cherche à s'appuyer sur un paragraphe si clair et si précis du Traité de Kainardjé, que vouloir consigner dans une pièce diplomatique le paragraphe concernant la sollicitude active des Empereurs de Russie pour le maintien, dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte, des immunités et des privilèges religieux octroyés du culte Grec par les Empereurs Ottomans, avant l'existence même de la Russie comme Empire, laisser dans un état douteux et obscur l'absence de tout rapport entre ces privilèges et le Traité de Kainardjé, employer en faveur d'une grande communauté de sujets de la Sublime Porte professant le rit Grec des expressions qui pourraient faire allusion à des Traités conclus avec la France et l'Autriche relativement aux religieux Francais et Latins, ce serait courir la chance de mettre à la disposition de la Russie certaines paragraphes, vagues et obscurs, dont quelques-uns mêmes sont contraires à la réalité des faits ; ce serait également, sans nul doute, offrir à la Russie un prétexte solide pour ses prétensions de surveillance et de protectorat religieux—prétensions qu'elle essaierait de produire en affirmant qu'elles n'ont rien d'attentatoire aux droits souverains et à l'indépendance de la Sublime Porte.

Le langage même des employés et agents de la Russie qui ont déclaré que l'intention de leur Gouvernement n'était autre que de remplir l'office d'avocat auprès de la Sublime Porte, toutefois que des actes contraires aux privilèges existant auraient lieu, est un preuve patente de la justesse de l'opinion du Gouvernement Ottoman.

Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan a jugé nécessaire de demander

des assurances lors même que les modifications proposées par lui à la note de Vienne auraient été accueillies, comment, en conscience, pourrait-il être tranquille, si la note de Vienne était maintenue dans son intégrité et sans modifications? La Sublime Porte en acceptant ce qu'elle a déclaré à tout le monde ne pouvoir admettre sans y être forcée, compromettrait sa dignité vis-à-vis des autres Puissances ; elle la sacrifierait aux yeux même de ses propres sujets, et tout en attentant à son honneur, elle commettrait un suicide moral et matériel sur elle-même.

Quoique le refus de la Russie d'accéder aux modifications reclamées par la Sublime Porte ait été basé sur un question d'honneur, l'on ne saurait nier que la cause réelle du refus de la Russie provient uniquement de son désir de ne pas remplacer par des termes explicites, des expressions vagues qui pourraient ultérieurement lui fournir un prétexte d'immiscion. Une semblable conduite oblige conséquemment la Sublime Porte à persister de son côté dans sa non-adhésion.

Les raisons qui ont déterminé le Gouvernement Ottoman à faire ses modifications ayant été appréciées par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances, il est prouvé que la Sublime Porte a eu complètement raison de ne pas adhérer à l'adoption pure et simple de la note de Vienne.

En entrant en discussion sur les inconvénients que cette note présente, le but n'est pas de critiquer un projet qui a obtenu l'assentiment des Grandes Puissances. Leurs efforts ont toujours tendu, tout en désirant de préserver les droits et l'indépendance du Gouvernement Impérial, à conserver la paix. Les démarches faites dans cette intention étant on ne peut plus louables, la Sublime Porte ne saurait assez les apprécier. Mais comme chaque Gouvernement possède évidemment, par suite de ses connaissances propres et de son expérience locale, plus de facilités que tout autre Gouvernement pour juger les points qui touchent à ses propres droits, l'exposé que fait le Gouvernement Ottoman provient de l'unique désir de justifier la situation obligatoire où il se trouve placé à son plus grand regret, tandis qu'il aurait désiré continuer à ne point s'écarter des conseils bienveillants qui lui ont été offerts par ses alliées depuis l'origine du différend et qu'il a suivis jusqu'à présent.

Si on allègue que l'empressement avec lequel on a arrêté en Europe un projet, résulte de la lenteur de la Sublime Porte à proposer un arrangement, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan se trouve dans l'obligation de justifier en exposant les faits suivants.

Avant l'entrée des troupes Russes dans les deux Principautés, quelques-uns des Représentants des Puissances, guidés par l'intention sincère de prévenir l'occupation de ces provinces, ont exposé à la Sublime Porte la nécessité de rédiger un projet de fusion des projets de note de la Sublime Porte et du Prince Menchikoff.

Plus tard les Représentants des Puissances ont réunis confidentiellement à la Sublime Porte différents projets d'arrangement. Aucun de ces derniers ne répondant aux vues de Gouvernement Impérial, le Cabinet Ottoman était sur le point d'entrer en négociations avec les Représentants des Puissances sur un projet rédigé par lui-même conformément à leur suggestion. Dans ce moment la nouvelle du passage du Pruth par les Russes étant arrivée, ce fait a changé la question de face. Le projet de note proposé par la Sublime Porte a dû être mis de côté, et les Cabinets ont été priés d'exprimer leur manière de voir sur cette violation des Traités, après la protestation de la Sublime Porte. D'un côté le Cabinet Ottoman a dû attendre les réponses, et de l'autre il a arrêté sur la suggestion des Représentants des Puissances un projet d'arrangement qui a été envoyé à Vienne. Pour toute réponse à toutes ces démarches actives, le projet de note élaboré à Vienne a paru.

Quoiqu'il en soit, le Gouvernement Ottoman craignant à juste titre tout ce qui impliquerait un droit d'immiscion en faveur de la Russie dans les affaires religieuses, ne pouvait faire plus que de donner des assurances propres à dissiper les doutes qui étaient devenus le sujet de la discussion ; et ce ne sera pas surtout après tant de préparatifs et de sacrifices qu'il acceptera des propositions qui n'ont pu être accueillies lors du séjour du Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople. Puisque le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne s'est pas contenté des assurances qui lui ont été offertes ; puisque les efforts bienveillants des Hautes Puissances sont demeurés infructueux ; puisqu'enfin la Sublime Porte ne peut tolérer ni souffrir plus longtemps l'état de choses actuel, ainsi que la prolongation

de l'occupation des Principautés Moldo-Valaques, parties intégrantes de son Empire, le Cabinet Ottoman, dans l'intention ferme et louable de défendre les droits sacrés de souveraineté et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement, usera de justes représailles contre une violation des Traités qu'il considère comme un *casus belli*. Il notifie, donc, officiellement que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan se trouve obligé à déclarer la guerre, et qu'il a donné les instructions les plus catégoriques à son Excellence Eamer Pacha pour inviter le Prince Gortchakoff à évacuer les Principautés, et de commencer les hostilités, si dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de l'arrivée de son dépêche au quartier-général Russe, une réponse négative lui parvenait.

Il est bien entendu que si la réponse du Prince Gortchakoff est négative, les agents Russes devront quitter les Etats Ottomans, et que les relations commerciales des sujets respectifs des deux Gouvernements devront être interrompues.

Toutefois la Sublime Porte ne trouve pas juste que l'embargo soit mis sur les navires marchands Russes conformément aux anciens usages. En conséquence il leur sera donné avis de se rendre dans la Mer Noire ou dans la Méditerranée à leur choix, dans un délai qui sera fixé ultérieurement. En outre, le Gouvernement Ottoman ne voulant pas apporter d'entraves aux relations commerciales des sujets des Puissances amies, laissera, pendant la guerre, les Détroits ouverts à leur marine marchande.

No. 81.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 32. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, October 11, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED by appointment on Baron Manteuffel yesterday morning, and found his Excellency cheerful and gay, contrasted with the thoughtful and preoccupied mood which he had evinced at my last interview. His Excellency expressed himself as feeling relieved of a heavy weight, and as breathing more freely since the Emperor of Russia's departure.

His Excellency informed me that all had ended as he had previously hoped, and that he had undergone a severe and heavy pressure.

He stated to me that in his first interview with the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty was much excited and had used harsh terms (des termes outrées), in which Prussia had come in for her full share. The Emperor stated to his Excellency that "his last rouble and his last man were and would be at Prussia's disposal," and inquired what he could expect in return? Baron Manteuffel replied that Prussia was not in want of either; that her interest demanded that she should remain neutral; that it was impossible for her to sacrifice her position, and to act in concert or alliance with Russia in the Oriental question; and that in preserving a neutral course, Prussia hoped she might be the better enabled to tender her impartial good offices in the cause of peace.

A long conversation then ensued, which his Excellency supported by arguing the impossibility of Prussia being brought to cooperate in any manner with Russia.

I inquired of Baron Manteuffel whether any direct proposition in writing in the shape of a Protocol or Convention had been submitted by the Emperor. He replied, with some degree of vagueness and hesitation, "qu'il n'y avait pas un papier précisement sur la table."

In the course of further discussion the Emperor said, "Voilà les flottes qui sont entrées dans les Dardanelles. Est-ce que vous souffrez ainsi une infraction du Traité de 1841?" Baron Manteuffel reminded His Imperial Majesty that Prussia had likewise witnessed the occupation of the Danubian Principalities.

The interview lasted some hours, during which His Imperial Majesty appears to have exhibited great warmth of temperament occasioned by disappointment.

Baron Manteuffel was firm and resolute in refusing to enter into any engagement present or future, or give any promises to the Emperor of the support of Prussia; and I am led to believe from another source that his Excellency openly

stated to the Emperor in the presence of the King that he would resign his portfolio rather than act in opposition to his duty and his conscience.

On the following day, previous to the Emperor's departure, Baron Manteuffel had again a protracted audience of His Imperial Majesty, when they were closeted alone.

Baron Manteuffel informed me that on this occasion the Emperor was more calm, and assumed a different tone; His Imperial Majesty seemed to evince an indifference whether Prussia would act with him or not, hinting that it was of no moment to him, and that he had more the interests of Prussia at heart; but that for himself, were he to exhaust the last rouble in his Treasury, he would fight alone.

Baron Manteuffel further informed me, that in conversation the Emperor had stated that he should not attack the Turks—that he should act on the defensive; but he seemed to expect that they would be the first to attack him in the provinces.

His Imperial Majesty likewise remarked to his Excellency: "Je viens de recevoir des nouvelles de Constantinople du 30. Il n'y avait pas encore eu une déclaration de guerre; voyez comme vos nouvelles sont fausses."

His Imperial Majesty appears to have used and fruitlessly exhausted all his immense power of captivation and menace; whilst Baron Manteuffel stood unflinchingly stedfast and determined. Prussia may indeed be proud that at so eventful a moment she was possessed of a Minister who had the courage, firmness, and straightforward honesty to face the Czar of Russia, and to resist manfully counsels and demands which were incompatible with the interests and safety of his country.

Baron Manteuffel informed me that he could evidently perceive that the Emperor was desirous of peace. His Imperial Majesty stated that having once accepted the Vienna note, he could make no further advance; but his language and manner seemed to imply that he was open to receive any propositions from other quarters, and the impression I gathered from what fell from Baron Manteuffel is that His Imperial Majesty almost invited them.

Having been privately informed from a credible source that the Emperor had urged the King to send a corps d'armée into Poland, in case it should be necessary, in the event of war, for Russia to move the second corps into Podolia or elsewhere, and that His Majesty had refused to lend himself to any eventualities; I inquired of Baron Manteuffel whether any particular allusion had been made by the Emperor to Poland. His Excellency replied with some hesitation, that no special allusion had been made, further than that the Emperor had remarked that he knew attempts would be made to raise a rebellion there, but that he had force enough to quell it.

Baron Manteuffel also told me that nothing of a political nature had been actually under discussion at Warsaw, and that the Emperor had only read to the King a vast number of despatches and private correspondence from Princess Lieven and others at Paris.

Your Lordship will doubtless perceive that the aim the Emperor had in view was to poison the King's mind against France and to excite his apprehensions of her.

In closing this report, I may be permitted to observe to your Lordship that on a subject of so grave and so confidential a nature as the interview between the Emperor of Russia and Baron Manteuffel, I found his Excellency naturally disinclined to divulge more than was sufficient to place his conduct in its true light, and that I consequently was cautious not to press inquiry on his Excellency indelicately.

I am inclined to believe that his Excellency is anxious not to create any bad feeling with Russia by unnecessarily displaying in too open terms the failure of the Emperor of Russia's visit.

The Prince of Prussia was at Potsdam during the Emperor's stay there, and I am informed, from a private source, strongly supported the views and policy of Baron Manteuffel.

On taking leave of his Excellency he begged me to convey to your Lordship his assurance that no promise or engagement of any kind had been given to the Emperor; and he further expressed a wish that what he had related to me should be considered as strictly secret and confidential.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 82.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

Berlin, October 12, 1853.

My Lord,

IN an interview I had with Baron Manteuffel on Monday last, his Excellency informed me that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Cruvelli, had just announced to him that a new proposition was elaborating at Vienna, in lieu of the declaration which had been concerted at Olmütz; he was not yet informed of the precise nature of the new idea, not having as yet received his despatches from Vienna, but gave his Excellency to understand that it contained a proposal that Russia and Turkey should arrange their differences with each other *directly* without foreign interference.

His Excellency seemed to view the proposition as totally impracticable, remarking that it was delivering over the weaker to the mercies of the stronger body, or, as his Excellency emphatically described it, as an arrangement to be made "entre le chat et la souris."

On seeing his Excellency this morning, he told me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister, had just been with him, and that he had also referred to this new Vienna proposition. Baron Budberg expressed a wish that it should be supported by Prussia, and proposed to Baron Manteuffel that, in the event of this project not being accepted by the Western Powers, Austria and Prussia should then separate themselves entirely from any further cooperation with England and France.

His Excellency treated this as a venturous invitation not to be entertained, and replied to Baron Budberg that he could give no reply to it, for he did not even know what the new Vienna proposition was.

No further intelligence respecting this Vienna project has yet reached Berlin, and I am therefore only able to report on the subject what Baron Manteuffel has communicated to me.

Your Lordship will probably have been more directly informed on this matter by Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 83.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 35.)

Berlin, October 12, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Moustier, the French Minister at this Court, informs me that he has communicated to Baron Manteuffel a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, announcing that orders have been sent to the French fleet forthwith to repair to Constantinople. In this despatch the Minister for Foreign Affairs further explains the grounds on which his Government could no longer counsel the Porte to accept the Vienna note. His Excellency received the notification without offering any remarks, notwithstanding that the Marquis de Moustier endeavoured to extract from him by further explanations an opinion as to the course which had been adopted.

M. de Moustier informs me that Baron Manteuffel had expressed himself to him in the same satisfactory terms, as I have reported his conversations to me with respect to the results of the Emperor's visit. His Excellency told M. de Moustier that His Imperial Majesty left Berlin with a disposition for serious reflection.

Baron Manteuffel likewise told M. de Moustier, that in the course of conversation the Emperor had raked up every rumour and newspaper report, of the truth of which Baron Manteuffel presumed to express his doubts to His Imperial Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 84.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 15.)

(No. 36. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, October 12, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE not failed to execute the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 12 of the 5th instant, and to convey to Baron Manteuffel the favourable light in which your Lordship had received his idea of renewing the negotiation on the Eastern question in London; and I am specially charged by his Excellency to express his thanks to your Lordship, for the good reception which his proposition had met with.

I have had some conversation with his Excellency on that subject both on Monday last, previous to his taking Her Majesty's decision, and again this morning.

On the former occasion his Excellency informed me that he was of opinion that, under present circumstances, the Vienna note was no longer applicable, and that some new arrangement on another basis must be sought for. His Excellency seemed further of opinion, that nothing more could be expected from the Vienna Conference. These feelings appeared to me to strengthen his conviction that a pacific arrangement was only now to be attained in London.

Since his interview with the Emperor of Russia, his Excellency is the more inclined to the idea that some effort in the above sense should be made in London, as he is persuaded that the Emperor is desirous of a pacific solution.

Baron Manteuffel informed me to-day that he had submitted the question to His Majesty, who had consented, after many objections to the adoption of his proposal. It has been, therefore, agreed, that the Chevalier Bunsen shall be instructed to enter upon the subject confidentially with your Lordship, and he will be furnished with instructions to this intent.

I inquired of his Excellency what was the precise nature of the proposition which he intended to make. His Excellency replied, that as he was anxious to avoid any severe scrutiny or misrepresentation of his views at the outset, he should merely propose as preliminaries:

1st. That a pacific settlement should be sought to be attained by means of negotiation.

2ndly. That the whole question of differences between Turkey and Russia should be settled from beginning to end on a firm and permanent basis.

On my inquiry his Excellency seemed to consider that the broad basis which he assumes, would imply the annulling of all Treaties existing between Russia and Turkey, and the adoption of a fresh one which would stand in their place. He stated that, in his opinion, there should be an end of everything *ab antiquo*, and a thorough new settlement *de novo*.

I remarked to his Excellency that this was a difficult, but perhaps not a hopeless undertaking, and that, in this enlightened age of civilization, when all nations were desirous of peace, there ought to be no reason for despairing of obtaining, by peaceful negotiation, that complete resettlement which must be the inevitable result of a war.

I inquired of his Excellency, whether any knowledge of these intentions had been communicated to the Emperor of Russia. His Excellency replied, that a negotiation in London had been mentioned to His Imperial Majesty, but the Emperor hastily broke off the conversation, remarking that London was to him the least desirable place; but that if a satisfactory arrangement could be presented he would certainly accept it, from whatever quarter it came. Baron Manteuffel replied to the Emperor, that as the greatest difficulty was offered in London, it was there that it could be solved with the greatest facility.

His Imperial Majesty also expressed a wish, that whatever arrangement might be come to should be first presented to, and accepted by the Porte, as he could not again subject himself to the treatment he had received from Turkey with respect to the Vienna note.

His Imperial Majesty, however, said that his impression was, that the Maritime Powers were bent on making war against him, in which case he could not hold back from it.

I pressed his Excellency several times to give me, in writing, the idea of the project he had in view, as it would be very desirable that your Lordship should be in early possession of them before entering on the subject with Chevalier Bunsen.

He told me he would have given me a copy of the memoir he had submitted to the King on the subject, but that there were several points on which His Majesty had raised objections, and that as yet his project was not moulded into shape; and that he therefore thought it better to confine his present statement to the preliminaries which I have had the honour of reporting, giving such instructions to Chevalier Bunsen as would place your Lordship in possession of his views.

I inquired of his Excellency whether he should mention his project to the French and Austrian Governments. He replied in the negative, saying that, previous to doing so he should like to have well-grounded hopes of success. He thought it might be invidious to name it to the one and not to the other; and therefore, until in possession of your Lordship's views, he reserved himself to communicate it to these Governments at the same time. I told his Excellency that we were so cordially united with France that we could enter into no secret negotiation apart from her; but in this respect perhaps his Excellency may be in the right, for if the attempt was known, in case of failure, it would not be flattering to Prussia, and it might likewise give Russia hopes of acquiring her support.

Baron Manteuffel gave me to understand that, in the event of a negotiation in London being entered into, he should invite the English Government to prevent Turkey from commencing hostilities.

As his Excellency informed me that he would write to the Chevalier Bunsen on the subject this evening by post, I deemed it important that your Lordship should be previously informed of this intention; and I have thought it my duty to forward these despatches by extra courier Schmock to Calais, and not to delay their transmission by Saturday's messenger. I hope your Lordship will approve my having done so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 85.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 756.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 11, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 743, in which I informed your Lordship that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not contemplated the possibility of the combined fleets being called upon to act on the Asiatic coasts of the Black Sea for the defence of Turkey, and that consequently in taking the Emperor's orders as to the instructions which were to be sent to the French Admiral, the defence of the European coast had alone been discussed, I have now the honour to state that His Imperial Majesty has directed that Admiral Hamelin shall be instructed to act in concert with Admiral Dundas, upon the joint orders of the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople, wherever it may be judged necessary to employ the naval forces of the two countries for the defence of the Sultan's dominions. The Emperor at the same time feels that the safety of Constantinople is the point which ought first to be provided for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 86.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 514. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 6, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 27th ultimo, No. 218, containing the copies of three despatches relating to the departure of the British and French fleets from Besika Bay to Constantinople.

Your Lordship will I trust pardon me if I express the great satisfaction which I feel at learning that appearances at that capital have been such as fully to justify a disregard of the Convention of 1841, even supposing the justification not to have been preceded by the forcible entry of the Russian troops into the Sultan's dominions.

As I have taken the liberty of stating to your Lordship on more than one occasion, I have been very desirous that the unhappy differences between Turkey and Russia should be decided by the submission of both parties to an award of the Allied Powers; but from the moment that it became clear that this was accepted by the one in a sense favourable to a continuance of those encroachments by which the peace of Europe would be endangered, it becomes of the utmost importance that such barriers as English and French fleets should be opposed to Russian ambition.

In saying this, I would beg to remark that I have no reason to change the opinions which I have frequently submitted to your Lordship as to the Emperor's views.

Now, as before, I believe that His Majesty began this deplorable quarrel, and even took military possession of the Principalities, neither with the idea of overrunning the rest of Turkey, of adding to his already overgrown possessions, or of involving himself in disputes with his allies; but I cannot doubt that His Majesty entertains most exaggerated ideas as to the influence to which he is entitled in the country of a feeble but independent Sovereign; and that the time is fully come when some demonstration must be made which will have the effect of showing where the limits to his authority are traced, the passage of which constitutes a trespass as well upon Europe as upon Turkey.

As I have several times taken the liberty of remarking to your Lordship, the Emperor is, I believe, less opposed than is commonly thought to the existence of Turkey; but the independence of Turkey is an idea very foreign to his thoughts, and it is one to which it is very important that he should be brought to reconcile himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 87.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 15.)

(No. 515. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 6, 1853.*

I HEAR, and I am inclined to believe upon good authority, that the 12,000 men which I mentioned in my despatch No. 508 to have been embarked at Sevastopol, have received orders to repair with all speed to some point on the coast of Mingrelia.

My informant conceives that Potee is the port at which, according to probability, they will be disembarked.

It appears that the Russians have received intimations of its being the intention of the Turks to promote and assist a general rising of the tribes on the frontier of the Caucasus, and they feel that the Imperial forces there are not sufficient to insure their security against a general attack of the kind.

From what I can collect, I infer that this expected movement is the occasion of considerable anxiety to the Russian Government, and the more so as the

same winds which commonly favour their operations against Turkey will render the approach of the eastern coast of the Black Sea a matter of some difficulty at this season of the year.

I still lean to the opinion that the Emperor of Russia had conceived hopes of extorting a certain amount of concession from the Turkish Government without having recourse to war, but I feel still more convinced that at all events it was far from his wish that hostilities should begin before the spring.

It is indeed obvious that this must be the case, as the spring would find the Russian armies in a much better state of preparation, while, as is calculated here, an interval of five or six months passed in inactivity, would be likely, together with the embarrassed financial condition of Turkey, to lead to the dissolution of the Sultan's forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 88.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 23. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE read the report of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel, as detailed in your despatch No. 32 of the 11th instant, with great interest; and Her Majesty's Government have learned with much satisfaction, that no promise or engagement of any kind has been given by the Prussian Government to the Emperor of Russia. A similar communication was made to me this morning on the part of Baron Manteuffel by the Chevalier Bunsen, for which your Lordship will convey the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency appears to have acted with great wisdom and firmness in a position of more than ordinary difficulty, and Her Majesty's Government desire sincerely to congratulate him upon the success which he obtained, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated; for if the Emperor of Russia had effected the alienation of Prussia and Austria from England and France, and had been able to reckon upon their moral and material aid in support of his aggressive policy towards Turkey, the maintenance of peace in Europe would have been impossible.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 89.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 24.)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 34 of the 12th instant, I have to inform your Lordship that if Russia were voluntarily to make such proposals as the Porte could accept for settling the differences between them, the intervention of foreign Powers would be unnecessary; but as no such proposals are likely to emanate from Russia, or from Austria on her behalf, Her Majesty's Government have learned with much satisfaction that Baron Manteuffel has declined to entertain the communications made to him by M. Cruvelli and Baron Budberg, with respect to the plan said to be preparing at Vienna for Russia and Turkey to settle their differences with each other directly without foreign interference.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 90.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1853.

My Lord,

I APPROVE of your having forwarded to me by the extra messenger Schmeck, your despatches to No. 37 inclusive.

The Chevalier Bunsen, in his interview with me this morning, did not allude to the project for settling the differences between Russia and Turkey, that was mentioned to your Lordship by Baron Manteuffel, as reported in your despatch No. 36 of the 12th instant; but he asked me what course Her Majesty's Government intended to pursue.

I told the Chevalier Bunsen that it was proposed to draw up a fresh note, together with a Protocol, founded upon the Treaty of 1841, which should be forwarded immediately to Constantinople with a strong recommendation to the Porte to accept the note, but not precluding such modifications as might be agreed upon between the Representatives of the Four Powers and the Turkish Government.

I have to observe, however, that an arrangement of this nature may not be practicable, nor indeed would it be sufficient in the event of war having been formally declared, and hostilities commenced between the Two Powers. An instrument more formal than a note would then be required for placing their relations upon a permanent and satisfactory footing, and future doubts and disputes should be guarded against by a Treaty.

Baron Manteuffel, to whom your Lordship is instructed to communicate this despatch, will see that the views of Her Majesty's Government coincide with those which he expressed to your Lordship.

But Her Majesty's Government do not disguise from themselves that the assent of Russia to a new and permanent form of arrangement is not to be reckoned upon. The views which His Imperial Majesty is known to entertain with regard to the approaching and inevitable dissolution of the Ottoman Empire; the policy towards Turkey that he has of late pursued, and seems determined to persist in; together with the indisposition he has always manifested to admit of foreign interference in the relations between Russia and the Porte, while they render the settlement of those relations upon a new and equitable footing most desirable for the future peace of Europe, yet at the same time make His Imperial Majesty's acquiescence in any new arrangement not improbable. But on the other hand, it is to be borne in mind that unless the result of war was favourable to Turkey, she would have no claim to depart from Treaties by which she has so recently declared herself to be bound.

The difficulties by which the whole question is still beset, and the complications which unavoidably arise from the distances which separate the contending Powers and those which are willing to mediate between them, and the failure which, from various causes, has attended the Conference at Vienna, induce Her Majesty's Government to give their entire assent to the proposal of the Prussian Government, that the negotiation should henceforward be carried on in London.

Baron Manteuffel informed your Lordship that the Emperor of Russia had expressed his repugnance to the proposal, and had declared that to him London would be the least desirable place for conducting the negotiation. But at any conference held here the interests of Russia would be fully represented; and His Imperial Majesty is no more justified in doubting the perfect impartiality of Her Majesty's Government than he is in expressing his belief, as reported to you by Baron Manteuffel, that on the part of England there was a desire to make war against Russia.

Your Lordship most properly informed Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government could enter into no negotiation upon this question to which France was not to be a party. Baron Manteuffel may possibly not be aware how complete is the intimacy and confidence which subsist between the Cabinets of England and France; but under existing circumstances Her Majesty's Government would feel bound to make known to the French Government any com-

munication they received from Baron Manteuffel, and they would, therefore, much prefer, and are convinced it would be for the interest of Prussia, and promote her friendly relations with France, that Baron Manteuffel should make no distinction between the two Governments, but frankly and simultaneously to both express the views of the Prussian Government. But Her Majesty's Government would willingly undertake to be the medium of communication upon this subject between the Prussian and French Governments, should that course be more agreeable to Baron Manteuffel with reference to the doubt he expressed to your Lordship upon the expediency of not making known his project to the Cabinet of Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 91.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 518.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 9, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing to your Lordship the copy of a letter containing very unfavourable intelligence from Constantinople, which reached me to-day by post from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa.

Events have but too well justified the expectations which I had formed of the consequences to be looked for from the occupation of the Principalities, when considered by the Turks with such commentaries as were offered by the Russian circulars, and more especially by the Russian manifesto.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I was informed yesterday that the Turkish force in Erzeroom is believed to be 25,000 strong.

G. H. S.

Inclosure in No. 91.

Consul Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *Odessa, September 31, 1853.*

THE steam-packets from Constantinople have of late brought accounts successively more disquieting, though it is probable that the apprehensions of some popular commotion, likely to be excited by fanaticism, have been exaggerated.

The intelligence received the day before yesterday by private letters of the 26th, is of a most alarming nature; for it is stated that, in consequence of the rejection of the "note" as modified, a great Divan was assembled on the preceding day (the 25th), in which the resolution was carried to summon the Russian Commander-in-chief to evacuate the Danubian Principalities within the term of fourteen days, and in case of non-compliance to proceed to a declaration of war.

At the present time, the 13th Division of Infantry, composed of sixteen battalions, with two batteries of guns, is embarking at Sevastopol, in order to be conveyed to Secoum-Kalé.

These troops are thence to march by Hovi, and through Mingrelia and Immeritia, towards the frontiers of Turkey. I am also told of a large force of Cossacks directed to Stavropol for the Caucasus.

A squadron is to come here shortly to carry the 1st Brigade of the 14th Division of Infantry to Sevastopol, there, with some battalions of the reserves from Perecop, to replace the 13th Division

The object of these movements might have been doubtful, were not the present disturbances in the Caucasus notorious, extending even to the south-western frontier, excited perhaps by emissaries, or by the mere vicinity of a Mussulman army said to be now forming in that part of the Ottoman Empire.

From these circumstances, and from the fact that the reinforcements have been called for by Prince Woronzow himself, we may for the present presume that these measures are adopted with no design of assuming a menacing attitude in that quarter, or in contemplation of aggressive operations.

I just now learn that the 2nd Brigade of the 14th Division is ordered to advance instantly to Ismail, a large Ottoman force having appeared about Toultcha, Isakchin, and Hlachin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 92.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 17.)

(No. 763. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 16, 1853.*

M. DE BOURQUENEY is led to think from a telegraphic communication dated the 6th instant which he has received from M. de la Cour, that an attempt will be made by the Porte to induce the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople to enter into a Convention, binding them to employ the naval forces of the two countries placed at their disposal in support of any hostile measures it may please the Turks to take against Russia, as the price of the admission of those fleets within the Dardanelles.

When the intelligence first reached M. Drouyn de Lhuys, he appeared much annoyed that M. de la Cour had asked for instructions how to act should this demand be made. With that want of forethought and neglect of consequences which too often characterize French proceedings, he appeared to think, without, however, directly avowing it, that the admission of the fleets into the Bosphorus should be secured on any conditions. In a conversation, however, which I had with him yesterday, he showed that he had reflected upon the inconvenience to which a Convention, such as had been hinted to him, would expose the two Governments.

The only answer returned to M. de la Cour has been the laconic one, "Faites entrer les flottes."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 93.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 230.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 18, 1853.*

I HEREWITH inclose the copy of a despatch* from Sir H. Seymour transmitting one from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa by which it appears that a portion of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol was about to employed in conveying troops from Sevastopol to Secoum-Kalé in order to reinforce the army under the command of Prince Woronzow.

Upon this subject Her Majesty's Government are convinced that it is unnecessary to furnish your Excellency with instructions, and it is only to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding with reference to my despatch No. 220 of the 8th instant, that I inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government considers that the British fleet should not be sent into the Black Sea for

* No. 91.

the purpose of interfering in any way with the transport of troops from one portion of the Russian territory to another, and which troops are not so moved with the object of making an attack upon the Turkish territory.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 94.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 231.) *Foreign Office, October* 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the satisfaction of conveying to your Excellency the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of the course pursued by you as reported in your despatch No. 279 of the 26th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 95.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 41.) *Berlin, October* 15, 1853.

My Lord,

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 11 of the 5th instant, I profited of the earliest occasion to communicate to Baron Manteuffel your Lordship's despatch No. 222 of the 30th September to Sir Hamilton Seymour. As his Excellency expressed a desire to read that despatch with more attention and care than a simple perusal afforded, and being aware that his Excellency could not possibly report to His Majesty from memory the clear and conclusive arguments which it contains, I ventured to leave a copy of that despatch in his Excellency's hands, and I trust that my having done so will meet with your Lordship's approbation. I conceive it to be highly necessary that both His Majesty and Baron Manteuffel should be in possession of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the question of the religious protectorate in Turkey sought to be acquired by Russia; the more so, indeed as His Majesty is by personal feelings inclined to lean to a general protection of the Christian church in the East, from whatever quarter it may come, without due consideration of the political consequences which such protection may involve.

In a conversation with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency confided to me that, in his opinion some plan might be devised for placing all the Christian communities of Turkey under the joint protection of the Five Powers, in order that, when any differences or doubts occur in questions of a religious nature, they might be referred to a joint counsel and judgment of the Five Powers. But his Excellency added that this idea would not be palatable to Russia, as she aimed at an undivided protection of her own church.

I remarked to his Excellency, that if the Sultan engaged himself to accord the same privileges to the twelve millions of his subjects professing the Greek Church, which he might accord to several hundreds or thousands of the Latin Church not being his subjects, he must either yield up to Russia the entire dominion of his Greek population, or he must naturally be so fettered as to be unable to extend further privileges to the Christian population not being his subjects, and that the only mode which it appeared to me could in this case be pursued was, not to bind the Sultan by any such engagement, but to leave him free to accord of his own will those advantages which he might in his wisdom and beneficence deem advisable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 96.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 15, 1853.

I WAITED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, and inquired from him whether he had received further intelligence concerning the proposition reported in my despatch No. 34 of the 12th instant, which had been expected from Vienna, and to which Count Cruvelli, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, and Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister, has referred in conversation with his Excellency.

He replied that Count Cravelli had informed him, that he had received the despatches he had expected from Vienna, but there was no mention in them of any new proposition. His Excellency was at a loss to explain this circumstance, and the more so, as his Excellency told me that there could be no doubt that the proposition, as stated in my despatch No. 34, had been under the consideration of Count Buol and Baron de Meyendorff, for the Emperor of Russia, when here, had referred to it in conversation with him, and had even informed him of the nature of the arrangement which was to be proposed.

My own suspicion is, that it was a plan got up by Russia in order to seduce the support of Austria and Prussia, and thus to separate them from the Western Powers. This plan may have been counteracted by the failure of the Emperor's designs on Prussia, and the proposition may have, accordingly, been abandoned as impracticable.

Being on this topic of distrust of Russia, I warned his Excellency against Prussia being entrapped to give her adhesion to proposals emanating from Vienna. His Excellency informed me, without hesitation, that he would never be carried so far, and that he would give no reply to any proposition without first consulting with the English Government.

Baron Manteuffel informed me, that he had received no intelligence from Count Arnim, at Vienna, on the Oriental question. I communicated to his Excellency the proposition which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had put forth, and which had received the adhesion of Her Majesty's Government, and of that of France. His Excellency told me he had received a telegraphic despatch from the Chevalier Bunsen, referring to a proposition under consideration in London which must evidently have been the one referred to.

With respect to Lord Stratford's proposition his Excellency seemed, on a cursory view, to think that it was vague, and did not sufficiently define the question of the religious privileges.

His Excellency reverted to the Olmütz declaration, and inquired whether, if a more legal character was given to that document, it might be made to answer its end. I replied to his Excellency, that laying aside the fact that it was no virtual guarantee to Turkey, and that it in no way neutralised the pretensions set forth in Count Nesselrode's memoir, it contained in itself a dubious and objectionable interpretation; and I quoted to him the phrase, stating that (the Emperor) "demande que le Sultan la (l'Eglise Grecque) fasse participer à tous les avantages qu'il accordera à l'avenir à *d'autres rits Chrétiens*." The omission of "étant sujets de la Porte" involved the whole principle for which we were contending.

I then inquired of his Excellency what course he thought Austria would take. He said he could not say; but I could perceive that his opinion is that Austria is with Russia.

I asked his Excellency whether he believed the report of Austria diminishing her army. His Excellency appeared to doubt it, and added, that she had called in her "furlough men," which did not portend any diminution of her military force; and he informed me that he had received very bad news from Italy, from Florence, and Rome, as well as from Lombardy, which, therefore, led him to disbelieve the report in circulation.

His Excellency told me that he did not think that, under the present circumstances, anything further would or could be done at Vienna towards an

amicable settlement of the Eastern differences, and is anxious to learn from the Chevalier Bunsen whether any hope may be entertained of a successful negotiation in London.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 97.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 43.)
Berlin, October 15, 1853.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 18, I have communicated to Baron Manteuffel this day the assurances therein contained, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government Prussia had nothing to fear from France. It was evident to me that his Excellency derived gratification from this communication, and placed confidence in it; and indeed his Excellency expressed his satisfaction at that assurance. He also seemed wholly to concur with the opinions expressed by your Lordship in the sequel of that despatch.

I have again taken occasion to remark to his Excellency, that with respect to any negotiation which may be entered into in London at the instigation or on the proposal of Prussia, our policy and union with France was of so cordial and intimate a nature, that we could not enter into any secret understanding apart from her; and that it might be accordingly desirable that his Excellency should at once make known his hopes and endeavours to the French Minister at this Court.

His Excellency replied that he was not aware of any need of secresy; but that he was first anxious to learn what hopes of success might be held out in London.

I have taken care to inform his Excellency in the spirit of your Lordship's despatches, that while the course which the Governments of France and England have laid down is clear and determined, it is their anxious wish, if possible, by a satisfactory arrangement, to avert the inevitable calamities which a war must entail; but that this moderate course is confined within certain limits beyond which they could not honourably advance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 98.

Consul-General Fonblanque to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Transmis de Vienne par Lord Westmorland, le 16 Octobre, à midi.)

Belgrade, le 16 Octobre, 1853.

(Télégraphique.)

M. MUCHIN arrivera demain ici comme Consul-Général de Russie. Il n'est pas muni d'un berat du Sultan. Dois-je expliquer au Ministre Simitch qu'une telle irrégularité constituera, dans les circonstances actuelles, une grave offense contre l'autorité de la Porte? Bessim Pacha ne s'occupe plus que des affaires de détails militaires, et son successeur était encore à Widdin le 11.

No. 99.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

16 *Octobre*, 1853.

(Télégraphique.)

DITES à Mr. Fonblanque que sa communication n'est pas nécessaire, car M. Simitch doit connaître son devoir.

No. 100.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(No. 372.)
Vienna, October 14, 1853.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED last night after 12 o'clock, your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the same evening, and I waited this morning upon Count Buol to communicate to him its contents.

I read to him first Lord Stratford's despatch of the 1st instant, and then your Lordship's despatch asking the opinion of the Austrian Cabinet upon the first proposition of Lord Stratford, and stating it had been favourably received by Her Majesty's Government as the only solution which was now possible.

Count Buol told me he had just received notice, that a messenger from the Porte was on his way to Vienna, supposed to be charged with the declaration of war, in which case any proposition of arrangement to be made at St. Petersburgh would be useless, if based upon the acceptation of the modifications that Government had so recently rejected; besides which, as the Governments of England and of France had declined to recommend to the Porte the acceptation of that note, and as the Porte had declared it "telle qu'elle est à jamais inadmissible," the Austrian Government had determined no longer to adhere to it.

I replied to Count Buol that Lord Stratford's proposal was to draw up a new *rédaction* of the Vienna note, containing the substance of the modifications proposed by the Porte, and accompanied by a declaration by the Representatives of the Four Powers that it did not materially differ from the original of that note, and I even pointed out to him the way in which this declaration might be worded; but he objected to any remodelling of that note, which had met with so little success, and in which the modifications which had already been rejected were to be embodied. Count Buol also stated that he had not as yet even received any official notice from the Governments of England or France that his own proposal of a declaration, forwarded from Olmütz on the 27th ultimo, had been rejected, or the reasons for its being so; and although he would make no point of this, if a project was submitted to him which he believed might be successful, yet he could not undertake to adopt one which he was satisfied would prove a failure.

I stated that in the present state of the question with Turkey, and with the anxious desire of all parties to avoid the extremities of war, which are menaced, I thought every effort should be tried; but Count Buol again repeated that if the declaration of war arrived by the messenger who was announced, all hope of any immediate settlement would be, for the moment, at an end; and shortly afterwards, this declaration was received, and Count Buol brought it to my house, and communicated it to me, stating that he felt that the affair had thus assumed so different an aspect that any proposition of arrangement must be taken upon new grounds.

I cannot but express to your Excellency the great disappointment I have felt at the want of success which has attended this last attempt to arrive at a conciliatory termination of this long and painful negotiation, and which has been so abruptly put an end to.

I have the honour of inclosing a copy of the telegraphic despatch of the 5th instant, which was received by Count Buol from the Internuncio at Constantinople, and which, as above stated, he communicated to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—*October* 12. M. de Bourqueney, who was with me yesterday when Count Buol brought me the despatch from Constantinople containing the declaration of war, had not then received any recent instructions from Paris; but this morning he has communicated to me the despatches of M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 7th, together with those of Count Walewski, and he has just left me on his way to Count Buol to lay before him the recommendation of Lord Stratford's proposal.

W.

Inclosure in No. 100.

Baron Bruck to Count Buol.

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 5, 1853.*

A TURKISH courier is the bearer of the manifesto of the Porte, and of a note which Omer Pasha is to address to Prince Gortchakoff. The proclamation to the Ottoman people will follow. The manifesto consists of an act of justification by the Porte, in which is reiterated what has been already often enough said. The note (to Prince Gortchakoff) declares that the state of war is to commence fifteen days after receipt of the same, unless the Provinces be evacuated. Except to the Russian flag the commerce of the Black Sea is to be left open. No embargo will be laid upon Russian ships. Russian Consuls and employés will be desired to leave the Turkish territory. The Turkish fleet is to sail out and to take up its position at Baltshick.

No. 101.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 18.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 17, 1853.*

IN answer to your letter of the 12th instant, Count Buol thinks that the moment for proposition or conference will be when the manner in which the Emperor of Russia has received intelligence that the declaration of war is known; and he hopes a collective proposal of the Four Powers may be then adopted. In the meantime any proposals [of the] nature from you, with the knowledge of the Russian Minister and the Minister of Turkey, will be received by every one with the consideration due to it.

No. 102.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 376.)
My Lord, *Vienna, October 15, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 328, which was brought by the Austrian courier, and transmitted to me by Count Buol, to whom I communicated it, in obedience to your Lordship's instructions. Count Buol was already informed by Count Colloredo of the general purport of the document. He read it with great attention, and made the following remarks. He admitted that since the proposition to which this despatch referred had been submitted to your Lordship, the circumstances to which it was intended to apply had so changed that it might be considered as no longer adapted to them. He accepted, therefore, your Lordship's reasons for being unable concur in it, and stated that he was himself ready to abandon it: he now felt that in the present posture of the affairs of the East, it had become necessary to seek some new form by which the unfortunate rupture of the friendly relations between the Governments of Russia and Turkey, which by the declaration of the Sultan had taken place, might be put an end to, and for that purpose he looked with hope to the continued concert of the Four Powers who had hitherto so strenuously exerted themselves to prevent it. Count Buol stated that the position of Austria in the contest which had arisen was, and would continue to be, that of a strict neutrality, and while he recognised the more

advanced engagements which had been taken by the Governments of England and of France, he hoped that the support which they would afford to the Government of the Sultan would not in any way interfere with their character of mediators, and that the great influence which by the late events they had acquired at Constantinople would be employed for the reestablishment of that peace which the Austrian Government had laboured in common with them so assiduously to maintain. Count Buol stated that when he took into consideration the assurances which had been given by the Emperor Nicholas that he sought no conquest, nor extension of dominion, and also bore in mind the pacific disposition which had been manifested by the Sultan, he could not but persuade himself that the friendly intervention of the Governments, the allies of both Empires, would be able to effect the reestablishment of their former relations. He believed that a fitting opportunity for the exercise of this intervention by the allied Powers would be afforded by the impediments which the advanced period of the season would oppose to the commencement of actual hostilities between the parties, and he must anxiously hope that this opportunity would be seized upon to carry into effect all the advantages which would be derived from the perfect unity of counsels amongst the mediating Powers. Count Buol in requesting me to leave with him a copy of your Lordship's despatch, which I was instructed to propose to him, assured me that he should consider it with the greatest attention, and that he should transmit his remarks upon it to Count Colloredo, and that your Lordship might rely upon his labouring with the most anxious desire for the reestablishment of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 103.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 522.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 11, 1853.*

AS far as the uncertain information of which I am in possession enables me to make a statement, one of the divisions of the Baltic fleet is at Revel, and, as usual, will winter there.

The second, after having been dismantled, is getting ready, in consequence of the orders lately received, and, as it is expected, will pass the winter in the same port; while the third, which has never been this year in a fit state to take the sea, will remain at Cronstadt.

According to report, some difficulties respecting the provisions of the division which is expected to sail for Revel have occurred, those which had been disembarked having been consumed by the Cronstadt garrison.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR

No. 104.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 524. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 11, 1853.*

THE movements of France being at the present crisis of as great importance as those of Russia herself, I am careful to see as much as possible of the French Envoy.

I find him, judging as far as I am able from a comparison of the two, a little

more pacific than his Government, but extremely friendly, and very much disposed to give proof of the confidence which he expresses in his English colleague.

It would, indeed, be difficult to say in what respect his conduct towards myself could be improved, for even when I was residing in the country he continued to see me every day, and even generally read to me as well what he writes as what he receives from Paris.

Yesterday when I called upon him, he communicated to me not only the despatch which he had just received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but the private note of that Minister, and another from M. Thouvenel. He read me as well a short despatch of acknowledgment which he was engaged in writing.

This despatch and the letter from Paris were dated the 1st instant, and that they were written under the feeling that war may possibly be at hand, is apparent from the fact of their containing the suggestion that the Marquise de Castelbajac should be dissuaded from leaving France to rejoin her husband here.

No indication, however, was given of any attempt being in contemplation to avoid war by dishonourable concession, although M. Thouvenel alludes to the present unfavourable circumstances of France, where high prices prevail, where industry is to a degree paralyzed by the uncertainty of political prospects, and where much anxiety is felt at the close neighbourhood of epidemic disease.

In the despatch the allusion to a war is very direct, but is accompanied by a declaration which will, I take it for granted, be passed on to the Russian Government, and which will tend to deprive war of much of the terror with which it is regarded by the Continental Governments. The passage is to this effect, that whatever may come out of the actual crisis, the Emperor Napoleon is firmly resolved not to have recourse to those means of which he completely disapproves. He will not, that is, appeal to the popular feelings of the country with which he may be at war.

In his reply, General Castelbajac remarks that he is convinced, now as before, that the Emperor is eager to avoid war; that this is proved by the circumstance of Russia not being prepared for war, the trans-Caucasian provinces being, even now, very insufficiently guarded; that the present alarming state of affairs is created by a mutual want of confidence; and that as a proof of the continued personal reliance which he feels in the maintenance of peace, he shall persevere in his intention of allowing Madame de Castelbajac to come out to Russia.

General Castelbajac then exhorts his Government not to relax in their endeavours to avert hostilities; but then adds, that if war should become inevitable, it had better be directed in the first instance against the South-Eastern Provinces of Russia, because it is in that quarter that she is the most vulnerable.

Upon hearing this passage, I remarked that General Castelbajac's system offered this incidental advantage, that the breaking up of a Turkish army, whenever such a movement might become requisite, would be attended with less inconvenience and risk in the countries to the east and south of the Black Sea than in Roumelia, occupied as it now is by the bulk of the Sultan's army.

General Castelbajac informed me that the Emperor of Russia had been most marked in his attentions to the French officers at Berlin, and had invited them all to Warsaw. General Guyon had, he said, been directed on no account to accept the invitation, but to excuse himself upon the ground of his services as Aide-de-camp to the Emperor Napoleon being required at Paris.

He acquainted me further, that the Emperor Nicholas had remarked, but he did not say to whom, "Qu'il n'osait plus se fier au Gouvernement Anglais et ses *arguties*, mais qu'il était toujours plein de confiance dans la loyauté de l'Empereur Napoléon."

This—considering the contempt which His Imperial Majesty has expressed constantly, and with little attempt at preventing the opinion being generally known, for the French Emperor—appeared to me extremely unworthy.

I, however, only remarked that the Emperor was playing his cards as it was obvious that they would be played; that every effort would of course be made to disunite France and England; but that for a man of such ability as the Emperor, I thought his attempt awkwardly made; that, to use a colloquial expression, it was "cousu de fil blanc."

I might have added, and upon unimpeachable authority, that His Imperial Majesty until very lately has been in the habit, in speaking of the French Emperor, of designating him as "Der Kerl."

Upon reading over my despatch, I find that I have omitted to state to your Lordship that General Castelbajac is directed to speak of the necessity of giving protection to the Christians as the motive, joined to that of Besika Bay being unsafe, which has led to the appearance of a French fleet before Constantinople.

As I understand the despatch, it is only in the event of being pressed upon the point that the French Envoy is to state that the passage of the Dardanelles is the natural consequence of the occupation of the Principalities.

With regard to language, that of great moderation is enjoined by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. No cause, he remarks, is advanced by the use of strong expressions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 105.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 290.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 5, 1853.

IT is very desirable for your Lordship to have the means of judging how far the Porte may be swayed by other than urgent and indispensable motives, in bringing its differences with Russia to the immediate hazard of war. The practical importance of such knowledge in the present stage of the question may perhaps lie open to doubt; but still it is natural for your Lordship to seek a clear view of the subject; and it would be satisfactory for all who deprecate the disasters of war to find that the Sultan's Ministers have not given way to groundless fears or to illusive speculations. On these points I can, however, add but little to what your Lordship has been able to derive from my preceding correspondence and the language of the Sultan's Minister in London. Allowing the assertions on one side to be neutralized by the suspicions entertained on the other, conjecture and inference are all I have to offer.

It must be admitted that the Porte has had reason to derive an increase of courage from circumstances which have occurred since the departure of Prince Menchikoff. She has seen the Four Powers acting together on her behalf; she has heard the voice of all Europe condemning her adversary; she perceives that the public sentiment of England and France is almost universally in her favour; she hears from all sides that the occupation of the Principalities by Russia constitutes a case of war; and she has not only put herself into a state of respectable defence, but she has appealed with perfect success to the zeal of her Mussulman and to the loyalty of her Christian subjects.

The effect of these successive encouragements can hardly have failed to raise her confidence and to strengthen her resolution. Even on the first presentation of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, the general feeling was one of resistance to his pretensions. There was indeed a visible abundance of desire and endeavour to avoid an extreme course; but the point at issue, namely, the exercise of Russian influence by means of a recognized right to interfere in the management of Greek ecclesiastical affairs, was stoutly rejected, and the dangers officially intimated as likely to follow on the breach of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey were braved deliberately by the Sultan and his Government.

Motives to a decided course of action have also sprung naturally from another source, or rather from the same taken in a different point of view. Large armies and powerful squadrons cannot be collected anywhere without exciting strong feelings among the people, and proclamations enlisting the hearts of all in a cause of common interest must necessarily bring out that popular spirit and national will which few Governments can entirely control, and which no Government can afford to throw away or to chill by unseasonable disappointment. The personal sacrifices attendant on military preparations opposed to such a neighbour as Russia, the increased pressure of taxation, and the enormous expenses devolving unavoidably, with much alarm and anxiety, on the State, must also have had their effect in producing an eager and impatient desire to

reach some kind of final result. The Turks must naturally long to change their present irksome position, and to put away the vexation and disgrace of acquiescing indefinitely in a forced occupation of two of their largest provinces by foreign armies. There may be some degree of excitement in the feelings thus called out; but while the Sovereign and his Government, in sympathizing with their people, must take the public opinion into their account, they have also substantial reasons of policy to plead in their justification. Such exertions as they have been making since the retirement of Prince Menchikoff tend more and more, as they are prolonged, to exhaust the resources of the Empire, and to render any future assertion of its independence, however great may be the necessity, difficult and almost hopeless. It can hardly be matter of surprise that such a concurrence of excited feelings and reasonable motives should have produced a ferment among the fanatical, but not on that account the less influential, classes of the capital; that a sympathising party should have been formed in the Ministry; and that all should have relieved themselves from individual responsibility by gathering round the throne, and resorting, in failure of other hopes, to their own imperfect yet self-dependent means of relief.

It is clear that there would have been imminent danger, under the circumstances, in taking any other course, and the more pacific members of the Cabinet appeared as little disposed as able to make head against the general determination. Reshid Pasha, and others of his ability and experience, cannot be ignorant of the peril to which they expose their country by engaging single-handed in a war against Russia. They may reckon to a certain degree upon the chances of eventual assistance from England and France; but they have been too often admonished by me and my colleagues of the precarious nature of such expectations to entertain them as justifiable reasons for entering upon a war policy. My impression is that their motives for going to war are such as I have described above, and that they indulge the hope of succour from abroad, upon the same principle that when a ship is on fire the seamen throw themselves overboard, and take their chance for struggling with the waves until they are picked up by some other vessel already in sight.

Notwithstanding all this, an inference of opposite tendency may possibly be drawn from the Porte's conduct in the late negotiations. The Turkish Ministers may be thought to have shown a want of readiness to close with fair terms of accommodation, by making unnecessary objections, by shifting their grounds, or by acting with gratuitous slowness.

On these several points I cannot hope to offer your Lordship any fresh information. If there be some appearances respecting them to justify a suspicion that the Porte has looked at times rather to the camp than to the Cabinet for a solution of its differences with Russia, they cannot in fairness be separated from the difficulties and complications of the matter in hand, or from the peculiarities which still prevail here in the habits of thinking, the modes of transacting business, and the processes of communication. There is much, no doubt, to disapprove, and even to complain of, in the Porte's habitual relations with Christendom; but the manner, at once firm and conciliatory, with which, on the whole, she has proceeded under circumstances of unusual provocation and unjust aggression, adhering to her rights in a spirit of independence, and accepting humiliations in deference to the counsels of her allies, ought surely to pass to her credit and entitle her to indulgence. If she asked at one time for the guarantee of the Four Powers as a supplement to the terms which alone she considered safe and honourable, she has since evinced a willingness to desist from that condition. She had previously declared her readiness to subscribe the Vienna note; not, indeed, without modifications, but with such as their allies have judged to be reasonable in substance, though superfluous in form, and which they have strongly recommended to the acceptance of the Emperor Nicholas.

At all events, my Lord, whatever circumstances may in reality have turned the scale from peace to war, I am slow to believe that the Turkish Ministers are acting from a political preference for the latter course. It is more natural and reasonable to suppose that they are not plunging wantonly into hostilities under the influence of any unreflecting passion; but that in despair, however mistakenly, of securing what they conceive to be essential to the sovereignty and independence of the Porte, and fearful of a popular revolution, together with the exhaustion of their available resources, they have resorted courageously, though reluctantly,

to the only remaining chance, as they imagine, of at least saving their honour, if they do not succeed in anything else.

There is, no doubt, some rashness in deciding on such a course; but a more timid line of policy would, in their estimation, have dangers of its own, without offering a permanent escape from those of war. The Sultan and his Ministers cannot be blind to a truth which is obvious to every one. They must perceive that their hold upon the sympathies of any auxiliary Power is one which has its origin in the sense entertained by that Power of its own interests. Temporary circumstances may produce an exceptional effect; but in their very natural and reasonable anxiety to elude the grasp of Russia, they can hardly be blamed for looking with hope to the adverse interests and corresponding policy of England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 106.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 291.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 5, 1853.*

A SPIRIT of self-devotion, unaccompanied with fanatical demonstrations, and showing itself among the highest functionaries of the State, bids fair to give an extraordinary impulse to any military enterprise which may be undertaken against Russia by the Turkish Government.

The Sultan has given his reluctant consent to the negotiation of a loan. The corps of Ulema are preparing, as it is currently reported, to advance a considerable sum in support of the war. The Grand Vizier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and other leading members of the Administration, have resigned a large proportion of their horses for the service of the artillery. Reinforcements continue to be directed towards the Danube and the Georgian frontier. Several steam-frigates are to be sent almost immediately into the Black Sea. In short, it is evident that, if hostilities commence, they will be prosecuted in a manner to test the strength of the contending parties, and to leave on the one side or on the other deep and durable traces of a truly national struggle. That the chances are greatly in favour of Russia, when we look to the final result, can be doubted by few, unless the assistance of the maritime Powers be given to Turkey with that degree of frankness and cordiality which passing circumstances may render difficult, but which more lasting interests would seem eventually to require.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 107.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 246.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1853.

I INCLOSE herewith a copy of a telegraphic despatch* which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul in Servia reporting the expected arrival of M. Sinitch as Russian Consul-General, and I have to instruct you to ask Count Nesselrode whether the information therein contained is correct.

Such acts, denoting as they do a disregard of the Sultan's authority, must add to the existing difficulties, and evince a spirit on the part of the Russian Government which Her Majesty's Government much regret.

I have informed Mr. Consul-General Fonblanque that he need not make to M. Sinitch the representation which he proposes.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 98.

No. 108.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 27.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 41 of the 15th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel, relative to the question of the protection of the Christian communities in Turkey, and stating that you had left with his Excellency a copy of my despatch No. 222 to Sir H. Seymour on the subject, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the course pursued by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 109.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 28.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October* 19, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 43 of the 15th instant, with respect to the cordial understanding which exists between the Governments of Great Britain and France, and their policy on the Eastern question.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 110.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 19.)

(No. 768.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 18, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me yesterday that he should direct Count Walewski to consult your Lordship as to the propriety of asking the Porte's permission to garrison the Castles of the Dardanelles during the presence of the combined fleets within those Straits. The French Minister appears to have been led to this idea by two considerations: 1st, the danger to which the fleets might be exposed should the fanatical party, whose only creed was hatred to Christians in general, gain the upper hand in the councils of the Sultan; 2nd, the possibility of the Russians undertaking a winter campaign, and advancing on Constantinople through Servia, a plan which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has been given to understand is or has been in contemplation. But a successful operation of this nature might place the Russians between Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and give them the command of those Straits. He thought, therefore, that it would be prudent to guard as far as possible against these contingencies.

I observed that I thought it very unlikely that the Turks would divest themselves even momentarily of the absolute command of the forts at the Dardanelles; but as the matter has been referred to your Lordship, I did not discuss it further.

I have only to add that M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not seem to contemplate sending troops for the garrison of those places, should it be agreed on all sides that such a measure was desirable. He appeared to think that the Admirals had sufficient means at their disposal to undertake the defence of them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 111.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 22.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, October* 4, 1853.

THE contents of your private letter of the 17th, received here yesterday, induced me to make a fresh attempt, though with a very slender prospect of success, to obtain some further delay in the execution of the Council's decision. Inclosed herewith is a copy of my instruction to M. Pisani on this subject, and his report in answer to it, in original.

Your Lordship's obedient, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 111.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Dear Sir, *Therapia, October* 3, 1853.

I WISH you to see Reshid Pasha as soon as you can. I have letters from London to the 17th, and judging from the language held in them, I would strongly advise the Turkish Government to hold back its *manifesto* and *summons* as long as it possibly can. The decision of the General Council affords a considerable margin for the *time* and *form* of measures of execution, and any precipitation would not only diminish the Porte's chances of carrying the main point without the sacrifices and dangers of war, but increase the difficulty of looking with confidence to foreign sympathy and eventual assistance.

I am particularly anxious that time should be allowed for learning from Vienna, if not from London, the effect of my last discussions and the accompanying suggestions.

Tell the Pasha that I appeal with confidence to his good sense and good feelings.

I have nothing particularly new either from England or from France; but what I hear of the state of things in the latter country, and the consequent disposition of the Government, particularly with respect to the grain harvest, is by no means favourable to the prospects of the Porte.

I inclose a paper relating to acts of violence in Bulgaria, which I beg you will recommend to the Pasha's most serious and immediate attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 111.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Therapia, October 3, 1853.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of your Excellency's instruction of this day's date, I lost no time in waiting upon Reshid Pasha and telling him that you advised the Turkish Government to hold back its *manifesto* and *summons*, as long as it possibly could, &c.

In reply to my request, his Highness expressed his regret not to have it in his power to comply with your Excellency's demand, as the decision of the General Council was irrevocably taken not to wait any longer, but run the hazards of war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 112.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 22.)

(*Expédié de Semlin par M. de Fonblanque, le* 22 *Octobre, à* 3 *heures* P. M.
Transmis par Lord Westmorland de Vienne, le 22 *Octobre,* 5 *heures* P.M.)

Constantinople, le 15 *Octobre*, 1853.

(Télégraphique.)

IL y a toute apparence que les hostilités commenceront en huit ou dix jours, sinon plutôt. Le Sultan a demandé l'entrée des escadres, et je suis d'accord avec l'Ambassadeur de France à cet égard. Elles franchiront le Détroit en masse: pour le moment une partie seule de chaque escadre viendra ici. Aucune proposition formelle n'est arrivée de Vienne à la suite de la réunion à Olmütz. Le projet annoncé confidentiellement par M. de Bruck est regardé comme inadmissible par la Porte. Reshid Pasha et, peut-être, ses collègues seraient favorables à l'idée d'une rédaction de la note de Vienne dépouillée également des modifications et des passages auxquelles elles se rapportent; mais l'acceptation d'une telle note par le Conseil Général doit être censée impossible dans la circonstance actuelle. J'espère que vous prendrez à temps des mesures pour réprimer toute tendance sinistre de la part du Gouvernement Hellenique. A juger du langage de mon collègue Français, son Gouvernement doit être bien disposé.

STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 113.

Baron Manteuffel to Chevalier Bunsen.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Chevalier Bunsen, October* 21.)

Berlin, le 14 *Octobre*, 1853

Monsieur,

LES rapports de votre Excellence ne nous ont, à notre sincère regret, laissé point de doute sur l'attitude déclinatoire que le Cabinet de Londres a cru devoir prendre au sujet de la proposition de l'Autriche de faire remettre par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances à Constantinople une note identique à la Sublime Porte pour la rassurer sur la portée et les conséquences de la signature de la note de Vienne. Je me dispense de revenir sur les motifs de cette nouvelle attitude du Cabinet de Londres, de la considérer comme un de ces faits dont un examen purement rétrospectif n'est pas de nature à aplanir les voies de conciliation et de paix; mais qu'il faut mettre en ligne de compte pour chercher de nouvelles formes d'arrangement. Or, il n'a pu nous échapper que les objections

élevées contre le projet d'Olmütz touchent plutôt la forme que le fond de ce document. On convient, et sous ce rapport le langage du Cabinet de Londres s'accorde avec les énonciations du Gouvernement Français, que la substance du document en question, en précisant les limites de ce que la Turquie accorde, renferme l'indication de toutes les idées nécessaires pour un arrangement propre à satisfaire tous les Cabinets.

Mais on lui reproche d'abord d'être venu trop tard, parceque au moment où il s'agissait de le prendre en considération, les rapports de Constantinople nous avaient apporté la nouvelle du refus péremptoire de la Sublime Porte de signer la note de Vienne, et puisque, ne contenant que les conseils et les déclarations des Quatre Puissances, il ne suffirait pas pour neutraliser l'effet de l'interprétation Russe consignée dans l'examen des modifications proposées par la Porte. Quant au premier point nous concevons, quoiqu'avec regret, qu'au premier moment les nouvelles incomplètes et exagérées de Constantinople dont l'arrivée coincidait avec la proposition Autrichienne, aient produit un effet préjudiciable à celle-ci en la faisant apparaître comme dévancée par la marche des événements. Mais depuis que nous connaissons plus exactement les faits, tels qu'ils se sont passés le 24 et 25 Septembre à Constantinople, et les décisions auxquelles le Gouvernement Ottoman, inaccessible aux Conseils des Puissances, s'est arrêté, nous devons, il me semble, puiser dans les difficultés aggravées de la situation de nouveaux motifs pour employer tous nos efforts, afin de retenir, par de nouvelles propositions d'arrangement, les parties immédiatement intéressées sur la pente rapide vers de conflits armés.

A cet effet je m'adresse avec confiance au jugement calme et éclairé du Gouvernement Britannique, qui, certes, ne se fera pas plus que nous illusion sur la gravité du moment, et sur l'immense responsabilité qui s'attache à la crise imminente; qu'il détache le fond du projet d'Olmütz de sa forme; qu'il ne le considère plus comme corollaire du projet originaire de Vienne, mais comme point de départ pour un nouveau projet de note à remettre par un Ambassadeur Turc à l'Empereur de Russie; qu'il nous communique le plus tôt possible, et tout-à-fait confidentiellement, ce projet; nous le soumettrons à un examen consciencieux et impartial, et nous tâcherons de nous l'approprier, si nous y voyons un moyen d'amener la solution des questions si longtemps débattues. Sans prendre d'avance un engagement quelconque, impossible à l'égard d'un projet à formuler encore, nous n'hésitons pas à énoncer que nous serons heureux de pouvoir nous prévaloir, avec toute la sincérité d'un complet désintéressement, de nos rapports de confiance avec la Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg pour l'y faire accueillir.

L'entière impartialité de notre position nous fournira, nous l'espérons, le moyen de concilier des intérêts peut-être moins divergents en réalité qu'ils ne le paraissent être à la suite d'une controverse peut-être non exempte d'acrimonie.

Pour pouvoir nous flatter de quelques chances à ce sujet, nous devons avant tout tâcher de prévenir toute précipitation guerrière de la part de la Sublime Porte; et nous venons d'enjoindre à l'Envoyé du Roi à Constantinople d'élever sa voix dans ce sens à toute occasion qui se présentera. Mais nous attachons le plus grand prix à ce que le Cabinet de Londres veuille bien se servir également de ses moyens d'action beaucoup plus efficaces sur le Divan pour préserver, sur le terrain même du différend qu'il s'agit de vider, le domaine des négotiations de toute atteinte préjudiciable à la solution pacifique.

Veuillez, Monsieur, porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance de Lord Clarendon, et vous faire l'organe du vif et sincère intérêt avec lequel nous attendons sa réponse à l'idée qui y est emise.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 114.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, October* 22.)

M. le Comte, *Vienne, le* 16 *Octobre*, 1853.

LORD WESTMORLAND s'est acquitté de la communication que votre Excellence m'avait préalablement annoncée par l'expédition exprès au courrier Steindl. J'ai l'honneur, M. le Comte, de vous transmettre ci-après le texte de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon dont M. l'Envoyé Britannique m'a laissé copie.

Nous avions espéré que le *projet de note* élaboré à Olmütz, par cela même qu'il renfermait l'expression la plus authentique et la plus récente de la pensée de l'Empereur de Russie, serait de nature à contrebalancer, si non à effacer entièrement, l'impression fâcheuse produite sur le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique par l'analyse des amendemens apportés par la Porte à la note primitive de Vienne, analyse à laquelle le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg s'était livré dans une dépêche confidentielle du 7 Septembre dernier.

En tout état de choses, nous avions pensé que le projet d'Olmütz offrait des éléments susceptible d'être utilisés au profit de l'œuvre de pacification que les Quatre Puissances avaient également à cœur de voir couronnée de succès.

Nous ne pouvons que regretter que le Cabinet de St. James ait apprécié différemment ce projet. Nous savons toutefois nous rendre compte des motifs qui peuvent l'avoir engagé à refuser son suffrage et son concours au projet d'Olmütz, en réfléchissant que ce projet tendait à maintenir, en y ajoutant des garanties morales, la note primitive de Vienne que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a été le premier à laisser tomber définitivement.

Sur ces entrefaites d'ailleurs les événements ont marché. Depuis que la Sublime Porte s'est proclamée elle-même en état de guerre avec la Russie, nous comprenons à notre tour que la note de Vienne a perdue toute chance d'être acceptée de part et d'autre comme moyen d'accommodement. Aussi n'avons nous pas hésité à nous expliquer dans ce sens tant à Constantinople qu'envers le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Nous sommes du reste trop pénétrées de l'immense gravité des intérêts qui se rattachent au maintien de la paix pour ne pas être disposés à continuer avec zèle les efforts que nous avons faits jusqu'ici, de concert avec les autres Cabinets, pour préserver l'Europe des calamités d'une guerre. Afin toutefois de pouvoir travailler dans ce sens avec quelque espoir de succès, il nous semble nécessaire d'attendre que la situation se définе plus nettement. Il y a surtout deux points à l'égard desquels nous sentons le besoin d'être éclairés.

Nous attachons d'abord de l'intérêt à connaître l'impression que produiront sur Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie la déclaration de guerre émanée de la Porte, et la sommation adressée au Prince Gortchakoff d'évacuer sans délai les Principautés Danubiennes.

Il nous importe, de l'autre côté, de nous assurer que malgré le changement survenu dans la situation, les Quatre Puissances se trouvent encore placées dans une attitude identique qui nous permette de continuer en commun le rôle intermédiaire et conciliant que nous avons tâché de remplir jusqu'ici, et dans lequel nous ne demandons pas mieux pour notre part, que de pouvoir persister.

Je vous charge, M. le Comte, d'en donner l'assurance positif à Lord Clarendon en lui communiquant la présente dépêche en copie, s'il devait vous en témoigner le désir.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 115.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 23.)

Paris, October 23, 1853.

(Telegraphic.)

THE two projects will be sent, I hope, to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, with orders to support one or the other, as may be judged most advisable there, but the first is greatly preferred here; or an amalgamation of the two might be found to be a good plan after consultation with the Porte. It is hoped that this will meet your views. Telegraph to me to Paris, when you despatch the "Fury's" officer, in order that the French despatches may be ready for him.

No. 116.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *October 24, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of yesterday is satisfactory. "Fury's" officer will go to-morrow night.

I will send you a messenger this evening with copy of my despatch to Lord Stratford.

If the French Government approve I propose to send a messenger with the notes to Vienna and Berlin, and to ask that their Ministers at Constantinople may support them.

The messenger can, if necessary, go on to Constantinople, where he would arrive nearly at the same time as the "Fury."

No. 117.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 234.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.*

THE two proposals for an amicable settlement of the difference between Russia and the Porte, contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 282 of the 28th September, and your telegraphic despatch of the 1st October, have received the best consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

For reasons, upon which it is not necessary to enter, the first of these proposals has been preferred. On the 12th instant I informed your Excellency by the telegraph *viâ* Belgrade, that it had been favourably received by Her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and I requested that your Excellency would endeavour to prevent the commencement of hostilities which would render a peaceful solution of the question at the present moment very difficult, if not impossible.

In the hope that the efforts of your Excellency with this object may have proved successful, and that the state of things in Turkey may not be such on the arrival of this despatch as to preclude a final settlement otherwise than by a new Treaty between the Porte and Russia, Her Majesty's Government, in concert with that of France, have prepared a note for the acceptance of the Porte, together with a note founded upon the preamble of the Treaty of 1841, copies of which are herewith inclosed.

The latter note is for the signature of your Excellency and of M. de la Cour, but copies of both have been sent to Vienna and Berlin, and it is to be hoped that your Austrian and Prussian colleagues will receive instructions to act in complete concert with yourself and the French Ambassador. Under any circumstances, however, Her Majesty's Government think it expedient that the note should be proposed to the acceptance of the Porte. Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna will be instructed to inform your Excellency, by telegraph, of the decision of the Austrian Cabinet. I send this despatch by Her Majesty's steamer "Fury," which is now waiting at Marseilles, in order to save time.

The objections raised against the Vienna note have been carefully attended to in the one now proposed, which has been framed with an anxious regard for the dignity and independence of the Sultan, and is recommended to the most serious consideration of the Porte.

It is, however, my duty to inform your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government observe with regret that due attention has not been paid by the Turkish Government to the advice tendered by your Excellency with a sincere regard for the Sultan's own interests, and when, with no other motive than that of preserving peace without detriment to the honour and independence of the Sultan, you desired that the declaration of war and the commencement of hostilities should be delayed until all attempts at negotiation should have finally proved unsuccessful.

Her Majesty's Government make every allowance for the great difficulties in

which the Sultan finds himself placed; but as it is their duty to guard the dignity and the interests of England, and as they are prepared to assist the Sultan in defending his territory, and as the presence of the British fleet at Constantinople affords unmistakeable evidence of the friendly disposition of this country towards the Porte, Her Majesty's Government are entitled to expect that the counsels of a sincere and powerful ally, conveyed through your Excellency, shall be received with becoming deference.

Your Excellency is instructed firmly, but in the most friendly spirit, to convey this caution to Reshid Pasha, and you will not conceal from him how great will be the disappointment of Her Majesty's Government if he should now reject the note which has been framed with due regard to the Sultan's honour, and if, moreover, the rejection of the note should rest on no better grounds than popular excitement or military enthusiasm, inducing the Porte to prefer war to peace, and to incur the risk of all the evils and the dangers which such a decision must necessarily bring with it.

Considering the assurances of support already given, and the measures actually adopted by Great Britain for the protection of the Turkish territory, it is indispensable that all further progress of hostilities should be suspended by the Porte, for a reasonable time, during the course of the negotiation in which Her Majesty's Government are engaged for the reestablishment of friendly relations between the Porte and Russia, upon the understanding that no hostile movement is made on the part of Russia.

To your Excellency I need hardly state that the traditional policy of this country in the East will be rigidly adhered to. The highest political interests, not alone of England, but of Europe, are involved in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, and those interests demand that any act of aggression by Russia against Turkey should be vigorously resisted. But a desire for war on the part of the Porte, in disregard of its consequences either to Turkey herself or to her allies, while there is yet a possibility that the legitimate objects which the Porte has in view may be attained by negotiation, would be viewed with great displeasure by this country, and would necessarily influence the policy towards the Sultan that it might be the duty of Her Majesty's Government to pursue.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 117.

Projet de Note.

LES Représentants de ont reçu l'ordre de porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements respectifs, persuadés de la haute importance de maintenir le principe consacré dans le préambule du Traité de Juillet 13, 1841, et animés du désir le plus sincère pour la conservation de la paix générale; et les dits Gouvernements, voulant attester ce désir, et en égard aux réclamations de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et aux droits souverains de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et ayant de plus reçu de la part du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg les assurances les plus formelles que Sa Majesté Impériale ne cherche aucune nouvelle concession ni aucun droit d'ingérence dans les affaires de la Turquie, et de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan les assurances également formelles qu'elle observera fidèlement ses engagements, et qu'en outre elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais les privilèges spirituels accordés au clergé et à l'Eglise Grecques; et considérant que ces assurances, appuyées par les firmans adressées au Patriarche Grec, sont aux yeux des dits Gouvernements une garantie suffisante pour le maintien de ces privilèges: les dits Gouvernements, dans le but de mettre fin au différend qui malheureusement s'est élevé entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte, ont donné l'ordre aux Soussignés de soumettre à la considération de la Sublime Porte la note ci-incluse, par laquelle se trouveront assurés la dignité et les droits de l'une et de l'autre Puissance.

Inclosure 2 in No. 117.

Projet de Note.

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend

Dans ce but le Soussigné a l'ordre de déclarer par rapport aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji, confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, que la Sublime Porte est fermement résolue de maintenir la promesse y consignée, en continuant à protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et toutes ses Eglises.

Quant aux privilèges religieux du culte Grec, il est de l'honneur de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan de maintenir en vigueur et à l'abri de toute atteinte, pour le présent comme pour l'avenir, les privilèges spirituels accordés à l'Eglise Grecque par les augustes prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté et confirmées par elle-même, et dans un esprit de bienveillance et d'équité, conforme aux principes qui dirigent le Gouvernement Ottoman, de faire participer cette Eglise aux privilèges spirituels accordés, ou qui seraient accordés, à toute autre communauté Chrétienne, sujette Ottomane.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre ci-incluse une copie du firman Impérial confirmatif des privilèges du clergé Grec, qui a été dernièrement remis au Patriarcat de ce rit.

Ce firman est une nouvelle preuve des intentions généreuses et de la volonté souveraine de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à cet égard, qui a inspiré partout la confiance que la promulgation de ce firman suffira à dissiper tout doute ou appréhension au sujet du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Pour ce qui concerne la garantie contre tout changement futur dans l'état des choses actuel des lieux de pélerinage à Jérusalem, la Sublime Porte promet officiellement qu'aucune modification ne sera portée à ce qui a été réglé par les firmans Impériaux dernièrement émanés à cet égard sans une entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan adhère au vœu exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour la construction d'une église qui sera desservie par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades de la même nation; et la Sublime Porte est disposée, et dès ce moment prête, à conclure un Acte solennel à cet égard. L'empressement avec lequel la demande concernant la construction d'une église et d'un hospice Russes à Jérusalem a été accueillie par la Sublime Porte, prouve une fois de plus que si Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan regarde qu'il est de son honneur de veiller au maintien des privilèges spirituels octroyés à l'Eglise Grecque par ses illustres ancêtres; si, dans l'exercice de ses droits de souveraineté elle ambitionne d'être l'auteur de la prospérité de ses peuples et l'objet de leurs bénédictions, elle met une égale ambition non seulement à observer scrupuleusement les Traités existants entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, mais à satisfaire à tout désir exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, son auguste allié; et dont l'accomplissement contribuerait à resserrer plus étroitement les liens d'amitié qui unissent les deux Souverains.

En communiquant à votre Excellence ce qui précède par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, mon gracieux Souverain, je saisis, &c.

No. 118.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 235.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

IN the event of the Turkish Government desiring to propose any modifications of the note which, by my despatch No. 234, your Excellency is instructed to bring under their consideration, you are at liberty to admit such modifications, provided they appear reasonable to yourself and to your colleagues, and that they are not of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 119.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 236.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, by telegraph from Belgrade, reached me on the 22nd; and I have the satisfaction of informing your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your having, in concert with the French Ambassador, acceded to the request of the Sultan, that the combined fleets should enter the Dardanelles.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 120.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 237.)

Foreign Office, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government have read with much satisfaction the manifesto of the Turkish Government, inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 289.

The moderate and dignified tone in which an appeal is thereby made to the public opinion of Europe, cannot fail to produce an impression highly favourable to the cause of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 121.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

Paris, October 25, 7·6 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS approves. He had already prepared his despatch in same sense. He will also write in same sense to Vienna by his courier of the 27th.

7·12 P. M. (Secret.)—M. de la Cour is recalled. General Baraguay d'Hilliers replaces him.

No. 122.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 346.)

Foreign Office, October 25, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 376 of the 15th instant has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government learn with sincere satisfaction that the desire of the Cabinet of Vienna to co-operate with them for the maintenance of peace has undergone no change; and your Lordship will inform Count Buol that that desire is fully reciprocated on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

The report of your Lordship's conversation with Count Buol was confirmed by a despatch from his Excellency, which Count Colloredo has placed in my hands, and a copy of which is herewith inclosed.*

Count Buol appears to consider that the present moment is not opportune for taking any further steps upon the momentous question at issue, and that it would be desirable to wait until the views of the Emperor of Russia are known upon the declaration of war by the Turkish Government.

Her Majesty's Government, however, have arrived at a different conclusion, and, in the belief that an opening was still left for negotiation, Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed, a few days ago, to use his efforts to prevent the commencement of hostilities. Her Majesty's Government are, therefore, on every account bound to give effect to their intentions with the least delay possible, and I accordingly inclose to you the copies of two notes† which you will submit to the consideration of Count Buol, and earnestly recommend for the adoption of the Austrian Government.

The first is founded upon the Treaty of 1841, and refers to the assurances repeatedly given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and recently renewed at Olmütz, as well as to the assurances that on various occasions have been received from the Porte. It is hoped that this note will be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, recommending to the acceptance of the Porte the note which has been framed with due regard for the honour and independence of the Sultan, while the maintenance of existing engagements between Russia and Turkey, the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church, and the guarantee respecting the holy places, are provided for in strict accordance with the assurances of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as to what was really desired of the Porte.

Your Lordship will, however, see by my despatch No. 235 to Lord Stratford, of which a copy is inclosed, and which you will also communicate to Count Buol, that Her Majesty's Ambassador is at liberty to admit of such modifications to this note as to himself and his colleagues may appear reasonable, and which shall not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government consider this to be just, because the Turkish Government are the only competent judges of the form of note they can properly assent to; and it is indispensable, in order to avoid the error committed on a former occasion, which the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Sultan, has a right to expect shall not again be repeated; and that no proposal shall be made to His Imperial Majesty which has not previously been agreed to by the Porte.

To avoid delay is manifestly of the utmost importance, and the notes which have the entire approbation of the French Government will be sent this evening to Constantinople *viâ* Marseilles, where Her Majesty's ship "Fury" is waiting; but I at the same forward them to your Lordship by a messenger whom you are at liberty to send on to Constantinople with the decision of the Austrian Government and the instructions which Her Majesty's Government confidently hope will be given to the Internuncio to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Your Lordship is instructed to communicate by telegraph the decision of the Austrian Government to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, who will thus be made aware of it about the same time that the arrival of the "Fury" may be expected

* See No. 114. † See Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 117.

at Constantinople, in which case he will wait for the cooperation of his Austrian colleague, before communicating with the Turkish Government on the subject.

I have taken measures to invite the concurrence of the Cabinet of Berlin in the proposal now forwarded to your Lordship.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 123.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 32.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 25, 1853.*

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship the copy of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel,* which has been placed in my hands by the Chevalier Bunsen, expressing the regret of the Prussian Government that Her Majesty's Government had declined to take any further measures for inducing the Porte to agree to the original note, but suggesting that a new form of note, which might embody the assurances lately given at Olmütz on the part of Russia, should be offered for the acceptance of the Turkish Government.

The drafts of notes† which I now inclose, will show that the views of Her Majesty's Government correspond with those which are expressed in Baron Manteuffel's despatch to the Chevalier Bunsen.

The first is founded on the Treaty of 1841, and refers to the assurances repeatedly given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, and recently renewed at Olmütz, as well as to the assurances that on various occasions have been received from the Porte. It is hoped that this note will be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, recommending to the acceptance of the Porte the note which has been framed with due regard for the honour and independence of the Sultan, while the maintenance of existing engagements between Russia and Turkey, the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church, and the guarantee respecting the holy places, are provided for in strict accordance with the assurances of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, as to what was really desired of the Porte.

Your Lordship will, however, see by my despatch‡ to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of which a copy is inclosed, and which you will also communicate to Baron Manteuffel, that Her Majesty's Ambassador is at liberty to admit of such modifications to this note as to himself and his colleagues may appear reasonable, and which shall not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government consider this to be just, because the Turkish Government are the only competent judges of the form of note they can properly assent to, and it is indispensable in order to avoid the error committed on a former occasion, which the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Sultan, has a right to expect shall not again be repeated, and that no proposal shall be made to His Imperial Majesty which has not previously been agreed to by the Porte.

To avoid delay is manifestly of the utmost importance, and the notes, which have the entire approbation of the French Government, will be sent this evening to Constantinople *vid* Marseilles, where Her Majesty's ship "Fury" is waiting; but I at the same time forward them to your Lordship by a messenger, who will proceed by the way of Vienna to Constantinople; and Her Majesty's Government confidently hope that the Prussian Minister will be instructed to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Your Lordship will communicate, by telegraph, the decision of the Prussian Government to Lord Westmorland, who will make it known to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe both by the telegraph, to Belgrade, and by the messenger who proceeds to Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 113. † Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 117. ‡ No. 118.

No. 124.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 22, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL privately informed me to-day that a copy of a despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff has been communicated to him by the Russian Minister, in which the thanks of the Russian Government are expressed for the attempts which Austria had made at Olmütz for a pacific arrangement in the Eastern differences. Reference was therein made to the propositions which Count Nesselrode had talked over with Count Buol, relating to a direct arrangement being entered into between Russia and Turkey. The Chancellor expresses his opinion that such arrangement is the only one now left for a peaceable solution, and he directly refers to an Envoy being sent by Turkey to negotiate directly with the General commanding, Prince Gortchakoff.

In as far as I could learn, hopes of such an arrangement had not been entirely abandoned on the part of Russia; for General Rochow, the Prussian Minister at St. Petersburgh, in a despatch received only this day, refers to it, although news must have been then received at St. Petersburgh of the declaration of war by Turkey.

Baron Manteuffel appeared to attach but little importance to this mode of pacification.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 125.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, October 22, 1853.*

AT an interview with Baron Manteuffel this day, his Excellency informed me most confidentially that M. Crivelli, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, had communicated to him a proposal on the part of his Government that a statement of the differences pending between Russia and Turkey, with a report of the steps which have been adopted by Austria and Prussia towards a pacification, should be laid before the Germanic Diet, and that Germany should pronounce through their common organ, their determination to maintain neutrality.

His Excellency had not yet informed His Majesty of this important communication. He seemed indisposed to partake of the Austrian view, although he appeared to receive with satisfaction this proof of the neutral line which the Austrian Cabinet would pursue. He informed me that he had as yet taken no decision as to the reply he should make. He thought, however, of acceding to the wish that a report on the Oriental question should be laid before the Diet, but wished that no opinion as to the course to be pursued should be expressed by that body.

I remarked to his Excellency that it appeared to me the step he was about to take might establish a dangerous precedent for Prussia, and be productive of grave consequences to her hereafter. Prussia had on the present occasion assumed that independent line which became a great Power, and her policy was based on the public opinion of the nation in community with their material interests; that it would not now be in consonance with her dignity to renounce the important place she held in Europe into the hands of a federal body amongst whom Austria held the first place, and perhaps might assume the directing lead; that the jurisdiction of the Germanic Diet had been (as far as I was aware) generally confined to matters of purely German interest; and that great European questions, such as the Oriental question, ought to be treated solely by the great Cabinets of Europe. I therefore represented to his Excellency that it would be, in my opinion, unwise in Prussia to recognize the principle even of

submitting to the Germanic Diet any report whatever relating to the Oriental question, and that the safest as well as the wisest course to pursue, would be simply to reply that in the opinion of Prussia the Oriental question was not of that political or internal nature on which a decision of the Diet should be called for.

His Excellency, on consideration, agreed with the views and the opinions I had expressed, and told me that it would be his endeavour to act in consonance with them. He could not, however, distinctly state what reply he should make until he had submitted the question to His Majesty's decision.

I trust that the opinion which I have expressed to Baron Manteuffel on this subject will meet with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 126.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 22, 1853.*

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 23, I expressed to Baron Manteuffel this day the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication relating to the Emperor of Russia's visit to Berlin, which had been made to your Lordship by the Chevalier Bunsen; and I did not fail to congratulate his Excellency, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, upon the success which his wisdom and firmness, in a position of more than ordinary difficulty, had attained.

His Excellency begged me to return his thanks to your Lordship, and appeared much pleased at the confidence evinced towards him by Her Majesty's Government.

I afterwards read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 25; and his Excellency was happy to learn, both from the Chevalier Bunsen and from your Lordship's despatch, that the views of Her Majesty's Government coincide with those which he has expressed. It is his Excellency's fervent hope that the endeavour which is now making in London will meet with a successful result.

I then informed his Excellency, after reading that part of your Lordship's despatch relating to the intimacy and confidence subsisting between the Cabinets of England and France, that it was indispensably necessary that he should inform the French Minister and his Government of the views of the Prussian Government, and of his wish that some species of negotiation should be entered upon in London. His Excellency told me that he had already signified this project to the French Government through Count Hatzfeldt, and that he had received in return a telegraphic despatch from him, stating that the proposal had been favourably received. He agreed that it would be advisable now to communicate freely with the French Minister, and he assured me that he would not fail so to do. His Excellency at the same time requested that the project of a negotiation in London might be kept secret from other quarters, as he considered that if it was prematurely divulged, considerable difficulties might be interposed.

I have since seen M. de Moustier, the French Minister, who has informed me that Baron Manteuffel had opened to him on this subject; and I have likewise communicated to him the mode of pacification which Baron Manteuffel had in view.

I have again to assure your Lordship that the most perfect unity and cordiality exist between M. de Moustier and myself; and it shall be my duty to communicate with him unreservedly on the subject of Oriental affairs.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 127.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 377.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 18, 1853.*

THE Turkish Ambassador at this Court received on Friday last the copies of the summons to be addressed by Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff, and of the manifesto of the Sultan to his subjects, and he immediately communicated them to Count Buol. The latter stated to me that although he deeply regretted the step taken by the Porte in opposition to the advice of the Four Powers, he found nothing to complain of in the documents themselves, which appeared to him to be drawn up with moderation, and to place the case of Turkey in the most favourable point of view.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 128.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 780. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 24, 1853.*

I MET Count Hatzfeldt at Compiègne a few days ago, when he was good enough to communicate to me confidentially a despatch dated the 14th instant, which he had been desired to read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and which states M. de Manteuffel's opinion of the present state of the Eastern question, and of the mediating part which Prussia is desirous of assuming. Count Hatzfeldt told me that a similar despatch had been addressed to the Chevalier Bunsen for communication to your Lordship.

The Emperor, to whom Count Hatzfeldt showed this despatch, observed that although quite ready to assist in any honourable arrangement of the Eastern question, he did not see what could now be proposed with a chance of success; that in his opinion events must be allowed to follow their course, and advantage might then be taken of an opening which they might produce, to promote a reconciliation between the contending parties. His Majesty remarked at the same time on the vagueness of M. de Manteuffel's proposition.

I had, the day before yesterday, an opportunity of learning from M. Drouyn de Lhuys the impression which the Prussian despatch had made upon him. His Excellency partakes the opinion of the Emperor, that little can be expected from any fresh overture for a pacific arrangement at the present moment; but he is pleased with the tone of the despatch, and thinks that advantage may be taken of the actual disposition of Prussia, to attach her more strongly to the policy which France and England have pursued in resisting the encroachment of Russia upon the Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 129.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 781. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 24, 1853.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC represents the public feeling at St. Petersburgh to be dissatisfied with the course which events have taken in the East, and the Russian Government as alarmed and somewhat taken by surprise at the determination and energy evinced by the Turks.

Both here and at St. Petersburgh it seems to be the game of Russia to endeavour to make it appear that England is dragging France in her wake for her own interests, and specious warnings are given to the latter to be on her guard, for that the day will come when Great Britain, having secured the best bargain she can for herself, will leave France to get out of the difficulties of the situation as best she may.

I should hardly think such miserable gossip worth noticing were it not for the purpose of recording that it has made no effect on the French Government.

Count Nesselrode on being informed that the combined fleets would pass the Dardanelles, merely observed to General Castelbajac that he hoped it was not intended to send them into the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 130.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 783. Confidential.)
Paris, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has made a statement to the French Government to the effect that the Emperor of Austria having failed in his endeavours to obtain a pacific solution of the Eastern question, and having received assurances from the Emperor of Russia which satisfy him that His Imperial brother will not desire any permanent acquisition of territory in the East, is determined on maintaining a strict neutrality in the coming contest between Russia and Turkey.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys contented himself by replying that if M. de Hübner would open the map of Russia and choose any one of the more modern acquisitions of Russia, he (M. Drouyn) would engage to show that within a few months of its acquisition, the Russian Government of the day had made just the same declarations and promises of non-annexation as the Emperor of Russia now made to Austria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 131.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 784.)
Paris, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he has spoken in very strong language to the Greek Minister, M. Mavrocordato, respecting the intelligence which he has lately received from M. Rouen, of the hostile feelings displayed in Greece towards Turkey; a feeling which the Greek Government appears disposed to connive at, if not to encourage. Telegraphic intelligence received by the French Government asserts that the Turkish territory has been invaded, Arta taken possession of, and that Prevesa is threatened.

In telling me this, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that it was matter for consideration whether France and England should not peremptorily summon the Greek Government to repress these hostile attacks upon Turkey; and whether it might not be advisable to invite Russia, as one of the Three Protecting Powers, to join them in this summons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 132.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 530. Secret and Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, October 14, 1853.

My Lord,

TO judge of the alteration in the pretensions of Russia, since the commencement of her unhappy quarrel with the Porte, it is of some interest to compare the terms of the *projet de note*, of which a copy was inclosed to Lord Westmorland, in your Lordship's despatch No. 326, with the language held to me by the Emperor, as reported in my secret despatch No. 263 of the 31st May.

If at that time His Majesty had deigned to listen to my suggestion, a note of the kind now proposed by the Austrian Cabinet would have been unnecessary, and long months of painful anxiety, destined perhaps to be followed by much greater misfortunes, would have been avoided.

It may be in your Lordship's recollection that, as recorded in my despatch of the 31st May, I took the liberty of saying to the Emperor: "If your Majesty is correct in stating that no fresh rights are sought for the Imperial Government, the objections entertained towards the note presented for the Porte's acceptance and signature must turn upon a matter of *rédaction*; allow me then to inquire whether there will be any objection to such an alteration in the terms of the note as shall leave a simple confirmation of old rights and preclude the possibility of any new ones being claimed."

His Majesty's refusal to comply with a suggestion fully warranted by his own declarations, as well as those of his ministers, too correctly shadowed out those difficulties in which Europe has ever since been involved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 133.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 25.)

(No. 531.)
St. Petersburgh, October 14, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD been told some days ago, by a person usually well informed, of the protest entered by Baron Brunnow against the entry of Her Majesty's ships of war into the Dardanelles, but had refused all credence to the statement.

Until the receipt of your Lordship's No. 225 and its two inclosures, it appeared to me hardly possible that the condition in which Turkey has been placed should be considered by any one as such as to leave her under those obligations which are notoriously contingent upon a state of peace, and still less was I prepared to learn that it could be contended that whilst it is allowable to one Power to invade and occupy large portions of the Turkish territory, contrary to the will and interests of the Sultan, an illegality would be committed if the ships of another Power should enter the interior waters of Turkey at the request and possibly in the interests of His Highness.

As this misconception, however, is proved to have existed, it is very satisfactory to know that it has been cleared up by the note addressed by your Lordship to Baron Brunnow on the 1st instant. Upon finding that M. de Kisseleff had abstained from taking the step to which M. de Brunnow had resorted at London, my impression was that one Minister had observed a prudent reserve, from which the other had departed; it occurs to me, however, upon reflection, that the sort of overture reported in my despatch No. 487, as having been made to the Chancellor by my French colleague may possibly, in the estimation of the Russian Cabinet, have established a difference between the positions of the English and French Governments: and that it may be held at St. Petersburgh that what had become lawful and regular under the sanction of

the Emperor, remains incorrect and interdicted if that approbation has not been applied for.

However this may be, I have been careful not to point out to the French Envoy this or any other difference between the positions of England and France with regard to this country.

In the conversation which I held to-day with Count Nesselrode, I was curious to know whether any disapprobation were discernible on his part of the correspondence originated by Baron Brunnow; I could discover nothing of the kind.

Count Nesselrode placed in my hands a copy of Baron Brunnow's rejoinder to your Lordship's note of the 1st instant, observing at the same time that the affair had become of secondary importance, and that he was not sure whether it would give rise to any ulterior proceedings on the part of Russia.

I replied that the question was one which would not be difficult to argue in the English sense, and that I could not better express my feeling as to the moderation which had been shown by Her Majesty's Government than by saying that had my opinion been called for, I should in all probability have counselled the passage of the Dardanelles, as soon as the Pruth was passed by a Russian army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I would submit to your Lordship whether it is possible that the difference in the lines taken by the Russian Missions at London and Paris, upon the occasion of the passage of the Dardanelles by the English and French ships, may have resulted from design, from the wish, that is, of creating jealousies between the two Governments.

G. H. S.

No. 134.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 25.)

(No. 532.)

St. Petersburgh, October 14, 1853.

My Lord,

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 222, I applied to Count Nesselrode to know when I could call upon him, and finding that, as he was obliged to proceed to Zarskoe Zeloe, he could only receive me on Friday the 14th instant, I sent him a copy of the despatch as soon as I was able to have it written out.

I have just returned from the Foreign Office, where I have held a serious but not altogether unsatisfactory conversation with his Excellency.

Little was said upon the subject of your Lordship's despatch beyond this, that Count Nesselrode remarked that it contained much reasoning, and that he was causing it therefore to be translated before placing it in the hands of the Emperor.

Upon my entering his room the Chancellor observed that we met again under a very gloomy aspect of affairs, and that a fresh complication had now arisen, news having been just received of the Porte having declared war with Russia.

To this circumstance, however, Count Nesselrode said he was not disposed to attach too much importance, one of the few considerations indeed which led him to hope that peace might yet be maintained was this, that although it was easy to declare war, it was difficult to carry on war under the rapid approach of winter.

Count Nesselrode then expressed his surprise at all hesitation on the part of the English Government not having been removed by the declaration as to the Emperor's intentions which the Four Powers had been empowered to make in the *projet de note* lately drawn up at Olmütz.

I replied that I was glad to have an opportunity of offering a remark which

appeared to me to have been often called for in the course of the late negotiations, that frequent allusion had been made to the character of the Emperor as offering a guarantee for the proper use of powers with which he might be invested, whereas in affairs of this kind personal considerations ought to be excluded.

Such weight, I said, as may be given to personal character may well be allowed to that of the Emperor; but in affairs between States, as in those between individuals, it is the character of the agreement and not of the person which is to be considered: the stipulations to be undertaken by Turkey are those which are to be binding on her not only during the reign of the Emperor Nicholas but under those of His Majesty's followers on the Throne.

Count Nesselrode wished that he could feel certain that the existence of unjust suspicions had not been betrayed of late, and added that, although grieved to say so, he would not conceal from me his apprehension that it was the settled purpose of Her Majesty's Government to humiliate Russia. I might be assured that under no possible circumstances would humiliation be submitted to by the Emperor.

If, I replied, this feeling exists I am glad you have expressed it, for I can declare to you, before God, in case such an asseveration be necessary, that your suspicion is unjust; no, I continued, you may be very certain that no disposition, however slight, exists with us to humiliate either Russia or the Emperor, or even to deprive Russia of any portion of her just influence; but, if you will, a wish is felt and a resolution is taken not to admit claims which Her Majesty's Government consider that Russia is not entitled to make.

Beyond this, I continued, I am willing to admit that Her Majesty's Government, although as anxious as at the outset for the continuance of peace, is intent upon that peace being of a durable kind; if it is desired to make only such an arrangement as would but stave off war for a few months, Her Majesty's Government care very little whether the storm breaks now or a little later: in fine, M. le Comte, I entreat of you to dismiss from your mind a suspicion which is unworthy, and which has not a shadow of foundation.

The Chancellor wished that it were in his power to set his mind at ease; but observed, that the feeling which he attributed to Her Majesty's Government was common to all England. How, he would ask, was it possible that such hostility should be felt throughout all classes against Russia?

I thought the feeling admitted of an easy explanation; the English public had been led to believe, in the spring, that the differences between Russia and Turkey were to be immediately arranged; they saw no approach to agreement; they considered the independence of Turkey in danger; the whole community suffered, every man in his own interests, and it could not be wondered at if, at last, any measures were desired by the public which should put an end to prolonged uncertainty.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to speak with much feeling of the horrors of war in general; particularly of war between two powerful countries—two old allies like England and Russia—countries which, whilst they may be of infinite use to one another, possessed each the means of inflicting great injury upon its antagonist; and ended by saying, that if for any motives known to him war should be declared against Russia by England, it would be the most unintelligible and the least justifiable war ever undertaken.

At the conclusion of some conversation to which this observation gave rise, the Chancellor said, "In a few words our position is this: war has been declared against us by Turkey; we shall, in all probability, issue no counter declaration, nor shall we make any attack upon Turkey; we shall remain with folded arms, only resolved to repel any assault made upon us, whether in the Principalities or on our Asiatic frontier, which we have been reinforcing: so we shall remain during the winter, ready to receive any peaceful overtures which, during that time, may be made to us by Turkey; that is our position."

I observed, that I thought the position a worthy one; and that I need hardly add, how sincerely I desired that the negotiations carried on by Turkey, or on the part of Turkey, might have the effect of putting an end to differences which, like Her Majesty's Government, I deeply deplored.

This conversation naturally strengthens my conviction of its being the wish of the Russian Government that a peaceable solution of difficulties should be found; and it encourages the belief, that some further abatement of the terms

now insisted upon by Russia would be admitted by her. I do not, however, doubt, that Count Nesselrode is perfectly warranted in saying, that the Emperor will not submit to humiliation: and my great fear is, that His Majesty will consider as humiliation the acceptance of such conditions as he is alone entitled to, and such as would at once bring into harmony the professions and the demands made in his name; that is to say, a full recognition and confirmation by Turkey of the privileges secured by Treaties and Hatti-Scheriffs to the Greek Church, its ministers, and its possessions.

I find that I have omitted to state, that in the course of his observations as to the consequences of a war between England and Russia, Count Nesselrode adverted to some collision between England and the United States, which was to be its certain attendant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 135.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 25.)

(No. 544.) *St. Petersburgh, October* 15, 1853.

My Lord,

JUST as the messenger is about to set off, I receive the private note of which I beg to inclose a copy, from Count Nesselrode, to say that the Government received last night the Sultan's declaration of war, and the summons addressed to Prince Gortchakoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 135.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Samedi matin, 15 *Octobre*, 1853.

POUR compléter les informations que je vous ai données hier je m'empresse de vous prévenir, mon cher Sir Hamilton, que nous avons reçu hier au soir la déclaration de guerre de la Porte, et la sommation adressée au Prince Gortchakoff.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 136.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 26.)

Vienna, October 25, 1853, 7 P.M.

(Télégraphic.)

WE have just met in Conference. Count Buol submitted to us a project based upon the communications of the 17th instant from St. Petersburgh, and referring to a plan of negotiation which might successfully be proposed at Constantinople. The plan does not admit of being embodied in a despatch.

I will write in detail by the messenger. No effect will be given to the project before the Cabinets of London and Paris have expressed their opinion upon it.

No. 137.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 350.) *Foreign Office, October* 27, 1853.

My Lord,

SOME days ago Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol respecting the infraction of the Treaty of 1841 on the part of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, when in the month of September two vessels of war had entered the Dardanelles at his request; and that without intending to enter any idle discussion upon the subject, Count Buol could not avoid expressing his regret that some previous communication had not been made to Austria and Prussia, who were parties to that Treaty.

I told Count Colloredo that Count Buol did not seem to to have acted upon his intention, because by writing a despatch which was to be read he did enter into a discussion, and that discussion was certainly an idle one, for there had been no infraction of the Treaty, as the Porte had ceased to be in a state of peace with Russia from the moment that the first Russian soldier crossed the Pruth. The Treaty of 1841 was accordingly suspended, and foreign ships of war were no longer prohibited from entering the Dardanelles or from going through the Straits, and as this state of things arose from the acts of Russia it was to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and not to Her Majesty's Government, that the remonstrances of Austria should have been addressed. Count Colloredo declined to give me a copy of Count Buol's despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 138.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 28.)

(*Transmis de Vienne par Lord Westmorland le* 28 *Octobre*, 10 *heures* A.M.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le* 21 *Octobre*, 1853.

LORD STRATFORD vient d'obtenir une courte suspension d'hostilités du côté de la Porte, et il transmit cette nuit à Vienne par estafette les projets de note d'une déclaration adopté à la suggestion favorablement accueillie par l'Angleterre et la France.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 139.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 28.)

(No. 793.) *Paris, October* 27, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 422, inclosing among other papers the instructions sent to Constantinople, Vienna, and Berlin, on the 25th instant, I have the honour to state that, having communicated those instructions yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, his Excellency informed me that his despatches to M. de la Cour, transmitted by Her Majesty's ship "Fury," were of the same nature as those addressed by your Lordship to Viscount Stratford

de Redcliffe, and that he proposed in the course of the day writing to the Emperor's Ministers at Vienna and Berlin, desiring them to support the Earl of Westmorland and Lord A. Loftus in their endeavours to obtain the assistance of the Austrian and Russian Governments in the fresh effort which the French and English Governments were about to make at Constantinople to reconcile the Porte with the Court of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 140.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 795. Confidential.)

Paris, October 27, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received from Berlin the same intelligence as that conveyed to your Lordship by Lord A. Loftus, of the desire of the Austrian Government to lay a summary of the Oriental question before the Diet, and to obtain an assurance of neutrality, during the impending struggle from that body. On my asking his opinion as to the course which he should advise Prussia to pursue, he replied that his accounts from Germany represented the German States to be so desirous of taking a neutral attitude, that he feared that Prussia would do herself serious injury with those States, and would give the Austrian Government an increase of influence, should she oppose a declaration of neutrality on the part of the Diet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 141.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 54.)

Berlin, October 25, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this morning, that he had received a despatch from the Prussian Consul at Bucharest, stating that the Turks had made an attempt to occupy an island in the Danube, situated near the town of Widdin.

It appears that this island was occupied by a corp of Wallachians, and not by Russian troops.

The Turks, after an exchange of shots, retired.

On the following day the Turkish Commander, Hussein Pasha, repeated the attempt with a force of 2000 men. Some Cossack troops came to the assistance of the Wallachians; but they eventually retired, after a mere demonstration of resistance, and having courteously saluted the Turkish Commander, who was left in occupation of the island.

No lives were lost in this affair, the distance from the Turkish fortress having been too great for the shots fired to take effect.

The only importance which is attached to this affray (if it merits such an appellation) is the probability that it may be the object of the Turks, in occupying this island, to facilitate the construction of a bridge for the passage of the Danube, and the possibility that the Russians would be induced on the same account to favour their undertaking.

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship, in original and translation,

an article from this morning's paper, "Spedersche Zeitung,"* describing the affair in question.

As exaggerated accounts may possibly be given of this transaction, I have thought it my duty to report to your Lordship the true statement of what has occurred, as reported to me by Baron Manteuffel.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 142.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Berlin, October 25, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 51 of the 22nd instant, marked Confidential, reporting to your Lordship that a proposal had been made by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires to Baron Manteuffel to the effect that a declaration of the neutrality of Germany in the differences between Russia and Turkey should be pronounced by the Germanic Diet, Baron Manteuffel informed me confidentially this morning that General Prokesch was to arrive here this evening or in the course of to-morrow to urge this matter on the Prussian Government, and to press for an immediate reply. His Excellency did not look forward with much satisfaction to this visit, as he had not had sufficient time to lay before His Majesty the great importance which such a step would involve, and he seemed to fear the effect which Baron Prokesch's power of persuasion might have on the King, who was personally disposed to entertain favourable views to any collective action of the Germanic Confederation. I repeated to his Excellency the dangers which in my opinion would result to Prussia hereafter if on this occasion she recognised the principle of submitting the direction of her policy on great European questions into the hands of the Germanic Diet; that it would establish a precedent which would infallibly fetter her future freedom of action, and place her on a line with the smallest of the German Principalities; and that it would be virtually delivering into the hands of Austria the lead and decision on all future questions of her foreign policy, and be placing her in a subservient position to Austria. I remarked to his Excellency that in the present conjuncture Austria and Prussia were the German Powers most interested in the Oriental question, and that their separate declaration of neutrality would be sufficient guarantee to the smaller German States that German interests would not be endangered by any eventualities to which the Eastern question was likely to give rise.

His Excellency expressed himself as entirely coinciding with these opinions, and told me that he should represent the question in this light to His Majesty.

He informed me confidentially that he had spoken with the Prince of Prussia on the subject, and that His Royal Highness had strongly expressed his opinion against the adoption of the course proposed by the Austrian Government.

His Excellency seemed to be perfectly aware of the object of the Austrian Government in making this proposal, and equally determined in his own mind not to give effect to it.

His Excellency further informed me that he should accompany the King to-morrow on a shooting excursion, which he had not previously intended to do, and should not return to Berlin until late on Thursday evening. He will thus elude the pressing demands of Baron Prokesch, and he evidently hopes in the meantime that a decision will be taken by His Majesty of declining the invitation of the Austrian Government, in conformity with the views and opinions which I have had the honour to report to your Lordship.

It is probable, however, that the Prussian Government will assent to a communication being made to the Diet, stating the policy of neutrality on the Eastern question which the two German States intend to pursue, and their hopes that a pacific solution may yet restore peace between the contending parties.

* Not printed.

I cautioned his Excellency to be careful that in any such communication the independence of Prussia and her freedom of action should not be in the slightest way rendered subservient to the Germanic Diet.

I have taken care to state to Baron Manteuffel that I am without any instructions from Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and that he must solely accept what I have expressed to him as the expression of my private opinion.

I trust your Lordship will approve of the advice which I have tendered on this important question to Baron Manteuffel.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 143.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 57.)
Berlin, October 25, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this morning that he had received a despatch from Count Hatzfeldt at Paris, in which he states that in a conversation with the Emperor Louis Napoleon, His Majesty had expressed his desire for the maintenance of peace. At the same time he feared that matters had advanced so far that it would be difficult now to induce Turkey to listen to any proposition of a pacific tendency.

Baron Manteuffel also informed me that he had learnt from Constantinople that a loan of 2,000,000*l.* sterling was contracting for by the Turkish Government in London and Paris, and that the terms of this loan had been already accepted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 144.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 540. Secret and Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, October 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE held an interesting conversation with Count Orloff since his return from Olmütz and Warsaw, upon which journey he was as usual the Emperor's constant companion.

It commenced by his saying, "Well, affairs look ill, and they have been badly managed. Mind, it is not the English Minister and a person in a certain position who are holding a conference; we are only two individuals conversing in a friendly manner. To speak the truth, great faults have been committed on both sides."

"What is certain, M. le Comte," I replied, "is this: that if, as at one moment it had been contemplated, you had been sent in Prince Menchikoff's place to Constantinople, all that has occurred there would have been avoided."

"And I really believe you are right," rejoined Count Orloff. "I know you English; I have negotiated with you; and I know you are to be trusted. I believe, too, that you have a certain confidence in me. Menchikoff is unquestionably a very clever man, but he is reserved, suspicious, and he is not a diplomatist; he does not know what he may do; he allows himself to depend too much, or to be too much restricted (I am not quite sure which of these expressions) by his instructions. He did not stop after the question of the holy places was settled, when in fact a satisfaction had been obtained."

The remainder of the sentence I am afraid of reporting, not being sure that I should do so correctly. The impression, however, which it left distinctly on my mind was this: that Prince Menchikoff had erred in not making a distinction between what he had a right to demand in virtue of Treaty or other agreement, and what he might have sought and obtained by means of negotiation.

Your Lordship will readily believe that I was desirous of prolonging this interesting inquiry, but such was not Count Orloff's intention: it may be that he felt that he had already said too much; and passing somewhat abruptly to another subject, after he had related to me what had occurred with regard to General de Guyon's invitation to Warsaw and the refusal of the Emperor Napoleon, he added, "En fin, je ne dirai pas que l'Empereur ait été blessé de ce refus; mais il ne pouvait pas s'empêcher de vous dire, C'est peu courtois."

I need not observe that Count Orloff's position as the most intimate friend and adviser of his master, renders it necessary that the greatest reserve should be observed with regard to the report which it has been my duty to make to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 145.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 542.)
St. Petersburgh, October 18, 1853.

My Lord,

THE French Minister has had the kindness to read to me a despatch in which he has reported the conversation which he had held with Count Nesselrode on the 14th instant.

The Chancellor's language appears upon this occasion to have been almost the same as that held to me by his Excellency on the same day.

As with me Count Nesselrode spoke of the desire apparently entertained by France of humiliating the Emperor, only that these hostile feelings were represented as being stronger in England than in France.

Upon these points the Chancellor appears to have been more explicit than with me.

1. In speaking of the difficulties which a war with Russia would entail upon England, he alluded specially to questions as to the rights of neutrals which would not fail to embroil England with the United States.

2. In stating the Emperor's intention of waiting patiently during the winter in expectation of the overtures which might be made by the Turks, he added that His Majesty had no ambitious views, and desired only such an arrangement as was conformable to the interests of his people, and of their coreligionists in Turkey. And,

3. He gave it to be understood that the reserve made by Baron Brunnow as to the rights of Russia would render it unnecessary to follow up the subject of the passage of the Dardanelles by the allied fleets.

By a singular coincidence (for there had been no concert between us) it appears from the Marquis de Castelbajac's despatch, that while he pointed out the conciliatory spirit which had been manifested by France and England, first in not passing the Dardanelles as soon as they were authorized to do so; and later, in lending themselves to the Vienna note; he added, No one can be more pacific than I have been, and than I still continue; but at the same time I will not conceal from you that I counselled the French Government to meet the passage of the Pruth by the despatch of the French fleet to the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 146.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 29.*)

(No. 547.)

St. Petersburgh, October 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Consul-General Yeames, which will be found to convey some intelligence which I transmitted to Her Majesty's Government as to the movements of troops in the south of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 146.

Consul-General Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Odessa, October 7, 1853.

Sir,

I FEAR that in my letter of the 30th ultimo I omitted to acknowledge the receipt of the letter with which you honoured me on August 21st.

That of the 10th ultimo reached me only yesterday, and I cannot account for the extraordinary delay in its conveyance.

In reference to the movement of troops mentioned by me in my last, I have now to state that the fleet, consisting of twelve line-of-battle ships, four frigates, and some steamers, with the 13th Division of Infantry on board, sailed from Sevastopol on the 29th ultimo, with a fair wind, for Seeoum Kalé.

On the 2nd instant the "Selafiel," and the "Uriel," of eighty-four guns, the "Flora" frigate, and a large corvette, arrived off this port, and having embarked a regiment of the 1st brigade of the 14th Division of Infantry, sailed for Sevastopol on the 4th. This squadron will return for the 2nd regiment of the same brigade.

More than 100 merchantmen have arrived here since yesterday morning, and some of them in less than forty-eight hours from the Bosphorus. The reports of the shipmasters are absurdly contradictory, and we must wait till to-morrow for more positive intelligence by the steamer.

It is believed, however, that the Sultan has been compelled to sign the summons to the Russian Commander-in-chief for the immediate evacuation of the Principalities, a measure carried in the Divan held on the 25th ultimo, to be followed by a declaration of war, in case of non-compliance.

It is probable that such an act will be attended by no consequences on this side.

The design of offensive hostilities may perhaps be not entertained here; and it is a fact that no preparations for them have been made, or can be made, for a long time to come.

Since the first occupation of the Principalities, there has been no movement of troops that way. They may be rather apprehended on the Asiatic frontier.

The fleets are still in Besika Bay, with the exception of the steamers, the apparition of which on the Bosphorus seems to have caused so much sensation in England.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 147.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October 29.*)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Munich, October 23, 1853.

THE Emperor of Austria has quitted Munich on his return to his own capital.

The language of His Imperial Majesty in regard to the policy of Austria on the Turkish question has given much satisfaction here, and has inspired fresh hopes as to the possibility of still averting a catastrophe in the East, or, at any rate, should a collision between Russia and Turkey be unavoidable, of preventing the extension of the war beyond the narrow limits of the provinces of the latter Power. I have been informed that the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Count de Grünne, took an opportunity of explaining to M. Von der Pfordten, in a long confidential conversation, the position which the Austrian Government had been compelled to take in the present conflict; and he seems also to have let fall some hints as to the attitude which it might hereafter assume in the event of the complications becoming more serious. On the latter point he is reported to have said that the supposition that the efforts made by the Emperor of Russia at Olmütz and Warsaw to engage Austria to anything beyond the observance of neutrality had been successful, was altogether erroneous; and he gave it to be understood that although the Emperor considered himself to owe to the Emperor of Russia a lasting debt of gratitude, which imposed a certain degree of restraint upon him, it was only under the conviction that the latter would continue to limit himself to what are termed his present moderate demands, that this declaration of neutrality had been made. All the endeavours of the Imperial Government, Count de Grünne observed, would be directed to maintaining this position, so long at least as nothing should occur to menace the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. What change of policy, or attempt on the part of Russia to aggrandize herself at the expense of Turkey might render expedient, it was impossible to foresee at the present moment; but under no circumstances would Austria enter into any combination against those Powers which had imposed upon themselves the task of aiding the Sultan under such a contingency. This account of what passed between Count de Grünne and M. Von der Pfordten, was given to me by one of my colleagues, to whom it had been repeated by M. Von der Pfordten himself, and to a certain extent was confirmed by a subsequent conversation I had with his Excellency on the subject. He informed me that His Imperial Majesty had twice spoken with him on these matters, and after reviewing at some length the possible eventualities which might arise out of a war between two such powerful States, had finally completely reassured him by stating that whatever turn affairs in the East might take, he was determined to observe the strictest neutrality.

Upon hearing this, I naturally inquired upon what conditions this attitude of neutrality had been secured; and whether Austria would be disposed to remain a passive spectator of the permanent establishment of Russia along so extensive a portion of the banks of the Danube as that which forms the Wallachian frontier; making at the same time some observations on the effects which such a proceeding would be likely to produce on the commercial interests of those countries of Germany which are traversed by that river.

M. Von der Pfordten, who appears to have been converted to the doctrine of the Greek propagandists relative to the impending dissolution of the Turkish Empire from internal decrepitude, did not seem much to relish the notion of an appropriation of the Danubian provinces by Russia, of which, however, he assured me the Emperor of Austria entertained no sort of apprehension, though he admitted that the seizure of them would form one of the two cases which would justify Austria in quitting her prescribed neutrality; the other was the eventuality of an attack on her Italian provinces, which I agreed with him in thinking not very imminent in the actual state of European politics. His Excellency talked a good deal about the formation of a Christian community under the name of a Byzantine Empire, with Constantinople for its capital, in the place of the Turkish rule, which is supposed to be on the eve of disappearing

from the continent of Europe; but when I pressed him for his ideas as to who would be a proper Sovereign to place on such an uncertain throne, he hesitated to name the only one who was undoubtedly in his thoughts, but who would probably be more unfit than any other, in every point of view, to be intrusted with the re-organization of a State of such magnitude.

To this country, whose system of policy has of late years approached as nearly as circumstances would permit to that of Austria, the explanations of His Imperial Majesty have proved peculiarly tranquillizing; for they have had the effect of relieving the public mind from a load of dread which has weighed upon it ever since the commencement of the dispute, that the proximity of Austria to the scene of action must, sooner or later, involve her in the struggle; and in such case it does not require the exercise of much penetration to discover that the other States of the Confederation would have an infinitely small chance of escape from participating in it also. Of all this danger the statesmen of this part of Germany were fully sensible, and consequently great is their joy at the prospect of the respite which the proclaimed neutrality of Austria holds out to them. This Government in particular has given utterance to its feelings of satisfaction in a pompous and somewhat absurd article in its semi-official organ, in which the sole credit of preserving the peace of Europe during the present crisis is given to Germany.

The east and the west of Europe, it says, threatened to engage in a conflict on the dispute between Russia and Turkey, but Central Europe threw its whole weight into the scale in favour of peace, and if peace be maintained, it will be chiefly owing to the neutrality of Austria and Prussia; the fate of Europe was placed in the hands of Germany, and it is placed in good hands as all Europe must allow. Germany and Austria, united as they are, possess the power to decide all European questions. Without them nothing can happen in Europe; and that nothing can be attempted against them, it will suffice to observe that they have more than adequate means of repulsing any impertinence that may be essayed, from whomsoever it may come, but which is not to be apprehended so long as they remain true to themselves, requiring nothing further than respect for their rights secured to them by existing Treaties.

There is much more in the same strain, but I hardly deem it worth while to take up your Lordship's time with any additional extracts.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 148.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 29.)

(No. 111.)
My Lord, *Frankfort, October 26, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Her Majesty's Representative at Munich, which reached me last night under flying seal.

The satisfaction which Sir J. Milbanke represents as being felt in Bavaria at the neutral attitude assumed by Austria in the dispute between Russia and Turkey, is, I believe, very generally felt; but it may be observed that this attitude is quite as much a matter of necessity as of good policy, in respect of Austria's status in Germany, as well as of the many other weighty considerations of internal and external relations connected therewith.

If Austria had shown any disposition to assist Russia, such is the dread of the influence of the latter Power in Germany being increased, that all Austria's influence on the minor States would have been lost, and Prussian ascendency established.

The general desire for the maintenance of peace is very strong, but there is a the public mind of Germany a nearly unanimous condemnation of Russian pretensions, and a desire to see them checked. It is wished that Austria could p once have declared a decided coincidence of views on the Eastern question

with our own Government and that of France; and I am persuaded that the obligations which bind her to a different policy are quite as much deplored in Austria itself as in the rest of Germany; but it is felt that the time is not yet arrived for her to emancipate herself from these fetters.

I saw yesterday an intelligent English traveller who left the south of Russia (Kiew) four days since. He informed me that there was unquestionably a good deal of fanaticism excited against Turkey among the lower classes, and among the more intelligent an evident wish for war, if with Turkey alone, but as to war with England the feeling was quite different, and the possibility of such an event seemed to be equally discredited and apprehended.

Great sickness was reported to prevail in the Russian army occupying the Danubian Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 149.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 30, 1853, 7·30 P.M.*

IT is not proposed to send the note to St. Petersburgh until it has been accepted by the Porte, in order to prevent the same difficulties that occurred before.

If any other note arrives from Lord Stratford, to which the Porte has already agreed, we hope it will be favourably considered at Vienna.

No. 150.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 800.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 30, 1853.*

I HAD the honour to apprize your Lordship by a telegraphic despatch, dated the 25th instant, that the Emperor had determined on recalling M. de la Cour, his present Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte, and on replacing him by General Baraguay d'Hilliers. This change has since been made public.

I have had two or three conversations with the General since his nomination; and I have every reason to be satisfied with them. He informed me that his instructions were based on the most complete and cordial understanding between France and England, a policy which he himself had always advocated; nor can I exaggerate the terms in which he assured me of his desire to maintain the most frank and friendly intercourse with Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte.

At the General's desire I furnish him with a letter for Lord Stratford, in order that he may find no difficulty in opening an immediate communication with his Excellency.

The General will leave Paris to-morrow evening, and as a special steamer has been placed at his orders, he hopes to be at Constantinople by the 10th proximo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 151.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 1.)

(No. 807.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 31, 1853.*

THE departure of General Baraguay d'Hilliers is deferred till to-morrow, in order, I believe, that M. de la Cour may learn the change that has been made before his successor arrives. Five officers have been named to accompany the new Ambassador.

I take this opportunity of mentioning, that Vely Pasha made an official request to the French Government, about ten days ago, to be permitted to engage some French officers for the service of the Sultan, but that his request was courteously refused.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 152.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 58. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 28, 1853.*

BARON PROKESCH, the President of the Diet, has arrived at Berlin, and had a lengthened interview this day with Baron Manteuffel.

His Excellency informs me confidentially that Baron Prokesch has submitted to him a project (which I have already had the honour to announce to your Lordship in my despatch No. 56 of the 25th instant), proposing to the Prussian Government to join in addressing a collective report to the Germanic Diet on the Oriental question, and to invite a declaration of neutrality on the part of the Germanic Confederation, should war unfortunately arise out of the differences between Turkey and Russia. His Excellency seemed to think that it was not the intention of Austria to submit this proposal to that body as a subject of deliberation, but merely as a communication of the policy which Austria and Prussia intended to pursue in this question, and as an invitation for the collective assent of the other German States.

Baron Manteuffel expressed to me his conviction that one object Austria had in view by this measure was to give assurance to the commercial and financial world, for he was aware of the great financial embarrassments under which she was now labouring; and he conceived that a positive assurance of neutrality expressed by the Germanic body would enable her to concert temporary measures of relief with greater facility and on more favourable terms.

Baron Prokesch informed Baron Manteuffel that even if Prussia declined to to accede to a joint representation to the Diet, Austria would not be deterred from it, and would inform the Diet of the steps which she had taken for the attainment of a pacific solution, and of her present determination to maintain a perfect neutrality in the event of open hostilities being resorted to by the contending parties.

In addition to the views and opinions which I had already expressed to his Excellency against adopting this course, I was enabled now to add that, in consequence of the new propositions which I had submitted to his Excellency this day, any such declaration of the Diet would be ill-timed and uncalled for.

It is evident to me that his Excellency disapproves of this proposal conveyed through Baron Prokesch; and I feel confident that an evasive if not a purely negative answer will be given by the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 153.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 28, 1853.*

THE messenger Poignand delivered to me yesterday your Lordship's despatches to No. 32 inclusive.

As Baron Manteuffel did not return to Berlin till a late hour last evening, I was unable to see him until this morning, when I had an interview with his Excellency at an early hour.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions I read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 32, and communicated to him the drafts of the notes inclosed in that despatch, leaving in his Excellency's hands copies of those documents to be immediately submitted to the King.

His Excellency expressed his concurrence with the arrangement which those documents seek to attain, and seems to entertain great hopes that they will meet the end so ardently desired by Europe.

I likewise communicated to his Excellency the copy of your Lordship's despatch No. 235 to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, empowering him to admit of such modifications as may appear reasonable to his Excellency or his collegues, and which should not be of a character to preclude the acceptance of the note by the Emperor of Russia.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to consider that the tone and nature of these documents gave evidence of the conciliatory disposition evinced towards the Emperor of Russia, whilst they contain every security and regard for the Sovereign rights and dignity of the Sultan.

His Excellency made but two remarks. First, that the term "le principe consacré dans le préambule du Traité de 1841," was perhaps rather more than was strictly the sense of that Treaty, which in effect merely declared the closing of the Dardanelles to ships-of-war in time of peace. He thought that the term "énoncé" would have been the more correct expression. Secondly, his Excellency remarked that there were many Greeks in the Ottoman Empire who were not subjects of the Sultan, but who, as members of the Orthodox Greek Church, would not be included in privileges or immunities which might be accorded to members of other churches not subjects of the Sultan.

I replied to his Excellency that in religious matters they would come under the terms of the Greek Church, which enjoyed full religious liberty in the exercise of their creed. In temporal affairs, however, they would partake of the same civil immunities which were granted to other foreign residents.

His Excellency, however, did not put forward these remarks in the light of objections; on the contrary, he assured me that I might safely inform your Lordship of the entire concurrence of the Prussian Government, and that instructions will be sent to Baron Wildenbruch to sign the note, and to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in urging the Porte to accept the arrangement proposed.

Of course his Excellency could not inform me until he had taken the King's commands officially of the adhesion of the Prussian Government, but he expressed his certain conviction that His Majesty would unhesitatingly accede to the invitation which your Lordship has addressed to the Prussian Government.

I hope by to-morrow evening to receive from Baron Manteuffel His Majesty's decision, and shall not fail to transmit it, in obedience with your Lordship's instructions, by telegraph to the Earl of Westmorland.

I have, &c
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 154.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 28, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this evening that he had just received a telegraphic despatch from Count Arnim at Vienna, stating that Lord Westmorland had learnt by telegraph from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated

Constantinople, October 21, "that Lord Stratford had obtained from the Porte an armistice until news had been received from England in reply to the propositions he had submitted to his Government."

His Excellency received this intelligence with much satisfaction, and seemed to augur from this act on the part of the Porte a favourable reception of the proposed note, copy of which I had communicated to his Excellency this day.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 155.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

Berlin, October 28, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL communicated to me a despatch which had been received from Count Arnim detailing the subject of a conference which had taken place at Vienna in consequence of a despatch which had been received by Baron Meyendorff from Count Nesselrode, portraying a disposition on the part of Russia to enter into direct negotiations with Turkey for the solution of their differences.

His Excellency was good enough to allow me a copy of Count Arnim's despatch, which is herewith inclosed for confidential communication to your Lordship, requesting that I would provide for its secrecy, and that it should be regarded as a confidential paper. Although your Lordship will receive by the courier a despatch from Lord Westmorland on the same subject, I have thought that this additional information would not be without interest.

I have already previously informed your Lordship of this proposal as contemplated by Russia, as also of the opinion which Baron Manteuffel expressed as to success which it was likely to attain.

This plan, however, is no longer of any importance, further than it offers evidence of the sincere desire of Russia not to cut the gordian knot with the sword but to attain a settlement by means of the pen.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 155.

Count Arnim to the Emperor of Austria.

Vienne, le 26 *Octobre*, 1853.

Sire,

LE Comte Buol a réuni hier de nouveau la Conférence. Il nous a communiqué une dépêche du Comte Nesselrode au Baron de Meyendorff, datée de St. Pétersbourg, du $\frac{14}{7}$ Octobre.

Il y dit que depuis son retour il a reçu deux nouvelles importantes: la déclaration de guerre de la Turquie, et le rejet par l'Angleterre et la France des propositions que le Cabinet d'Autriche avait faites d'Olmütz. Il ajoute que dans le but de ne pas rompre les négociations, le Comte de Buol avait pensé à un expédient, savoir celui de faire remettre à la Porte par les quatre Cours une déclaration renfermant des assurances positives sur les véritables intentions de l'Empereur de Russie, d'engager la Porte à s'entendre directement avec la Russie sans signer la note de Vienne, et à envoyer à cet effet un Plénipotentiaire dans un endroit dont on conviendrait.

Le Comte de Nesselrode continue en disant que depuis la déclaration de guerre, et vu la position que la France et l'Angleterre semblaient vouloir prendre, ce ne pouvait point être à la Russie à rechercher des expédients. Il

ne croit pas que la Turquie dans l'exaltation belliqueuse dans laquelle elle se trouve, veuille faire les premiers pas. Cependant, dit-il, si l'Autriche croit pouvoir se promettre quelque succès d'une démarche pareille, et si elle peut faire accepter aux Deux Puissances maritimes cette proposition, l'Empereur de Russie n'y mettra pas obstacle.

Le Comte Nesselrode déclare, que, si la Porte envoie un Plénipotentiaire au quartier-général du Prince Gortchakoff, celui-ci, assisté d'un Plénipotentiaire qu'on lui enverrait, sera muni d'instructions pour traiter directement avec le Gouvernement Ottoman. Afin de ne pas nuire au succès de cette tentative, les troupes Russes auront l'ordre de rester sur la défensive non-obstant la déclaration de guerre.

Cette déclaration importante a été reçue par la Conférence avec une vive satisfaction. Elle est une nouvelle preuve des intentions pacifiques de l'Empereur de Russie, et de son désir de terminer le différend.

Le Comte de Buol, après nous avoir fait cette communication, nous a prié d'en rendre compte à nos Cours, et de les engager à donner des instructions pour presser la Porte de profiter des bonnes dispositions de la Russie. La première chose à obtenir serait l'envoi de la part de la Porte d'un Plénipotentiaire.

Le Baron de Bourqueney a fait sentir que l'envoi d'un Plénipotentiaire Turc au quartier-général Russe, serait une chose à laquelle la Porte se déciderait difficilement, et qu'il ne lui semblait pas non plus dans l'intérêt de la nécessité de la négociation que les Plénipotentiaires Russe et Turc se trouvassent en tête-à-tête. Il a donné à entendre qu'il lui semblait convenable que des Plénipotentiaires des quatre Cours assistassent à cette Conférence; en un mot, que la paix fût conclue sous la médiation et la garantie des Quatre Puissances. Le Comte Buol a reconnu que l'envoi du Plénipotentiaire Turc au quartier-général Russe aurait des inconvénientes; il a pensé que l'on trouverait bien un autre endroit: quant à la médiation, le Comte Buol n'est point entré dans cette question. Il a dit que la première chose à faire était de disposer la Porte à envoyer un Plénipotentiaire. Ensuite on pourrait s'occuper du Traité à conclure.

Le Baron de Bourqueney a ensuite proposé d'adjoindre le Baron de Meyendorff et l'Ambassadeur de Turquie à la Conférence, pour discuter la rédaction du Traité à intervenir.

Cette proposition n'a point été admise, mais le Comte Buol veut proposer à Constantinople de munir l'Ambassadeur Turc d'instructions et de faire connaître par lui les demandes de la Porte.

Quant au Traité lui-même le Comte Buol est d'avis qu'il ne sera pas difficile à conclure, d'autant que la Russie et la Porte ne sont en différence que sur peu de points et de peu d'importance. Je signalerai d'avance un point sur lequel il croit que la Russie fera bien de revenir. C'est la demande que toutes les concessions que la Porte pourrait faire à quelques communautés religieuses seraient de droits applicables aux Grecs. Comte Buol pense avec raison qu'il serait convenable et utile de discuter le Traité, et d'entendre les deux parties d'avance, afin que tout fût tellement préparé que la signature ne serait plus qu'une simple formalité.

Ayant été appelé par l'Empereur, le Comte Buol a fini la Conférence en nous priant de nouveau d'en rendre compte à nos Cours et de les engager à envoyer les instructions nécessaires pour faire réussir, s'il est possible, cette nouvelle combinaison.

Tout ce qui a été dit a eu le caractère d'une causerie confidentielle. Il m'a paru que le Baron de Bourqueney a été frappé de la modération de l'Empereur de Russie. En sortant il m'a fait l'éloge de impartialité et du jugement éclairé dont le Comte Buol faisait preuve. J'en conclus qu'il tâchera de disposer favorablement son Gouvernement.

Le Gouvernement de votre Majesté aura sans doute connaissance de la dépêche du Comte Nesselrode. Cependant j'en mets très humblement copie ci-jointe sous ses yeux. Nous n'avons point de nouvelles positives de Constantinople. Nous ne savons donc pas si les flottes sont franchi les Dardanelles ou non. Il serait bien à désirer qu'elles ne l'eussent point fait, et qu'un pareil événement ne vint point nuire aux négociations.

(Signé) ARNIM.

No. 156.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 384.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 25, 1853.*

IN answer to your Lordship's inquiry as to how far the Turkish and Russian Ministers were informed of the proceedings of the Conference, I am happy to give your Lordship the information you desire on a subject upon which a good deal of misrepresentation has prevailed.

Baron Meyendorff was in the first instance asked by Count Buol, by direction of the Emperor, to attend the Conference which it was proposed to assemble; but he declined upon the grounds of his not having been authorized by his Government to take part in any meeting of that nature.

The Turkish Ambassador was at that time living at Baden, but on his immediate return to Vienna I informed him of the first meeting of the Conference, and of the proposals which had been made. He, as well as Baron Meyendorff, said he had no instructions to discuss any project of arrangement.

The note which it was proposed to adopt was shown to the Turkish Ambassador, and Baron Meyendorff was made acquainted with it, but by neither saw any objection made; although each said he could form no official opinion upon a measure on which he had no instructions.

The Turkish Ambassador and the Russian Minister were thus treated, as far as information with respect to the terms of the note is concerned, with equal attention and consideration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 157.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 31, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 45 of the 20th instant, inclosing a translation of an article published in the "Kreutz Zeitung," and extracted from the "Augsburg Gazette," stating on the authority of Her Majesty's Consul that revolting cruelties had been perpetrated by the Turkish authorities towards the Christian residents in the neighbourhood of Salonica, I have to instruct your Lordship to take means for contradicting this statement. No such report, nor anything of the kind, has been received from Her Majesty's Consul, and the whole article is a tissue of falsehoods. The good order maintained by the Turkish troops on their march has been most remarkable.

Your Lordship will always make known to me any articles of this kind which may appear in the Prussian newspapers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 158.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 37. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 31, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel, and the reasons which you gave to his Excellency against the proposal of the Austrian Government to submit a report upon the Eastern Question to the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, as reported by your Lordship in your despatch No. 51 of the 22nd instant. Such a step might improve the present position of Austria in the Diet, and aid her future policy in the event of war, but it would impair the independent attitude assumed by Prussia, and fetter her action both now and hereafter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 159.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 38. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 31, 1853.*

I HAVE to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel with respect to the course pursued by his Excellency on the occasion of the Emperor of Russia's visit to Berlin, as well as the friendly and unreserved communications which have passed between your Lordship and the French Ministers at Berlin on the Eastern Question, as reported in your despatch No. 52 of the 22nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 160.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 386.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 25, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has received a report from the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires in Athens, of the irruption of armed bands of Greek subjects from the northern provinces of Greece, upon the adjacent territory, and that one of these bands, about 500 strong, after having possessed itself of Arta had marched towards Prevesa, of which it was feared it would take possession, and that another party were in march upon Samia. It was also stated in this despatch that great fears were entertained lest an attempt should be made to produce an insurrection in Thessaly, where considerable excitement was said to prevail.

The Greek Government is stated to have deprecated these measures, and to have endeavoured to prevent them as far as they have been able, and Count Buol (who had already written upon reports he had previously received, directing the Chargé d'Affaires to make the strongest representations to the Government of King Otho against these proceedings), has repeated these injunctions, and he stated that he was aware the French Minister at Athens had acted in a similar manner, and that he was convinced your Lordship would do the same.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 161.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 387.) *Vienna, October 25, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE latest intelligence which Count Buol has received from the Internuncio is of the 10th instant, from Constantinople. He reports the general disposition of the Turkish Government for the prosecution of the war which has been declared, and which he supposes will be commenced by hostilities on the part of the Turkish army under the orders of Omer Pasha.

Baron Bruck expresses his regret that the assurances contained in Count Buol's note from Olmütz did not arrive before the declaration of war, as he thinks they might have made a favourable impression; but he states, that the remarks of Count Nesselrode upon the Turkish modifications had fortified Reshid Pasha in his conviction, that these modifications ought to have been adopted.

I communicated to Count Buol Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch of the 15th instant. He remarked upon it, that he was already aware of the disposition which had been taken with respect to the passage of the combined fleets through the Dardanelles; but what he regretted to learn from the despatch was the disinclination which it seemed to imply on the part of the General Council in Constantinople, to the acceptation of terms of arrangement with Russia, towards which it appeared that Reshid Pasha might have been favorably disposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 162.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 391.) *Vienna, October 25, 1853.*

My Lord,

AT the invitation of Count Buol I this day met my colleagues, M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim, at his house, when he read to us a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode on the 17th instant to Baron Meyendorff, and communicated by the latter to Count Buol. I have the honour of inclosing a copy of this despatch to your Lordship, and you will perceive that it was written in answer to one from M. de Fonton, dated the 6th instant, announcing the declaration of war by the Porte, and an expedient proposed by Count Buol upon the receipt of that intelligence.

In placing the copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch in our hands, Count Buol observed, that although it addressed to him alone the authorization to open fresh communications, upon the plan he had suggested, with the Government of the Sultan, he felt that it was more conformable to that unity of councils which had existed between the Four Powers throughout the negotiations, to lay his expedient before their Representatives in conference, in order that they might take the deliberate opinions of their respective Governments upon it; and he stated, that he should await the replies of the three Cabinets before he should take any step whatever upon the subject.

The plan which Count Buol suggests for the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and those of our allies, is, that a collective note should be addressed by the Four Powers to the Porte, founded upon the principle that the Government of the Sultan is ready to adhere to the engagements which they have spontaneously taken in the course of the negotiations, and to re-establish their former relations with Russia upon conditions conformable to the dignity and sovereign rights of the Sultan, and inviting them to agree to an armistice, and to the appointment of a Plenipotentiary to treat with a Russian Plenipotentiary, the two to meet at some place to be fixed upon by mutual consent of the two

Governments. The proposed note would contain the renewed declaration of the Four Powers, of the assurances given by the Emperor of Russia, and their adherence to the conditions which the Porte had agreed to accept, in the modified Vienna note, omitting all reference to any concession, by the Sultan to the Greek Church, of the rights and immunities which he might in future accord to any other Christian community. As in consequence of the declaration of war, a Treaty or Diplomatic Convention becomes necessary, the Ottoman Government will be invited by the note to inform the Four Powers, through the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, of the stipulations on which such Convention might be agreed to, and these stipulations would be immediately forwarded by the Representatives from Vienna to St. Petersburgh, and the Cabinet requested to send an answer through the Russian Minister at this place, so that the negotiation would not be exposed to the delays which might arise from direct discussions between the Government of Russia and the Porte. The Plenipotentiaries to be named by both parties would, in fact, only have to meet to sign, and the Four Powers would retain a control over the whole of the transaction.

Count Buol stated, that he would not adopt the proposal in Count Nesselrode's despatch, that the Sultan's Plenipotentiary should proceed to the Russian head-quarters; indeed, it was in contradiction to the former part of the despatch.

In submitting these propositions to the consideration of the Allied Governments, Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the general principles embodied in them might meet with your Lordship's approbation. He stated that he should be ready to attend to any suggestions which the Cabinets might think it advisable to offer, in order that whatever might be agreed upon to propose to the contending parties should be calculated to secure the great object which is equally sought for by all, the re-establishment of peace and the maintenance of that harmony and good understanding amongst the States of Europe which has so long existed, and has contributed so essentially to the general prosperity of all.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 162.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Meyendorff.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{17}{29}$ *Octobre*, 1853.

J'AI trouvé ici à mon retour de Varsovie une dépêche que M. Fonton m'avait adressée de Vienne le $\frac{31 \text{ Octobre}}{12 \text{ Novembre}}$. Elle m'annonce deux nouvelles graves; la déclaration de guerre contre nous à laquelle la Porte vient de se décider, et le rejet par les deux Cours maritimes des propositions qui leur avaient été faites d'Olmütz par le Cabinet Autrichien.

Désirant ne point voir rompre entièrement par ces deux incidens le fil des négociations pacifiques, le Comte de Buol a songé à mettre en œuvre un expédient dont il m'avait déjà entretenu durant mon séjour à Olmütz.

Cet expédient consisterait dans la réunion du Divan par les quatre Cours d'une note collective qui, conçue à peu près dans le sens de celle convenue à Olmütz, c'est-à-dire, renfermant des assurances positives sur les véritables intentions de l'Empereur à l'égard de la Turquie, engagerait celle-ci, non plus à signer la note Autrichienne pure et simple, mais à s'entendre directement avec la Russie, et à envoyer à cet effet un Plénipotentiaire dans un endroit qu'elle choisirait pour ces négociations d'un commun accord avec notre Cabinet.

M. le Comte de Buol sentira que dans la position nouvelle où nous mettent la déclaration de guerre de la Porte d'un côté, et de l'autre l'attitude que semblerait vouloir prendre l'Angleterre ou la France, ce n'est point à la Russie à rechercher de nouveaux expédiens auxquels la Porte n'aurait pas donné son consentement préalable, et que l'initiative des ouvertures en cette occasion ne saurait nous appartenir. Il nous paraît même peu probable que la Porte, dans l'état d'enivrement belliqueux où elle est à cette heure, et après une prise de position si marquée que celle que lui donne sa déclaration de guerre, veuille faire les premiers pas vers un tentative de pacification. Néanmoins, si le Cabinet

Autrichien croit pouvoir lui faire comprendre que l'initiative doit venir d'elle, et employer efficacement ses efforts auprès des deux Puissances maritimes pour leur faire accepter de la part de l'Autriche la proposition dont il s'agit, ce n'est pas de l'Empereur que viendront les obstacles à sa mise à exécution. Que la Porte se détermine à envoyer un négociateur au quartier-général du Prince Gortchakoff, et ce dernier, assisté d'un Plénipotentiaire qui lui sera adjoint d'ici *ad hoc*, sera muni des instructions nécessaires pour traiter directement avec le Gouvernement Ottoman. Pour ne rien faire qui puisse entraver le succès de cette dernière tentative de conciliation, l'Empereur non obstant la déclaration de guerre de la Porte, compte ne rien changer provisoirement à son attitude actuelle. Nos troupes auront l'ordre de rester sur la défensive attendant l'attaque des Turcs et les repoussant s'il y a lieu. Rien ne s'oppose donc de notre part à ce que M. le Comte de Buol donne suite à son projet d'ouvertures, s'il croit pouvoir, dans les circonstances actuelles, en attendre un bon résultat.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 163.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 293.)

Therapia, October 6, 1853.

My Lord,

I AM deeply sensible of the interest so liberally displayed by Her Majesty's Government in the preservation of British lives and property at Constantinople, under the impressions derived from M. de la Cour's telegraphic despatch of the 11th ultimo. It is with reference to your Lordship's despatches Nos. 205 and 206, that I express this sentiment, applying it, moreover, to that part of those instructions which authorizes me to consider the presence of Her Majesty's squadron here, if I thought proper to require it, as intended to embrace the protection of the Sultan also in case of need.

Fortunately there is no necessity whatever for calling up the squadron on either account. My despatches, which had not reached London when M. de la Cour's telegraphic despatch was communicated there, will have informed your Lordship of the degree of danger which appeared to exist when they were written, and my reasons, if I remember right, for resisting all exaggerated proposals, and confining myself to an application, in concert with the French Ambassador, for two or three large war-steamers from each of the squadrons. I am still of opinion that assistance thus limited would have answered every purpose, unless indeed the Ottoman squadron had taken part against the Sultan, which was a very extreme case to suppose. I wished to save Her Majesty's Government from any embarrassments likely to accrue from a premature passage of the Dardanelles by Admiral Dundas' squadron, and at the same time to take precautions adequate to the appearance of danger. I did not form my opinion in this respect without taking the opinion of Her Majesty's senior officer in command on the Bosphorus.

I am gratified by your Lordship's approval, as founded on M. de la Cour's statement, and I shall be still more so if honoured by its repetition after your Lordship had received my expected despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 164.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 294.)

Therapia, October 15, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Sultan has invited the squadrons to enter the Dardanelles. I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of Reshid Pasha's official note communicating His Majesty's request. Your Lordship will observe that the application

is grounded on the Porte's resolution to make war, and on its declared apprehension that Russia may commence hostilities even before the expiration of the fifteen days assigned to Prince Gortchakoff for his evacuation of the Principalities. Though war has been hitherto declared only with that reservation, I have thought it my duty, under your Lordship's instructions, to comply with the Sultan's invitation. I have, nevertheless, withheld my consent for a few days, and arranged with M. de la Cour that the ships shall not arrive here till after the middle of next week. In doing so I have been actuated by a wish to keep open the chances of peace for any acceptable result of the meeting at Olmütz, and to guard against the possibility of furnishing a shadow of pretence for the continued occupation of the Provinces by Russia. The hope of any available proposition from Olmütz has vanished with the communication made by Baron Bruck to Reshid Pasha after the arrival of the last post from Vienna; and when the portions of the squadrons destined for Constantinople shall arrive here, it will be impossible that any effect should be thereby produced at the Russian head-quarters in Wallachia.

Inclosed herewith is my intended answer to Reshid Pasha's note. The French Ambassador will address His Highness in the same sense.

I have also the honour to inclose a memorandum of the course which I propose to follow, in concert with M. de la Cour and the Turkish Government, respecting the entrance of the squadrons. I have reason to believe that it is in accordance with Admiral Dundas's opinions.

Your Lordship will not fail to understand, that in taking a decision on this subject I have been guided by a reference to my original instructions. The juncture for which the last ones were framed, has long since ceased to have any existence in fact, and whatever peril may in future arise from unforeseen circumstances, I see no reason at present to apprehend its revival. I might have preferred an additional delay of a few days, in order to afford a complete coincidence between the passage of the Dardanelles by the squadrons, and the actual or formal commencement of war. But the instructions of my French colleague are, according to his assurance, so peremptory, that, by longer postponing my decision, I should have incurred the risk of separating from him to a degree which would not only have proved embarrassing to your Lordship, but prejudicial to the interests of our common cause, and also to the separate influence of Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have laboured to provide for all the considerations attached to this intended movement of the squadrons, and hope that the difficulty of doing so will atone for any oversight, and obtain for me, nevertheless, your Lordship's indulgent approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 164.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.)

October 8, 1853.

YOUR Excellency already knows that the proceedings of the Russian Government have led to war, and that if a negative answer was received within the term appointed to the letter from his Excellency Omer Pasha to Prince Gortchakoff concerning the evacuation of the Principalities, hostilities were to commence.

The term thus fixed by the Sublime Porte will be duly observed; but Russia may have acquired earlier intelligence of the Porte's final decision, and may hasten hostilities. I am therefore ordered by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan to inform your Lordship that it is highly important in the opinion of the Sublime Porte that a part (whatever may be considered necessary) of the allied naval forces lying outside the Straits, as a mark of the friendly dispositions of the English and French

Governments on behalf of the Sublime Porte, should enter within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

An official note similar to the present has been addressed to the French Embassy.

I have, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 164.

Projet of Answer to the Porte.

THE Undersigned, in acknowledging the Porte's official note transmitted to him by his Highness Reshid Pasha, for the purpose of inviting part of Her Majesty's squadron, now at anchor near the Dardanelles, to come within those Straits, on the grounds of the Porte's having been led by the proceedings of Russia to resolve on war, and of its apprehending that hostilities may commence even before the term assigned in the summons to Prince Gortchakoff, has the honour to state that, having taken these considerations, and particularly the one last mentioned, into his serious and friendly consideration, he is prepared to comply with the Sultan's request, as soon as the necessary communications and arrangements can be made; suggesting, however, that it may be found most expedient, considering the lateness of the season, that the whole squadron should be sheltered within the Dardanelles, such part of it only as may be required being brought up to Constantinople.

His Highness the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is requested to send the necessary firmans to the Dardanelles.

The Undersigned, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 164.

Memorandum.

Samedi, le 13 *Octobre*, 1853.

ENVOYER à Reshid Pasha les notes responsives demain matin.

Ecrire demain aux deux Amiraux dans les mêmes termes.

Les escadres entreraient dans le Détroit des Dardanelles Mercredi, ou tout au plus tard Jeudi.

Qu'elles mouillent, selon les dispositions concertées des Amiraux, quelque part entre Koum Kalé et Gallipoli.

Qu'on détache de chaque escadre soit deux vaisseaux de ligne, soit une grosse frégate avec un vaisseau, à Constantinople, en y ajoutant quatre frégates à vapeur.

Leur arrivée ici ne doit pas avoir lieu plutôt que Vendredi matin.

No. 165.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 296.)

Therapia, October 15, 1853.

My Lord.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a paper given in to Reshid Pasha, and communicated confidentially to me, and I believe to M. de la Cour also, by the Austrian Internuncio soon after the arrival of the last courier from Vienna.

Reshid Pasha informed me that he considered the proposal announced in this memorandum is not only inadmissible, but even as less satisfactory to the Porte than other suggestions which had preceded. Such in substance was his reply to the Austrian interpreter on receiving the communication from him. Nor has that reply surprised me, considering the position in which the Porte is

now placed between the declaration of war unanimously adopted by the General Council and the formal invitation addressed to Prince Gortchakoff, accompanied with proclamations to the Mussulman people and army, such as those which are inclosed herewith.

Had any propositions made by Count Buol after the meeting of the Emperors at Olmütz, been calculated to obtain the concurrence of the British and French Governments, I cannot but presume that some indication of the fact would have reached the French Ambassador or myself by this time, at least through our respective colleagues at Vienna.

It seems to be almost impossible in the present state of affairs that any proposition short of a complete surrender of Russian views should be able to avert the declaration of hostilities. It is more reasonable, though less satisfactory, to look forward to the natural effects of the approaching season for some opportunity, not indeed of preventing war, but of restoring peace before any considerable loss may have been sustained on either side. In a late conversation with the Internuncio, I remarked that his Excellency's opinion appeared in that respect to agree with mine.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 165.

Memorandum addressed to the Porte by the Austrian Internuncio.

EN conseillant unanimement à la Sublime Porte l'adoption du projet de note concerté à Vienne, les Cours d'Autriche, de France, d'Angleterre, et de Prusse, sont pénétrées de la conviction que ce document ne porte nullement atteinte aux droits souverains et à la dignité de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Cette conviction est fondée sur les assurances positives que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a données quant aux intentions qui animent Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie en demandant une garantie générale des immunités religieuses accordés par les Sultans à l'Église Grecque dans leur Empire.

Il ressort de ces assurances qu'en demandant en vertu du principe posé dans le Traité de Kaïnardjé que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs privilèges spirituels sous l'égide de leur Souverain le Sultan, l'Empereur ne demande rien de contraire à l'indépendance et aux droits du Sultan, rien qui implique une intention d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman.

Ce que veut l'Empereur de Russie c'est le maintien strict du *status quo* religieux de son culte; savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Église Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes de la Porte; par conséquent, la jouissance en faveur de l'Église Grecque des avantages déjà accordés à ces communautés. Il n'entend point ressusciter les privilèges de l'Église Grecque tombés en désuétude par l'effet du temps ou des changemens administratifs, mais demande que le Sultan la fasse participer à tous les avantages qu'il accordera à l'avenir à d'autres rits Chrétiens.

Le Cabinet Impérial d'Autriche aime, par conséquent, à ne pas douter que la Sublime Porte, en pondérant encore une fois avec toute la sérieuse attention que la gravité de la situation exige, les explications données par la Russie dans le but de préciser la nature et l'extension de ses demandes, ne se décide à l'adoption pure et simple de la note de Vienne. Cette adoption, tout en assurant au Gouvernement Ottoman de nouveaux titres à la sympathie et à l'appui des Puissances qui la lui ont conseillée, lui offre à la fois un moyen aussi prompt qu' honorable d'opérer sa franche réconciliation avec l'Empire de Russie, réconciliation que tant d'intérêts majeurs réclament si impérieusement.

Inclosure 2 in No. 165.

Proclamation issued to the Inhabitants of Constantinople, Eyoub, Scutari, and Galatz.

(Traduction.)

L'ACCEPTATION des propositions telles que la Russie les a faites et que tout le monde connaît relativement aux privilèges religieux, aurait non seulement porté atteinte aux droits de souveraineté et d'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman; elle serait aussi la source immediate, aussi que dans le temps à venir, de préjudices de toute espèce, dont Dieu nous garde!

La Russie a pris par ses immenses préparatifs de guerre une attitude menaçante.

Quant à la Sublime Porte, tout en prenant de son côté aussi des mesures de précaution et de défense, et en envoyant des forces aux frontières Impériales, soit dans l'Anatolie soit dans la Roumelie, elle a, en même temps, ainsi que son système et ses principes pacifiques lui en imposeraient le devoir, épuisé tous les moyens que la plume fournit, présenté un arrangement modéré, et fait tous ses efforts pour conserver la paix. La paix est objet de tout temps chéri et sacré. Mais tout cela n'a produit aucun effet; et, à la fin, l'armée Russe a passé le Pruth, et envahi, en dernier lieu, les Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, pays héréditaires de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Malgré cet état de choses, la Sublime Porte a employé des intermédiaires pour opérer une réconciliation dans l'intérêt du maintien de la paix; mais cela n'a pas été possible, et, en conséquence, un Conseil-Général a été convoqué les 22 et 23 du mois de Zilhidji, composé des Vizir, des Cazeska, des Ulemas, des chefs militaires, et d'autres fonctionnaires, et la question y a été examinée dans toutes ses faces. Or, étant devenu clair et évident que, puisque la Cour de Russie n'accepte pas l'arrangement auquel la Sublime Porte peut adhérer, la solution de ces contestations d'une manière pacifique n'est pas possible, étant dans la connaissance de tout le monde que c'est la Russie qui a violé les Traités en faisant envahir par ses troupes des pays Ottomans, et la prolongation de cet état de choses étant nuisible, il a été décidé à l'unanimité de mettre notre confiance en l'assistance Divine et en celle de notre Saint Prophète, d'entreprendre la guerre, et de commencer les mouvemens des troupes. Cette décision du Conseil a été confirmé par un Fetva du Sheik-ul-Islam,—Fetva qu'on a jugé à propos de mettre en exécution,—et un rapport à cet égard ayant été mis aux pieds du trône pour prendre les ordres du Sultan, le Maybata du Conseil-Général a été sanctionné par un Hatti-shérif, et le tout a été porté à la connaisance des Cazeskeres des corps d'armée de Roumelie et d'Anatolie, et de tous les habitans de l'Empire en publiant des firmans partout.

Ainsi vous autres vous réunirez les Imaums des quartiers, et vous leur direz que, comme c'est la Russie qui a donné lieu à cette affaire, et que c'est sur elle que tombe la responsabilité, ils doivent adresser des prières au Dieu des armées pour le triomphe de la Sublime Porte et des troupes Impériales; et vous leur ordonnerez de prier sans cesse et avec ferveur pour la prospérité de notre cause; et, en même temps, vous ferez comprendre à tous que, comme cette guerre est une guerre contre une Gouvernement qui, sans le moindre raison, a voulu violer les droits de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, les relations amicales qui existent entre la Sublime Porte et les autres Puissances amies, n'ont subi la moindre altération par suite de cette situation, et, par conséquent, nul ne doit molester les négociants ni les sujets de ces Puissances, ni les personnes des différentes religions, en ce qui regarde la vie, l'honneur, et la fortune, et nul ne doit se permettre de les molester de quelque manière que ce puisse être, car la loi protège la vie, l'honneur, et la fortune de chaque classe des sujets et de Rayas comme les nôtres; tous doivant d'après nos saintes lois être traités en chaque circonstance avec justice et jouir d'une parfaite sécurité: en un mot, il répugne à la sainte loi, ainsi qu'à la simple raison, comme cela a été publié par le passé, de tenir les Rayas de la Sublime Porte, qui professent une religion ayant de la conformité avec celle de la Russie, responsable de la conduite du Gouvernement Russe; ce qui ce Gouvernement demande, il le demande dans ses propres intérêts et pour augmenter son influence. Les sujets de la Sublime Porte jouissent depuis des siècles des privilèges religieux que les Empereurs Ottomans

leur ont accordés sous la protection particulière de la Sublime Porte, et ces privilèges acquirèrent tous les jours plus de force et plus d'extension. Ils savent que la prétension du Gouvernement Russe de prendre leurs privilèges sous sa sauvegarde aurait pour résultat de les affaiblir.

Vous ferez bien comprendre à tous qu'une des causes extérieures de triomphe imploré c'est que toutes les classes des sujets de sa Hautesse passent bien ensemble, que les uns ne molestent ni humilient les autres, et que tous tâchent de vivre dans une parfaite union, et de servir une patrie commune.

Si, par négligence, par ignorance, ou par rancune, quelqu'un agit contrairement à ces ordres légitimes, il sera sévèrement puni pour cela.

Toutes les dispositions précitées ont été arrêtées dans les Conseils Généraux tenus par le passé et tout récemment encore.

Vous aurez donc soin que nul ne se permettre d'actes contraires aux ordres sus-énoncés.

Le 5 Moharem, 1270. (*8 Octobre*, 1853.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 165.

Proclamation to the Army at Shumla.

Ai Soldati Imperiali!

QUANDO noi combatteremo col nostro nemico, affine di essere sempre fermi e corraggiosi, e non voltiamo le spalle allo stesso, e possiamo vendicarci di lui, noi sacrificheremo la nostra testa e la nostra anima. Ecco il Coran! Noi l'abbiamo giurato sul Coráno. Voi siete Mussulmani, e non dubito che voi sacrificherete la vostra testa e la vostra anima per la religione e pel Governo.

Ma se vi ha fra voi, un sol uomo che ha paura della guerra, lo dica; perchè è assai pericoloso presentarsi al nemico con tali uomini. La paura è una malattia del cuore. Chi ha paura verrà impiegato negli ospedali ed in altri servizj; ma per chi in guerra voltasse le spalle al nemico, verrà fucilato.

Gli uomini corraggiosi che vorranno per contro sacrificarsi per la religione e per il trono restino. Essi uniscano il loro cuore a Dio, amino la religione, si mostrino valorosi, e Dio darà loro certamente la vittoria.

Soldati, purifichiamo il nostro cuore, e poi confidiamoci pure all' aiuto di Dio.

Combattiamo, e facciamo sacrificio di noi, come già gli avi nostri, e come essi ci hanno lasciato il nostro paese, la nostra religione, così noi dobbiamo lasciarli ai nostri figli. Voi tutte sapete che lo scopo di questa vita è quello di servire degnamente Dio e il Sultano; e guadagnare così il cielo.

Soldati, chi ha onore deve pensare così e servire secondo questi sentimenti. Così Dio vi protegga. Amen.

No. 166.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 301.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 17, 1853.

I HAD a private audience of the Sultan this morning, and delivered in the usual manner the Queen's reply to His Majesty's letter announcing the birth of a Prince in the Imperial family.

The Sultan took occasion to express his thanks for my compliance with his request that Her Majesty's squadron, now anchored at Besika Bay, should come within the Dardanelles, and he also expressed a hope that so signal a mark of Her Majesty's friendship would prove the forerunner of a still more effective support. I said, in reply, that the deep interest taken by Her Majesty's Government in the independence and welfare of the Ottoman Empire was a sufficient pledge for times of increased peril; and that although I would not take upon myself to say more without special instructions, I felt assured that

any well-founded appeal to their sympathy would meet with the most friendly consideration; but in order to secure the effects of such sympathy, it was essential that the Porte should not only exert its own means to the utmost, keeping the door open for negotiation on reasonable grounds, but that it should proceed frankly in a course of administrative progress, calculated by the enforcement of just and liberal principles to satisfy the expectations of such a country as Great Britain.

The Sultan said that he was always ready to listen to my suggestions, and when approved on examination by his Ministers, to give them effect, together with any addition of theirs.

I exhorted His Majesty to bear in mind the extreme importance, now that the Empire was menaced with all the dangers of a war with Russia, to act upon a broader system than that of mere military operations, and without further loss of time to take effective measures for securing internal tranquillity, providing against reverses, and removing all subjects of complaint and pretexts of aggression on the side of Persia and of Greece.

The Sultan appeared feeble and dejected. He listened attentively to my remarks, but seemed more inclined to acquiesce silently in their truth, than to enter upon any of the topics to which they referred. He said, nevertheless, when an allusion was made to the army, that should it be desirable for him to show himself at its head, he was ready.

Allow me, in conclusion, to add, that His Majesty's language to me, personally, was, as usual, expressive of confidence and kindness.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 167.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 21, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith are copies of a despatch addressed and forwarded by me to Vice-Admiral Dundas, yesterday, requiring that officer to bring Her Majesty's squadron under his command within the Straits of the Dardanelles; of a previous despatch, marked Confidential, addressed by me to that officer four days before, with a view to the same operation; and of an official note from Reshid Pasha in acknowledgment of my reply to his note inviting me in the Sultan's name to require the presence of Her Majesty's squadron within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The French Ambassador has acted in perfect concert with me, and it is probable that the two squadrons are by this time within the Dardanelles, and that the detachments destined for the Bosphorus will be here to-morrow or next day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 167.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, October* 16, 1835.

I HAVE to prepare you for the removal of Her Majesty's squadron under your command from its present anchorage at Besika Bay, in concurrence with the French squadron under Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

The Porte has addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, an invitation in the Sultan's name for parts of the respective squadrons to come within the Dardanelles, and we have signified our intention to comply with His Majesty's request.

At the same time we are alive to the importance of not leaving any portion

of the ships exposed without necessity to the violent winds which often prevail at your anchorage in the season now close at hand, and we therefore learn with satisfaction that the Porte is preparing to address us in that sense.

We are therefore of opinion that you will best provide for the requirements of the case by bringing the whole of your squadron within the Dardanelles as soon as you are informed officially that the necessary firmans for your passage have been received by the Turkish officers commanding there. We further propose that you should detach two ships-of-the-line with four steam-frigates to Constantinople, and that you should anchor the remainder of your force at some convenient place either in the Straits, or on this side of them, below the Isle of Marmora.

A similar instruction is conveyed to Vice-Admiral Hamelin by his Excellency the French Ambassador, who dispatches a steamer this evening with our joint communication to the squadrons.

We conceive that your professional experience, united to that of Vice-Admiral Hamelin, will best determine the most suitable anchorage for ships within the above-mentioned limits. It is proposed, in compliance with the wishes of the Porte, that the vessels detached to Constantinople shall anchor on their arrival in the Bosphorus opposite to Therapia.

Orders will be sent from the Porte to facilitate the purchase of provisions in those districts which are near to the selected places of anchorage as soon as they are known; and the firmans of admission will probably reach the Dardanelles in three days from the present date.

Should you see no objection to coming up in person with the detachment of ships destined for the capital, I shall gladly avail myself of the opportunity to communicate with you more completely than by correspondence, and I cannot but think that the interests of the public service would be promoted by our interview.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 167.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Therapia, October* 20, 1853.

AT the Sultan's request, and in virtue of my instructions, I require the presence of Her Majesty's squadron under your command within the Straits of the Dardanelles.

The French Ambassador addressed a similar requisition to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

Orders for the admission of both squadrons will be dispatched by the Ottoman Government in the course of to-day.

I directed Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles to ascertain, and to acquaint you with the fact of their being received.

As soon after hearing to that effect from him, as you can conveniently move the squadron, it is desirable that you should enter the Straits.

My confidential despatch of the 16th instant, will have enabled you to concert whatever may be necessary with the Commander of the French squadron.

I repeat that agreeably to the Porte's proposal two sail-of-the-line and four steam-frigates from each squadron will suffice for the present in the Bosphorus.

Convenient ground for anchoring the required number of ships will be reserved in this part of the Straits towards the entrance from the Black Sea. The Honourable Captain Drummond, who proceeds to-day with the "Retribution" to join your squadron, will give you more exact information on that point.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 167.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Moharem 16, 1270. (*October* 19, 1853.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's reply to my note of the 5th of Moharem, relative to the squadrons lying outside the Dardanelles. The promptness with which the Porte's invitation thereon has been complied with affords a proof of your Government's sincere disposition on behalf of the Sublime Porte. His Imperial Majesty has received it with satisfaction; and I am especially charged to convey his Imperial thanks thereon. The Sublime Porte considers that it will suffice, for the present, that two line-of-battle ships and four large steamers from each of the squadrons, English and French, should be brought near to the entrance of the Black Sea; and that, since it is really impossible for the rest of the ships to remain outside the Dardanelles during the bad season without danger, they also should take up their station, either separately or together, at some convenient and safe anchorage, within or on this side of the Straits.

I am therefore ordered by his Imperial Majesty to send directions to the Commandant of the Straits to allow both the vessels which are to come in this direction as well as those which are to remain within the Straits, to pass, and to communicate the same to your Excellency, and to your colleague the French Ambassador.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

Inclosure 4 in No. 167.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Calvert.

Therapia, October 20, 1853.

Sir,

THE Porte intends to send orders for the immediate admittance into the Dardanelles of the British and French squadrons, now at anchor in Besika Bay.

The orders will be forwarded in the course of the day by a Turkish officer, who will take his passage in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Retribution," by which this despatch is conveyed to you.

As soon as you ascertain that the orders are received by the officer in command at the Dardanelles, you will send information thereof to Vice-Admiral Dundas, and be careful that no room for mistake be left, as to the time and manner of entrance, between that officer and the Turkish authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 168.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 305.)

My Lord,

Therapia, October 21, 1853.

I HAVE lost no time in giving effect to your Lordship's instructions respecting a suspension of hostilities. The difficulties are necessarily great in this advanced stage of the business; but they are surmounted, in so far as the Government is concerned, and I only hope that facts will be found as tractable as opinions. I fear, however, that it will prove otherwise in the result.

The telegraphic despatch from Vienna, announcing that the first of my two suggestions had been favourably received by the British and French Governments, reached me in the afternoon of the 18th instant. My first object was to see M. de la Cour, but I did not succeed in finding him till late, and he had not then received his telegraphic despatch, which left Belgrade before mine,

and was found, when it reached him, to contain no instruction to the purpose. His Excellency was nevertheless quite ready to act upon your Lordship's instruction to me, and we agreed to have a meeting of the Four Representatives, in order to address our united solicitations to the Porte for a suspension of hostilities. Unfortunately the Internuncio was expecting his weekly courier from Vienna, and declined a meeting before its arrival. All that I could do, therefore, in the interval was to prepare Reshid Pasha for the intended application. Early in the morning yesterday a meeting of the four took place at my house. After stating that I had received official advice of a new proposal directed to the maintenance of peace on terms approved in London and Paris, with an instruction from your Lordship to obtain, if possible, a suspension of hostilities, preparatory, as we might presume, to a fresh concerted attempt at negotiation; I proposed a joint application to the Porte in that sense. The French Ambassador and the Prussian Envoy acceded to the proposal at once. The Internuncio hesitated in a manner which wore the appearance of an unwillingness to act ostensibly with us; but finally he consented to send a verbal message to Reshid Pasha of the same purport which I had suggested. His latest instructions from Vienna were of the 10th instant, mine were two days later from London, and therefore he concluded, reasonably enough, that he might still receive instructions which would make him regret the immediate commencement of hostilities.

As soon as we had separated, I directed M. Pisani to inform Reshid Pasha of what had passed, and to interest his Highness to obtain, if possible, the assent of his colleagues to our joint advice. A Council of Ministers, with the addition of the Sheik-ul-Islam, was accordingly summoned for 5 o'clock in the afternoon, and those who attended sat in deliberation till 6 this morning.

In spite of much resistance, the point in question has been carried, and steamers are now in readiness to start for Trebizond, Batoum, and Varna, with the Porte's orders for a suspension of hostilities, as soon as the Sultan's pleasure shall have been made known. The strictest secrecy is enjoined, under an impression that the people might be dangerously excited by a knowledge of the Porte's intentions.

Your Lordship will understand how close a run it is when I state that Prince Gortchakoff's answer to the summons of Omer Pasha is considered by the Porte as that refusal to evacuate which authorises the commencement of hostilities; and, consequently, that war now actually exists between the two Empires. Add to this the undoubted fact that a steamer has been sent from Varna to the Asiatic frontier with orders to attack immediately after the close of the fifteen days, which expire on the 24th instant.

Reshid Pasha, before he went to meet his colleagues, inquired of me for how many days I proposed to defer the commencement of hostilities; what was to be done if they had already commenced; and whether the intended declaration would be communicated previously to the Porte.

I said in reply that it would be useless to suspend the commencement of hostilities for less than eleven or twelve days—the end of the month, for instance; that if hostilities had begun the Porte must do its best to prevent their continuance; and, with respect to the supposed declaration, that if adopted at all, it would probably be sent to both parties at once.

I have only to add that the delays which have hitherto postponed the commencement of hostilities originated with me; that I was unable to procure a month's delay, which I proposed, instead of fifteen days; and that I know not how to press more delay without incurring the responsibility of exposing the Porte to serious disadvantages, and an increase of danger, both from within and from without.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 169.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 306.)

Therapia, October 22, 1853.

My Lord,

ENCOURAGED by your telegraphic instruction through Vienna, announcing the favorable reception of the first of the two suggestions which I submitted to your Lordship in my despatch No. 282 of the 28th ultimo, and anxious to enlist any chance in favour of a pacific arrangement, however difficult and all but impossible at this late hour, I determined on framing drafts of a new note and declaration according to the idea contained in that suggestion, and sending them as a forlorn hope to Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna.

It is true that the time allowed for delaying the commencement of hostilities, if they have not already begun, is very short; and that, if the idea, approved in London and Paris, has been followed up at Vienna, the work has already, in all likelihood, assumed a definite shape. But so much being at stake, I have thought it better to risk an endeavour which may prove superfluous, than to have the mortification of thinking that a good opportunity had been lost through want of spirit at a decisive moment.

Copies of the two drafts, which I drew up yesterday, and of my covering despatch to Lord Westmorland, are inclosed herewith. Your Lordship will perceive, that in going upon the principles set forth in my suggestion I have kept in view the note sent privately to me by your Lordship, as well as the original Vienna note. I have provided, in substance, for the Porte's modifications by omitting, in one case, the passage which she objected to, and by adapting the phrase, in two others, to the sense of her requisition. I have, moreover, availed myself of your Lordship's permission to alter the expression in some instances so as to make it more acceptable to Russia, without compromising any point of difference on which the Porte has justly taken its stand.

Neither the time nor the nature of the case allowed of my taking the opinion of the Turkish Ministers on the suggested course of proceeding; but I cannot anticipate any insurmountable difficulty on their part, unless the progress of events should close the avenues of peace and oblige them to persist in the prosecution of hostile measures against Russia.

They are evidently apprehensive of being embarrassed by fresh proposals from Vienna at variance with their repeated declarations; and hence, I presume, the official note, of which a translation is inclosed herewith, addressed to me and also to the French Ambassador in the course of yesterday.

I may state in conclusion, that M. de la Cour has co-operated with me in framing the draft transmitted herewith in copy, though instructions of a tenor similar to mine, as respects the suggestion, had not reached him.

The Austrian and Prussian Ministers confined themselves to a simple application for the suspension of hostilities.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.

Therapia, October 21, 1853.

My Lord,

IN pursuance of the instructions addressed to me by Lord Clarendon on the 12th instant, and transmitted by telegraph, I have solicited and obtained the Porte's consent to a brief delay in the commencement of hostilities. The accompanying translation of a note addressed to me, and also to the French Ambassador, by Reshid Pasha to-day, will apprise your Lordship of the limitations attached to that consent. In order to provide, as far as the shortness of the interval will allow, for the eventual execution of that suggestion, which is

stated by the Earl of Clarendon to have been favourably received by the British and French Governments, I have framed, with the approval and assistance of M. de la Cour, a new *projet de note*, grounded on that which was privately transmitted to your Lordship, as well as to myself, by Lord Clarendon, and also a form of declaration on the part of the Four Powers. The two drafts are inclosed herewith, and I place them at your Lordship's disposal, on the contingency of their being available, in the absence of any preferable arrangements, and in virtue of an understanding between the four Courts, consequent upon instructions received by your Lordship from England.

I regret that the unavoidable length of these papers will not allow of their transmission by telegraph, and that the present state of affairs between the Porte and Russia affords so slight an opening for the hope of their successful application, especially if they were to be rendered unacceptable here by any changes at all inconsistent with the plain unquestionable substance of the Porte's modifications of the original note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 169.

Draft of Declaration.

LES Cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, signataires, conjointement avec le Cabinet de Russie et la Porte Ottomane, du Traité conclu en 1841, en vue de manifester solennellement leur intention de veiller au maintien de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, ont vu avec un profond regret les pénibles différends survenus en dernier lieu entre ces deux Puissances, leurs augustes alliés. Elles ont employé avec zèle leurs bons offices les plus empressés pour amener un rapprochement amiable entre les deux Gouvernements.

Si jusqu'à présent leurs efforts n'ont pas été couronnés de succès, elles n'en sont pas moins animées du même désir de voir cesser au plutôt un état de choses qui ne peut continuer sans porter une grave atteinte aux principes rappelés plus haut, et auxquels elles veulent rester fidèles.

A cet effet, obéissant à leur conviction, et se fondant, en outre, sur les assurances qu'elles ont reçues des deux parties, et d'où il résulte que l'une d'elles n'entend demander aucune concession nouvelle, pas plus que l'autre n'a intention d'éluder aucune obligation déjà contractée, elles se sont arrêtés à la rédaction d'une nouvelle note qu'elles jugent propre à écarter tous les doutes comme à donner toutes les garanties nécessaires.

Ce projet, paraphé par leurs Représentans et annexé à la présente déclaration, est porté à la connaissance des deux Cours dont les relations diplomatiques sont en ce moment suspendues.

Les quatre Cours ci-dessus désignées y joignent l'expression de leur désir le plus ardent de le voir accepté de part et d'autre comme offrant une solution juste et honorable à la fois des questions en litige, en même temps qu'il fournit une garantie des droits de souveraineté sans affaiblir les engagemens dont l'exécution est garantie à la Russie par ses Traités avec la Porte.

Inclosure 3 in No. 169.

Draft of Note.

SA Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ayant donné en mainte circonstance les assurances les plus amicales de sa constante bienveillance envers l'Empire Ottoman, et Sa Majesté le Sultan n'ayant, de son côté, rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entr'elle et son auguste allié les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, la Sublime Porte a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend et de répondre ainsi au désir de la Cour Impériale de Russie.

Un iradé suprême en date de a fait connaître au Soussigné la décision Impériale; il se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer au nom de la Sublime Porte à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul-Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son ardent désir de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente entre les deux Etats, a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les communications dont son Altesse M. le Prince de Menchikoff a été l'organe auprès de la Sublime Porte, et Sa Majesté espère que l'Empereur, son auguste ami et allié, lui saura gré de la confiance qu'il prend plaisir à lui manifester encore dans cette occasion.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de faire connaître par la présente que Sa Majesté le Sultan n'est animé que du désir de rester fidèle aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, concernant le culte Chrétien et ses églises. Il est, en outre, chargé de faire connaître que Sa Majesté regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais l'Eglise orthodoxe d'Orient dans la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui lui ont été octroyés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lesquels privilèges sont confirmés par elle.

C'est aussi l'intention sincère de Sa Majesté de faire participer l'Eglise Grecque d'Orient à tels autres privilèges religieux qu'il lui plairait d'accorder dorénavant à tout autre communauté quelconque de ses sujets Chrétiens, ou qui leur ont été déjà octroyés par Sa Majesté ou par ses glorieux ancêtres.

Le firman Impérial, qui vient d'être donné au patriarcat et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, ayant eu pour objet de donner une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman, qui donne toute sécurité, devant faire disparaître toute crainte à l'égard du culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, le Soussigné est heureux de faire la présente communication.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du Hatti-humayoun du 15 de la lune de Rebi-ul-Akhir, 1268 (Février 1852), expliqué et corroboré par les firmans de , et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état de choses sans entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie, et qu'il ne sera causé aucun préjudice aux différentes communautés Chrétiennes.

Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem, ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage dès à présent à souscrire à cet égard un Acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Inclosure 4 in No. 169.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

October 21, 1853.

(Translation.)

WE learn from the communication now made to us that there is an idea of drawing up a new project of arrangement, and that it is desired that hostilities should be put off for the term of ten days, counting from to-day (Friday). The Sublime Porte, in deference to the counsels of her illustrious allies, consents to postpone hostilities during the term in question, and orders have been sent to the Commanders in Roumelia and Anatolia by special steamers this day.

But the war may have begun in some places before the arrival of these orders, and as in that case it will be impossible to desist, the Sublime Porte hopes that no blame will be attributed to her in this respect.

With reference to the other points, the Porte cannot consent to the introduction into the note to be given to Russia of the passage concerning the ancient

solicitude of the Emperors of Russia for the maintenance of the religious privileges in the Ottoman Empire, as set forth in the corrections made in the Vienna draft of note, as well as in the note which accompanied the amended draft; nor that those privileges should be considered as deriving from the natural construction of the Treaty of Kainardji. Neither can she consent to the expression of "treaty or special disposition" concerning the participation by the professors of the Greek religion in the spiritual advantages granted to other Christian communities. The Porte, moreover, cannot consent to the passage in the note implying that the participation in question is granted at the demand of Russia.

As the assurances, stating that it is not the intention of the Russian Government to touch the independence of the Sublime Porte, or to meddle with the internal affairs, affect the dignity of the Imperial Government of Turkey, the securities and guarantee sought for must be limited only to the assurance that Russia will not make the note which is to be addressed to her a pretext for intermeddling in religious matters.

The acceptance of the new draft of note in question will depend upon the issue of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's orders consequent upon the examination [of that draft] by the General Council, and the Ministers of the Porte cannot hold out any promises in that respect; neither can the Ministers of the Porte, in the event of the draft in question being rejected, again prolong the term [for the commencement of hostilities] already put off.

I make this communication to your Excellency as the Imperial Government considers it important that the Representatives of England and France, the sincere allies of Turkey, should be apprized beforehand of the subject of it.

No. 170.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 308.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 22, 1853.

IT requires but little sagacity to perceive that the war which has all but commenced is likely to prove a contest of no ordinary importance, and perhaps of no ordinary duration. The Porte is bringing forward all the remains of its strength, and, together with the nation, feels that the issue of the struggle must determine its future destiny. It is evident, on the other side, that Russia, weary of a precarious and disputed influence in the Levant, will exert its colossal force to secure a complete and recognised supremacy. The truce to be imposed by winter may offer opportunities for negotiation; but the motives to persistance are on both sides so powerful, that a pacific arrangement, unpreceded by an exchange of blows, may be considered all but hopeless, and hardly even then to be obtained on fair terms without the interference of other Powers.

Such being the prospect, it is essential that the Turkish Government, and those in alliance with it, should fix their attention principally on the means of prosecuting an active and extensive war with success. The real independence of this Empire, or, at least, the free exercise of legitimate power by its Sovereign, being the main object in view, with reference to political, social, and commercial interests of the highest order, it is requisite not only that Turkey should come out of the contest with honour, but that her success should be obtained with the least possible drain on her resources. This can hardly be accomplished under any circumstances, unless all available means of defence or attack be prepared and directed with a comprehensive judgment, and effectual measures be adopted in time for covering weak points and guarding against dangers which, whether from within or from without, may operate as diversions in favour of an invading enemy.

Although the Turkish authorities have carried on their defensive preparations with remarkable energy and order, deficiencies of no small importance remain to be supplied. Commissariat establishments and field officers are wanting; the regular cavalry is defective, especially in numbers. On the other hand, an application for officers has been made to the French Government, and assistance of that kind may be obtained from other quarters too. I am assured that provisions are stored in considerable quantities by order of the Porte; and

bodies of undisciplined cavalry may be expected to come in aid of the regulars, with less disadvantage than elsewhere. Orders have also been given to collect an army in Bosnia; another to defend the mountain pass near Sophia; and a third to act in reserve between Adrianople and the capital. To these may be added the forces collected on the Asiatic frontier from Batoom inwards. They cannot by this time be far from offering a total of 50,000 men. But Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom, measuring them against the Russian armies on that side, holds out but little prospect of their success in the field. Yet I suspect that the Porte is inclined to rely principally upon them, hoping to acquire by their means, with the assistance of Mahomedan tribes subject to Russia, a footing so firm and extensive in the adjacent Russian provinces, as to afford an equivalent for the Danubian Principalities.

Your Lordship is aware that the Porte has not been able to concentrate large bodies of men on special points without leaving a large proportion of the Empire with very imperfect means of protection, and affording a strong temptation to its neighbours and tributary subjects to look after their own interests at the instigation of Russian agents. The measures which I have suggested, as your Lordship knows, to provide for the maintenance of order, have been generally accepted by the Porte, and partially adopted for practical execution. It may be added, that hitherto in Bulgaria, Thessaly, and Albania, where the Christian population is held to be sufficiently ill-affected, no symptoms of active discontent or dangerous combination have been discovered to any alarming amount. But such forbearance can hardly be expected to withstand the excitement of war, especially if the Sultan's armies were to sustain any signal defeat. The Bulgarians would probably, even in that case, be restrained by their experience of Russian military rule, and the fear of a return visit from the Turks. Servia gives promise of attachment to the Porte, in so far as an exemption from Russian occupation is concerned. In the Asiatic provinces of the Empire disorder is more likely to break out among the Turks, at the expense of the Rayah population. Something of this kind has already occurred at Adalia, and also in Kurdistan. In the former case an officer and two battalions were immediately sent down, at my request, to restore order and to punish the offenders. In the latter, repeated orders have been sent to the Turkish frontier authorities for the same purpose. I may take this opportunity to mention, that at Smyrna, where *brigandage*, not wholly divested of a political tendency, has long prevailed in alarming proportions, a chief of great notoriety has been recently compelled to surrender, by the zealous and well-directed efforts of the Pasha and his police.

The exhortations which I have repeatedly addressed to the Porte with respect to Greece and Persia, are always received with attention and expressions of readiness to comply; but hitherto, nothing effective has been done to deprive them of pretexts for doing the Porte an ill turn when her armies are engaged with Russia. It would seem, that the professions of both Governments continue to be friendly; but there would be less to apprehend, if they were given to understand that the Sultan's maritime allies would not permit them to take any unfair advantage of his eventual difficulties. The intimation of a military visit from India would operate powerfully on the Persian Cabinet; and a small detachment of the British and French Mediterranean squadrons would suffice to cool the enthusiasm of Athens.

It is far from my intention to outrun the natural course of events; but, looking forward to no very distant period, it may perhaps be worth while to consider the expediency of having some addition to our garrison force at Malta and Corfu, and enough of naval force to admit of operations in the Adriatic, should the bordering tribes of Turkey break into aggression on this Empire, under the influence of foreign sympathy with Russia.

Officers, arms, and money are points of weakness for which the Porte may eventually have to cast an imploring look upon her allies. I stated in a former despatch that the Sultan had given his consent for a loan. I have now to add that Namik Pasha is going to Paris and London with the authority to contract one, if it can be obtained on moderate terms, to the amount, in the first instance, of two millions sterling. It is not unlikely that the Sultan's Commissioner will have authority to enter upon other questions of common interest with the British and French Governments. Meanwhile, I hear very little of those liberal measures which seemed at one time to have been all but definitively adopted,

particularly the equalization of evidence in criminal procedure, and the opening of Turkish ports for a free exportation of grain. The delay is attributed to the pressure of still more urgent business; but it may be presumed, without unfairness, that financial considerations and fear of popular tumult in case of scarcity, as on the coast of Africa, may have a share in retarding the one, while the remains of Mussulman fanaticism may cause hesitation as to the other.

With respect to operations in the Black Sea, there is doubtless considerable room for those of an aggressive as well as for those of a defensive character. We have not as yet sufficient information as to the practicability of attempting Sevastopol and Nicolayef with success. But it is obvious that in blockading those places, interrupting the conveyance by sea of supplies for the Russian army, encouraging the inhabitants of Circassia, and laying under contribution such unprotected coast establishments as Odessa and others, the activity of a strong efficient squadron might be a cause of much vexation and injury to the Porte's enemy.

On these points, however, I beg to reserve any further suggestions until I have had an opportunity of conferring with Admiral Dundas. My only object at present in addressing your Lordship at all on the question of Turkey's prospects in a war with Russia is to draw a seasonable attention to the weak points, and also in general to the more obvious means of counteracting the dangers attached to them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 171.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No. 309.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 22, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the letter addressed to Omer Pasha by Prince Gortchakoff, in reply to the summons which he had received on the 9th instant from the Turkish Commander-in-chief.

Reshid Pasha has informed me officially that the negative character of that reply constitutes, in his point of view, the beginning of war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 171.

Prince Gortchakoff to Omer Pasha.

M. le Mouchier, *Bucarest, le* $\frac{\text{09 Septembre}}{\text{10 Octobre}}$, 1853.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai reçu le 27 Septembre, à 3 heures du matin, la lettre que vous m'avez adressée en date du 26 Septembre, v.s.

Sans entrer dans l'examen de cette question, je crois devoir prévenir votre Excellence que je n'ai aucun pouvoir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon maître, pour traiter de la paix, de la guerre, ou de l'évacuation des Principautés par les troupes confiées à mon commandement.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF.

No. 172.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 550. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 20, 1853.*

I THINK it right to offer your Lordship the details of a private conversation which I held yesterday with the Chancellor, who, in the company of the Neapolitan Minister and of Count Kisseleff, passed the evening at my house.

Count Nesselrode's manner was more than usually cordial, and on taking my hand as he entered the room, he said, "Eh bien! nous sommes toujours en paix."

"Yes," I replied; "and I hope means will be found for enabling us to remain at peace."

"I hope so," the Chancellor said; "and I believe so. You know that Talleyrand used to say, that he only asked for six weeks; I am better off, for I have six months before me."

Count Nesselrode proceeded to remark, that he felt sure that he knew the reason why the English messenger had not arrived; that he was aware that your Lordship had been occupied in devising some fresh propositions (*système* was the word employed), and that these, when completed, would be sent to Vienna, and probably communicated to me.

The conversation proceeded in the same easy strain, and in the course of it I obtained a confirmation of some of the views which I had before taken of the state of things in Turkey. Thus I learnt, that the Emperor had been relieved from much anxiety by the accounts received of the safe landing of the reinforcements sent from Sevastopol to the point at which a Turkish attack was the most apprehended; and that, like myself, the Government conjecture that Omer Pasha may, for want of supplies, be unable to remain long in his present position.

This idea had been suggested to me some days ago by one of the most distinguished officers of the Russian army, who knows the ground well, having taken an active part in the campaign of 1829. This officer has told me that unless constant supplies could be received from seaward, it was totally impossible that Omer Pasha should long occupy his present position, Bulgaria being so completely barren and without resources, as not even to offer any kind of forage for the cavalry when the summer is over.

Count Nesselrode appears to share this opinion, and to think that Omer Pasha is not unlikely to break up his camp, and crossing the Danube at Widdin to throw himself into Little Wallachia, where he would find plentiful supplies, and where he would still have a rapid and difficult river (the Olta) between him and the Russian army.

The important part, however, of Count Nesselrode's conversation was as follows:—

"I will tell you," he observed very frankly, "what I conceive to be the great danger of the present situation. If it is prolonged, we are exposed to the risk of a general rising of the Sultan's Christian subjects, and that may plunge us into almost inextricable difficulties." He proceeded to explain his apprehension by saying that a fabric so tottering as the Turkish Empire may by prudence be kept from falling, but once fallen its reconstruction is an event which, even if desired, would be found impracticable.

I did not wish (particularly in my own house) to reply with any asperity to the very amicable remarks which had been made to me by the Chancellor, and I consequently refrained from observing, as I might have done with great truth, that the consideration upon which he laid so much stress was precisely that which I had so often insisted on with him, and which upon more than one occasion I had ventured to press upon the Emperor at the beginning of this unhappy quarrel.

In case this private conversation should be brought to more general knowledge than was intended, I think it right to state to your Lordship that the Neapolitan Minister was so placed as to hear every word of it, and that he left

my house telling me fairly that it was long since he had possessed the means of offering his Court as interesting a report as he was now able to make.

I will not conclude this despatch without stating to your Lordship that I am not aware of having omitted any opportunity of throwing upon Prince Menchikoff the blame which he so improperly imputed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe; that I pursued the same object last night, and that I have the satisfaction of thinking that my endeavours have not been entirely fruitless.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 173.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 552.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 21, 1853.*

IN acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 237, I would again state, that although no engagement to this effect was taken by him, Count Nesselrode by his language had led both my French colleague and myself to infer that Baron Brunnow's correspondence with your Lordship respecting the passage of the Dardanelles would not be carried any further.

Were the allied fleets to enter the Black Sea, the Russians' remonstrances would no doubt be renewed in a louder strain. This effect may indeed be produced by their appearance at Buyukdere, but evidently upon grounds as little tenable as those upon which exceptions against the passage of the Dardanelles were taken by the Emperor's Envoy.

The trespass committed by Russia involved consequences to which the aggrieved party had manifestly a right to resort at pleasure. The trespass did not lose that objectionable character because it had been persisted in, or because its first occurrence was not met by prosecution.

Among the members of the Corps Diplomatique, there are several who are always disposed to consider that the right is on the side of Russia.

These persons, as I understand, argue that there is no analogy between the passage of the Pruth and that of the Dardanelles; that the one is a question which regards Russia and the Porte, and that the other is one in which Austria and Prussia have a violation of treaty to complain of, or rather which might be complained of.

This view of the case has been only once noticed to me, and was met by me in a manner which caused the subject to be dropped.

You make, I said, a convenient position for Russia, if you allow her to come in for hostile purposes from the north, and exclude those who may come to the Porte's assistance from the south.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 174.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 555.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 22, 1853.*

I WAITED upon Count Nesselrode yesterday at the Foreign Department, and held a conversation with him, which, if not satisfactory in other respects, was so at least as regards the calm and even friendliness of his tone and manner.

His Excellency inquired if I had received a *travail*, which he understood Her Majesty's Government to have been occupied in preparing, and which he thought might have been sent to me by the messenger who arrived here on the 20th instant. I replied that I had no knowledge of this *travail*, and that I doubted its existence, inasmuch as I felt at liberty to state that if the step would

prove acceptable to the Emperor's Government, your Lordship would be ready to draw up such a note, in lieu of that proposed at Vienna, and now set aside, as should guard against all ambiguities requiring explanations, and as should give to Russia all she professes to claim, and yet not expose Turkey to such an interference (*ingérence*) in her internal affairs as the Emperor declares he does not aim at.

Count Nesselrode replied that he could only repeat to me that the posture (*position*) of Russia was this: that she had no intention of resorting to aggressive measures, but should, during the winter, await the overtures for peace which might be made to her by Turkey.

To this I answered that I considered his Excellency's observation in the light of an acceptance of the offer on the part of your Lordship, that it mattered little whether overtures were made by Turkey or on the part of Turkey, and that here was a direct proposition to an instrument which might be the means of restoring peace to the two countries, and of averting evils the amount of which no one could calculate.

Count Nesselrode assented to this, observing, however, that it was hardly necessary to remark that the consideration of the *projet de note* to be proposed by your Lordship did not pledge the Russian Government to its acceptance; that the Emperor's interests and dignity could not be overlooked; and that it must be remembered that all the interference of the English Government had hitherto been employed in supporting the views of Turkey.

Turkey, his Excellency continued, still owes us a reparation that indeed Her Majesty's Government itself admitted. I replied that if I understood the allusion, his Excellency was now adverting to the holy places: that certainly Russia had possessed a claim to obtaining a full acknowledgment of her rights at Jerusalem, a security against their being called in question afresh; but that the whole difference between us had from the commencement of the affair been this, that an undue extension had been sought upon a particular point.

But, said Count Nesselrode, you must not forget that we are at war with Turkey. She has declared war against us, and a state of war can only be put an end to by a Treaty; to obtain a Treaty, Plenipotentiaries must be named on both sides, negotiations entered upon, and engagements taken directly by the two parties.

This, I rejoined, does not appear to me to alter the case; preliminaries precede the signature of a Treaty, if that be requisite. Well, the Earl of Clarendon's note would be a preliminary, and might be followed by a final arrangement.

Count Nesselrode expressed his assent, saying, that if your Lordship's note should be such as the Emperor would feel at liberty to accept, it might serve as a basis of negotiation.

I then spoke of the extreme moderation of the measures which had accompanied the Porte's declaration of war, as indicative of the Sultan's wish to renew amicable relations with Russia. To these observations his Excellency did not make much reply.

During the whole of my visit I was prepared for some inquiry as to the Black Sea, but no such allusion was made, and I judged it expedient not to originate the subject. I am indeed almost inclined to doubt—only that Count Nesselrode is possessed of an imperturbable calm in the midst even of disagreeable affairs—whether he is aware of the orders which have been transmitted to Admiral Dundas. He inquired with some interest whether the fleet had left Besika Bay, and appeared to be under the impression of its being still in its old place of anchorage. In reply, I stated that I had no information as to the arrival of the fleets, but that I thought it might be safely assumed that they were all in the Bosphorus.

Count Nesselrode adverted to the inconvenience of so large an assemblage of ships being anchored in a very narrow channel; and it is possible (although I do not believe that this meaning was intended) that the observation was meant as a reason thrown out intentionally for the Bay of Buyukdéré being the station resolved upon.

I will only add, that Count Nesselrode alluded in the course of our conversation to what he considered to be the commencement of a change of public feeling in England upon the subject of the Turkish question—an illusion in which I have once more cautioned him not to indulge; and that upon my

having casually remarked upon the possible chances of misunderstandings which had lasted so long, leading to a rupture which would be marked in the first instance by the withdrawal of the English and French missions, Count Nesselrode said quietly, and as if thinking aloud, "Mais il n'y a donc aucune chance de rupture."

From all that precedes your Lordship will, I think, infer that there is no absence here of that calm which is so requisite for the consideration of questions involving peace or war; and I should feel sanguine as to the result of the fresh attempts about to be made by your Lordship in the cause of humanity, if I were not aware how difficult it is to reconcile professions with acts, and if experience had not shown me that in asking for what neither Turkey nor her allies can safely grant, the Emperor were not fully convinced that his demands are warranted by Treaty engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 175.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received October* 31.)

(No 556.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 22, 1853.

A SENSE of duty urges me to take the liberty of offering your Lordship an observation with regard to the orders transmitted to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in your Lordship's despatch No. 220.

I have every reason for believing, that there is no question of the Sevastopol fleet being employed for the landing of troops upon the Turkish territory; and that, as has been stated to me by the Russian Governor, their wish is to confine themselves during the winter to defensive operations.

If this plan be departed from, moreover, it will be, I conceive, upon the eastern and not upon the western coast of the Black Sea, as it is possible that the movement upon the populations of Georgia and the Caucasus may lead to some attacks being made upon the province of Erzeroom.

I would then venture to submit to your Lordship whether, if the orders transmitted to Admiral Dundas shall not have been acted on immediately, that their execution should be suspended.

It is very far from my wish to deprecate recourse being taken to energetic measures, should they be requisite; but I feel certain that your Lordship will desire that no unnecessary offence should be given to Russia.

This consideration it is which induces me to remark, that much less offence would, I apprehend, be offered to the Emperor by the eventual orders given to Her Majesty's fleet being made known confidentially by myself to Count Nesselrode, than if a knowledge of them should be brought here in consequence of the communication made by Admiral Dundas to the Russian Admiral in command of the Sevastopol fleet.

According to one method of communication the Emperor, without being supposed to have received a summons, might take measures for the security of his fleet: while, according to the other, he would learn from one of his own naval officers the affront (as His Majesty would be sure to consider it) offered to the Russian flag.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 176.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 557. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 22, 1853.*

I REGRET that it is not in my power to offer your Lordship a copy of a despatch which General Castelbajac has just addressed to his Government, and which, after having read to me, will be forwarded by to-day's messenger to Count Walewski for transmission to Paris.

It would have been agreeable to me if my colleague had laid less stress upon the moderation of the Emperor's views, and upon the strong motives which exist for the assistance afforded by France to the Porte being doled out with a sparing hand; but the military details which he gives, and the opinions as to the operations of the Russian and Turkish armies which, as a military man he expresses, are of considerable interest.

General Castelbajac states that up to the present time there have been 55,000 Russian troops in the Principality, which have now been increased by the arrival of a corps d'armée under General Lachen, 45,000 strong.

He imagines that without any very extraordinary effort these forces might be brought up to 300,000.

According to General Castelbajac's anticipation, active operations, when undertaken by the Russians, will be directed chiefly against the Pashalic of Erzeroom, where they will be less under the observation of the European Powers and more removed from the chance of all interference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 177.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Wyse.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 130 of the 7th ultimo, respecting the movements of troops towards the frontiers, and the equivocating and unsatisfactory language of M. Paicos upon the subject, I have to inform you that reports from various quarters have reached Her Majesty's Government, which have little room for doubt, that the Greek Government, instead of endeavouring to allay excitement, are encouraging the hostile feeling displayed in Greece towards Turkey.

I have accordingly to instruct you to inform M. Paicos, that Her Majesty's Government cannot too strongly express their disapprobation of the unfriendly and unjustifiable course adopted at this moment by the Greek Government towards a neighbour and an ally; and you will further say, that Her Majesty's Government are entitled to demand that energetic measures shall be forthwith taken to prevent all acts of aggression upon the Turkish territory, and to maintain tranquillity on the frontier.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 178.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Wyse.

(No. 42. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

AS it is important at the present moment to obtain correct information relative to the course of policy actually pursued, and likely to be adopted, by Greece towards Turkey, I have to instruct you, if you should think it expedient so to do, to send a competent person in whom you can confide, to ascertain and report upon the real state of things on the frontier; and whether any acts of aggression upon the Turkish territory are committed, or connived at, by the Greek troops.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 179.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 249.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the course taken by your Excellency on the receipt of the Sultan's invitation to the British and French squadrons to enter the Dardanelles, as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 294 of the 15th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 180.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 250.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the communication which you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas respecting the entrance of the squadrons into the Dardanelles, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 304 of the 21st ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 181.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 252.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 1, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the language which you held to the Sultan at the audience you had of His Imperial Majesty on the 17th ultimo, as is reported in your despatch No. 301 of the same date.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 182.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 253.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1853.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 293 of the 6th ultimo, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in having refrained from calling up the whole of the fleets from Besika Bay at the time when your despatch No. 272 of the 15th of September was written.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 183.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 259.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1853.

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode in the conversation with his Excellency, reported by you in your despatch No. 550 of the 20th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 184.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 263.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 1, 1853.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 555 of the 22nd ultimo, I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode with respect to further steps for the arrangement of the Eastern question, in your conversation with his Excellency on the 21st ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 185.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 59 of the 28th ultimo, reporting your communication to Baron Manteuffel of the drafts of notes inclosed in my despatch No. 32, I have to observe that Her Majesty's Government learn with much satisfaction that Baron Manteuffel approves of the notes, and will instruct the Prussian Minister at Constantinople to support them.

It appears, however, that a note and declaration has been forwarded by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vienna of a character similar to those which your Lordship has lately communicated to Baron Manteuffel, and as it must be inferred that the assent of the Porte to that note has been secured, and that it will not be framed in a manner unacceptable to Russia, Her Majesty's Government would in that case strongly recommend its adoption in preference to any other mode of arrangement, as much delay and some obvious difficulties would be thereby avoided.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 186.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 358.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 2, 1853.

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol to the Austrian Minister at Athens instructing him to advise the Greek Government to repress excitement and to avoid giving any cause for alarm or complaint to Turkey at this moment.

I requested Count Colloredo to convey to Count Buol the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for this communication, which was very satisfactory, as there was reason to fear that the Greek Government stood in need of such advice, and I further informed Count Colloredo that similar instructions had been addressed by me to Mr. Wyse.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 187.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October* 30, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I forwarded last night, the 29th October, at 12¼, a telegraphic message to the Earl of Westmorland, in the following words:

"Le Gouvernement Prussien adhère entièrement aux projets d'arrangement proposés par Lord Clarendon. Des instructions dans ce sens sont envoyées au Comte Arnim. Baron Wildenbruch recevra l'ordre d'appuyer Lord Stratford."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 188.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 560. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 24, 1853.

NO intimation has ever been made to me of the Emperor's intention of calling upon the Porte for an indemnity for his armaments, in the event of the final rejection of the Vienna note; but, as I before stated, the existence of such an intention has reached me.

In the event then, in the happy event of an arrangement of difficulties between Russia and Turkey becoming within view, I would (however unnecessary the suggestion may be) take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship that this pretension is to be carefully guarded against.

It might appear incredible that a nation should be entertained of claiming damages from an independent Sovereign for the flagrant trespass committed upon his dominions, but that improbability could not with safety be admitted.

I say not with safety, because, apart from the enormous injustice of the demand, the claim, if once entertained, would defeat the object which the rest of

Europe must have in view, namely, that of seeing Moldavia and Wallachia delivered from Russian holding.

It may very safely be assumed that the Turkish exchequer would be totally unable to liquidate such an account as might be presented for the immense military preparations which Russia has been making for the last twelvemonth; and equally certain it is, that the claim being once recognized, and the bill sent in, the next step would be an attachment upon the Principalities or some other Turkish possessions as a security for payment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 189.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 563. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, October 24, 1853.

My Lord,

A CONVERSATION which I have held with a person who is upon the most intimate terms with the Chancellor and Count Orloff, confirms opinions which I have already ventured to express to your Lordship, as to the great disinclination felt by the Emperor to plunge into a war which might be disastrous to himself, and could hardly fail of being so eventually to his closest allies.

The person in question prepared me for much excited feeling on the part of the Emperor, who appears to resent an interference with what he considers his unquestionable rights, but he does not anticipate that these feelings will lead His Majesty to push matters to extremities.

He cautioned me as to the expediency of Her Majesty's Government not pressing too heavily upon the Emperor's powers of endurance, but ended by saying: "Tout cela ira mieux qu'on ne croit généralement. Vous en sortirez pacifiquement, mais très lentement; difficilement l'affaire sera terminée avant Pâques."

I questioned my acquaintance closely as to the existence of some secret engagement entered into lately between the Emperors of Russia and Austria; the more closely as the idea has for some time possessed my own mind.

I was assured in the most positive manner the apprehensions might be safely dismissed, and at this conclusion, as I may take the opportunity of adding, my French colleague had previously arrived.

The person to whom I before alluded, remarked, and certainly in this respect his opinions agree closely with my own, that an arrangement between Russia and Austria for the spoliation of Turkey would give rise to difficulties which it would be hardly possible to get over; since besides that Austria, independently of exposing herself to the certainty of a war with Western Europe, and of revolutions in Italy and Hungary, could as little expect that she would be allowed by her co-partner to become mistress of the Principalities, as she could admit, either in the interests of Austria or of those of the whole of Germany, that they should become Russian possessions.

Meanwhile, eaten up as these fine provinces are by an immense occupying army, and exposed as they will be during the winter to the forays of both Cossacks and Turks, much of their value will be lost for many years to come.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 190.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, October 30, 1853, 11 P.M.*

COUNT BUOL, after a deliberate examination of the proposition of Lord Clarendon, and of the documents which accompany it, has begged us to inform our Governments, by telegraph, that he suspends his judgment and all action upon it, until a reply be received to the project presented by him at the Conference of the 25th, but, as a first step, he submits to our Cabinets the following considerations.

The project of the 25th is based upon an overture of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and therein lies one of the chances of its acceptance. In the two English projects of note the word "pacification" is not used, and no mention is made of the evacuation of the Principalities; finally, the hostilities which have commenced at Isaktcha necessitate a diplomatic Convention, although the religious questions may be settled by some other sort of document. Count Buol renders full justice to the intentions of the Cabinet. He in no wise rejects the fundamental ideas of the proposition. He thinks only that they should be assimilated to the present situation of affairs, the more certainly to secure their success; and he questions whether the Turkish note (the mode of communicating which to St. Petersburgh is not indicated) would not with greater propriety be addressed by the Porte to the Four Powers, who would present it as a basis of preliminaries to Russia. I insisted strenuously upon the complete and immediate acceptation of your Lordship's proposed note, and in this I was supported by Baron Bourqueney, but we could not refuse to inform our Governments of the objections which I have above indicated. Count Arnim being instructed to transmit orders to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, in the case only of the Three Powers being agreed, has thought it necessary to demand fresh instructions from his Government. I have announced this delay by telegraph through M. Fonblanque to Lord Stratford, with whom it rests to decide whether or no he will await the ulterior decisions of the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin.

No. 191.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 1.)

(Télégraphique.) *Vienne, le 31 Octobre, 1853.*

LE Commandant de la forteresse de Temesvar écrit au Gouvernement en date d'aujourd'hui que le 27 du mois courant 3,000 hommes d'infanterie de l'armée d'Omer Pasha et 100 de cavalerie ont passé le Danube à Calafat, et marchaient sur Badouven. Beaucoup d'autres troupes continuaient à passer la rivière sur barques. Les Russes s'avançaient sur le même point, on croyait à une rencontre, le 28.

No. 192.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 362. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 2, 1853.*

IN my despatch No. 350 of the 27th ultimo, I informed your Lordship that Count Colloredo had declined to give me a copy of the despatch he had read to me.

He has, however, received instructions to comply with my request, and he yesterday placed in my hands the despatch of which I herewith inclose a copy.

Count Colloredo then read to me another despatch from Count Buol,

stating that the Austrian Government had desired to have a copy of any note or requisition from the Turkish Government upon which Her Majesty's Ambassador had determined to call up to Constantinople two British ships of war.

I said I was at a loss to understand the object Count Buol could have in view by these communications; but that as I had already given an answer, I begged to decline all further discussion on the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 192.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.

Vienne, le 16 Octobre, 1853.

M. le Comte,

LA déclaration de la guerre émanée de la Sublime Porte suspend sans doute les effets du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841. Dès ce moment aucune des Puissances signataires de cet Acte ne saurait plus à ce titre articuler des objections fondée contre l'entrée dans les Détroits de bâtiments de guerre étrangers.

En présence de cet état de choses ce serait, selon nous, entamer une discussion oiseuse que de se livrer à l'examen de la question de savoir si l'apparition antérieure dans les parages de Constantinople de quelques frégates Anglaises et Françaises était, ou non, attentatoire à la lettre du Traité de 1841.

On prétend que les Représentants de France et d'Angleterre en appelant ces vaisseaux ont obtempéré à l'invitation du Gouvernement Ottoman, qui craignait à son tour que des troubles compromettant la sureté des populations Chrétiennes se vinssent à éclater dans la capitale.

Quel que soit du reste le motif qui a donné lieu à un fait qui nous semblerait difficile à concilier avec les termes clairs et précis du Traité de 1841 aussi longtemps que la Porte Ottomane ne s'était pas proclamée elle-même en état de guerre, il nous aurait paru désirable dans l'intérêt même de l'inviolabilité du principe consacré par cette transaction, que les autres Parties Contractantes eussent été consultées d'avance sur l'urgence ou l'opportunité d'y déroger exceptionellement.

Je vous charge, M. le Comte, de donner confidentiellement lecture de cette dépêche à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 193.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 3.)

Le 3 Novembre, 5 P.M.

(Télégraphique.)

AYANT reçu votre lettre du 29, et votre dépêche télégraphique d'hier matin, j'ai demandé à me réunir avec mes collégues chez le Comte Buol aujourd'hui pour appuyer encore le projet de Lord Stratford.

Le Comte Buol accepte les bases du projet, mais regarde comme indispensable de leur donner une autre forme.

Il reçoit la nouvelle télégraphique de Paris qu'on y délibère avec Londres sur son projet du 25 Octobre.

M. Hübner lui annonce le résultat de cette délibération pour aujourd'hui.

De Berlin on parle d'une rédaction Française du projet transmis à Lord Stratford dont on s'occupe en préférence à toute autre, et M. Bourqueney vient aussi de la recevoir.

Mes deux collégues sont d'accord avec le Comte Buol pour ajourner une décision l'appuyant sur les arguments expliqués dans ma dépêche (No. 392) du 30 Octobre, en y ajoutant les incidents survenus depuis.

Je vous écrirai en détail par ma dépêche d'aujourd'hui.

No. 194.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 392.)

My Lord, *Vienna, October 30*, 1853.

I WAITED upon Count Buol yesterday immediately after the receipt of your Lordship's instructions of the 25th instant, and informed him that I had to lay before him a proposal, which your Lordship considered to be the last effort that could be made, with any chance of success, to effect an arrangement between Russia and the Porte before the calamities of war should actually commence, and of which you most anxiously desired the approval of Count Buol; and I also stated that the greatest anxiety was felt by Her Majesty's Government for the cooperation of Austria and the success of the present proposal. Count Buol replied, that he could not fail to be favourably impressed towards any proposition so recommended, and he awaited its communication. I read to him first your Lordship's despatch No. 346, with the tenor of which he was entirely satisfied; and I then placed in his hands the copies of the two projected notes, the one for the signature of the four Representatives, and the other for the acceptance of the Porte. Count Buol said he looked upon these documents as of so much importance that he should desire to consider them with attention; and he thought as the French Government was already a party to them, and as Prussia was invited as well as Austria to become so, that they should be taken into consideration by the four in common. He therefore proposed that I should meet my colleagues with him at an early hour on this the following day; and in the meantime he requested that the two notes might be left with him. I consented to this request; and I pointed out to Count Buol that I considered these notes to be in every way calculated to meet with his approbation: first, because they fulfilled the great object the Four Powers had always had in view, that of guarding against any act or declaration which might be derogatory to the honour and independence of the Sultan, or which might leave unsatisfied any of those rights and pretensions which were secured to the Emperor of Russia by Treaty, or which His Majesty declared that he required.

I remarked also that, taking into consideration the statement which Count Buol had lately made of his own views as to the propositions to be made to the Porte, I conceived that the notes now proposed fulfilled his intentions; and I particularly called his attention to the adoption of the modified Vienna note in all its essential points, and the omission of any claim to the future grant of rights to the Greek population of such privileges as the Sultan might at any time in future accord to religious communities not subjects of the Turkish Empire.

I left the documents in Count Buol's hands, and this morning I returned to his house, and met there Baron Bourqueney and Count Arnim. Count Buol read to us two projects of note, and then stated what I have already shortly reported to your Lordship in my telegraphic despatch of this day. He felt convinced that since the declaration of war had been made, and particularly since the unfortunate commencement of hostilities which had taken place at Isaktchi, it would be impossible to hope that the former relations existing between the two Governments could be restored by a note of the nature of that now proposed. He felt at a loss to understand in what way that note was to be communicated from the Porte to the Russian Government. It had formally been proposed to send an Ambassador, but this seems to him to be no longer contemplated: no other form of transmission had been pointed out. The note did not call upon the Emperor for the evacuation of the Provinces, which was most essential for the restoration of peace, nor did it make any mention of the mode in which this restoration was to be effected. He therefore thought that the purport of the note proposed for the signature of Reshid Pasha, should rather be addressed to the Representatives of the Four Powers, who might present it to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh as a basis upon which the preliminaries of peace might be established.

I replied that the intense interest which was felt by my Government for

the adoption of the present project by the Four Powers imposed upon me the duty of urging to the utmost its immediate adoption, and I repeated that it was considered by Her Majesty's Government as the last chance of averting the commencement of hostilities, the cessation of which it was impossible to foresee. I added that the project had, with the assent of the French Government, been already transmitted to Constantinople, where it would, even without the support of the other Powers, be submitted, and urged upon the Porte in the strongest manner; and if it should not be accepted, the want of success might be attributed to the absence of such support. The note contained nothing which the Turkish Government ought to object to, and it granted to Russia all that Government professed to claim. It was proposed first to the Turkish Government, in order that the reasonable desire of the Emperor Nicholas should be fulfilled, that no proposal should be submitted to him, as the former one had been, with the risk of being after his acceptance refused by the Porte. In the instruction sent to Lord Stratford, although he had been authorized within certain limits to consent to some modifications which the Government of the Sultan might propose, they were to be confined to such as the Representatives of the Four Powers would approve, and which would not be objectionable to the Emperor of Russia, and it was not believed, therefore, that His Imperial Majesty would refuse to receive such a document, when he should be aware that the peace of Europe depended upon it; the great object being to obtain something from the Porte which might suspend hostilities and give a chance of peace; and I stated that Her Majesty's Government could not give a greater proof of their deep anxiety upon this subject than by the effort they now made for the attainment of success. I also remarked, that I had every reason to believe that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh was aware that Her Majesty's Government was engaged in drawing up a project of the nature of the one now proposed, and that they did not show disfavour to the idea; and concluded by saying that the notes before us having been framed with an anxious regard to the dignity and independence of both parties concerned, and being about to be offered to the Sultan with urgent recommendation of all the influence Her Majesty's Government might justly aspire to, I hoped I might not plead in vain for the cooperation in this honourable effort of the Government which had hitherto acted in such cordial alliance with us.

Count Buol assured me that he fully participated in the anxiety which I felt for the continued and cordial union of the Four Powers, and he felt all the advantage of the adoption at the present moment of any course which might hold out a chance of averting the continuance of that state of hostilities which, from the recent accounts of the events at Isakteha, we now know to have commenced. It was not, therefore, from any want of the most cordial adhesion to the feelings and intentions expressed by Her Majesty's Government that he felt obliged to demur to the immediate adoption of the present proposals, but from the sincere belief that they are not applicable, without some alteration, to the actual posture of affairs, which had assumed a new aspect with which your Lordship was unacquainted when you drew up the notes. He felt convinced, from the tenor of Count Nesselrode's despatch of the 17th instant, that the state of war declared by the Porte could not be put an end to without the intervention of Plenipotentiaries or some diplomatic act, and therefore it would be risking loss of time and of that weight with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh which we possessed, if we proposed a simple note from Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode as a sufficient engagement upon which the Emperor of Russia would be satisfied to rest the re-establishment of peace. He earnestly appealed to me, and to the Representatives, to bring before our Governments the remarks he had made, and he should await the answers of our respective Cabinets. Count Arnim stated, that he had been instructed by his Government to support the proposition of your Lordship, and to forward orders to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople to give his best assistance towards carrying it into effect, provided it was agreed to by the other Powers; but such condition not being actually fulfilled, he should refer the statement of Count Buol for the consideration of his Government.

M. de Bourqueney, after supporting with energy the appeal I had made for the immediate assent of the four Governments to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, consented also to refer the statement of Count Buol, as well as his reasons for the delay which he desired and the modifications he

proposed, for the consideration of his Government; and in conformity with the decision of these Ministers I felt myself obliged to adopt the course they had determined upon, and I transmitted immediately a telegraphic despatch to be forwarded from Belgrade to Lord Stratford, as I have already informed your Lordship, by which I announced to him the delay which would take place in the instructions to be given to the Austrian and Prussian Ministers at Constantinople, so that he may exercise his own judgment as to the steps he will take on the arrival of your Lordship's despatches by the "Fury."

I detained the messenger Poignand, in hopes of receiving without delay your Lordship's further orders.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 195.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 813. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 3, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that he had on the previous day received a communication from M. de Hübner which, he had been informed, would be equally made to your Lordship through Count Colloredo.

The substance of it was that Austria had been commissioned by the Russian Government to state that the declaration of war on the part of the Turkish Government had not altered the pacific intentions of the Emperor Nicholas; that His Majesty was still ready to settle his differences with Turkey by means of negotiation; and that a Turkish Plenipotentiary presenting himself at the Russian head-quarters in the Principalities would be met by a Russian Plenipotentiary, when a Convention, having for its object the settlement of those differences, might be discussed between them. M. de Hübner was desired to express the readiness of the Austrian Government to make this proposition to the Porte, and the support of the French Ambassador at Constantinople was asked for.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, guarding himself against any official expression of opinion, until he had taken the Emperor's orders and had an opportunity of consulting Her Majesty's Government, observed that he was required to give his assent to a proposition the spirit of which he had combatted since the commencement of this question. He was called upon to consent to consider the Eastern question as a matter of private difference which might be settled within closed doors by Russia and Turkey; while the justification of the attitude assumed by France was that it was a European question, and one with which the faithful observance of Treaties and the balance of power was intimately connected. He was called upon, moreover, to advise the Porte to enter into single discussion with Russia. But such a course of action would be in direct contradiction to the policy which in later times had guided the Great Powers in all questions concerning Turkey. They had always been treated as European questions—witness the separation of Greece from Turkey; the settlement of the Egyptian question; and even the miserable quarrels of the Druses and the Maronites.

M. de Hübner replied that his Government did not wish to be bound by the strict letter of its official proposition, and he then produced a confidential (reservée) despatch from Count Buol, in which that Minister stated that the Convention to be signed by the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries might be drawn up beforehand by the Four Powers, and that some place, other than the Russian head-quarters, to be agreed upon by the two Plenipotentiaries, might be named as the point of meeting.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys, still reserving his official answer, rejoined that in his opinion the proposed mode of action was inadmissible. The Four Powers had, until the present hour, pronounced their opinions fairly and openly. It would be unworthy of them to accept now the ill-defined and subreptitious (subreptice) part which Count Buol offered them.

Nevertheless, M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have some idea that Count

Buol's proposition may be turned to account, and he proposes writing to M. de Bourqueney, from whom he has received reports which tally entirely with the communication made by M. de Hübner, that if Count Buol's intention is to establish conferences at which a Russian and a Turkish Plenipotentiary are to meet in the presence of Plenipotentiaries of the other Four Powers, and where a Convention is to be negotiated settling the present question, and preventing for the future the recurrence of such aggressive acts on the part of Russia as that now complained of, France might not be indisposed to entertain such a proposition. But your Lordship will understand that this despatch is written for the guidance of M. de Bourqueney in his language towards the Austrian Government, and not as authorizing him to make a specific proposal. I should add that M. Drouyn de Lhuys continues ready to support the project of note sent by your Lordship on the 25th ultimo to Constantinople, nor does he object in any way to the project sent on the 21st ultimo from Constantinople to Vienna, should that version be preferred. It would appear from a despatch of M. de la Cour, that the latter project had been communicated confidentially to Reshid Pasha, and had received his sanction, though his Highness could not answer for its adoption by the Grand Council.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 196.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 4.)

(No. 814. Confidential.)

Paris, November 3, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my previous despatch I have the honour to state that, on leaving M. Drouyn de Lhuys yesterday, I met M. de Hübner, and did not scruple to acquaint him with the substance of the conversation which had just taken place between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself.

M. de Hübner said M. Drouyn de Lhuys had mistaken the tenor of Count Buol's confidential despatch. That what Count Buol wished to convey was that the Vienna conferences should be resumed, and that a Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiary should be invited to participate in them. But he gave me to understand that as his Government had been simply charged by Russia to express the wish of the Emperor Nicholas to treat directly with the Porte, they could not make any other proposition. I presume, therefore, that what Austria wishes is that a counter-proposition, which she would support, should be made by some other Government. M. de Hübner did not explain himself clearly on this head.

On my remarking that I feared, after late occurrences, that the Porte would not willingly send a Plenipotentiary to Vienna, and that if conferences were opened some other place must probably be chosen as their seat; M. de Hübner said that such a determination would be a source of great mortification to Count Buol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 197.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 816. Confidential.)

Paris, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE just seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the proposition lately made from Vienna, and have learnt from him the course which the French Government has the intention to pursue. M. de Lhuys informed me that he was much pressed by the Austrian Envoy for an answer, and that the language which he held to M. de Hübner, and the reply which he proposed

sending through M. de Bourqueney to the Austrian Government, were to the following purport:

The French Government could not accept the proposition as placed before them by Count Buol; that is, they could not advise the Porte to send a Plenipotentiary to meet a Plenipotentiary from Russia, for the purpose of negotiating a Treaty of Peace, wherein would be comprised the several points which until now it had been proposed to settle by a note. There were three reasons why France could not offer this advice:

First, it not require the incitement of any other Power to enable the Porte to enter into direct negotiation with Russia.

Secondly, it was next to a certainty that any advice of the kind would be refused at Constantinople.

Thirdly, such advice would, if accepted, convert a question which the Four Powers had been unanimous in considering of European interest, into one that was to be solved by a private understanding between Russia and the Porte.

The opinion of the French Government was that the negotiation which had been commenced at your Lordship's suggestion, should be pursued; that the Conference of Vienna, or one to be established elsewhere, if it was thought preferable, should in a joint or identic note recommend to the Russian Government and to the Porte the project of note which your Lordship had recently drawn up and sent to the three Courts for their approval; or, what was perhaps preferable, (since it must be supposed that it had obtained the sanction of the Turkish Government,) the project of note drawn up by Lord Stratford. If the two parties agreed to this solution of their quarrel, it should then be proposed to them to send each a Plenipotentiary to some neutral place, where, under the auspices of the Four Powers, they might negotiate a short Treaty, renewing those which had existed between Russia and the Porte previous to the late declaration of war by the latter Power, and in which, if thought advisable, the evacuation of the Principalities might be recorded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 198.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 565.)

St. Petersburgh, October 27, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour of stating to your Lordship, as I thought upon good authority, that the corps of General Osten Sacken had entered the Principalities.

This is not so; at least up to yesterday the Government had no knowledge of such a movement having taken place.

The disposition of the Russian forces, according to an account which your Lordship may rely upon, is as follows—

The 4th corps, composed of four divisions under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff and General Dannenberg, are quartered at and about Bucharest. This force hardly exceeds 60,000, comprising detached bodies of troops engaged in guarding the line of the Danube some 200 leagues in extent, from Widdin to Ismail.

The three points of the Danube which are the most closely observed, as those at which the passage of a Turkish army is the most to be apprehended, are Widdin, Nicopoli, and Silistria.

Prince Gortchakoff's reserves, formed of the 3rd corps of 60,000 men, under the command of General Baron Osten Sacken, are in cantonments between Kieff and the Pruth.

The 5th corps, 60,000 strong, under General Lüders, are quartered about Odessa and in Bessarabia: it was the 3rd division of this corps which was lately disembarked at Secoum Kalé.

The 6th corps, another body of 60,000 men, are at present quartered at Moscow.

Two corps of cavalry of the reserve remain among their colonies at Krumenshuk and Kharkoff.

The 2nd corps, commanded by General Panintine, is stationed in Poland.

The 1st corps, under the orders of General Sievers, occupies the Baltic Provinces and Lithuania.

The Corps de la Garde, and that of the Grenadiers, each of 40,000 men (being still "sur le pied de paix"), are quartered in the capital, at Nowgorod and Narva.

The corps of the Caucasus, with its reserve division stationed at Taganrog, forms a force of 80,000 men.

The troops in Mingrelia under the command of General Biboutoff, which are destined to operate in Asia Minor, amount at present to 25,000 men. This force, however, can at any time be reinforced by detachments from the army of Prince Woronzow.

I will only observe that the above statements, although meagre and incomplete, are, as far as they go, worthy of confidence.

As yet I have been unable to obtain any return of the number of Cossacks in the Principalities and in Asia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 199.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 566. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 28, 1853.

I HAVE always held it to be the duty of a diplomatic agent to state to his Government not only what he sees, and hears, but what he believes or surmises.

It is not that his opinions possess the value of those formed by the persons to whom his reports are addressed, but because his inferiority in many other respects is frequently compensated by the advantage of local information which he possesses.

This much I venture to urge in justification of the numerous occasions which I take of addressing your Lordship, and of the freedom with which I venture to express a judgment respecting matters upon which it does not belong to me to decide.

Acting upon this system I will venture to remark to your Lordship that the actual position of the Russian Government, as far as I understand it, is one of expectancy.

This attitude, in fact, offers various advantages.

In the first place, it carries with it an appearance of moderation and magnanimity.

Next, it leaves open a door for that much-desired event, the interruption of the good understanding and harmonious action which happily directs the movements of England and France.

After that, it gives time for the preparation of a vast amount of military resources which, in the first instance, appears to have been considered unnecessary; above all, it is hoped, that the same dead season which will add to the military efficiency of one army will quietly impair the strength of the other.

I believe—I might almost say I know—that financial embarrassment, a rigorous climate, and a scarcity of provisions, are looked to here as causes which are tolerably certain to cause the melting away of Omer Pasha's army; whilst it is not doubted that some successes, which are confidently counted upon when the hour of trial shall arrive, will tend to a great diminution of the ardour at present shown by the Sultan's forces, and will dispose the Turks to be content with much less favourable terms than are now looked for by them as the result of a negotiation.

If these opinions are correct it appears to follow, that what is aimed at by the policy of the Emperor is unsuited to that of England and France; and that little time should be given for the acceptance, by His Imperial Majesty, of terms ascertained to be acceptable to the Sultan, and above all, fully adequate to what his imperial opponent has a right to expect.

I apprehend, as I have done all along, that the Emperor, expecting at first to succeed by surprise, and as it were *per saltum*, counted upon resistance as little as he desired it.

I apprehend the state of feeling in Germany to be such as to make His Majesty less disposed than ever to appeal to the chances of war; but, in a word, my belief is, that if war is to arise out of this unhappy quarrel, or rather out of those extravagant pretensions, the early spring is the season in which it would be the most willingly entered upon by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since writing the above despatch I learn, upon good authority, that some uneasiness exists on the part of the Government, as to the possibility of an attack from the Baltic in the event of hostilities with England and France.

G. H. S.

No. 200

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 570.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 28, 1853.

IN one of my last despatches, No. 550, I stated Count Nesselrode to have expressed his apprehension of a rising of the Christian subjects of the Porte.

With reference to this communication I hold it to be of importance that Her Majesty's Government should be able to show: first, that the danger had not escaped the attention of their agents abroad; and, secondly, that there was no remissness in giving due notice of its approach. For this reason, as a paper may well be overlooked among the mass of correspondence to which the affairs of Turkey have given rise, I think it right to call to your Lordship's recollection a memorandum dated the 8th of January, which, after having read it to Count Nesselrode, I forwarded to Her Majesty's Government in my despatch No. 10 of that year.

Your Lordship will observe that the evil which Count Nesselrode now anticipates was precisely that to which I invited his attention at the opening of the year; and that as I represented it as likely to result from the gathering of a large Russian force on the Turkish frontiers, much more should I now be justified in ascribing it to the violation by that force of an important portion of the Turkish territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 201.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 571.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 28, 1853.

THERE can be, I think, no doubt that a fresh Russian manifesto has been for some time in preparation, and according to general belief it may be held to contain fresh appeals to the religious feelings of the army and nation. However this may be I have been assured, by a person in general well informed as to the events of the day, that for the present at least this paper has been withdrawn from publication. I trust that it may never see the light—an appeal to religious passions being under actual circumstances both unnecessary and dangerous.

The "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of the 25th instant, contains a notice of Prince Bariatinsky's as Chef d'Etat Major of the forces in the Caucasus, where he has long served, and where he has obtained the reputation of being one of the most rising officers in the Emperor's armies.

An Imperial rescript, not as yet published, has been issued, in which Prince

Menchikoff is thanked for the skilful manner in which the troops were conveyed from Sevastopol to the eastern coast of the Black Sea. No notice, as I understand, has been taken in this paper of the Prince's diplomatic services, and upon this score very slight thanks are indeed his due. He signally failed, as I before observed, at once in effecting a favourable arrangement, or in establishing a reasonable ground of quarrel with Turkey, and he has involved his country in difficulties of which, at his age, he may very possibly never witness the conclusion.

Justice has not been backward in the case of this intriguing old man; the blame which he was so eager to ascribe to Viscount Stratford being now, as I observe, very generally imputed to himself.

There is a great outward appearance of calm here, and the language held about Eastern affairs is in general moderate; still the indications of warlike preparation are not wanting. Very great activity prevails at the War Office; a captain, lieutenant, and ensign, from each of the regiments of the Guards have received orders to join the army in the field, and it has been intimated to the remainder of the officers of the same corps that they must hold themselves in readiness to march.

It is now stated to me that should they leave St. Petersburgh the Guards will proceed either to Moscow or Kieff.

As the information respecting the Baltic fleet has continued to be most contradictory, while no reports upon the subject were sent here from the Vice-Consul, M. de Michele went himself to Cronstadt on the 25th instant. He found there nine ships-of-war apparently and nominally all ready for service.

According, however, to a local opinion expressed by Mr. Consul De Michele, twelve or fifteen hours must elapse before these ships, upon receiving their sailing orders, could put to sea.

The weather at St. Petersburgh continues to be unusually mild, so that the navigation may possibly yet remain for some weeks open.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 202.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 577. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1853.*

AFTER some days of reflection I made up my mind to apprise the Chancellor, on the 27th instant, of the orders which have been issued to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, and to the Admiral of Her Majesty's fleet in the Bosphorus, respecting the opposition to be made to the landing of Russian troops upon the Turkish territory.

I did so for various reasons; amongst which the strongest were the desire of preventing the possibility of a collision which might be avoided, and of guarding against the chance of these orders being first learned at St. Petersburgh through the Russian Admiralty.

In preparing Count Nesselrode for the communication, I began by remarking, that I was not charged to speak to him officially, but that Sir Hamilton Seymour desired to make a statement to Count Nesselrode which it was interesting to him to learn, and which might guard against unnecessary complications.

Count Nesselrode listened with the appearance of some surprise to my statement; and then observed that he had one question to make: He would ask whether Russia and England were at peace or war? To this I replied, that I could only say that his Excellency had put to me a question of the nature of that which had perplexed so many persons during the summer—that there were few persons who, when the Principalities were occupied, had not asked themselves or been asked by others whether Russia and the Porte were at war or at peace.

We then spoke of the matter in a subdued tone; and I explained to his Excellency the cases in which no molestation would be offered to Russian ships; and again, those in which an attempt to violate the Turkish territory would be forcibly repelled (la force sera repoussée par la force). Count Nesselrode admitted that he had knowledge, through the Russian Mission in London, of the resolution of which I spoke, but was not aware of the resolution having already given rise to orders being sent to Her Majesty's diplomatic and naval servants.

The communication, I can safely say, was made on my part in a friendly spirit, and upon the whole it was better taken than I had anticipated.

I ought to have mentioned, that Count Nesselrode having inquired of me what would be the line taken by Her Majesty's naval commanders in the event of a collision with the Russian forces being sought by the Turks, I was obliged to admit that I had no knowledge of the conduct which would be observed. I could only hope that the chances of conflict would be avoided by both parties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Upon reading over my despatch I find that I have omitted to state that Count Nesselrode having adverted to the inconsistency of Her Majesty's Government in acting as it is now doing, after having admitted that the Porte had no *casus belli* against Russia, I replied that neither Her Majesty's Government nor I believed any other had made such an admission; that what was true was that, from conciliatory motives and in the interest both of Turkey and Europe, Her Majesty's Government had recommended that the *casus belli* should not be acted upon—should not give rise to war; but that as to the real nature of the Russian act, no difference of opinion could possibly exist.

G. H. S.

No. 203.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 578. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1853.*

THE conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 27th instant, was at one moment so animated that it was highly agreeable to me to find it concluding in an amicable manner; that it did so is no doubt to be ascribed to that amenity both of manner and character for which Count Nesselrode is so remarkable.

I should find it difficult to state, from the number of subjects touched upon, what it was which gave rise to a somewhat violent attack on the part of Count Nesselrode upon the feelings of Her Majesty's Government.

On a sudden however, he remarked that all the difficulties which at present existed had arisen from the conduct of the English Cabinet; that if England had had the grievances of which Russia had to complain, redress would have been sought in a very different manner from that pursued by the Imperial Government in its demands upon Turkey; that after the admission by England of a reparation being due to Russia, it appeared as if that admission were now withdrawn; that if England had insisted as she ought to have done at Constantinople, the Porte would long ago have given way, and the Vienna note would have been signed; that England, in fact, was solely to blame for the complications of the moment, and for those disastrous consequences to which they were likely to lead; and that the conduct now pursued was an unworthy return for the proofs of friendship which had been given to England by His Imperial Majesty.

To this I replied that I must be allowed to remark that far from this statement being admissible, it was to the Russian Government, and to them alone, that all the difficulties which beset us were to be ascribed; that I had about me a paper to which I had hesitated to allude, but which I desired to use as a weapon of defence, and which showed that on the 8th of January last I had distinctly warned him of what would be the consequences of a gathering together of troops on the Turkish frontier; that naturally those consequences, so easily to be foreseen, had been aggravated by the Russian forces being poured into the Principalities; that as for Her Majesty's Government, all that could be reproached to them was an enduring patience, and an absolute confidence in the assurances given by Russia, which had laid them open to much suspicion and

reproach in England, and to which the worst return had been made, first, by the event proving that the confidence had been misplaced, and secondly, by the reproaches now cast upon them.

With regard to the reparation acknowledged to be the due of Russia, I begged once again to repeat that all that was known by Her Majesty's Government or myself as to the views of Russia in her dispute with Turkey related to the holy places; that consequently, all that had been admitted by Her Majesty's Government applied to that sole subject; that Russia had no more right to make war upon Turkey for withholding a political privilege, than England would have if she went to war upon being refused any commercial advantage for which she might apply to a foreign Government.

I concluded by alluding to your Lordship, and by stating that after what had passed, I must be permitted to remark that you had been wounded, and very deeply wounded, at finding, after the assurances which upon the faith of reports received from myself you had made in Parliament, that these statements were so little borne out by subsequent facts.

I spoke warmly, and I fear with anger. After a pause of some duration the conversation was resumed in its ordinary tone, and I begged to be allowed to recapitulate late events.

The Vienna note, I said, after being withdrawn, appears to be buried (enterré). Meanwhile the dispute between Russia and Turkey continues, and is aggravated by an unfortunate declaration of war; Her Majesty's Government, still bent upon peaceable measures, offer to draw up a fresh note, and if I understand your Excellency aright, this note you are ready to take into consideration.

In this plain statement of facts Count Nesselrode concurred, only cautioning me not to expect that anything approaching to assent could be given to a note the terms of which were unknown to him, and again remarking upon the necessity of providing that no expression, and, as I believe he said, no omission, should indicate a wish to lower (amoindrir) the Emperor's position. It would, he added, be humiliation to Russia to place her on the same line with Turkey.

Having either by word or gest signified that I did not quite comprehend this concluding phrase, Count Nesselrode repeated—"Is it possible that you should entertain any idea of placing Russia and Turkey on the same line?"

M. le Comte, I replied, I must admit freely that I hardly know how to answer your query. If you ask me, do I compare the civilization or the power of Russia to that of Turkey? certainly I do not. If, on the contrary, the question applies to the independence of the two countries, you must allow me to say that I consider one State to have the same independent rights as the other.

The conversation after this became more familiar and amicable, but some further allusion being made to the wish entertained by England of defeating Russian influence in Turkey, I observed that a man could hardly be more English in his feelings than myself; that I hoped I was a faithful servant of the Government; but did not hesitate to say that far from wishing that Russia should meet with any defeat or humiliation, all my desire was that an adjustment honourable to both parties might be arrived at, and might pave the way for the resumption of those amicable relations which I considered indispensable for the welfare of Turkey and for the tranquillity of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 204.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 579. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 29, 1853.*

A TELEGRAPHIC message, which reached St. Petersburgh on the night of the 27th instant, brings intelligence of the Turks having crossed the arm of the Danube which separates Widdin from the large island in the middle of the stream. It has been currently reported here, that they have crossed over the river itself to Kalifat; but I am assured, positively, that this statement is incorrect.

The town is full of rumours of military preparation, and it is stated, and I believe with truth, that the 6th Corps d'Armée, stationed in and about Moscow, and the 1st Corps, stationed in the Baltic Provinces and in Poland, have received orders to call in their reserves, and to hold themselves in readiness.

In general, the position of the Government appears to be one of considerable embarrassment. Prince Gortchakoff is loudly blamed by some of the first military authorities for having exposed himself to great risks by the extension given to his lines, and it should appear that some not very definite apprehensions exist here as to dangers which may manifest themselves nearer to the seat of authority. Upon what these apprehensions are founded I am unable to say, but I hear of a conversation which took place among some of the superior officers of St. Petersburgh, in the presence of the young Grand Dukes, in which was discussed the expediency of adopting some fresh military precautions in Finland, and even in the neighbourhood of the capital.

This anxiety, even if unfounded—these apprehensions—are suggestive of much serious reflection when they suddenly beset the Government of a Monarch who, a few months ago, held almost the proudest position ever occupied by a continental Sovereign, and who has, up to the present time, considered himself so perfectly the master of the destinies of Turkey that, to use the expression employed by Count Nesselrode just before his departure for Olmütz: "Une chiquenaude donnée par l'Empereur, et l'Empire Ottoman s'écroule."

General de Rochow, a sensible man, and one who knows the country well, observed to me the other day, that whereas it is commonly held that Russian policy is the most farseeing of all, he considered it, on the contrary, as the least guided by calculation.

"In Russia," he said, "whether as regards diplomatic or military affairs, the Government is too apt to 'vivre au jour le jour.' What is now happening illustrates this; events are taking them by surprise, and their position is uncertain and exposed."

I repeat the observation in strict confidence, General de Rochow having expressed his wish that it should not be repeated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 205.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 395.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 1, 1853.*

UPON the receipt of Lord Stratford's despatch of the 21st October, which had been announced to me by telegraph, I waited upon Count Buol, and after communicating to him the project of notes by which these despatches were accompanied, as well as the despatch addressed to me by Lord Stratford, I pressed Count Buol, with the same anxiety and the same arguments as I used on Sunday with respect to your Lordship's project, not to reject this last attempt of Lord Stratford's at reconciliation between Russia and the Porte; and I remarked to him that your Lordship strongly recommended this project, and I read to him the passage in your Lordship's telegraphic despatch which I had just received, and which stated "if any other note arrives from Lord Stratford to which the Porte has already agreed, we hope it will be favourably received at Vienna."

Count Buol, after taking cognizance of these documents, remarked that hostilities had already commenced on the Danube, although the period announced by Lord Stratford for the suspension expired on this day only. The Turkish forces had now advanced across the Danube, and a collision with the Russian forces was immediately expected. Under such an unfortunate state of things, it appeared to him impossible to entertain a hope that a note from the Foreign Minister of Turkey to Count Nesselrode (however well adapted to a period of peace, or even to one which preceded the commencement of hostilities, and

which would have been destined to prevent them) could be expected to be received as a document calculated to re-establish those relations of friendly intercourse between the two nations, which had been so violently set aside. With respect to the general tenor of the assurances given in these documents, Count Buol looked upon them as so nearly identical with those proposed by your Lordship, that he should have no hesitation in adopting them generally as the basis of a preliminary proposition for the re-establishment of peace: it was therefore the form of the present proposal, under the present circumstances, which prevented him from adhering to the project, a decision which rested upon the same grounds which he had already stated as regarding your Lordship's project, and which he hoped would be considered by you as well founded and conclusive.

I replied to Count Buol by restating the arguments which I have reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 392; and although I admitted that both the proposal of your Lordship and that of Lord Stratford had been drawn up when it was hoped that hostilities would have been averted, yet I could not but think that their adoption by the Porte would have been proved of the greatest value towards the re-establishment of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—I have the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the despatch which I have received from Lord Stratford, together with the documents which accompany it.

Count Arnim has just informed me that his suspension of the instructions destined for M. de Wildenbruch has been approved by his Government.

Inclosures in No. 205.

[See Inclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4 in No. 169.]

No. 206.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 396.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 1, 1853.*

I RECEIVED from Baron Meyendorff the following intelligence:

"M. Moukhin, who has been appointed Consul-General of Russia at Belgrade, was ordered to deliver a letter from Count Nesselrode to the Prince of Servia, by which he was advised to remain tranquil and neuter. This letter has been delivered, and M. Moukhin will continue to reside at Belgrade without demanding his exequatur, and without taking officially the character of Consul-General. It is supposed that his presence will not embarrass the Servian Government, as Turkey has given the same advice as Russia, and as the Pasha newly installed at Belgrade appears to entertain moderate and pacific views."

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 207.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 819.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 6, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Constantinople up to the 26th ultimo. Nothing was changed in the situation of affairs. Reshid Pasha appeared certain that the counter-orders sent to the commanders in Asia would not reach them in time to prevent the commencement of hostilities. He seemed sanguine of success attending the Sultan's arms, and he appeared to indulge in hopes that this success would so change the aspect of affairs as to superinduce a modification of the nature of the Porte's obligations towards Russia in the Principalities. The idea of the Turkish Minister seemed to be that greater independence might be conceded to Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia, which would place them less under the control of Russia, while the nominal sovereignty of the Porte would be maintained; and to this scheme he adds another, for the independence of Circassia and Daghistan, under the guarantee of the Western Powers.

As M. de la Cour mentions that Reshid Pasha had imparted this idea to Lord Stratford, and as his own despatch on the subject is exceedingly vague, I confine myself to saying that such a scheme exists, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' first impressions are favourable to it; though when I asked him what hope there would be of obtaining the consent of Russia to it, unless she was utterly vanquished, he did not, any more than myself, think such a result possible.

The only other point of interest mentioned by M. de la Cour is, that he had had the assurance of Reshid Pasha, that he had no knowledge of Lord Stratford's proposition before it was transmitted to Vienna; but his Lordship had subsequently informed M. de la Cour that he had since shown it to Reshid Pasha, who did not appear dissatisfied with it, though he would in no way answer for the success which it might obtain when submitted for the consideration of the Grand Council.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 208.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(No. 823.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 6, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has been informed from Berlin, under date the 30th ultimo, that the Prussian Government has definitively declined being a party to any declaration of the Diet respecting the attitude assumed by Austria and herself in the Eastern question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 209.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 7.*)

(Télégraphique.) *Le 6 Novembre, 1853, 6 P.M.*

J'AI reçue votre lettre du 2me. J'en ai communiqué la substance au Comte Buol.

Il regarde comme urgent la rédaction en conférence d'une note qui serait remise à Constantinople.

L'Autriche ayant interrogé la Russie sur la nouvelle position, la Russie a répondu qu'elle est prête à traiter. La note exprimerait le regret des Quatres Cours en voyant la guerre succéder aux négotiations. Elle rappelerait le préambule du Traité de 1841. Elle récapitulerait les assurances données à Olmütz, et exprimerait la conviction que la Porte serait toujours fidèle à ses engagemens antérieurs. Elle inviterait la Porte à traiter et lui demanderait d'indiquer sous quelles formes et conditions.

La note terminerait avec la demande d'une armistice.

Le Comte Buol désire ardemment que la Conférence de Vienne soit autorisée à rédiger la note et à l'expédier à Constantinople avec des instructions des Cours pour leurs Représentants dans le sens de cette démarche.

No. 210.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 7, 1853.*

YOUR despatch of the 6th has been received.

The terms of the note, generally, are approved; but we cannot agree to the note without seeing it. Send it as soon as possible.

No. 211.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 67. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 4, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON PROKESCH, whose arrival at Berlin and the nature of whose mission I have already reported to your Lordship, left this capital on Monday last on his return to resume his duties at Frankfort.

Baron Manteuffel has confidentially informed me that the proposal that Minister was charged to make to the Prussian Government, inviting their assent to a declaration of neutrality by the Germanic Diet in the differences which have arisen between Russia and Turkey, has been declined.

The project itself, as Baron Manteuffel informs me, contained an assertion which could not be admitted by the Prussian Government; viz., "That Austria and Prussia had acted in common accord in declaring their neutrality." As the Prussian Government had taken their own political line in this sense without any previous agreement with Austria, it was evident that a proposal conceived in such terms rested on fallacious grounds, and in this respect it was not likely to be received in any favourable light by His Prussian Majesty.

Baron Manteuffel further rested the objections of the Prussian Government to this invitation on the inexpediency of the measure, and the utter hopelessness that it would be productive of any material benefit.

I am informed that the Austrian Cabinet are extremely annoyed at this refusal of Prussia; and that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has stated to Baron Manteuffel that this decision of the Prussian Government had been received at Vienna "avec un pénible regret."

I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in original and translation, an article of a semi-official character, which has since appeared in the "Zeit," stating the position which Prussia has assumed on the Oriental question, and explanatory of the grounds on which she had refused her assent to the proposal made by Austria.

In order that, in the event of Austria bringing the subject before the Diet) the smaller German States might not consent to any collective steps which might isolate Prussia in the eyes of Germany, Baron Manteuffel has addressed a circular to the Prussian Missions at the German Courts, for confidential communication to those Governments who would probably associate themselves with Prussia, of which I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy in original and translation.

Baron Manteuffel informed me this evening that the assembling of the Diet at Frankfort had been postponed for some days, in the hope that the Prussian Government might be induced to re-consider their decision. Baron Manteuffel added that it would be to no purpose.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 211.

Extract from the "Zeit" Newspaper.

(Translation.) *Berlin, November 1, 1853.*

WE regard the preservation of the independence of Prussia, in the face of the complications in the East, as a theme of sound Prussian policy.

It is known that a proposition has already appeared in the papers to bring the differences between Russia and Turkey before the Diet in Frankfort, for the purpose of applying its mediation in the name of the Confederation. As far as circumstances permit of a conclusion there is reason to suppose, at this moment, that that project has again been under diplomatic consideration.

Without doubting, in the slightest degree, that the vote of the Germanic Confederation would have a great weight if it was cast into the scale in the discussion and decision of the Eastern question, we still consider it more than dubious, that the interests of Prussia require a submission of her policy in this affair to the decrees of the Diet.

The question, as its name shows, is not a German one; not one in which all States of the Confederation have an equal interest. It may be easily conceived, that the frontier position and the commercial relations of one State, may render necessary for it a very different policy to that of another State; and also for this reason, because, for instance, Austria and Prussia, Holland and Denmark, have territorial possessions out of Germany, which possibly may impose on them considerations which essentially differ from those of the Confederation. But under the existing mode of voting these considerations would be either disregarded in the Diet, or, if they succeeded, it would be at the expense of those separate States who are not under the same considerations, and who have not the same interests.

Moreover, were the Diet, with a sacrifice of the independence of Austria and Prussia, to undertake the mediation, a quick and satisfactory result could hardly be expected. The present process of business in the Diet does not, decidedly, promote rapid deliberation and decision. But an affair, which is already in such an advanced phasis of development as the Russio-Turkish affair, requires also for mediation a speedy and united action, such as can not be expected from the deliberations of the Diet, whose members are tied down to the instructions of their separate Governments.

Therefore it cannot appear to us advisable for Prussia, under any point of view, to give up her independence of judgment and action in the Eastern question in favour of an interference of the Diet.

Inclosure 2 in No. 211.

Baron Manteuffel to the Prussian Representatives at the German Courts.

(Translation.) *Berlin, October 31, 1853.*

THE differences at issue between Russia and Turkey have, in spite of the continued exertions of the European Cabinets, assumed of late a more serious character. A successful attempt had, indeed, been made, to arrive at a plan of agreement calculated to accommodate the conflicting interests, and to bring the sovereign rights of the Sultan into harmony with the just claims of the Emperor of Russia. But such different interpretations, and such diverging modes of viewing it, became apparent on the part of the Powers who were most concerned, that neither the former propositions, nor a more recent attempt at reconciliation, undertaken by Austria at Olmütz, under the eyes of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, have led to the desired result; on the contrary, the Porte has, as you know, declared war against Russia, on the ground of the invasion of the Danubian Principalities by the Russian troops some time ago.

His Majesty the King, our most gracious master, does not disguise to himself the whole gravity of this fact, and his Government see in it a more urgent call to examine conscientiously, and to execute perseveringly, the duty which is imposed on Prussia in her own interests and those of her German

allies: Unhappily, it has not been possible totally to prevent the commencement of hostilities; but the more serious and urgent, is the object of the Royal Government to put an end to them as soon as possible, by entering into fresh negotiations and to preserve to the rest of Europe the blessings of peace. The preliminary steps taken for this object justify the hope of an agreement. But Prussia, being well prepared for serious complications, for the purpose of maintaining her perfect impartiality in the face of passing events, and unfettered by any direct interest, believes she will be able more efficiently to promote the necessity felt on all sides, the longer and the more completely she maintains the independence of her own decisions. Prussia believes that, by this attitude, she draws closer the bonds of confidence which encircle the German Governments. For we conceive it to be a noble and salutary duty of our common German country, to cast the important weight of her whole power into the scale of peace; and we are penetrated with unshaken confidence, that all German Governments will unanimously unite themselves with us in the fulfilment of this high and historical duty.

You will express yourself towards the Government to whom you have the honour to be accredited, in the sense of the above remarks, and communicate this paper *confidentially*.

It is also my duty to lay stress on the strictly confidential nature of this communication, because it would be contrary to its object if, under any other point of view, the character of a demonstration might be attached to it.

(Signed) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 212.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 69.)

Berlin, November 4, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD an interview with Baron Manteuffel this evening, and expressed to him the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that the project of note to which by your Lordship's instructions I had invited the adhesion of the Prussian Government, had been approved by His Prussian Majesty.

On this occasion I communicated to Baron Manteuffel, in the spirit of your Lordship's despatch to me No. 42, the draft of the project which had been framed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and of which copies are forwarded to your Lordship from the Earl of Westmorland by this messenger.

I informed his Excellency that the substance and terms of Lord Stratford's project were almost identical with that proposed by your Lordship, and that on submitting them to His Majesty it would be advisable to propose that instructions should be sent to Baron Wildenbruch, at Constantinople, to support Lord Stratford in urging on the Porte the adoption of either of the two projects. As the instructions referred to in my despatch No. 65 of the 30th ultimo, which had been forwarded to Vienna for transmission to Baron Wildenbruch, have been retained by Count Arnim, in consequence of the non-adhesion of the Austrian Cabinet to the proposal to which they relate, it may be desirable that Baron Manteuffel should still transmit such instructions to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople as may tend to support Her Majesty's Ambassador; and in this sense, therefore, I shall endeavour to urge Baron Manteuffel to authorize Baron Wildenbruch to support either of these projects, should Lord Stratford still be of opinion that it may lead to a beneficial result.

I communicated to his Excellency the opinion expressed by Count Buol, as reported in the Earl of Westmorland's despatch No. 395, that "he regarded the assurances given in these documents as nearly identical with those contained in your Lordship's project, and would adopt them generally as a basis for a preliminary arrangement for the re-establishment of peace; and it was therefore the form which prevented him from adhering to the project."

I inquired of his Excellency, what opinion he entertained as to any successful results to a pacific arrangement. His Excellency seemed to fear that at present the complication of difficulties had increased, and he was but little sanguine that Turkey would, under present circumstances, be disposed to accept any such arrangement as would be palatable to Russia. He seemed to consider that all the pacific endeavours resorted to are in arrear of events, which advance so rapidly that what is proposed to-day is no longer applicable for the morrow. He appeared still to revert to his former idea, that nothing efficacious or durable can be effected but by a thorough revision of all the Treaties now existing between Russia and Turkey, in a conference at which the two contending parties shall assist.

His Excellency believes that the Emperor of Russia is desirous of an honourable retreat, and stated, as if from information he had received, that His Imperial Majesty would be inclined to make suitable concessions to Turkey, but that he would not yield anything to England and France.

I stated to his Excellency that the recent events had materially changed the possibility of an arrangement by means of a note; that an actual state of war had commenced, and that it appeared now that a Treaty or Convention could alone realize peace between the contending parties. For this purpose it was most important that the union of the Four Powers should be preserved, and that they should concert previously together the basis on which a Treaty of Peace should be negotiated.

I remarked to his Excellency that all eventualities must be taken into consideration; that the Four Powers might at the present moment arrange among themselves not only as to the terms of a future Treaty, to be submitted to both parties, but that they should be prepared beforehand, in the event of any serious collision, to step in and to impose an armistice of such duration as to afford time for negotiation and hopes of a satisfactory result. For my own part, I could not believe that if the voice of Europe was raised in the interest of peace, and to prevent the useless effusion of blood, it would be disregarded, or that the attempt would be made in vain.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 213.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 70.)

Berlin, November 4, 1853.

My Lord,

IN the course of a conversation with Baron Manteuffel this evening, I referred to the anxiety caused by certain movements in Greece on the Turkish frontier. His Excellency informed me that on the invitation of the Austrian Cabinet, he had instructed M. de Thile, the Prussian Minister at Athens, to advise the Government of His Hellenic Majesty to act with great prudence and caution with respect to Turkey, and carefully to abstain, under present circumstances, from giving any umbrage or cause of complaint to their neighbour and ally.

I told his Excellency that I should have much satisfaction in reporting this circumstance to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 214.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 7.)

(No. 71. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 4, 1853.

My Lord,

THE French Minister the Marquis de Moustier informs me that he received a despatch by post last Saturday from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, announcing the transmission by a messenger of a project which your Lordship had drawn up, which had received the approbation of the French Government, and which was to be presented to the Porte by Lord Stratford.

On the arrival of the messenger, M. de Moustier was rather surprised to receive two projects, with instructions to submit them to the Prussian Government for their approbation; and stating that the Porte, through Lord Stratford, would be invited to accept whichever it deemed most suitable. Accordingly M. Moustier submitted these projects to Baron Manteuffel the day after his Excellency had conveyed to me the entire adhesion of the Prussian Government to your Lordship's proposition; and his Excellency therefore informed me that instructions had been already sent to Baron Wildenbruch to support Lord Stratford in urging the acceptance of your Lordship's project.

Baron Manteuffel inquired of me an explanation of this circumstance, expressing some surprise at this apparent contradiction to what I had told him. I was unable to elucidate his inquiry, but I stated that it had probably arisen from some oversight in the Foreign Office during the absence of M. Drouyn de Lhuys at Compiegne; and I took especial care, as M. Moustier has likewise done, to assure Baron Manteuffel that it could not have arisen from any divergence of opinion between the two Governments, as the instructions with respect to these projects were precisely similar, viz., that the project should be submitted to the Porte by Lord Stratford; and I took occasion to reiterate to his Excellency the entire unanimity and intimate understanding which exist between the English and French Governments.

I further took occasion this day to read to Baron Manteuffel that part of Lord Cowley's despatch No. 800 to your Lordship, in which is stated that the instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers "are based on the most complete and cordial understanding between France and England, and of General Baraguay's desire to cultivate the most frank and cordial intercourse with Lord Stratford." I did this also with the intent of counteracting certain reports which have been industriously spread here, that General Baraguay d'Hilliers was likely to take a line which would not be in accordance with the views of Lord Stratford.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 215.

Circular to Her Majesty's Missions abroad.

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 7, 1853.*

IN my circular despatch of the 13th of June last I informed you of the views of Her Majesty's Government with respect to the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Ottoman Porte, which had then recently occurred.

You were informed, that although Her Majesty's Government could not conceal from themselves the gravity of this occurrence, and had thought it necessary in consequence to order the British fleet to approach the Dardanelles, they still hoped that an amicable solution might be found of the existing differences between Russia and the Porte. That hope, I regret to say, has not yet been realized. On the contrary, affairs have assumed a still graver character by the declaration of war by the Porte, and the actual commencement of hostilities.

I shall proceed, therefore, briefly to notice the events which have led to this lamentable result; and to acquaint with the views of Her Majesty's Government thereupon.

The demands made by Prince Menchikoff, and upon the rejection of which he retired from Constantinople, were repeated by Count Nesselrode in a letter addressed by him to the Ottoman Minister, with the threat that if, within a specified period of eight days, they should not be accepted *sans variante* by the Porte, the Russian troops would occupy the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia.

This renewed demand was met by the Porte with the same temperate but firm refusal as before; and, accordingly, the Russian troops crossed the Pruth

and occupied the Principalities. At the same time a manifesto appeared in the "St. Petersburgh Journal," in which the Emperor of Russia disclaimed the intention of making war, or of extending his territory; and declared, that he should hold the Principalities simply as a guarantee for the recovery of the rights withheld from him by the Porte.

Thus the Court of St. Petersburgh proposed, under the name of peace, to obtain all the advantages of war. But it is scarcely necessary to point out to you, that from the moment that the first Russian soldier crossed the Pruth, as far as Russia was concerned, a state of war had virtually commenced. Nor is this the less true because actual hostilities were deferred and the chances of an amicable arrangement prolonged, by the Porte, with the advice of her allies, abstaining at that time from issuing, as she had a perfect right to do, a formal declaration of war.

Meantime, with a view to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded for preserving peace, a Conference of the Representatives of the Four Powers was established at Vienna, and a note was drawn up by them, which was unanimously recommended by the Four Powers to the Sultan for his adoption, in the belief that, whilst it would prove acceptable to the Emperor of Russia, it fully guarded the honour and independence of the Sultan.

These expectations were, however, frustrated. The Emperor of Russia, indeed, declared his willingness to accept the note, and engaged upon its transmission, without alterations, to St. Petersburgh by the Porte, to withdraw his troops from the Turkish territory. But the Porte insisted upon certain modifications of it as essential, in its opinion, to the maintenance of the rights and authority of the Sultan. These modifications could not be considered by Her Majesty's Government as in themselves objectionable, but they appeared to them unnecessary, as they seemed merely to interpret the note in the sense intended by the Four Powers; and they accordingly joined in recommending the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to adopt the modifications. The Emperor of Russia, however, declined to accept the note thus modified; and Count Nesselrode entered at length into an analysis of the modifications in a despatch to Baron Meyendorff, dated September 7, copy of which is herewith annexed, together with a copy of a despatch addressed by me, in consequence, to Sir Hamilton Seymour.*

The Four Powers, in recommending the note framed at Vienna to the adoption of the Porte, acted upon the assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor of Russia, that he sought no new concessions or rights in Turkey, but only the maintenance of existing Treaties and of the *status quo* in religious matters, and the true meaning of that note, the only meaning, as they believed, which could be attached to it, was in conformity with this principle; but the reasons put forward by Count Nesselrode in his despatch to Baron Meyendorff for rejecting the Turkish modifications, showed that he placed a different interpretation upon the original note, and thus, to a great extent, justified the fears of the Porte as to the pretensions which Russia would hereafter found upon it; and Her Majesty's Government therefore felt that, under these circumstances, it would not be just or honourable to continue to urge upon the Sultan the acceptance of the note.

The presence soon afterwards of the Emperor of Russia at Olmütz afforded Her Majesty's Government a fresh opportunity of ascertaining, through Her Majesty's Minister at the Court of Vienna, whether the Emperor was still willing to accede to an arrangement, if such could be found, by which the differences of Russia with the Porte might be amicably terminated; and they received, through the Earl of Westmorland, the most positive and formal assurances that the Emperor sought no new right—no further extension of power in Turkey; and that he looked for nothing but the maintenance of Treaties, and the *status quo* in religious matters.

In the meanwhile, however, the successive events which had taken place; the invasion of the Principalities; the orders issued by the Russian authorities to the Hospodars to break off their official intercourse with the Porte, and to withhold the tribute due from them to their Sovereign; the consequent recall of the Hospodars by the Porte; the extensive preparations of war carried on by the Ottoman Government, and the passing of large bodies of troops towards the

* See Part II, No. 341; and Part III, No. 11.

Danube, had roused the minds of the population of Constantinople to such a pitch of excitement, that the French and English Ambassadors thought it advisable to call up from the fleets at Besika Bay four war-steamers to protect the subjects of their respective States, and, if necessary, to afford protection to the Sultan.

The conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in taking this step was, under the circumstances, entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government; and although these apprehensions have now ceased, the whole of the fleets have subsequently, at the request of the Porte, entered the Dardanelles to support, by their presence, the Ottoman Government.

It is scarcely necessary to add, that although no formal declaration of war had been made by the Porte when the four steamers entered the Dardanelles, their entry constituted no infraction of the Treaty of 1841; for, as I have already pointed out, the Porte had ceased to be in a state of peace, and the Treaty had been virtually suspended from the moment that the Russian troops invaded the Principalities.

The rejection by the Emperor of Russia of the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note rendered it necessary in the opinion of the Porte to put an end to the system of forbearance which she had hitherto pursued, and to have recourse to more decisive measures; and after a solemn deliberation it was unanimously resolved in the Grand Council of the Sultan that war should be declared against Russia. The advice was adopted by the Sultan and his Government; and Omer Pasha, the General commanding the Turkish forces on the Danube, was directed to summon Prince Gortchakoff to evacuate the Principalities within fifteen days.

Although Her Majesty's Government made every allowance for the great difficulties by which the Sultan was surrounded, and it was fully admitted that a declaration of war was amply justified by the Russian invasion of the Principalities, yet Her Majesty's Government could not but regret that this step had been taken by the Porte whilst attempts at negotiation were not yet wholly abandoned, but her allies were still endeavouring to bring her differences with Russia to a peaceful and honourable termination; and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to use every effort to induce the Porte to suspend hostilities, in order to give time for a further effort for the re-establishment of peace.

The result of these efforts, made in concert with the Representatives of the other three Powers, was successful, and the Porte was induced to suspend the commencement of hostilities for a short time in order to allow a fresh proposal for an arrangement with Russia to be submitted to her by her allies; but from some unexplained cause, either that the orders of the Porte were disregarded, or that Omer Pasha, not having received these orders, regarded the negative answer of Prince Gortchakoff as the signal for hostilities, by the latest accounts hostilities appear to have actually commenced.

Such is a brief sketch of the present state of affairs, and of the events which have led to it.

Throughout these arduous negotiations there has happily existed between the British and French Governments the most complete concert and agreement both of opinion and action. They look upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire as a great feature of European policy; and whilst they have left and will leave no means untried which may hold out the prospect of saving the Porte by a pacific arrangement from the dangers by which she is menaced, and Europe from the calamities of war—and they do not even now despair of such an arrangement being found—they are at the same time resolutely determined to uphold the independence of the Sultan and the integrity of his Empire.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 216.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 278.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1853*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 577 of the 29th ultimo, in which you report your communications with Count Nesselrode on the subject of the instructions laid down for the guidance of the Admiral of Her Majesty's fleet in the Dardanelles.

I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings in this matter, and the language which you held to Count Nesselrode. But with respect to that passage in your despatch in which you report that Count Nesselrode spoke of the "inconsistency of Her Majesty's Government in acting as it is now doing, after having admitted that the Porte had no *casus belli* against Russia," I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with surprise this statement on the part of his Excellency, the reverse having been always declared by Her Majesty's Government, as there could be no doubt that the occupation of the Principalities was an act of flagrant hostility, which the Sultan was entitled to resist by force.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 217.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 266.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1853.*

THE drafts of note and declaration inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 306, of the 22nd ultimo, as well as the reasons which induced your Excellency to frame them, have been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government.

We learnt by telegraph from Belgrade that that note and declaration were on their way to Vienna. We felt sure that in spirit they must be the same, and that in form they could not be essentially different from those which were inclosed to your Excellency in my despatch No. 294 of the 24th ultimo; and Her Majesty's Government therefore, in order to avoid delay, did not hesitate to recommend to the Governments of Austria and Prussia that your Excellency's should be adopted in preference to those transmitted from hence, and which were then under consideration at Vienna and Berlin.

Unfortunately, however, hostilities had in the meanwhile commenced, and the Austrian Government considered that the time for notes was passed, and that the difference between Russia and the Porte could only be settled by a Treaty.

Her Majesty's Government have concurred in this opinion, and have now under their consideration the form of Treaty that has become necessary. When agreed upon by the Four Powers it shall be forwarded to your Excellency for the concurrence of the Porte, who should then have no difficulty in sending a Plenipotentiary to sign it at such place as may be agreed upon, that shall be neither in the territory of Russia or of Turkey.

Her Majesty's Government have received assurances that Russia has no present intention to cross the Danube; and by a despatch of the 6th instant from Lord Westmorland, of which your Excellency will find a copy in my despatch No. 261 of the 8th instant, you will see that Russia is still prepared to negotiate.

But although a Treaty is indispensable for the re-establishment of peace between the two countries, Her Majesty's Government are still of opinion that

a note will be the most effectual mode of terminating the discussions that have arisen upon religious points.

To Her Majesty's Government it is indifferent whether the declaration and note framed by themselves or by your Excellency be adopted. Both contain all that the Emperor of Russia professes or is entitled to ask; both exclude all that it would be contrary to the dignity of the Sultan to concede. It will be for the Porte, on the recommendation of your Excellency, to select between them; and Her Majesty's Government would propose that it should be signed by the Turkish Plenipotentiary at the same time as the Treaty.

By this mode of proceeding the Porte will obtain, through the friendly mediation of her allies, all that she could expect to achieve by incurring the risks of war. The assent of the Sultan and his Ministers to such an arrangement can hardly admit of reasonable doubt, and in that case Her Majesty's Government trust that the Sultan and his Ministers will be guided solely by their own views of what is best for the dignity and welfare of the Ottoman Empire.

It will be obviously expedient that when this negotiation commences it should be accompanied by an armistice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 218.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 267.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 8, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve the proceedings adopted by your Excellency, as reported in your despatch No. 305 of the 21st ultimo, for preventing the commencement of hostilities, and they much regret that the promise you obtained to that effect should not have been acted upon.

That promise was given you on the 21st. Hostilities, as we have reason to believe, commenced on the 27th by the passage of the Danube. A Tatar might with ease have reached Omer Pasha within five days, and Her Majesty's Government are therefore led to conclude either that the orders in question were not sent by the Porte, or that they were not obeyed by the Commander-in-chief.

Her Majesty's Government are anxious to receive the explanation upon this subject which your Excellency has doubtless demanded from the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 219.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 312.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

I HAVE received from the Austrian Internuncio the official note of which a copy is herewith inclosed. His Excellency's authority for protecting Russian subjects and interests in this country during the war appears to have been brought from Vienna a few days ago, together with a peremptory order to the individuals in Russian employment, who are still remaining here, to leave immediately, and they are in consequence to embark for Galatz or Odessa in an Austrian steamer to-day.

Your Lordship will observe that Baron de Bruck establishes in his note dated the 23rd instant, the actual existence of war between Turkey and Russia.

I have not yet replied to his note, thinking it right to ascertain previously

the view taken of it by the Porte. There is a Treaty Article, between the Turkish and Russian Governments, by which the commercial subjects of the latter are allowed, in case of war, to remain six months in this country for the settlement of their affairs. It is probably with reference to that Article that the Austrian Representative has been authorized to protect any Russians remaining here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 219.

Baron Bruck to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Buyukdere, 23 Octobre, 1853.*

SUR la demande faite par la Cour Impériale de Russie, Sa Majesté l'Empereur, mon auguste maître, a daigné autoriser l'Internonciature de prendre sous sa protection les sujets et les propriétés publiques de la dite Cour dans cette capitale, pendant la durée de l'état de guerre actuellement existant entre elle et l'Empire Ottoman.

En ayant l'honneur de vous informer, M. l'Ambassadeur, de cette disposition, qui dès aujourd'hui est entré en vigueur, je me permets de vous prier de vouloir bien en donner connaissance à la Chancellerie de votre Légation.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) V. BRUCK.

No. 220.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 313.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith, in copy, is a despatch addressed to me by Her Majesty's Consul at Erzeroom, and I submit it to your Lordship by way of sequel to another received by me a few days ago, on the same subject and from the same quarter. Mr. Brant has not taken a favourable view of the Turkish army in his neighbourhood, and thinking it by no means impossible that his opinion may be correct, I have pressed upon the Seraskier, and also upon Reshid Pasha, the importance of paying seasonable attention to his remarks. I am assured by the latter that Selim Pasha, who commands the forces on the Asiatic frontier of the Empire, displayed a certain degree of talent, and an exemplary conduct, in the operations carried on against Ibrahim Pasha in Syria, where also he had the command, and that measures are in course of operation for reinforcing the Sultan's army now commanded by him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 220.

Consul Brant to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Erzeroom, October 14, 1853.*

ON the 11th the Mushir left before daylight in the morning, and all the troops followed about midday, commanded by Ahmet Reis Sasha. The unexpected and sudden departure of the Mushir, who went post, gave rise to the report that the Russians had actually passed the frontier, but this was soon discovered to be unfounded.

Three battalions of infantry are left here under the command of Shukri Pasha. They are, I hear, the most inefficient of the army, as the commander is among the military Pashas.

The Valee Pasha will command the Bashee Boyoob collecting, with whom

he will join the army. His departure is not fixed, nor can I state the number of this irregular force. Hussein Pasha, formerly of Moosh, will be left as Governor.

The report I mentioned of the Armenians having volunteered to raise a regiment is untrue; it was a joke of much one at the Medjlip, which was misunderstood by a military Pasha who happened to be present, and was reported by him as a serious affair.

I trust that Reshid Pasha is a competent judge of what an army should be; in such case his inspection may do much good, and he may perhaps be in time to remedy some, at least, of the existing defects, and to raise the spirits of the soldiery. At one time the talk of the soldiers was only of destroying the Moscow Giaours without any assistance; but of late they have quite changed their tone, and now say, that unless assisted by French or English troops, they must be defeated.

I have no reliable information regarding the Russian forces, but it is said a considerable army is assembled at Gumri, and that there is a force of 30,000 available to act against the Turks, while there are sufficient troops to face the Lesghee and the Circassians.

The emissaries of Shamil passed through Georgia in the character of pilgrims on their way to Mecca. They came to assure the Turks that, as soon as they attacked the Russians, Shamil would fall upon them on his side.

There is at present no reserve here for the army, if defeated, to fall back upon; and I fear a defeat would be a complete rout, and that the army would at once disband.

It is said, however, that three complete regiments, about 8,000 or 9,000 men, are shortly expected here, besides twenty-four pieces of artillery, which had already been landed at Trebizond.

No. 221.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 314.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

I LEARN from Reshid Pasha that Count Buol de Schavenstein has informed the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna that his Government intends to remain neuter on the breaking out of war between Russia and Turkey. I asked whether the language held by the Internuncio agreed with this declaration; and the Pasha answered that nothing had yet been stated to him by his Excellency in that sense.

I learn from the same quarter that a disposition to serve the Porte, if opportunities occurred, had also been expressed at Vienna to Arif Effendi; by which, I presume, is meant negotiation, as the language held here by the Austrian interpreter is that Russia will never accept any propositions originating with Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 222.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 315.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

I HAVE intelligence of the actual entry of the combined squadrons within the Dardanelles: but the detachments of them destined for the Bosphorus are not yet arrived here, owing, no doubt, to the strong northerly winds which have prevailed during the last two or three days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 223.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 316.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 25, 1853.*

IN a conversation which I had with Reshid Pasha privately this morning, I ascertained, or rather received confirmation of, the following points: firstly, that he cannot take upon himself to propose any further suspension of hostilities; secondly, that if any satisfactory proposal, involving a pacific arrangement, were to come from the Four Powers with a proper degree of authority, he would not refuse to submit it to the General Council; thirdly, that the declaration and note, which I have already forwarded to London and Vienna, and which I have since read over in strict personal confidence to him, would meet with his own individual acceptance, but that he could take no decision without his colleagues, nor would he undertake to pronounce in what light it would be viewed by the General Council, to which it must necessarily be submitted.

Judging from the time which has elapsed since your Lordship's acceptance of my suggestion was made known at Vienna, without my receiving any intimation on the subject from that capital, and taking also into consideration the order received from Vienna for the immediate departure of the Russian officials, and Baron Bruck's declaration of the actual existence of war, I can no longer entertain the slightest hope of a pacific adjustment.

Reshid Pasha takes credit to himself for having obtained the short suspension of hostilities already announced to your Lordship, as having been carried in the face of much opposition and difficulty. The truth is, the measure offers more prospect of inconvenience and risk than chances of advantage to the Porte's interests.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 224.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 400.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 3, 1853.*

UPON receiving last evening your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of yesterday morning, stating "the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the project coming from Constantinople may be accepted in preference to any other," I sent a copy of it to Count Buol, and I requested him to allow me to wait upon him this morning, in order to bring again before him your Lordship's wishes; and I also proposed that my colleagues, Baron Bourqueney and Count Arnim, should be present at our interview.

Count Buol replied by stating that he should be happy to receive me at any hour which should be convenient to me, and that he begged I would invite the other Ministers to meet me.

In consequence of this appointment Count Arnim, Baron Bourqueney, and myself, assembled at Count Buol's, when I communicated your Lordship's telegraphic despatch, and the proposal from Lord Stratford which I had previously brought before them, and I again pressed upon them its acceptance, as being a means by which the Porte might give evidence of its desire of re-establishing friendly relations with Russia, upon such terms as the Emperor had stated himself to require, and as the Government of the Sultan had already declared themselves prepared to concede. I stated that although the term of the suspension of hostilities, under which the project of Lord Stratford had been proposed, had expired; and although hostilities between the parties had to a certain extent taken place, yet, I could not but believe that the acceptation of the note by the Porte would not be affected by these changes; and I also

declared my conviction that the recommendation of such a document by the Four Powers, and its signature by Reshid Pasha, if not received at once by the Emperor of Russia as putting an end to the war, would be a great step towards facilitating any future negotiation which might take place. I remarked that notwithstanding the reasons which had already been stated against the adoption of this project in its present form, and against the probability of its being accepted as a means of reconciliation, under present circumstances, either by the Porte or by Russia, yet I had again invited a further consideration of it, in consequence of the great anxiety which was felt by my Government that it should have the recommendation of the Four Powers, and of the importance which they attached to the assurances it contained of the desire of the Porte to take the initiative towards the re-establishment of friendly relations.

Count Buol stated that it was on account of the reasons I had given that he had at once agreed to reconsider the decision which had been come to upon this project, and if he could see any grounds for changing that opinion, he should be most anxious to adopt them; but it was of essential importance for the allies of the Governments now in hostility to each other, to be careful not to propose a project which would risk being refused by either party. The first object was to ascertain whether the Porte was willing to treat; for it was impossible to suppose that a state of war, such as now existed, could be put an end to by a note. If the Porte should be willing to treat, an intention which had already been declared on the part of Russia, then a declaration of the nature of the present project, addressed to the Four Powers, might be transmitted to St. Petersburgh, as the ground upon which the negotiation might be established, and the intervention of the Four Powers to recommend and support it, might secure its acceptance. But for the re-establishment of peace there are other points to be insisted upon, such as the evacuation of the Principalities, of which there is no mention in the note; and the regulation of the different interests which have been disturbed by the state of war, which by some authentic Act must be put an end to. All these interests may be regulated by a transaction between the parties, under the friendly control of the Allied Governments. The great object therefore, at present, was to obtain the assurance of both the belligerents that they are willing to enter on a negotiation; to establish an armistice during which the negotiation can be carried on; and to fix upon such a mode of communicating the proposals of each party, as may avoid delay and give protection to the interests of Europe, as well as to those of the parties directly concerned.

Count Buol stated that in considering the project submitted to him, together with the documents which accompanied it, he could perceive no assurance that it would even be accepted by the Porte. The term of ten days fixed for the suspension of hostilities, with the view of facilitating the adoption of a new project of arrangement, is already passed, and hostilities have taken place. The passage to which Reshid Pasha objected, concerning the participation by the professors of the Greek religion in the spiritual advantages granted to other Christian communities," is placed in the note; and Reshid Pasha has distinctly stated that its acceptance by the Sultan must depend upon its examination by the General Council, and that the Ministers of the Porte cannot hold out any promise in this respect.

Count Buol conceived that your Lordship was probably not aware of these details when you transmitted your last telegraphic despatch, as he believes the despatch containing Lord Stratford's note in detail, and Reshid Pasha's letter, which were sent by the "Caradoc" from Constantinople, could not have reached London on the morning of the 2nd.

Under these circumstances of total uncertainty whether this project of note would be accepted by either party; under the conviction that the state of war at present existing could not be put an end to by such a document; with the persuasion that in its present form, as addressed to Count Nesselrode, it would not be accepted at St. Petersburgh, and that a great loss of time would be the consequence, Count Buol, with the expression of his regret, declined to agree to it as it stood, while he adopted its substance if addressed to the Four Powers, and proposed as the expression of a desire on the part of the Porte to re-establish its friendly relations with Russia. He consequently desired to adjourn the consideration of the project till he was informed if the alterations he suggested would be adopted by Her Majesty's Government; and he appealed to me to report this decision, and to my colleagues to support it by their sanction.

M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim both concurred in the decision of Count Buol; and I consented to submit the determination which had been come to, and to invite the opinion of my Government with regard to it.

Count Arnim mentioned that one of the grounds upon which he had been directed by his Government to suspend the transmission of the instructions to M. de Wildenbruch to support your Lordship's project was, that a proposal of the same nature had been made by France, which had been favourably received; he therefore inquired if any such project had been sent to Baron Bourqueney, who stated that a project of note had been forwarded to him in his last despatches from Paris, and he proposed to communicate it, as it had already been transmitted by the "Fury" to Constantinople. Count Buol remarked that he had already received a notice from Berlin of the existence of this project; and it was a reason why, while so many propositions were afloat, he should not precipitately decide upon any of them. He also stated he had received notice from M. de Hübner that his own project of arrangement of the 25th ultimo had been favourably viewed at Paris, and that he might expect an answer to it in the course of the day; and he observed that he was anxious to receive this decision, as he had not yet announced to the Porte that Russia was ready to treat, which being a commission of some importance, he ought to have fulfilled immediately, but which he had delayed, out of consideration for the other Powers, who had hitherto acted with him in such cordial union.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 225.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 372.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

COUNT COLLOREDO has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, reporting the language held by him at the Conference which was held at Vienna on the 30th ultimo, and setting forth the motives which have induced the Austrian Government to suspend all opinion and action with respect to the propositions of Her Majesty's Government on the Eastern question. The Austrian Government has been informed that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, after the declaration of war by the Porte, and which has unfortunately been followed by hostilities, insists upon the form of a Treaty to bring back the relations of Russia with the Porte to their former state; nor are the Austrian Government surprised that Russia should now insist upon a formal Treaty which will expressly confirm those Treaties which have preceded it, and which the declaration of war has suspended.

Such being the case, the Austrian Government have stronger reasons for doubting whether it would be possible to obtain the assent of Russia to the mode of arrangement proposed by Her Majesty's Government: nor do they think it would be easier to persuade the Sultan to agree to these propositions, as he scarcely would, or indeed could, in the face of the present state of excitement, cause a note to be addressed to the Court of St. Petersburgh, which explicitly affirms his desire "to bind more and more the ties of friendship which unite him to the Emperor of Russia," until the re-establishment of peace by a formal Treaty has placed facts and words in harmony.

The mutual relations which subsist at this moment between Russia and the Porte can scarcely be otherwise defined than as a state of war; and, in the opinion of the Austrian Government, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, in asserting that a state of war cannot cease except by a Treaty of Peace, enunciates a principle the application of which the Sublime Porte has an equal interest in maintaining, inasmuch as she hopes to establish her future relations with her powerful neighbour on a sure and solid basis.

The Austrian Government, in pointing out their reasons for doubting the success of the plan proposed by Her Majesty's Government, consider that their endeavours contain materials which may be usefully employed in the interests of

peace, if the Porte will draw from them the substance of the answer which she will make to the Four Powers, in the sense of the plan proposed in Count Buol's despatch of the 27th ultimo, namely, to indicate to the Four Powers the basis on which the Porte will be willing to enter into negotiations for peace with Russia and to regulate the religious question.

In consequence of the recent overtures of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, the Austrian Government feels called upon, either alone or in concert with the other Three Powers, to inform the Porte that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is ready to enter at once into negotiations for peace.

The propositions of Her Majesty's Government have been agreed to in Conference by the Representatives of France and Prussia; but as Count Buol was not authorised to accede to them, he states that Count Arnim has not forwarded the telegraphic despatch to M. de Wildenbruch, empowering him to sign the note proposed by Her Majesty's Government, in case his three colleagues at Constantinople shall have done so. Count Buol does not know whether Lord Stratford will decide to proceed alone, or in concert with his French colleague, in the present state of the question.

I told Count Colloredo, that when the declaration and note were forwarded to Vienna and to Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government were under the impression that the commencement of hostilities would have been suspended, but that as the orders to that effect appeared unfortunately either not to have been received or not to have been obeyed, it was clear that the differences between Russia and the Porte could not now be terminated by a note, and that a Treaty had become necessary for that purpose.

Count Buol's proposal, that the Porte should be requested to state on what basis it would be willing to enter into negotiations for peace with Russia, and to regulate the religious questions, appeared, I said, to be fair and reasonable; but much would depend upon the form in which this invitation was conveyed, and that if Count Buol would transmit to Count Colloredo the note which, in his opinion, should be addressed by the Four Representatives at Constantinople to the Porte, it should have the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government; but that it was impossible for them to be a party to such a note, with previous knowledge of its contents.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 226.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 48.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 67 of the 4th instant, reporting the refusal of the Prussian Government to assent to the proposal of the Government of Austria for a declaration of neutrality on the part of the Diet of the Germanic Confederation in the differences which have arisen between Russia and the Porte, I have to instruct you to observe to Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government feel convinced that the Prussian Government have come to a wise decision on this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 227.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 50.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the instructions which have been given by the Prussian Government to their Representative at Athens with respect to the course to be pursued by the Greek Government in the present state of the Eastern question, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 70 of the 4th instant, and I have to instruct you to inform Baron Manteuffel that similar instructions have been sent by Her Majesty's Government to Her Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I am &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 228.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you in your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the present state of the Eastern question, as reported by your Lordship in your despatch No. 69 of the 4th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 229.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(Télégraphique.) *Le 8 Novembre, 1853.*

JE viens dans ce moment, 4 heures de l'après-midi, de recevoir votre dépêche du 7. La note que vous demandez n'existe pas; on attendait votre approbation des bases pour la faire rédiger par les Quatre Représentants. J'ai couru chez le Comte Buol avec cette dépêche; il réitère sa prière que vous consentiez à ce que cette réduction soit faite ici, car le sang versé à Oetelnizza le met dans l'impossibilité de retarder la communication à la Porte des ouvertures pacifiques de la Russie, et l'invitation d'y répondre d'après le plan qu'il a suggéré.

No. 230.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(Télégraphique.) *Le 8 Novembre, 1853.*

LE Consul de France à Bucharest écrit à M. de Bourqueney en date du 6:

"Le 2 et le 3 Novembre, les Turcs ont passé le Danube de Tourtoukai à Oltenizza, au nombre d'environ 12,000. Le 4 le Général Parlof les a attaqué [avec] 9,000 hommes; après une vive cannonade un combat à la bayonette a eu lieu entre les deux armées.

"Les Turcs ont gardé leurs positions à Oltenizza et s'y sont fortifiés.

"L'affaire a duré trois heures. Les Russes ont eu plusieurs officiers et 136 soldats de tués, et 6 officiers supérieurs, 18 officiers, et 479 soldats blessés; j'ignore la perte des Turcs. 4,000 Turcs occupent Calarache, 2,000 se sont établis dans une île en face de Georgevoet, 12,000 sont en Petite Valachie."

No. 231.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(Télégraphique.) *Le 8 Novembre.* (Le temps nous presse.)

D'OLTENIZZA le sang a coulé en abondance, et le Comte Buol nous a supplié, M. de Bourqueney et moi, d'obtenir de nos Cabinets les pouvoirs nécessaires pour rédiger en Conférence sans délai et expédier à Constantinople la note collective qui conduerait à l'armistice fondé sur les dispositions du Cabinet Russe à rentrer en négociation.

Remarquez que cette note n'engage pas la responsabilité, et serait consultée sur les conditions et la forme de la négociation. Les pièces importantes sont les instructions aux Représentants à Constantinople, et celles là le Comte Buol en soumet l'esquisse aujourd'hui même à nos Cabinets. Selon le Comte Buol nous avons ici une Conférence ou des pourparlers: si nous constituons la Conférence par des pouvoirs envoyés à ses membres, les pièces seront collectives comme la note en question; si nous n'avons que des pourparlers les pièces seront individuelles, et le Comte Buol ne croyait pouvoir consciencieusement retarder l'envoi à Constantinople d'une ouverture Russe de paix faite à l'Autriche au moment où la guerre est flagrante.

No. 232.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 9, 1853.*

WE are willing, if the French Government send similar instructions to M. de Bourqueney, to join in a note inviting the Porte to state on what terms and conditions she is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace; but under present circumstances it will be quite useless to propose a cessation of hostilities which the Turks must consider disadvantageous to themselves, and we do not think it right to put them in a position to refuse a request made by the Four Powers.

An armistice might, however, be proposed with fair prospect of success, if the Russian army were to retire behind the Pruth and the Turkish army behind the Danube during the negotiation; there would be nothing unusual in this, and the Turkish army in the Principalities is now as numerous as the Russian.

No. 233.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 580. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 31, 1853.*

ALL that I learn disposes me to believe that the want of forethought and prudence which has marked the diplomatic proceedings of Russia during the latter months has even characterized their military operations in the Principalities.

In the reports commonly current upon this subject there is probably much exaggeration. It would still appear that great carelessness has been shown by the Russians in obtaining due information as to Omer Pasha's forces and their positions.

It was probably not considered necessary to take much precaution with regard to an army of whom so contemptible an opinion has upon slight grounds been formed.

I would observe that the many statements repeatedly made by the Russians of its being intended that the winter should be allowed to pass by without hostilities, is sufficient to prove that they have been ill informed as to Omer Pasha's resources. They did not desire to begin active hostilities for some time, and they therefore thought fit to assume that it would not be in the power of the Turks to do so.

The reports which reach us from the Principalities lead to the belief that they are the scene of much suffering on the part of the Russian troops from the diseases prevalent among them (and from which, as is asserted, a tenth part of the army is attacked); on the part of the inhabitants, from the changes of all sorts which the disastrous occupation has again brought upon them.

One thing, and one thing only, is wanting to disprove the statements of the Russians with regard to the detested rule and the sinking power of the Turks, and it may possibly be that this remaining contradiction may be afforded—I allude to the rising of a Christian population, not against their infidel masters but against their orthodox invaders.

A report, respecting the correctness of which I am as yet unable to express an opinion, prevails here, according to which the Emperor is meditating a visit to his army in the south.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 234.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 581.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 31, 1853.*

AN ineffectual attempt has been made here, as your Lordship will have seen by my despatch No. 578, to prove that Her Majesty's Government have been inconsistent with regard to their declarations as to the reparation due by the Porte to Russia; if it be desired to point out a striking instance in which it is the Russian Government who have laid themselves open to this imputation, it will only be necessary to revert to a fact recorded in your Lordship's despatch No. 149 of the 22nd July last.

Your Lordship informed me in that despatch, that in speaking of the arrangement to be entered into by Russia and Turkey, Baron Brunnow stated to you, "that the Turkish Government could not be expected to sign any Convention, nor to agree to any project of arrangement, unless they previously received beforehand a guarantee, in the form that would be acceptable to them, for the evacuation of the Principalities." If this declaration be compared with the subsequent acts of the Russian Government, then indeed a contradiction of a very striking nature is established.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 235.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 584. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, November 1, 1853.*

I HELD last night a very confidential conversation with General de Rochow, the only member of the Corps Diplomatique who is upon terms of intimacy with the Emperor.

I can almost transcribe his words, which were as follows; "These people are very desirous of peace; I may almost say that they are apprehensive of war; but you must not presume upon this, you must not press too hard upon them.

"In the interests of Europe, perhaps in the interests of Turkey herself, the best thing that could happen would be that at the outside she should receive a severe check; the business can hardly now be arranged without fighting: a Russian victory would settle it very speedily.

"The Emperor's position you understand: it is exactly this. He will during the winter months attempt nothing, either in European or Asiatic Turkey; but he is prepared to repel very vigorously any attack which may be made upon him.

"As for his friends (Austria and Prussia) all he asks from them is a neu-

fraîlité bienveillante—the employment of their good offices in a pacific sense with the Two Great Maritime Powers.

"Si vous voulez agir sur l'esprit de l'Empereur, adressez-vous de préférence à Vienne. A Berlin vous trouverez plus de bienveillance, mais là aussi on est moins dans le cas de pouvoir seconder vos intentions. Vous voyez que je vous parle avec impartialité. C'est que je vous parle en homme qui désire la conservation de la paix et non comme Ministre de Prusse.

"Encore une chose: toute hostilité de votre part dans la Mer Noire sera regardée ici comme une déclaration de guerre; ceçi vous le savez sans doute, d'ailleurs cela s'entend de soi-même."

It is commonly held that General de Rochow is a complete Russian; this is not the case. No one knows the Russians better, or esteems them less than he does; but what is, true is that he is very much attached to the Emperor, and too prone, without perhaps being aware of it, to adopt the views and opinions of a Sovereign of whom he sees so much, and from whom he receives such constant proofs of confidence and favour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 236.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 585. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 1, 1853.

HARDLY a day passes without my seeing General Castelbajac, and yesterday I held a great deal of conversation with him. As a colleague I cannot desire that he should be other than he is,—as French Minister I should be glad that he took a somewhat different view of the Emperor's policy.

The following extract from our yesterday's conversation will serve to exemplify my meaning.

"Our Governments," said General Castelbajac, "do not seem to me to understand the Emperor's views; they think him warlike, and I, who know him well, am convinced that he desires peace, and is, perhaps, apprehensive of war."

"My dear General," I replied, "that is not the question. Certainly, he desires peace if he can attain his object without war; but what it is our business to find out is this—will he, to avoid the chances of war, forego a pretension which your Government and mine have declared to be inadmissible? Will he drop his demand for a Protectorate? that is the question reduced to the smallest possible compass."

Again, we talked about the Black Sea, and about the difficulty of sustaining any argument as to our intended attitude there—a difficulty which I would not, indeed could not, admit.

"The best thing," I said, "is to avoid any discussion of the subject, or if possible any allusion to it; thus, if it is forced upon you, say, as I have done, and shall continue to do—'Our position in the Black Sea, if hostilities are made compulsory, may be very extraordinary, anomalous, whatever you Russians may please to call it; only the singularity, the anomaly has been created by yourselves: your own occupation of the Principalities has established a state of things which is neither peace nor war; we are sorry to find ourselves in an ambiguous situation, but only bear in mind that it is yourselves who have involved us in these perplexities.'"

So again with the Turkish declaration of war: my French colleague deplores it, and so do I; but I request him not to give utterance unnecessarily to the feeling, and above all to take especial care not to admit (according to the Russian version) that the Sultan is now the aggressor.

This feeling I explain in a few words; I deplore extreme acts, but after all if a man enters another's house with violence, he must not be offended if the aggrieved party attempts an ejectment before entering upon discussion.

General Castelbajac listens to all this with the greatest good-humour, but fails, I think, in observing that the chances of the continuance of that peace

which he is so eager to preserve, would be improved by more energy, more occasional asperity, than he employs in his intercourse with the Russians.

I will entreat of your Lordship to consider this despatch as strictly confidential.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No 237.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 586. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 1, 1853.

AS is well known, the two great motives by which the Emperor's policy towards Turkey is represented as being actuated, are the lively interest taken by His Majesty in the welfare of his coreligionists under the Sultan's authority, and the barbarous treatment to which it is to be understood these and other Christian sects are constantly experiencing at the hands of their lawful but barbarous Governors.

It does not often happen that an opportunity is offered for instituting a direct comparison between, not the professions, but the acts of the two Sovereigns towards large bodies of this Christian population; but as such an occasion presents itself, with reference to the occupation of the Principalities, I am desirous of turning it to account.

In the year 1848, the occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia was considered to be essential by Russia; the Porte taking a very different view of the case and regarding the measure as unnecessary and even hurtful.

As it was to be expected, the opinion of the Protecting Power prevailed, and large bodies of Russian troops having crossed the Pruth, the Porte, to prevent her provinces being committed to the exclusive keeping of the Emperor's armies, was compelled to take part in the occupation.

Here the contrast between the conduct of the two Powers becomes at once very striking.

The Russian Commissioner instantly instituted prosecutions and persecutions upon a very extensive scale, and expressed his surprise at the Turkish Commissioner declining to take part in them.

Fuad Effendi explained that his master was animated by totally different views; that his object was not vengeance, but improvement; that he looked to the future, not to the past, and was the enemy of a reactionary course.

The Turkish authorities further stated that it was the Sultan's wish that the presence of his troops should be an advantage to the provinces; everything that was required for their maintenance was to be paid with the greatest punctuality, and no precaution was omitted which could prevent an extraordinary occasion being made use of for raising prices in a manner calculated to distress the inhabitants.

The character of the Russian proceedings was of another order.

They paid for nothing, and they devoured the country. Their course was to be traced by devastation. Consul-General Cunningham describes their progress in a few graphic words. The effect of their presence is, he wrote, like that "produced by a flight of locusts."

It was, however, to be understood that this extensive consumption was not to be gratuitous. The charge was to be defrayed by the local Governments.

To make these payments, nevertheless, the local Governments required funds, and not possessing any, they were were compelled to borrow money of their invaders.

This loan the impoverished state of the land disqualified the inhabitants from repaying, and before it was possible that prosperity should return to their locust-devoured plains, a fresh Russian occupation, that of the current year, took place.

It was, however, announced that the Emperor intended to pay for everything required for his army, and Count Nesselrode, as your Lordship will have

read in my reports, stated to me that the occupation might in fact be considered as a benefit, as a kind of godsend for the inhabitants.

The advantage is one which the unfortunate Wallachians and Moldavians are little likely to appreciate, for although I believe everything that is consumed by the Russians is paid for, the payments are effected in bills (bons), the amount of which is to be deducted from the sum owing to Russia by the Principalities for the occupation of 1848, owing, that is, to the necessity of having had previously to support a large Russian army, whose presence was as unwelcome to the inhabitants as to their legitimate Sovereign.

When this picture and this are looked upon, it should certainly appear that Count Nesselrode was borne out in saying that Russia and Turkey are not to be placed on the same line. The impoverished, the barbarous, the infidel Power is seen to hold a conduct which shows in proud relief against that of its magnanimous, mighty, and believing antagonist.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 238.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 73.)
Berlin, November 6, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE been privately informed that the following intelligence has been received here by one of the chief military authorities, of the disposition of the Russian forces in the Principalities.

In Wallachia there is only one corps d'armée, that of Prince Gortchakoff and General Dannenberg, exclusive of a division of cavalry, the latter amounting at most to 4,000 strong.

On the Russian and Moldavian frontier is stationed one corps d'armée (Baron Osten-Sacken).

In Bessarabia is General Lüders' corps d'armée, composed of three divisions.

One division at Odessa.

One division on the Lower Danube.

One division in the Crimea, which latter has been sent to the Caucasus, in the neighbourhood of Batoum. A division of reserve (styled Zapasni) has been ordered to replace this last division in the Crimea.

From this statement, on which I have reason to rely, the Crimea would appear to be weakly garrisoned.

I take the liberty also of remarking to your Lordship (and I have military authority for making this statement) that a corps d'armée consisting of 60,000 men on paper cannot (with deductions from sickness and other causes, taken at the lowest rate of 25 per cent.) be reckoned at more than 45,000 effective men.

I have thought it my duty to transmit this intelligence, as corroborating what has already been reported to your Lordship by Sir H. Seymour in his despatch No. 565 of the 28th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 239.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 76.)
Berlin, November 7, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD an interview this evening with Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency informed me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister at this Court, had communicated to him this morning, and left in his hands, copy of a circular despatch, dated October 19, addressed by Count Nesselrode to the Russian

Missions at foreign Courts, inclosing a manifesto of the Russian Government as a reply to the declaration of war by Turkey.

His Excellency read to me these documents, and seemed to consider that they were written in a moderate and pacific spirit.

I remarked to his Excellency, that however "pious" the language, the arguments they contained, and the statements on which these arguments were based, were wholly false and unfounded; that at the outset Russia had stated that the mission of Prince Menchikoff solely related to the question of the holy places; but when that question had been satisfactorily arranged (in the solution of which the able services rendered by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been gratefully acknowledged by Prince Menchikoff) fresh demands of a distinct nature to those previously announced by the Russian Government, and totally incompatible with the sovereign rights of the Sultan, were presented to the Porte.

I observed further to his Excellency, that for such a cause, and under such pretext, Russia had no more right to make war on Turkey, than any Power would have to violate the territory of its neighbour for a refusal to sign a Treaty of commerce; and I added, that as to the question of war Russia could alone be held responsible to Europe, as she herself had first broken the peace of Europe by a lawless and illegal occupation of the Sultan's territory.

Baron Manteuffel acquiesced in the justice of my remarks, and I trust I have succeeded in counteracting any false impression with which Baron Budberg may have sought to imbue his mind on the occasion of placing these documents in his Excellency's hands.

Although your Lordship will probably be already in possession of these papers, I have the honour to inclose copies of them herewith.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 239.

Circular Despatch addressed to Russian Missions at Foreign Courts.

St. Pétersbourg, le 19 Octobre, 1853.

LES efforts que nous ne cessons de faire depuis huit mois pour arriver à l'arrangement à l'amiable de nos différends avec la Porte Ottomane sont malheureusement restés infructueux jusqu'ici. Il y a plus la situation semble tendre à s'aggraver tous les jours d'avantage. Tandis que l'Empereur offrait, durant son entrevue à Olmütz avec son intime amie et allié l'Empereur François-Joseph, de nombres facilités au Cabinet Autrichien pour éclaircir le malentendu qui l'est attaché aux motifs exposés par nous pour rejeter les modifications que la Porte avait voulu introduire dans la note concertée à Vienne, la Porte cédant, malgré les conseils des Représentants Européens à Constantinople, à l'impulsion des idées belliqueuses et du fanatisme Mussulman, vient, comme vous l'aurez déjà appris, de nous déclarer formellement la guerre. Cette mesure précipité n'a pourtant rien changé pour le moment aux dispositions pacifiques de l'Empereur. Nous n'abandonnons point encore pour cela les résolutions énoncées dès l'origine dans notre circulaire du 31 Juin / 9 Juillet. A cette époque, Sa Majesté Impériale a déclaré qu'en occupant temporairement les Principautés comme gage matériel destiné à lui assurer la satisfaction qu'elle réclame, elle ne voulait pas pousser plus loin les mesures de coércition, et éviterait une guerre offensive aussi longtemps que le lui permettraient sa dignité et ses intérêts. A l'heure qu'il est, et en dépit de la nouvelle provocation qui vient de lui être adressée, les intentions de notre Auguste Maître restent les mêmes.

Nantis du gage matériel qui nous donne l'occupation des deux Provinces Moldo Valaques, bien que toujours prêts, suivant nos promesses, à les évacuer du moment que réparation nous aura été fait, nous nous contenterons provisoirement d'y maintenir nos positions, en restant sur la défensive, aussi longtemps que nous n'aurions point été forcés de sortir du cercle dans lequel nous désirons enfermer notre action. Nous attendrons l'attaque des Turcs sans prendre l'initiative des hostilités. Il dépendra donc entièrement des autres Puissances de ne point élargir les limites de la guerre, si les Turcs s'obstinent à vouloir nous la faire absolument, et de ne point lui imprimer un caractère

autre que celui que nous entendons lui laisser. Cette situation toute expectante ne met point obstacle à la poursuite des négociations. Comme de raison, après la déclaration de guerre qu'on vient de lui faire, ce n'est point à la Russie à rechercher de nouveaux expédients, à prendre l'initiative des ouvertures de conciliation. Mais si, mieux éclairée sur ses intérêts, la Porte est plus tard disposée à mettre en avant ou à accueillir de pareilles ouvertures, ce n'est point de l'Empereur qui viendront les obstacles à ce qu'elles soient prises en considération.

Voilà, M. ———, pour le moment tout ce qu'il m'est permis de vous dire, dans l'incertitude où nous sommes de savoir si la Porte Ottomane donnera une suite immédiate aux projets belliqueux qu'elle vient d'adopter. Faites part de nos intentions éventuelles au Cabinet auprès duquel vous vous trouvez accrédité. Elles attesteront une fois de plus le désir de notre Auguste Maître de circonscrire autant que possible le cercle des hostilités si elles doivent avoir lieu malgré lui, et d'en épargner les conséquences au reste de l'Europe.

Recevez, &c.

No. 240.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 77.)

Berlin, November 7, 1853.

My Lord,

I REFERRED this evening, in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, to the instructions which he informed me had been transmitted to Baron Wildenbruch to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in urging the Porte to accept your Lordship's projects.

His Excellency told me that those instructions had effectively been sent, as duplicates had been forwarded direct to Constantinople *vid* Trieste, in addition to those which had been transmitted through Count Arnim.

I stated to his Excellency, that it was possible that Lord Stratford might, under the existing circumstances, still find occasion either to utilize your Lordship's project or the one he had transmitted from Constantinople, which latter, though identical with your Lordship's project, had the advantage of having apparently been approved by the Porte. I said that perhaps if the form of a note was no longer tenable, Lord Stratford might possibly find it desirable to propose it as a basis or preliminary to a Treaty or Convention; and that it was therefore most desirable that Baron Wildenbruch should be instructed by his Excellency to support Lord Stratford in any endeavours he might make to bring about a pacification, according to the terms of these projects, or with such modifications as would not render either project unacceptable by the Emperor of Russia.

His Excellency assented to this view, and said that he had already written a private letter to Baron Wildenbruch, stating clearly the position and policy of Prussia; in that letter he referred to the instructions he had previously given to act in concert with Austria, and proceeded to explain to Baron Wildenbruch that circumstances having changed, those instructions were no longer in force.

His Excellency informed me that he would again instruct Baron Wildenbruch to support Lord Stratford in his endeavours to bring about a pacification. His Excellency further added that it was his sincere wish to cooperate with England in this sense.

I have taken this step on two grounds; 1st. That Lord Stratford should be supported at Constantinople by the Prussian Minister, should the emergency occur; and 2ndly. To forestall any other engagement which might be addressed from other quarters.

However desirous the Prussian Government may have been of acting in complete harmony and concert with Austria in the negotiations which have hitherto taken place, I think I may safely assure your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel is anxious to preserve a thorough independence of action for Prussia; and I am firmly persuaded that it is his wish to act in cooperation with England towards the attainment of peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 241.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 831. Confidential.)

Paris, November 8, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon, who informed me that he had received yesterday a pressing telegraphic message from M. de Bourqueney, asking to be empowered to sign a note which Count Buol had just proposed that the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna should address to the Porte, requesting the Turkish Government to consent to an armistice, in order that negotiations might be resumed with a view of terminating the Oriental question in a manner consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan. M. de Bourqueney begged for an immediate answer, which, however, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not yet given, as he wishes to be informed previously of the light in which this proposition is viewed by Her Majesty's Government.

M. de Lhuys' own impression is not favourable to this plan. He remarks that the Turks will probably refuse the proposition if made to them, unless it is accompanied by some proof or direct assurance that in ceasing hostilities they will obtain that for which they took up arms: and he thinks that it is hardly fair by the Turks to put them in a position to refuse a request of the Four Powers. He conceives that the wiser course is to abstain from all interference until such interference can be interposed with the hope of a successful result. At the same time he feels the odium which may attach to a Government refusing its cooperation in any measure having for its object to stop the effusion of human blood; and if he receives no intelligence before this evening from Count Walewski of your Lordship's opinion, he is inclined to tell M. de Bourqueney that if Count Buol's proposition to the Porte is accompanied by something more tangible, in the way of reassuring the Turkish Government, he has no objection to the course proposed; otherwise he thinks that it had as well be let alone. I remarked that perhaps the better plan would be to leave the matter very much in M. de Bourqueney's hands; to give to that Minister a general idea of what the French Government thought should be done if an armistice was proposed; but to authorize him, since he was so much nearer the scene of action, and moments were sometimes precious where armies were in presence, to join his colleagues in proposing an armistice whenever he judged the moment favourable. It seemed to me, moreover, but fair that the proposal for an armistice should be made to each of the belligerent Parties; for proposing it to the Turks only was more or less indicating an opinion that they were in the wrong; and since it appeared that the Russians had attacked the Turkish army which had crossed the Danube, the former could hardly continue to plead that they were acting on the defensive alone.

When I left him, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued uncertain what to do: he was expecting an answer from the Emperor, to whom he had submitted M. de Bourqueney's despatch, as also one from your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 242.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 72.)

Copenhagen, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

IN the course of a conversation which I had yesterday the honour of holding with the King, His Majesty referred to the continued uncertainty which prevails as to the issue of the Oriental question, and expressed serious uneasi-

ness as to the position in which Denmark would be placed in the event of a war between Great Britain and Russia.

His Majesty said that his own wishes, and the interests of his country, would induce him, on such a contingency, to maintain a strictly neutral policy; but he feared that if the prospect of hostilities should lead either belligerent to establish a squadron in a Danish port, and to draw its supplies from Denmark, the advantages which it would thus derive might become a cause of complaint on the part of the other, and that he might be eventually drawn into a war without intending it; and he expressed at the same time the hope that England would not again think it necessary to take measures of a precautionary character to prevent such maritime resources as Denmark might still possess from falling into the power of her enemies.

To the latter part of His Majesty's observations I replied that I was sure His Majesty would do England the justice to acknowledge, that if in 1807 she had adopted a harsh course towards Denmark she had been driven to it by the circumstances of the time; and with regard to the question generally, I said that though I could not offer His Majesty any official assurances of the policy of Her Majesty's Government respecting contingencies which might never arise, I felt convinced that whatever measures they might eventually be obliged to adopt, and whatever events might take place in the Baltic, every possible deference and consideration would be shown to the wishes of His Majesty, and that there was at all events no immediate ground for anxiety on his part, as the naval forces of Russia would soon be prevented from moving by the winter; and that if in the spring it should be deemed necessary by Her Majesty's Government to send a squadron to the Baltic, which I believe there was every reason to consider an improbable eventuality, such a squadron was not likely to remain long in the waters of Denmark, and if it proceeded towards the Gulf of Finland it would, I trusted, relieve His Majesty from all apprehension of his neutrality being compromised by the acts of Russia.

His Majesty concluded by begging me to convey to the Queen the expression of his earnest desire to cultivate the most friendly relations with Her Majesty, saying that his feelings towards "the Queen his sister" were really those of a brother, and that he wished me to express to Her Majesty his anxious hope that the policy of Her Majesty's Government would never be inconsistent with the sisterly regard which he believed Her Majesty to entertain towards himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 243.

Mr. Buchanan to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *Copenhagen, November* 5, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that my Austrian and Prussian colleagues have received, within the last few days, circular despatches from their respective Courts, acquainting them with the neutral policy which Austria and Prussia have determined to follow in the war which is commencing between Russia and Turkey.

The absence of M. de Bluhme, however, who is suffering from the gout at Elsinore, has hitherto prevented them making any communication with his Excellency on the subject of those communications.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 244.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 11.)

(No. 590.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 3, 1853.

THE manifesto which has been so long expected was published this morning; but, as I understand, not in the terms in which it had been originally drawn up.

The appearance of this important paper, of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy, I believe to have been hastened by the Sultan's declaration of war, followed up by actual hostilities on the banks of the Danube.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 244.

Manifesto.

Par la grâce de Dieu, nous, Nicolas I, Empereur et Autocrate de toutes les Russies, &c.

Savoir faisons:

PAR notre Manifeste du 14 Juin de la présente année, nous avons fait connaître à nos fidèles et bienaimés sujets les motifs qui nous ont mis dans l'obligation de réclamer de la Porte Ottomane des garanties inviolables en faveur des droits sacrés de l'Eglise Orthodoxe.

Nous leur avions annoncé également que tous nos efforts pour ramener la Porte, par des moyens de persuasion amicale, à des sentiments d'équité et à l'observation fidèle des Traités, étaient restés infructueux, et que nous avions, par conséquent, jugé indispensable de faire avancer nos troupes dans les Principautés du Danube. Mais, en adoptant cette mesure, nous conservions encore l'espoir que la Porte reconnaîtrait ses torts, et se déciderait à faire droit à nos justes réclamations.

Notre attente a été déçue.

En vain même les principales Puissances de l'Europe ont cherché par leurs exhortations à ébranler l'aveugle obstination du Gouvernement Ottoman. C'est par une déclaration de guerre, par une proclamation remplie d'accusations mensongères contre la Russie, qu'il a répondu aux efforts pacifiques de l'Europe, ainsi qu'à notre longanimité. Enfin, enrôlant dans les rangs de son armée les révolutionnaires de tous les pays, la Porte vient de commencer les hostilités sur le Danube. La Russie est provoquée au combat; il ne lui reste donc plus, se réposant en Dieu avec confiance, qu'à recourir à la force des armes pour contraindre le Gouvernement Ottoman à respecter les Traités et pour en obtenir la réparation des offenses par lesquelles il a répondu à nos demandes les plus modérées et à notre sollicitude légitime pour la défense de la foi orthodoxe en Orient que professe également le peuple Russe.

Nous sommes fermement convaincu que nos fidèles sujets se joindront aux ferventes prières que nous adressons au Très-Haut, afin que sa main daigne bénir nos armes dans la sainte et juste cause qui a trouvé de tout tems d'ardents défenseurs dans nos pieux ancêtres.

"In te, Domine, speravi: non confundar in æternum."

Donné à Tsarskoé-Sélo, le vingtième jour du mois d'Octobre de l'an de grâce mil huit cent cinquante-trois, et de notre règne le vingt-huitième.

(Signé) NICOLAS.

No. 245.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Hon. W. Grey.

(No. 3.)

Foreign Office, November 12, 1853.

Sir,

BARON REHAUSEN read to me a few days ago a despatch from Baron Stierneld, stating that the Eastern question was a source of great uneasiness to the Swedish Government, who wished Her Majesty's Government to be assured that, in the event of war occurring between Great Britain and Russia, Sweden would occupy a position of strict neutrality.

Baron Stierneld added, that the policy of Denmark being similar to that of Sweden, he was in communication with the Danish Government upon the subject, for the purpose of securing complete concert between the two countries in the event of war, and that he should make known the result to Baron Rehausen.

I thanked Baron Rehausen for this communication, and said, that as taking part with Russia would probably be injurious to Sweden, and would certainly be unpopular in the country, it was satisfactory to learn that a neutral position had been determined upon; and that if Her Majesty's Government respected that position, they were entitled to expect that the neutrality of Sweden should be strictly and faithfully maintained.

You will communicate this despatch to Baron Stierneld, and ascertain from his Excellency what arrangements have been made with the Danish Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 246.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

Vienna, November 11, 5 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE received your telegraphic despatch of last night; M. de Bourqueney has not yet received any instructions similar to those it contains. Nevertheless I communicate it to Count Buol, who has felt himself obliged to transmit already the Russian propositions to Constantinople, as stated in my despatch of yesterday, No. 406. As I am not authorized by your instructions to sign any document, or to act without the concurrence of M. de Bourqueney, Count Buol confined himself to the expression of his most anxious desire that you should invite the Porte to state if it is willing to enter into negotiations, and on what conditions; and he will receive any such proposal as you may forward, with the desire to concur in it, as also in any instructions to be sent to the Representatives in Constantinople to support it.

No. 247.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 12.)

(No. 838.)

Paris, November 11, 1853.

My Lord,

THE messenger Moore arrived here this morning, and delivered to me your Lordship's despatches of yesterday's date.

I was unable to obtain an interview of M. Drouyn de Lhuys until late this evening, when I informed him of the answer which your Lordship had sent through Lord Westmorland, to Count Buol's proposition that the Four Powers should call upon the Porte to consent to an armistice. M. Drouyn de Lhuys highly approves that answer, and will send immediate orders by telegraph to M. de Bourqueney to support the proposition which it contains.

When I saw his Excellency he had just read the Russian manifesto of the 20th October, o.s. The mendacious and treacherous tone of this document had made a great impression upon him, and he appeared to think that there was little to be done in the way of negotiation with a Government which could condescend to such base and dishonourable means to uphold an unrighteous cause.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 248.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 593. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, November 4, 1853.

My Lord,

UPON the arrival of the messenger Robbins, on the 2nd instant, under the impression that I might possibly be yet in time to induce Count Nesselrode to modify or to suppress that manifesto, the appearance of which has for some time been daily looked for, I addressed him the private and confidential letter of which I beg to inclose a copy.

As it proved the letter can have produced no effect, for at the moment of its delivery the manifesto, as I learned three or four hours later from a person who had seen a written copy, had been sent by the Senate to the printing office.

I am assured, by a person who has full knowledge of the transaction, that the manifesto, as written originally and in very different terms by the Emperor himself, had not only been withdrawn by subsequent orders from the printing office, but, together with all the copies struck off, had been destroyed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 248.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private and Confidential.)

November 2, 1853.

My dear Count Nesselrode,

ALTHOUGH we are to meet, I am happy to say, at dinner to-day, I must write a few lines to say that our messenger is arrived, and that all that he brings is good.

Our Government, and not less that of France, although prepared for the worst, is working honourably and indefatigably in the cause of peace.

A fresh *projet de note* has been prepared and, according to your very judicious suggestion, it will be ascertained whether the Porte can be induced to accept it before it is submitted to you.

Meanwhile, as unfortunately Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was unable to prevent the declaration of war, he has been labouring to arrest the progress of war: and according to news of the 21st October, from Constantinople, has actually determined the Porte to an armistice until news should be received from England as to the probability of an arrangement.

All this looks well; and, as I will take the liberty of adding, peaceful prospects will be further improved if I am enabled to report that the Russian Government persevere in their present wise course of abstaining from the publication of any declaration or manifesto calculated to increase those suspicions and misgivings—those apprehensions as to the danger impending their religion and their political existence, which have hurried the Turks into measures which all have witnessed with regret.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 249.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 594. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

IT is right that I should state to your Lordship that I know, as a certain fact, of the Emperor having observed a short time ago to those about him, that if once he were seriously engaged in a Turkish war that he would take good care that it should be the last war in which Turkey should take part.

As usually happens here, not many days passed without an intention expressed by the master being repeated by his servants, and, as it happened, on one occasion in my hearing.

I mention this fact to your Lordship as I have mentioned many others to which I do not attach any great importance; but I am apt to consider these words of His Imperial Majesty, as expressive rather of casual impatience than of a settled purpose.

Although much uncertainty hangs over the immediate future of Turkish history, my own fears point more at the possibility of the Emperor's being tempted to retain possession of those provinces which the Russians are so addicted to overruning, than at the chance of his undertaking to lay the whole fabric of the Ottoman Empire in ruins.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 250.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 596.)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

COUNT NESSELRODE, when at my house on the evening of the 2nd instant, alluded to the manifesto which was to appear on the following day.

He intimated his hope that the paper was not of such a nature as could give offence to Her Majesty's Government, and while giving it to be understood that it contained one or two expressions which were open to observation, begged me to bear in mind that it was to be considered as being addressed to the Russian nation and not to the public of Europe.

The opinion generally entertained of this document here is that it is as mild as under the unfortunate circumstances which have called it forth could have been expected, and that it has not been drawn up with a view of diminishing the chances of a pacific arrangement with Turkey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 251.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 597.)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

THE messenger Robbins, who arrived here on the 2nd instant, has delivered to me your Lordship's despatches up to No. 251.

I called yesterday upon the Chancellor, chiefly for the purpose of making inquiry respecting a report which had reached me, as to the intended nomination of General Budberg as Governor of the Principalities.

The sum of the information which I received is, that General Budberg is to be named Commissioner, the title of Governor being one which was calculated to give rise to misapprehensions as to the Emperor's intentions, which remained

those of not incorporating the two Provinces (de ne point incorporer les Provinces).

The Government, Count Nesselrode further stated, would have been glad to have retained the Hospodars, but since the declaration of war their position had become so painful that they were unwilling to continue the exercise of their functions; it became therefore necessary to provide some present system of government for Wallachia and Moldavia.

It may be of interest to your Lordship to know that General Budberg was aide-de-camp to Marshal Diebitsch in 1829, and was the officer who having been sent forward to the Porte to say that the Marshal was upon the point of marching upon Constantinople, placed himself in communication with the English Ambassador, and by out-staying the time assigned to him by twenty-four hours, was able to take back intelligence of Turkish Plenipotentiaries having been empowered to treat.

Before I left him, Count Nesselrode spoke, with a feeling which was manifestly most sincere, of the pain with which he viewed the chances of a rupture with England. Although that this event should really occur was a misfortune which he could not yet bring himself to contemplate, I might, he observed, readily picture to myself what his feelings must be, if I reflected that the great object of his life had been to build up an alliance, which now, at the end of his career, he saw in such jeopardy.

Before closing my despatch I may state to your Lordship that I hear upon good authority that Admiral Lutke, one of the best officers in the Russian fleet, and formerly only the naval instructor of the Grand Duke Constantine, is to have the command.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 252.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 14.)

(No. 600.)

St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour to receive (forwarded by Lord Augustus Loftus) your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 28th ultimo.

After some reflection I made up my mind not to notice to the Chancellor, or indeed to any one, either the note which you announced as having been proposed at Constantinople, or that of which the draft was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe marked No. 251.

My resolution was taken upon the ground of endeavouring to guard against any confusion which might arise from two notes being brought forward about the same time; and, as regards the *projet de note* prepared by your Lordship, because it struck me that the chances of its acceptance here would be much improved by its arriving through Vienna, more especially if it should have met with the full approbation of the Austrian Cabinet.

Count Nesselrode has twice expressed to me a wish of being put in possession of your Lordship's note, but to this indirect application I returned an evasive answer.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch I have been assured that the note prepared at Constantinople has not been approved of at Vienna.

No. 253.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 603.) *St. Petersburgh, November 5, 1853.*

My Lord,

ACCORDING to information which I have just received, and upon which entire reliance may be placed, the position of the Russian army in the Principalities is as follows:

Prince Gortchakoff remains with the bulk of his forces at Bucharest. He believes that the Turks have the intention of passing the Danube, and has detached three corps d'observation to watch any such movements.

General Aurep, with one brigade, is posted opposite to Silistia.

General Dannenberg, the commander of the 4th corps d'armée, occupies the country opposite to Rustchuk; and General Fishback, with one brigade, has taken up his post at Kraiowa.

Besides these, General Lüders, with another division, retains his position at Ismail.

With regard to the 3rd corps, under General Baron Osten-Sacken, the accounts of his arrival in the Principalities prove to have been premature; the Government have not yet intelligence of his having crossed the Pruth.

The contradictory accounts received here as to the amount of Omer Pasha's army appear to indicate that, as regards intelligence with respect to the enemy, Prince Gortchakoff is not well served; the Turkish army having been variously represented as 100,000 and 200,000 strong.

It is believed by the Government that he has some 120,000 men under his orders, and that the bulk of his force is collected near Rustchuk.

It seems to be now suspected here that Omer Pasha's demonstrations at Widin may cover the purpose of crossing the river at some other point.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 254.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 844.) *Paris, November 13, 1853.*

My Lord,

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch dated the 8th instant, has been received from the French Consul at Bucharest, giving some further details of what may be called the battle of Oltenizza.

The action took place in the village of that name, which consists of a few houses and a ruined fort, and in the delta on which it is situated.

The Turks, to the amount of 9,000 only, not 12,000 as originally reported, crossed from Tourtoukai, bringing with them everything necessary to entrench themselves in Oltenizza. They were attacked by General Danenberg, with what force is not stated, and a most obstinate combat partly at the point of the bayonet ensued. The Turkish fortress on the opposite side of the river at Tourtoukai fired with such precision that the shots fell just beyond the feet of the Turkish defenders, doing much execution among the Russians.

The latter had 1200 men put *hors de combat*. Almost all the colonels and chefs de bataillon were killed or wounded; a proof of apathy on the part of the Russian troops obliging their officers to expose themselves, as of very accurate firing on the part of the Turks. The Turkish bullets were chiefly conical.

Prince Gortchakoff was to make a forced march on the 9th, with the main body of his army, to meet the Turks, and it was calculated that a serious battle would be fought on the 10th or 11th.

Some disaffection seems to have shown itself among the Polish troops, and four soldiers who had demurred to fighting in defence of a faith which was not their own, had been summarily shot.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 255.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 402.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 8, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has communicated to me, as well as to M. de Bourqueney, the draft of the instructions he should propose to send to the Internuncio for the direction of his conduct in recommending to the Government of the Sultan the course they might pursue in the negotiation with Russia, which will have been proposed to them by the collective note of the Four Representatives.

I inclose this document.

Count Buol submits this draft for the consideration of your Lordship as a mere project, upon which he will attend to any suggestions you may offer; he does not recommend it as a draft according to which the other Governments should be bound in the instructions which they would send to their Representatives. He is aware that in the mediating position of Austria, more management of terms is required towards Russia than from England and France, but the objects to be attained being the same, a general concordance in the way of putting them forward may be of the greatest utility.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 255.

Draft of Instructions to be addressed to Baron Bruck.

LORSQUE la note collective aura été remise à la Porte, la tâche la plus importante dont les Quatre Représentants auront à s'acquitter consistera à exercer toute leur influence, afin que la Porte se décide sans délai à une réponse qui d'un côté corresponde aux dispositions conciliantes énoncées par la Russie, et que de l'autre, par les termes dans lesquels elle sera conçue, facilite aux Puissances unies de travailler avec succès au rétablissement des bons rapports entre la Turquie et la Russie.

Les Représentants feront d'abord apprécier les motifs de délicatesse qui ont porté leur Cours à ne pas s'occuper de la rédaction même de la réponse à faire. Elles ont cru plus convenable de s'en rapporter à ce sujet au tact des Ministres Turcs eux-mêmes. Convaincues d'avance qu'ils s'appliqueront à élaborer une pièce qui offrira des chances d'être bien accueillie à St. Pétersbourg, ses Cours pensent que le caractère de spontanéité qu'elles désirent réserver à la réponse de la Porte, on assurera davantage le bon effet.

Si, comme il est à prevoir, les Représentants étaient toutefois consultés à cet égard, ils auraient à s'exprimer dans le sens suivant:

1. Cette pièce aurait à exprimer la disposition constante de la Porte de mettre un terme aux différends. En rendant justice aux intentions de la Russie, la Porte se déclarerait prête à s'entendre avec elle.

2. En prenant acte des assurances données par la Russie, la Porte de son côté se déclarerait prête à maintenir des points déjà concédés dans ses manifestations antérieures. Ils pourraient être énumérés dans l'ordre dans lequel ils se trouvent énoncés dans les différents projets de note. On y rattacherait comme de raison, les conditions de l'évacuation des Principautés.

3. Quant à la forme dans laquelle auraient lieu et le rétablissement de la paix et le règlement de la question religieuse, on la fixerait de commun accord dès l'ouverture des pourparlers.

4. Quant au mode d'entrer en négociation, la Porte se déclarerait prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire et à le munir des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires pour traiter avec un négociateur Russe.

5. Quant au lieu où on se réunirait, la Porte est sans doute la maîtresse d'accepter purement et simplement l'offre de la Russie de se réunir dans un endroit avoisinant le théâtre de la guerre.

Elle peut même ne pas objecter à la Ville de Bucharest indiquée par la Russie, si elle le juge convenable à ses droits.

Comme il se pourrait, au reste, que la Porte crût devoir s'y refuser par un motif de dignité, ou bien aussi qu'elle ne jugea pas à propos de se séparer complètement de l'appui et des conseils des Puissances qui déjà lui ont donné des marques d'intérêt, elle pourrait décliner l'offre en appuyant son refus de raisons plausibles et convenables.

La Turquie devra prendre conseil d'elle-même si un lieu neutre n'offrirait pas plus de chance de réussite. On pourrait dans ce cas lui suggérer si la capitale où siège déjà la Conférence qui s'occupe plus particulièrement de cette question, ne répondrait par peut-être mieux que toute autre à toutes les exigences de la situation.

En suivant cette proposition la Porte aurait toutefois à se garder d'insister trop déjà dès à présent sur la forme à donner à cette négociation, ainsi que sur le mode dans lequel les Puissances amies auraient à y intervenir, pour ne pas se priver abord soulever des difficultés et des longueurs.

La Porte serait bien sous ce rapport de s'en rapporter aux soins de la Conférence d'aviser la négociation, une fois entamée, aux formes les plus convenables, soit pour sa dignité, soit pour ses intérêts.

6. La Porte s'engagera formellement en acceptant l'offre d'entrer en voie de négociation à un armistice, tout comme les Puissances prendront sur elles d'obtenir de la Russie qu'elle persévère dans son intention de ne pas sortir de la position qu'elle a prise et de rien entreprendre de son côté qui pût mettre obstacle aux intentions de la Porte.

Dès l'entrée en négociation cet armistice pourrait être directement conclu entre les parties belligérentes, en fixant la ligne de démarcation qui séparerait les deux armées.

No. 256.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, November 10, 1853.*

IT will not probably strike your Lordship as anything extraordinary that the Eastern question affords a new subject of difference of opinion between Austria and Prussia as to the question whether their participation in the negotiations which have taken place, and their attitude in the present posture of affairs, should or should not be communicated to the Diet, and the concurrence and adhesion of that body invited.

Your Lordship is no doubt informed of the nature of M. de Prokesch's overtures on his passage through Berlin on his return to his post here; and that in view of the prospect entertained at the moment of his presence in Berlin of effective negotiations being reopened, his Excellency appeared to admit that the motives put forward by the Prussian Cabinet for considering the present moment inopportune for making a communication on the posture of these affairs to the Diet, ought to prevail.

With this understanding the sitting of the Diet on Thursday last passed without any reference to the subject; but I have learnt from an undoubted source that Baron Prokesch received a telegraphic despatch from Vienna yesterday, instructing him to make to the Diet in their sitting of this day a communication of the neutral attitude assumed by Austria; and, as I am led to understand, with an invitation to the Diet to adhere to this declaration of neutrality.

There exists, it would seem, more than one reason for the Austrian Government taking a course which to a certain extent places her *de novo* in decided opposition to Prussia.

In the first place there is ground to believe that this was one of the measures, the adoption of which was stipulated, in conjunction with the recent reduction of her forces, in the negotiation not yet fully terminated for her projected loan.

In the next place, her old policy of showing deference for the Diet, in

opposition to the course recently taken by Prussia, and thus strengthening her German interests, will probably not have been left out of sight.

By omitting, or even by delaying any notice of the subject in the Diet, the two great German States would have thus shown their intention of acting independently as European Powers, which would seem to be the purpose of Prussia. When one of these States takes the course of making a communication from which the other abstains, and especially when the one communicating is Austria, and the one abstaining Prussia, in a matter which incalculably more concerns the former than the latter, the divergence of views becomes the more salient and remarkable.

I have learnt that, since Baron Prokesch left Berlin, Count Thun was suddenly summoned to Vienna, and the decision now taken, by which Baron Prokesch is ordered to act in a mode so much at variance with the views of the Prussian Government, would appear to have been taken after Count Thun's arrival in that capital.

Up to yesterday evening the instructions of the Prussian Plenipotentiary to the Diet did not admit of his following the example of Austria in the proposed communication; but neither, as far as I can learn, would he make any opposition to a vote of adhesion, if such a vote was invited by the President.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 257.

Sir A. Malet to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 120.)

My Lord, *Frankfort, November 11, 1853.*

I LEARN that the report contained in my No. 118, of what would be the nature of the communication made by Austria to the Diet in the sitting of Thursday the 10th, was substantially correct; but that an invitation to adhere to the declaration of neutrality did not form part of Baron Prokesch's communication.

M. de Prokesch spoke in general terms of its having been the object of Austria, in conjunction with Prussia, France, and Great Britain, and with a full reliance on the declarations of the Emperor of Russia, to have maintained peace. These hopes had, however, in some degree been frustrated by recent events. Still Austria did not abandon the expectation of preventing the hostilities which had commenced from becoming serious; and no greater proof of her sincerely entertaining this opinion, and of having no fear of the warfare spreading, could have been given than by the reduction decided on, and already effected, in her army.

Austria hoped that the members of the Confederation would approve of and concur in her policy.

The Prussian Plenipotentiary, Count Bismark, in remarking on the communications of the President of the Diet, is reported to me to have spoken to the effect that Prussia, as well as Austria, had, in conjunction with her allies, used similar efforts to preserve peace, and entertained similar hopes of negotiation being still successful in checking the spread of hostilities. Count Bismark, in the course of his remarks, used the remarkable expression that Prussia, in these matters, desired to preserve her freedom of action, and, with some conciliatory phrase of his hope that in so doing she would meet with approval from the members of the Confederation, gave them very clearly to comprehend that his Government intended acting in this question as an European Power, and not to consider herself fettered by any federal obligations.

Nothing that passed indicates that Austria and Prussia will not co-operate with equal sincerity to settle the Eastern question, in accordance with the views of France and England; but the different attitude of the two Powers in respect of the Confederation, is, as your Lordship will see, deserving of attention, as being so distinctly marked.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. MALET.

No. 258.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 81.)

Berlin, November 1, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED to-day on Baron Manteuffel, and referred to the circular and manifesto which had been submitted to him by the Russian Minister. I stated to his Excellency that since my last interview with him I had read over those documents with calmness and attention, and that I thought it necessary to make the following remarks to his Excellency on the nature of those documents.

I first stated that I was not aware that Russia had made any efforts for an amicable arrangement with Turkey, unless a violent attack upon her territory could be viewed in a pacific sense; that she had obviated any settlement by her refusal of the Turkish modifications, even though they had been counselled for her acceptance by the Powers of Europe; that consequently if matters had been brought to a serious ebb, the shame could only be laid at her door; that the possibility of an arrangement had not only been impeded, but absolutely cut off by Count Nesselrode's memorandum, notifying the grounds on which the Russian Government had declined to accept the modifications of the Vienna note; that during four months the Porte had exhibited (in conformity with the advice of the European Powers) the greatest moderation in not declaring war against Russia—a right which could not be contested to her, and which, her patience exhausted, she was legally entitled to exercise; that thus her conduct could not be stigmatised as governed by warlike propensity or by fanaticism—an accusation indeed which might with more just reason be addressed to Russia.

With respect to the pacific disposition of the Emperor of Russia referred to in the Russian circular, I stated to Baron Manteuffel that we could alone judge of their value by the acts of His Imperial Majesty; he had commenced war against Turkey in June last; it is true that his words are words of peace, but his acts were acts of open hostility.

I referred then to the resolutions published in the Russian circular of June 21 (July 3), cited in the circular, and which, though I acknowledge to have been satisfactory in their theory, had been unfortunately quite the reverse in their practice. The Governor of the Provinces had been completely laid hold of by the Russians; the inhabitants had been forcibly compelled to provide provisions, horses, and money; the tribute due by the Hospodars had been authoritatively confiscated by Russia: in short they had been treated as conquered provinces reduced to the yoke of Russia.

I further remarked, with respect to the satisfaction demanded by Russia, that it must be borne in mind that the mission of Prince Menchikoff had been solemnly asserted to relate merely to the question of the holy places, which by the offices of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had been satisfactorily arranged; but that subsequently secret demands, incompatible with the dignity and sovereign rights of the Sultan, had been addressed to the Porte, and categorically refused, with the unanimous approbation of Europe. I stated that Turkey as an independent country had full right to reject these demands, and that Russia had no legal power to enforce them by arms.

I reminded his Excellency that Russia had, in invading the Principalities, committed the first breach of the European peace, and could not therefore with justice accuse Turkey of warlike propensities or of hostile acts; and that if Russia were really desirous of fulfilling those engagements she had repeatedly given in writing and so repeatedly refuted by her acts, she ought to withdraw her troops within her territory, and that failing to do so, it was her who must be considered as the aggressive Power. I represented such an act as one the most likely to circumscribe the circle of hostilities, and to save Europe from the disastrous eventualities of war.

The Russian documents to which I alluded, are drawn up with such specious reasoning and seeming plausibility, that I deemed it my duty, in the interests of truth and justice, to offer to Baron Manteuffel the foregoing observations.

His Excellency received them with interest and attention, and I trust they

will attain the object I seek, and serve as a counteraction to Russian duplicity, and its wilful system of aggressive ambition.

His Excellency further informed me that His Majesty on reading this manifesto had expressed his deep regret that the Emperor of Russia should have again appealed to the religious passions of the people.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 259.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 82.)

Berlin, November 11, 1853.

My Lord,

HAVING been informed by Sir H. Seymour's despatch No. 597, of the nomination of a Civil Governor for the Danubian Provinces by the Russian Government, I thought I ought to draw the attention of the Prussian Government to this circumstance, and requested to know from Baron Manteuffel what course he would pursue with regard to the Prussian political agents who were accredited to those Governments.

His Excellency replied that this matter had not yet been taken into consideration. He had, however, understood that by the Act of Constitution of those States, foreign Agents were legally accredited to the Government during the absence of the Hospodars.

I replied to his Excellency that the case might be altered, if, as my intelligence reported, a Russian General assumed the supreme Government of the country.

His Excellency said that he had not as yet received intelligence of any such nomination, but that, on my suggestion, the subject should be duly taken into consideration.

As this may become a matter of some importance, I should be happy to receive your Lordship's instructions, as a guide to the opinion I may be called upon to express on the subject in question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 260.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 84.)

Berlin, November 11, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL communicated to me a despatch which he had received from the Prussian Minister at Vienna this day, an extract of which I have the honour to inclose herewith.

By that despatch it appears that Count Arnim had been pressed by Count Buol to give a positive answer whether the Prussian Government was ready to support the proposal which the Austrian Cabinet had submitted to the English and French Governments. Baron Manteuffel told me that he had taken no engagement since the adhesion of the Prussian Government to your Lordship's proposition, and that he should now await events.

He repeated to me that Baron Wildenbruch is instructed to act in concert with and support Lord Stratford at Constantinople.

His Excellency seemed to think that passing events on the Danube would defeat all calculation, and hinted that at that very moment Omer Pasha might be at Bucharest.

Until some definite and concerted line has been agreed upon, I thought it unadvisable to enter on further consideration of the means to provide a pacific arrangement, but I feel persuaded that your Lordship may count upon the

support and assistance of Prussia in any project which Her Majesty's Government may bring forward for the attainment of peace between Russia and Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 260.

Count Arnim to Baron Manteuffel.

(Extrait.) *Vienne, le 8 Novembre*, 1853.

LE Comte de Buol désire cependant une explication positive. Il pense aussi que la note Anglaise, soit celle de Lord Clarendon, soit celle de Lord Stratford, exprime ce que le Traité à intervenir doit contenir. Mais la Russie ayant consenti à traiter non obstant la déclaration de guerre, il s'agit avant tout à engager la Porte à vouloir traiter également. Il ne sera pas difficile de concerter une note pour poser cette demande à la Porte: ce qui le sera plus, ce sera de formuler les instructions à donner aux Représentants des Quatre Cours à Constantinople,—des instructions sur ce que les instructions à donner par la Porte à son Plénipotentiaire doivent contenir.

Le Comte de Buol se propose de réunir la Conférence aussitôt que les Ministres d'Angleterre et de France auront reçu les dépêches qui leur sont annoncées, et je ne manquerai pas de rendre un compte exact de ce qui s'y sera passé.

No. 261.

The Earl of Clarendon to Mr. Buchanan.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1853.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 72 of the 5th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you had held with His Majesty the King of Denmark on the Eastern question, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government are animated by the most friendly feelings towards Denmark, and have no other wish in the event of war unfortunately breaking out between Great Britain and Russia, than that Denmark should occupy a neutral position; but they have a right to expect that that neutrality shall be *bonâ fide* and strictly observed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 262.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 405.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 9, 1853.

YOUR Lordship will have received from Frankfort the text of the declaration made by Baron Prokesch to the German Diet, announcing the reductions which have been effected in the Austrian army, and the policy of neutrality, in the present posture of affairs in the East, which his Government have adopted.

The grounds upon which the Prussian Cabinet have declined to be a party to this communication to the Diet will have been transmitted to your Lordship from Berlin. Although that decision has been received here with regret, it has in no way altered the feelings of the Government as to the identity of policy which will be followed by both Cabinets.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 263.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 55.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 76 of the 7th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which your Lordship had held with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the manifesto which had been issued by the Russian Government on the Eastern question, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion; and I have to instruct your Lordship to observe to Baron Manteuffel that this manifesto is founded on an untruth. It declares that Turkey has violated Treaties between her and Russia, but not a single instance of this has been advanced by Russia throughout the whole of the discussions, nor has a single instance been adduced of the ill-treatment of Christians, which should call forth the solicitude of the Emperor of Russia.

The sole cause of complaint urged against the Porte was that concerning the holy places, which was at once satisfactorily settled, since which the territory of the Sultan has been occupied, and Europe is exposed to the calamities of war, because the Sultan would not concede to the Emperor rights over his own subjects that would have been utterly destructive of his independence; and Count Nesselrode in his despatch rejecting the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note, has taken care that the world should labour under no mistake as to what the rights were which the Emperor required, and the Sultan most properly refused.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 264.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 56.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 14, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 77 of the 7th instant, reporting that you had urged Baron Manteuffel to instruct the Prussian Representative at Constantinople to support Lord Stratford in his endeavours to bring about a settlement of the differences between Russia and Turkey, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 265.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 14.)

(No. 406.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November* 10, 1853.

COUNT BUOL having requested Count Arnim, M. de Bourquency, and myself, to assemble at his house on the evening of the 9th instant, he stated, that when he had received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the offer to enter into negotiations with the Government of Turkey, for the re-establishment of friendly relations, he had immediately communicated it to us on the 25th of October, for the information of our Governments, with a request to know from them whether they would join in transmitting this proposition to Constantinople, and sanction a collective or identical note, recommending the Porte under certain conditions to accept it. With respect to the tenor of the note, he had

not taken upon himself to do more than state what he considered might form the substance of it.

The statement of the general heads of the arrangement he proposed had been forwarded to our Governments on the 25th of October, and subsequently, on the 6th November; he had stated them to us in greater detail, and he had consequently hoped that, as they had generally been approved of, the note might have been drawn up here, in conformity with any suggestions or modifications which the different Governments might have instructed their Representatives to attend to, or to require; but as this hope had not been fulfilled, and as the draft of a note was required to be sent to London and to Paris for approval, and the hostilities, which it was the object of a communication which was to accompany it to put a stop to, were unfortunately being carried on with considerable loss of life, he felt he was bound no longer to delay forwarding the proposal which had been entrusted to him; and therefore he had received the Emperor's orders at once to transmit it to the Internuncio, with directions to submit it to the Government of the Sultan, recommending it to their attention, and requesting that they would notify to him the decision they might come to with regard to it.

With a view, however, of acting as far as he was able, under these circumstances, in unison with the allied Governments, he had called us together for the purpose of communicating the despatch he should forward to the Internuncio; and he begged us to understand, that it was only a transmission of the proposals he had received from St. Petersburgh. As to the advice he meant to give to the Porte, it was expressed in the instructions to Baron Bruck, a copy of which I forwarded to your Lordship in my despatch No. 402, which he had communicated confidentially to Baron de Bourqueney and myself.

Count Buol then read to the Conference the draft of the note to be addressed to the Internuncio, and he has this day communicated it in the form in which he has decided to forward it, and I have the honour herewith to inclose a copy of it. Count Buol requested that we would explain to our Courts the necessity under which, after so much delay, he had felt himself obliged to adopt the course he has now taken, but that in doing so he had in no way abandoned the prospect of a collective communication of the Four Governments upon the decision which the Turkish Government will be called upon to come to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 265.

Count Buol to Baron Bruck.

Vienne, le 11 Novembre, 1853.

PAR l'office que la Sublime Porte a bien voulu adresser à votre Excellence à la date du 4 Octobre dernier (1 Moharem, 1270), le Gouvernement Impérial a vu avec peine que celui de Sa Majesté le Sultan avait abandonné l'espoir d'arranger dans les voies pacifiques son différend avec l'Empereur de Russie. Les regrets de la Cour d'Autriche ont été d'autant plus motivés qu'au moment même où la Sublime Porte en appelait au sort des armes, l'Empereur de Russie donnait à Olmütz itérativement des assurances qui, aux yeux du Cabinet de Vienne, étaient de nature à augmenter les chances d'une solution pacifique. Quoiqu'il en soit, persuadée de la haute importance qu'il y a de maintenir le principe consacré par le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, et animée du désir le plus sincère de voir conserver la paix générale, la Cour de Vienne a pris à tâche de connaître les résolutions que la déclaration de guerre de la Porte provoquerait de la part de l'Empereur de Russie.

C'est à sa grande satisfaction qu'elle a acquis la certitude que les dispositions conciliantes de Sa Majesté Impériale n'ont pas subi de modification, et qu'elle n'envisage pas le fil de négociations comme rompu par le fait de la déclaration de guerre.

Si l'Empereur demande que le culte et le clergé Grecs continuent à jouir de leurs priviléges spirituels, Sa Majesté entend expressément que ce soit sous l'égide du Sultan. Elle déclare ne pas vouloir toucher à l'indépendance et aux droits de

ce Souverain, ni s'ingérer dans les affaires intérieures de l'Empire Ottoman. Tout ce que la Russie désire obtenir, c'est l'assurance du maintien strict du *statu quo* religieux du culte Grec, savoir, une égalité entière de droits et d'immunités entre l'Eglise Grecque et les autres communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte. Par conséquent, la jouissance en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque des avantages déjà accordés à ces communautés, ainsi que la participation à ceux que le Sultan accorderait à l'avenir à d'autres rits Chrétiens. C'est sur cette base que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg est prêt à entrer avec le Gouvernement Ottoman immédiatement et directement en négociations de paix, dont le siège, selon lui, pourrait être établi à Bucarest. En attendant, l'Empereur de Russie, non obstant la déclaration de guerre de la Porte, a énoncé l'intention de ne rien changer à son attitude actuelle, et donné à ces troupes l'ordre de rester sur la défensive. Intimement convaincu que Sa Majesté le Sultan n'a, de son côté, rien de plus à cœur que de mettre le plus promptement possible un terme à l'effusion de sang qui a malheureusement déjà commencé, et qu'elle est par conséquent décidée à maintenir inaltérablement les points déjà concédés à la Russie, le Cabinet de Vienne, en mettant ces intentions du Sultan en regard de celles que l'Empereur de Russie, à son tour, a si positivement énoncées, ne saurait se refuser à l'espoir que des négociations de paix, précédées d'un armistice, ne tarderaient pas à aboutir à une prompte et franche réconciliation. C'est dans cet espoir que je charge votre Excellence d'adresser à la Sublime Porte les plus vives instances pour qu'elle fasse un accueil favorable aux propositions renfermées dans la présente dépêche et dictées par l'amitié sincère que l'Empereur notre auguste maître voue à Sa Majesté le Sultan, ainsi que par le vif intérêt qu'il attache au prompt rétablissement des bons rapports entre les deux Empires voisins.

Votre Excellence est autorisée à remettre à Reshid Pasha une copie de cette dépêche, en témoignant à M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères le haut prix que nous attacherions à la voir accueillie dans la même esprit de conciliation qui nous a dicté la présente démarche.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BUOL.

No. 266.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 292.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 15*, 1853.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 597 of the 5th instant, in which you report that you have been informed by Count Nesselrode of the appointment of General Budberg as Russian Commissioner in the Principalities, I have to observe that although Count Nesselrode has assured you that it is not the intention of the Emperor to incorporate the two Provinces, yet his Excellency must be aware of the unfavourable impression that will be produced by the appointment of a Russian Commissioner, and the inferences that must necessarily be drawn from it, viz., that Commissioner means Governor, and Governor means permanent retention of the Principalities; and this inference will be further justified by the reason given for the appointment, as the absence of the Hospodars is duly provided for by the "Réglemens Organiques" of the two Principalities. A council to carry on the Government was appointed accordingly: the members of which it was composed were presented to Prince Gortchakoff, who, as Her Majesty's Government is informed, recognised their official character by desiring them to make it publicly known that if any person of any rank whatever, should indulge in remarks on Russia, or on the present state of affairs, in the slightest degree disparagingly to the Imperial Government, such offender should immediately be hanged, be he Grand Bars (the highest rank), or simple elder of a village.

You will, however, ask Count Nesselrode what the intentions of the Russian

Government really are, and you will formally protest in the name of Her Majesty's Government against any project of incorporating the Principalities either now or at any future period with Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 267.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 15, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 81 of the 11th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the manifesto which has been issued by the Russian Government on the Eastern question, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 268.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 848. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November* 14, 1853.

ONE of my colleagues, who is desirous that his name should not be mentioned, has had the goodness to communicate to me in strict confidence the substance of a conversation which he held the day before yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He went to the Foreign Department with the intention of inquiring whether the French Government recognized and adopted as its own the article in the "Moniteur," inclosed in my despatch No. 843, commenting on the Russian Manifesto of the 20th of October (o. s.). He observed, that he thought the tone of it somewhat keen, inasmuch as the name of the Emperor of Russia was so often referred to. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that, as a Minister, he had no explanations to give respecting an article in the "Moniteur;" but that, as a private individual, he had no objection to state that articles of the kind were sometimes necessary; that although there was no longer a Chamber of Deputies in France, there existed a public opinion of which account must be taken, and which it was necessary to enlighten. In the present critical state of affairs it was impossible to know how soon France might be called upon to make sacrifices in defence of the public rights of Europe; and the Government considered it therefore necessary from time to time to pronounce an opinion respecting the state of public affairs, in order that France might not be taken by surprise, and might know if she was called upon to make sacrifices, for what those sacrifices were required. As to the frequent reference to the Emperor of Russia, to which my informant had alluded, M. Drouyn de Lhuys could only say that as it was in the Emperor's name that the Russian Manifesto was published, His Majesty became responsible for the contents of it; and if he chose to assert that which was not true, the contradiction must be made to apply to him.

The conversation then turned on the present state of the Eastern question, when M. Drouyn Lhuys declared that he saw but one chance of terminating it, namely, that the Four Powers should meet in Conference, and summon the belligerent Powers to retire, the one behind the Pruth, and the other behind the Danube, and to send Plenipotentiaries to treat for peace. That if either party refused their assent to this proposition, the Four Powers should declare that they would abstain from all further interference; that they should at the same time bind themselves by a solemn engagement, whichever way the war might terminate, whether to the advantage of Russia or of Turkey, not to permit the present territorial arrangement of Europe to be disturbed; and that they should pledge themselves to employ, if necessary, their united forces to prevent it. If this is done, said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, it may be hoped that the belligerent parties, seeing that no real advantage can be gathered on either side from the continuance of the war, will put a stop to a useless effusion of blood; and, either by direct negotiation, or through the mediation of the Four Powers, arrive at an arrangement of their quarrel.

My informant observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the language of the French Government had changed within the last few days; that when M. Drouyn de Lhuys had last spoken to him he seemed inclined to favour the continuance of the Conference at Vienna, and the measures which Count Buol had proposed.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys rejoined that events had marched with great rapidity since; that the action of Austria was less decided than ever; that what was possible a short time back was impracticable now. "In short," he added, "you may consider me as having made the proposition for a Conference on the terms mentioned above, and report it to your Government."

My informant then addressed M. Drouyn de Lhuys as follows; "I do not ask you as French Minister for Foreign Affairs, but as M. Drouyn de Lhuys, whether you have really any hope of an early reconciliation between Russia and Turkey." M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, "I will answer as a private individual in language which it would not be right in me to employ as a Minister. I have no such hope. My conviction is that Russia has no intention of terminating this quarrel but in a manner advantageous to herself, unless indeed Austria or Prussia will take a decided tone, which would materially alter the whole question. As it is, what has Russia to fear? Whatever may be the present partial successes of the Turks, they cannot continue. England and France cannot by their fleets prevent a Russian occupation of the Principalities; but a word from Austria, or even decisive language on the part of Prussia, would force the Emperor of Russia to retire. He could not brave all Europe. But he knows that neither Austria nor Prussia will speak that word; therefore, I repeat it, my conviction is the Emperor of Russia is not sincere in his protestations in favour of peace; his object is to gain time and to keep the Principalities."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 269.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 82 of the 11th instant, requesting instructions for your guidance in the event of a Russian military officer being appointed to the government of the Danubian Principalities, I have to inform you that it has been left to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to give the necessary instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls in the Principalities; but if the government provided by the Constitution is superseded by a Russian Commissioner or Governor, it will be impossible for any English political agent to remain there.

I transmit to you a copy of a despatch* which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh on this subject, in reply to his No. 597 to which you refer.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 270.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 59.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 84 of the 11th instant, reporting that you are convinced the Prussian Government is prepared to

* No. 266.

support any project which Her Majesty's Government may bring forward for the attainment of peace between Russia and Turkey, I have to convey to your Lordship the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this announcement.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 271.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 457.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

I INCLOSE the copy of a despatch* which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, with reference to the instructions which Count Buol proposes to send to the Internuncio, as stated in the inclosed copy of a despatch† which I have received from Lord Westmorland.

Your Excellency will communicate my despatch to Lord Westmorland to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and inform me whether it meets with the concurrence of the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 272.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 378.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 402, inclosing the draft of instructions which Count Buol proposes to send to the Internuncio for the direction of his conduct in recommending to the Government of the Sultan the course they might pursue in the negotiation with Russia, which will have been proposed to them by the collective note of the four Representatives.

Your Lordship states that Count Buol is aware that in the mediating position of Austria more management of terms is required towards Russia than from England and France, but the objects to be obtained by the Four Powers being the same, a general concordance in the way of putting them forward may be of the greatest utility.

Your Lordship will renew to Count Buol the assurances of the satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government will experience in cooperating with the Austrian Government towards the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte; but it seems necessary in the first instance to agree upon the collective note that is to be presented to the Porte, before the instructions with reference to the answer that is to be returned to it are taken into consideration.

The note should in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government simply state the desire of the Four Powers to mediate between the belligerent parties, and to stop the further effusion of blood; that they have received assurances of the readiness of Russia to treat, and not doubting that the Porte is animated by the same spirit, they request to know upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace.

On the assumption that this form of collective note is adopted by the Four Powers, I will now proceed to state the views of Her Majesty's Government upon Count Buol's draft of instructions.

Her Majesty's Government do not consider that the object which the Four Powers have in view would be advanced by an argument founded on the conciliatory dispositions displayed by Russia. The recent manifesto of the Emperor, the appointment of a Russian Governor in the Principalities, and the announcement of Prince Gortchakoff that the subjects of the Sultan in Wallachia and Moldavia who spoke disrespectfully of Russia should be hanged without trial,

* No. 272. † No. 255

render the allusion suggested by Count Buol impossible; but Her Majesty's Government entirely concur with his Excellency that no project of answer should be submitted to the Turkish Minister, and they should be left free to reply in the manner they may think fitting.

In the probable events of the four Representatives being consulted with respect to the answer, Her Majesty's Government, taking the different heads in the order proposed by Count Buol, would be prepared to recommend—

1st. That the Porte should declare that it always has manifested its desire to put an end to the difference, and is still ready to come to an understanding with Russia.

2nd. That the Porte having received formal assurances through the Four Powers that Russia seeks no rights nor any new concessions from the Sultan, and upon the condition that the Principalities are evacuated with the least possible delay, is prepared on her part to renew her former offers.

3rd. That the form in which peace shall be re-established and the religious question settled shall be matter for negotiation, upon the understanding that the Porte is not required to accede to any demands to which she has already objected.

4th. That the Porte should appoint a negotiator and furnish him with full powers to treat with a Russian negotiator.

5th. Her Majesty's Government, without any desire to fetter the decision of the Porte, will certainly recommend that the Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiaries should not meet together alone, and that the place of meeting should not be in any portion of the Sultan's territory now occupied by Russian troops. Her Majesty's Government consider that the intervention of the Four Powers in the settlement of a question which vitally affects the present and future peace of Europe is indispensable, and they think that the neutral place in which the negotiations for this object are to be conducted, should be left to the selection of the Porte, subject, of course, to the assent of Russia.

6th. The cessation of hostilities would at this moment manifestly be to the disadvantage of the Porte: if she were now to consent to an armistice for six weeks, at the end of which the negotiators found themselves unable to agree upon the terms of peace, but during which Russian reinforcements would have arrived in the Principalities, the position of Russia would be greatly improved, while that of Turkey would be proportionably deteriorated. But if the Porte received assurances from the Four Powers that the terms on which she was willing to treat would, without any essential modification, be accepted by Russia, then Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to recommend that an armistice should be forthwith concluded between the belligerent parties, who should fix the line of demarcation that would separate the two armies.

Your Lordship will give a copy of this despatch to Count Buol. If his Excellency agrees in the advice which Her Majesty's Government is prepared to offer to the Porte, instructions to that effect will be sent to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, provided that they meet with the concurrence of the French Government. This despatch shall be communicated by Lord Cowley to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who will doubtless send instructions by telegraph to the Baron de Bourqueney.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 273.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 379.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 406 of the 16th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Count Buol to Baron Bruck, has been received and laid before the Queen.

Her Majesty's Government could not have concurred in Count Buol's despatch, and they are satisfied, therefore, that they come to a right decision in declining to agree to any proposal to the Turkish Government that had not

previously been proposed for their consideration; but they regret that Count Buol did not think it expedient to comply with their request, as little if any delay would have been thereby occasioned, and Count Buol might possibly have been persuaded not to take a step which Her Majesty's Government fear will prove useless.

The despatch to Baron Bruck contains nothing new; it merely reiterates the assurances that the Emperor of Russia has always been willing to give, but it affords no intimation, and still less any guarantee, to the Porte that His Imperial Majesty desists from demanding rights which he professes to have no intention of exercising; and if the Turkish Government now consented to an armistice and to commence a negotiation upon the vague and indefinite terms proposed to them by Count Buol, they would simply restore things to the state in which they were on the day that Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople.

Her Majesty's Government accordingly regret that offers which cannot be accepted should be made to the Porte, as they must serve to irritate the Turkish Government and to indispose them to listen to advice which it would be for their interest to adopt.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—You will communicate this despatch to Count Buol.

No. 274.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 296.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November* 16, 1853.

THE manifesto of the Emperor of Russia has been received with astonishment and regret by Her Majesty's Government, and by all classes of people in this country.

It may be intended only for the Russian people; but a manifesto assigning the reasons of the Emperor of Russia for declaring war against Turkey is a document of the highest importance, and challenges the criticism of Europe.

It is difficult to comprehend what can have been the inducement to put forward statements that recent events enable every man to contradict. Facts do not bear out the statement that the principal Powers of Europe had in vain endeavoured to shake the blind obstinacy of the Porte; it is true that they endeavoured to mediate, and the Porte showed itself willing to adopt their advice with certain modifications; those Powers then attempted to shake the determination of Russia, but in vain; they received only proofs of how real were the dangers apprehended by the Porte.

The manifesto complains of the violation of Treaties, and implies that the Greek religion in Turkey stands in need of defence; but no Treaty has been violated by the Porte, and no specific charge of that nature has at any time been brought forward; no complaint has been heard from the Greek Patriarch or the Greek subjects of the Sultan; on the contrary there have been expressions of gratitude to the Sultan for the privileges he has confirmed, and they have not invoked the protectorate that Russia was desirous to exercise.

No Treaty has in fact been violated except that which forbids the passage of the Pruth to Russian soldiers; and Russia has no right to say she has been provoked to war when the Sultan, after long forbearance, endeavours to repel the invader from the Turkish soil. The Sultan has not appealed to the fanaticism of his people, and he has given no offence to Russia beyond refusing to grant what Russia had no right to demand, and which it would have been fatal to his independence to concede.

A comparison between the conduct and the good faith of the two Powers has thus been forced upon Europe, and the manifesto has therefore rendered signal service to Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 275.

The Hon. William Grey to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Stockholm, November* 7, 1853.

BARON STJERNELD, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, having this day resumed his duties for the first time since his late severe illness, I had the honour of presenting to his Excellency your Lordship's letter accrediting me in the character of Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm during the absence of Her Majesty's Minister.

I took the opportunity of saying to Baron Stjerneld that your Lordship had heard with great satisfaction from Sir E. Lyons that, in the event of a war between England and Russia, it would be the object of the Swedish Government to maintain a strict neutrality.

His Excellency interrupted me at once, saying that he had instructed Baron Rehausen to make a verbal declaration to that effect to your Lordship; and he repeated to me very earnestly that the neutrality of Sweden would, in the event of a war, be a most strict and *bond fide* one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. GREY.

No. 276.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, Thursday* [*November* 17.]

Bucharest, 14.—THE Turks, after destroying the[ir] fortifications at Oltenizza, have recrossed the Danube without being molested. The Russian force concentrated round Oltenizza amounted to 45,000 men. On the 13th the Russian Manifesto was read in all the churches of Bucharest. Shots are continually exchanged near Giurgevo. The Turks and Russians are both trying to get possession of the Island of Mokanon. General Englehardt is advancing from Ibrailh on Gaurna-Tatomnitza with a brigade of the 5th corps. He has been replaced by a part of the reserve of the 4th corps, which have latterly entered Moldavia. The reserves are estimated at about 12,000 men.

No. 277.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 17.)

(No. 91.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 15, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith an article from the "Zeit," commenting on the Russian manifesto and the late military events on the Danube.

I have selected this article as the "Zeit" may be regarded as a semi-official journal, and its language is therefore constrained to be more moderate than that of the other journals. But with the exception of the "Kreuz Zeitung," entirely devoted to Russia, all the Berlin press express, in the strongest terms, their disapprobation of Russian policy and their hostility to Russian aggression. In this respect I conceive that public opinion in this country is almost unanimous. It is so universal, and so deeply rooted among all classes, that no Government would presume to act in opposition to it by entering into any alliance with Russia.

The policy pursued by Baron Manteuffel is based on the public opinion of the country; it is in harmony with the national will; consequently, Baron Manteuffel has acquired greater popularity, and his public position is now strengthened by the junction of all parties in support of his external policy.

It is felt that he has restored a position of independence to Prussia, and that he has completely detached her from those influences of Austria and Russia which were galling to the national pride. He has thus compensated for the painful position in which Prussia was placed in 1850, at Olmütz; and from which, at that time, his moral courage rescued her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 277.

Article from the "Zeit" Newspaper.

(Translation.) *Berlin, November* 12, 1853.

THE Russian manifesto, so long denied yet now produced, has materially altered the position of things. The hopes of peace, which it was thought could be attached to the silence of Russia, are now that Russia has spoken without foundation. Both parties have proclaimed war, and the existing question will now hardly be decided any other way than by arms: by the victory of the one and the defeat of the other.

It is more difficult to say now than a few months ago, which side will be triumphant. A compact and well-disciplined Russian force was then opposed by a weak ill-organised army, which, it was to be foreseen, would be overthrown at the first onset. To-day, there is a material difference. The Turkish Empire, consumptive and gradually expiring as everybody believed, has risen with an energy which is the more surprising, as it was not in the least expected. We see enormous masses gathered from all corners of Asia and Africa; and what they want in discipline and military practice, is made up by the religious fanaticism which has been awakened in them.

Nevertheless, the expectations of Turkey are not so favourable as might appear. We must not be deceived by momentary successes of the Turkish arms on the Danube and in Asia, though it is certain that these successes will have great influence on the spirit and the confidence of the Turkish troops. As yet, Russia has not unfolded her power; as yet, it is only with inconsiderable portions of the Russian army that the Turkish soldiers have come into collision; only in a great regular action, in an open battle, will it be shown whether the Turkish regiments are a match for those of Russia.

On the other hand, the defensive power of Turkey has been generally under-rated; Russia may have been mistaken in this point.* On both sides appeals have been made to religion, and wars waged under the banner of religion are the bloodiest and most inveterate; both parties have appealed to their holy and just cause. The Emperor of Russia declares the defence of the orthodox faith in the East the object of his legitimate solicitude. It is quite apparent that, in the present defined state of things, diplomatic negotiation is no longer possible.

The duty of the Powers who are earnest in maintaining general peace, will now be to take care that the war, which has broke out and can no more be repressed by mediating intervention, be fought out alone by the parties who believe themselves to be in a situation to prefer war to peace—that its origina local character may not become universal. As yet, there is every reason for expecting that this will be the case.

The war on the Danube and the Black Sea will, therefore, it is to be hoped, affect us no further than that we shall follow it with interest and attention.

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* This time she will not come so easily by her victories as in 1828; the resistance of the Turks will be much more decided and more violent than it was then.

No. 278.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 15, 1853.

I HAVE not failed to execute your Lordship's instructions, and to inform Baron Manteuffel of the circumstances which had occasioned the presentation of the two projects (mentioned in my despatch No 71 of the 4th instant) by the French Minister at this Court, when only one had been submitted officially to his Excellency by Her Majesty's Government.

Indeed, this explanation was scarcely necessary, for Baron Manteuffel had been convinced, both from the assurances given by M. de Moustier and myself, as well as from the nature of those "projets," and the instructions which accompanied them, that there was no reason to regard them in a distinct light, or as offering any grounds for placing in doubt the unity of views and opinions of the Two Cabinets; and his Excellency informed me that, viewing them in this sense, he had expressed to Count Arnim his preference for one of the former, although he had subscribed to the one which had emanated from your Lordship.

I took occasion, however, to reiterate to his Excellency the cordial unanimity and perfect understanding which exists between the English and French Governments.

I am led to believe that intrigues are constantly in action here to awaken fear and suspicion of France, in order to deter the Government from any active support or cooperation with the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 279.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 15, 1853.

I AGAIN reverted this evening, in conversation with Baron Manteuffel, to the position of the Prussian Agents in the Danubian Provinces since the departure of the Hospodars.

His Excellency informed me that he had learnt from Baron Wildenbruch that this subject had been mentioned to him by Reshid Pasha, and that Baron Wildenbruch had stated to the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs that, as those Consular Agents were accredited to the persons of the Hospodars, their official functions would cease on the departure of those Princes.

On the communication of Baron Wildenbruch's report to the King, His Majesty directed that on no account should any statement of Baron Wildenbruch be disavowed.

Baron Manteuffel told me that as these agents are under the direction of the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, it is probable that Baron Wildenbruch will have instructed them in the sense of his statement to Reshid Pasha.

His Excellency added, that it was desirable that they should not be withdrawn, as they might at this moment be called upon to render material service in protecting Prussian subjects.

I remarked, that they should take care to guard against any act which could be taken as a recognition of the Government installed by Russia; and that, therefore, any services which they might be called upon to render to Prussian subjects should be exercised "officieusement," and not officially.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 280.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 17.)

(No. 94. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 15, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this evening that he had received a despatch from Count Arnim, dated Vienna the 11th instant, stating that, at a Conference held on the previous day, Count Buol informed the Representatives of the Four Powers, that in the present state of affairs it was most urgent that some collective step in the sense of his last proposal should be taken at Constantinople, and that he was anxiously awaiting a reply from London and Paris with respect to the projet de note which had been transmitted to those Cabinets.

Count Buol further communicated a despatch which he had addressed to the Internuncio, stating that he had been commissioned by the Russian Government to convey to the Porte the pacific disposition of the Emperor Nicholas, and the further assurances which had been given by the Emperor at Olmütz, which despatch was to be forwarded to Baron de Bruck (that evening) on the 11th instant.

Baron Manteuffel expressed himself as being at a loss to comprehend the sense of Count Buol's communication, and laid particular stress on the plea put forth by Count Buol, which was also observed upon by M. de Bourqueney at the Conference, of "his having been commissioned by the Russian Government to take this step," and which he (Count Buol) added he felt himself bound to fulfil.

I observed to Baron Manteuffel that if Count Buol felt himself in duty bound to fulfil any commission he had accepted from the Emperor of Russia, he was certainly at liberty to do so without the concurrence of the other members of the Conference, and I remarked to him that it would appear like a mockery to the Sublime Porte to convey the assurances of the Emperor of Russia's pacific disposition towards Turkey at the moment when a sanguinary contest was raging between their two armies on the Danube.

I further remarked to his Excellency, that the moment to present notes or projets de notes was passed; that war in all its intensity had put an end to any amicable arrangement otherwise than by a formal Treaty; and that before resuming negotiations, the combatants must be brought to a stand-still by means of an "armistice."

I stated that this armistice could not now be sought for at Constantinople. In my opinion it could only be obtained at the seat of war; and that even there some favourable opportunity must be waited for to propose it with any chance of success.

I observed that his Excellency was more deeply impressed than I had before seen him with the serious aspect of affairs, and he is evidently alarmed that the complication of this Oriental question may ultimately endanger the European peace.

In terminating his despatch, Count Arnim requested to know whether he was authorised by his Government to sign any collective note to the Porte which might be agreed upon by the Conference at Vienna. Baron Manteuffel told me that he should give no such instructions to Count Arnim without first being made acquainted with the terms of that note; and said that, as any such note would probably be transmitted by your Lordship through Berlin to Vienna, and possibly communicated to him by me in the event of its approval by the English Cabinet, he should await that communication, and should then furnish Count Arnim with the necessary instructions.

His Excellency also intimated to me (I am not certain whether he has done so to Count Arnim) that, as Baron Wildenbruch has received his instructions to support Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in any possible overture which may tend to peace, he will be enabled to exercise his own discretion in the event of any new propositions being addressed to the Porte.

Your Lordship will receive a more detailed account of the Conference to

which Count Arnim refers from Her Majesty's Envoy at Vienna. I was unable, from the hurried manner in which that despatch was read to me, to glean more than its general substance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 281.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 856.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 17, 1853.*

M. DE LHUYS has addressed a circular to the French Diplomatic Agents abroad in the sense and spirit of your Lordship's circular of the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 282.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 409.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 14, 1853.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 392, which reports the communication made to you by Count Colloredo of the despatch addressed to him by Count Buol after the Conference of the 30th ultimo, and which also states the opinions your Lordship expressed in reply to Count Colloredo.

Count Buol considers these opinions as agreeing with his own in substance, and differing only in details easy of explanation.

Your Lordship desired that the note proposed by Count Buol to be addressed by the four Representatives at Constantinople to the Porte, should be transmitted to London for approval. He considered this desire perfectly natural, but he would prefer having the note emanate from you, to drawing it up himself. So much delay had, however, taken place since he received the declaration of the readiness of the Russian Government to treat, and serious events pressed on so rapidly, that he felt it was obligatory upon him not to withhold a day longer than necessary informing the Turkish Government of the opening offered for negotiation. He had fulfilled this obligation by his despatch to the Internuncio, of which he had placed a copy in the hands of the Representatives at the Conference, but he had little expectation of any successful result for this document; and he had therefore forwarded the Russian proposals merely as discharging a duty imposed upon him, and had abstained from entering into the merits of them, and had confined his opinions upon them to his communications with the Conference, and the proposed instructions to the Internuncio, which he had confidentially submitted to Baron Bourqueney and me. He felt convinced that the only chance that existed of inducing the Porte to listen to the recommendations he had proposed to offer, was that they should be supported by the combined influence of the Four Powers. He had, therefore, abstained from forwarding them, in the hope that your Lordship would now draw up a note which he would receive with the anxious desire of concurring in it, and should he consider any modification desirable, it might be speedily arranged by telegraphic communication. He will greatly prefer that the note should originate in London rather than Vienna.

I then proceeded to read to Count Buol the parts of your Lordship's despatch No. 266, addressed to Lord Stratford, in which you state that, "although a Treaty is indispensable for the establishment of peace between the two countries, Her Majesty's Government are still of opinion that a note will be the most effectual mode of terminating the dissensions that have arisen upon religious points;" and that "it will be obviously expedient that when this negotiation commences, it should be accompanied by an armistice." Count Buol entirely concurs in these proposals, which are in conformity with his own views,

He conceives them likely to produce the best results; and he hopes, therefore, that your Lordship will not delay in transmitting to him, first, the project of note to be addressed to the Porte, inviting the Sultan's Government to treat; secondly, the general form and stipulations of the Treaty; and lastly, the draft of the note by which you would propose the religious questions to be arranged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 283.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 604.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 7, 1853.*

A FEW days ago the destruction of a Russian hussar regiment in Wallachia was much talked about.

At present there are rumours in circulation of the forces under Prince Gortchakoff having been defeated in two engagements.

I allude to these statements, which possibly may be without foundation, for the purpose of observing that all the flying rumours which have prevailed here have been unfavourable to the Russians—a tolerably clear indication, it may be assumed, that the public do not regard with much satisfaction the war in which they find themselves engaged.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 284.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 18.)

(No. 606.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 6, 1853.*

I BEG to transmit to your Lordship a letter which reached me yesterday evening from Mr. Consul-General Yeames, giving an account of the affair between the small Russian flotilla and the Turkish batteries of Isaktcha, which took place on the 23rd ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 284.

Consul-General Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *Odessa, October 28, 1853.*

THE announcement of your sudden departure from St. Petersburgh in one of the Russian newspapers, subsequently contradicted, could not fail, for a time, causing me extreme inquietude; and to the present day every circumstance around us is of a nature to darken the gloom rather than to inspire confidence.

I shall probably not be the first to inform you, Sir, that hostilities commenced on the Danube early in the morning of last Sunday, the 23rd instant.

Eight gun-boats, with six companies on board, had on the preceding day been detached from the Russian flotilla stationed at Ismail, to proceed to Galatz and Ibraila in tow of two steamers, the "Pruth" of 100, and the "Vodinaretz," of 60 horse-power. On nearing Isaktcha, it became evident that the further progress of the boats would be opposed; upon which four guns were hastily brought down to the left bank from Satanova, where 6,000 Russians are posted, in order to cover the passage, and a cannonade immediately ensued from both sides across the river. The Turkish fire was soon diverted by the approach of the flotilla, upon which it was then directed; the cannonade was returned by

the boats, and continued until it had ascended beyond the line of the Turkish fire.

The passage was thus effected, and its success is said to have caused animation along the Russian lines.

The loss on this side is reported to be 3 killed and 3 wounded, at the Satanova battery; and in the boats, 6 killed and 70 wounded, and among those that fell was unfortunately the commanding officer of the expedition.

I have seen no account of the extent of damage done to the steamer and gun-boats; but it is asserted that the Turkish battery was dismantled, and that the village of Isaktcha was seen in flames in two different places.

I am told that on the night of that day a Turkish force crossed over into Tchetal, one of the islands of the Delta opposite to Ismail, with guns, and opened a fire upon the bridge of pontoons at that place.

The particulars are not yet known to me, but it is certain that many of the inhabitants of Ismail have in their alarm fled into the country.

Apprehensions are manifested, even here, of some possible hostile demonstration by sea, and orders have been given to strengthen the batteries of the two moles.

Yesterday an Austrian steamer arrived from the Bosphorus, having on board the remaining members of the late Russian Mission, and after having landed her passengers, immediately sailed on its return.

Our news from Constantinople comes down to the 24th. There were no disturbances in that city.

The combined fleets had not arrived, but a part of them was expected on the following day.

I am sorry to say that hostilities are reported to have taken place on the Asiatic frontiers likewise.

Great efforts were still made to bring forward new armaments, exhibiting a greater vitality than Turkey was supposed to possess.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 285.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 318.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 26, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is copy of a note addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Austrian Internuncio, in reply to the Porte's notification of the Sultan's request that the British and French squadrons should enter the Dardanelles.

M. de Bruck had previously sent word to Reshid Pasha that his Government regretted the failure of the efforts to produce a reconciliation between Russia and the Porte; intimating at the same time that it saw no further prospect of employing its good offices for that purpose usefully.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 285.

Baron Bruck to Reshid Pasha.

Buyukdéré, le 24 *Octobre*, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Internonce et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, en ayant l'honneur d'accuser à son Altesse Reshid Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, réception de la note 18 Mouharem, 1270 (21 Octobre, 1853), relativement à l'invitation adressée par la Sublime Porte aux flottes réunies de France et d'Angleterre de passer dans l'intérieur du Détroit des Dardanelles, se réserve de faire connaître dans le temps à son Altesse Reshid Pasha les décisions que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique pourrait être dans le cas de prendre par suite de la mesure précitée; et saisit, &c.

(Signé) V. BRUCK.

No. 286.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 319.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October* 29, 1853.

HOSTILITIES commenced between Turkey and Russia on Sunday, the 23rd instant.

Omer Pasha has written to the Seraskier, to say that about fifty soldiers crossed the Danube at Tutrachan in boats, attacked an advanced post of Cossacks, killed four of them and took two. He states, moreover, that some of the Egyptian troops swam across the river at Carason, and performed a similar exploit.

Whether the Turkish Commander's object was merely to mark the beginning of hostilities, to ascertain the practicability of effecting a passage, or to encourage his army, I know not. If he had no distinct object in view, the sacrifice of human life, though on a small scale, appears to have been very wanton.

I hear, from the best authority, that Omer Pasha thinks seriously of crossing the Danube with a much larger force, and that he reckons with confidence on a successful operation. I am assured that the Porte has written to admonish him of the danger of such an undertaking, and to recommend a more prudent course. Much appears to be left to the General's discretion, and his character for boldness warrants some apprehension of his compromising the Sultan's interests by a premature attack.

The officer who was sent to Shumla with the Porte's orders for a suspension

of hostilities arrived there too late. I have applied to Reshid Pasha for an explanation of this incident, which, however, is practically of little consequence in the present state of our information from Vienna, and his Highness has replied that Omer Pasha, calculating from the day on which he knew that his summons had been received by Prince Gortchakoff, considered the term of fifteen days as having expired on Sunday, the 23rd. It appears from Colonel Neale's report, that the Porte's officer disembarked at Varna on the 22nd, and proceeded to Shumla without delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 287.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 321.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

IT is my duty to inform your Lordship that Captain Slade, who holds the temporary rank of rear-admiral in the Turkish service, under circumstances known to Her Majesty's Government, is gone into the Black Sea in command of a double-banked Turkish frigate. He called a few days ago to inform me of this intention, and I reminded him of the heavy personal responsibility which he would incur by placing himself, while a half-pay officer in Her Majesty's service, in a situation where he might be called upon in the performance of his duty towards the Sultan, to take part in attacking the forces of a power which is still at peace with his own Sovereign. I warned him of my inability, without instructions from your Lordship, to interfere on his behalf, if the fortune of war should betray him, as a prisoner, into the hands of the Russians.

I have explained my view of the matter to Reshid Pasha, and I request that your Lordship will inform me whether that view, such as I have described it above, is correct.

Your Lordship will, no doubt, remember that Captain Slade was received into the Turkish service, by arrangement between the Porte and myself, for the purpose of tendering advice on naval matters to the Captain Pasha.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—From information which has reached me since writing the above, I have reason to doubt whether Captain Slade has the command of the frigate in which he is embarked.

It is for your Lordship to judge how far that circumstance makes, if it be correct, any difference of principle in the considerations attached to his position.

No. 288.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 323.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA has for some time made up his mind to confirm the Porte's original instructions to the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, commanding them to retire from their respective Principalities; but the preparation of the letters addressed to them for that purpose has undergone some unexplained delay. The letters are now ready, and have the Sultan's sanction for their transmission to Bucharest and Jassy; but the state of war between Russia and Turkey has obliged the Porte to request my assistance for conveying them respectively to those places.

This I propose to do in concert with the French Ambassador, who agrees

with me in approving Reshid Pasha's opinion that the Consuls accredited to the Hospodars ought to withdraw, as the latter are commanded to do from the Principalities.

Feeling myself at liberty under your Lordship's instructions to act in this manner, I have given the necessary directions to Mr. Colquhoun and also to Mr. Gardner.

A copy of my despatch to both of them is inclosed herewith; and M. de la Cour writes to their French colleagues in the same sense.

With respect to Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Galatz and Ibraila, I am still desirous of leaving him at his post for the protection of our commercial and shipping interests.

A copy of the instruction which I have addressed to him is inclosed herewith. It remains to be seen how long the course of events in the Black Sea will allow him to act upon it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 288.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Consul Gardner.

Sir, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Porte having confirmed its original orders to the two Hospodars, to the effect of commanding them in the Sultan's name to retire from the Principalities, after making such temporary arrangement as circumstances may allow for the administration of the country by means of the Boyards, and hostilities having actually commenced between the respective armies on the Danube, I have to instruct you to retire with all convenient expedition from the Principality of Wallachia, after providing for the safety of the consular correspondence, archives, and deposits, in the most available manner you may have it in power to adopt.

You are authorised to leave some person, having the proper qualifications and worthy of confidence, to look after the more urgent interests of British subjects; and before your departure you will introduce the object of your choice to the principal local authority for that purpose.

Instructions of similar purport are addressed by the French Ambassador to M. Poujade and to M. Tastu.

As you will probably find it most convenient to repair to Varna, I shall take care to provide you with suitable means of conveyance from that port to Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

N.B.—A similar despatch was addressed on the same day to Consul Colquhoun.

Inclosure 2 in No. 288.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Consul Cunningham.

(Private and Confidential.)

Dear Sir, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

I INCLOSE herewith for your own information a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to-day to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy.

Mr. Colquhoun having a political character as agent, and Mr. Gardner residing at the court of a Prince, similarly circumstanced with the Hospodar of Wallachia, there could be no hesitation as to the propriety of their retirement from the Principalities. The case is different with respect to you; and commercial and shipping interests placed under your charge have the strongest claims to our protection, especially at a moment when the exportation of grain to England and France is going on to so great an extent. It is, therefore, my wish and intention, that you should hold on as long as possible, applying to the

local authorities while you are allowed to do so with good effect, and even to the Russian intruders, when forced by their arrangements to do so. How long this annoyance may be necessary, and how soon it may cease to be possible, I cannot yet undertake to say; but my expectation is, that the Russian Commander-in-chief will now exert a direct authority over the Principalities, and it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the contingencies which may raise immediate differences and bring on rupture and war between Russia on the one side and England and France on the other.

The combined squadrons are now within the Dardanelles, and detachments of them will be in the Bosphorus as soon as the violence of the prevalent north-east winds will allow.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 289.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 324.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Sultan has publicly announced his intention of going to Adrianople in the spring, with the view, as it would seem, of encouraging his army, and perhaps even of making his appearance at the camp. This ulterior object is rather intimated than announced in the rescript or hatti sheriff addressed by His Majesty to the Grand Vizier, copy of which, in translation, is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 289.

Hatti-Sheriff.

(Traduit du Turc.)

Mon Illustre Vizir,

DU jour que la probabilité que les différens survenus entre notre Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie aboutiraient à une guerre, a acquis de la consistance, j'ai observé dans nos troupes Impériales, et parmi tous les fonctionnaires et tous nos sujets, à l'occasion des préparatifs de tout genre qui étaient entrepris, un enthousiasme et des preuves de zèle et de fidélité qui ont mérité tous mes éloges; et je ne doute pas que dans cette circonstance chacun redoublera désormais de zèle et d'efforts dans l'accomplissement de son devoir.

Comme l'objet principal de cette guerre est de maintenir les droits sacrés et l'indépendance de notre Sublime Porte, j'ai pris la résolution, mettant ma confiance dans l'assistance divine du Souverain Créateur et dans les mérites du Saint Prophète, et pour prendre part en personne à l'accomplissement d'un pareil devoir, de me mettre, s'il plaît à Dieu, en voyage au printemps prochain.

Il faut par conséquent que l'on fasse dès à présent les préparatifs nécessaires de notre voyage Impérial suivi d'un cortège; notre première station sera à Andrinople, et il faut fournir les troupes qui doivent m'accompagner de tous les objets dont elles ont besoin. Tu auras donc à te concerter avec tous nos Ministres pour prendre les mesures que la circonstance exige.

Que le Très-Haut veuille, par considération pour son Saint Prophète, notre Seigneur, faire toujours triompher notre Sublime Porte, et combler de bonheur dans ce monde et dans l'autre ceux qui auront fait preuve de zèle dans cette cause sacrée.

Le 18 Mouharrem, 1270. (31 *Octobre*, 1853.)

No. 290.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 326.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 31, 1853.*

THE Greeks have followed the example of the Armenians in presenting an address to the Porte expressive of their loyalty, gratitude, and devotion to the Sultan's Government. A French translation of the address is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. The original, in Turkish, was drawn up by a Bulgarian Greek, who owes his fortune to the Porte, in a strain better suited to the past than to the present times. It contained passages of such exaggerated and ignominious flattery, even in a religious sense, that I made it a point of duty to insist upon its being reduced to its present form, even after it had received the signatures of the Patriarch and Synod. This was effected by the exercise of private influence; and I am persuaded that a service has been thereby rendered both to the Porte and to the Greek nation, whose spiritual chiefs had laid themselves open to the suspicion of having sacrificed even their religious sentiments to some unworthy motive. The present form of address, though not a little Oriental in its expressions, may be considered as fairly representing, in substance, the improved state of feeling between the Porte and its Christian subjects, especially with reference to the existing pretensions of Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 290.

Address of the Greek Nation to the Porte.

(Traduction.)

LA nation Grecque, humble et fidèle sujette de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, rend grâces à Dieu qui, dans sa sagesse providentielle, avait inspiré à Hazreti-Omer, de glorieuse mémoire, de promulguer, il y a douze siècles, l'édit sacré que prescrit que la vie, la propriété et l'honneur des Chrétiens Grecs que la volonté Divine venait de placer sous l'égide de la Puissance Mahométane, soient protégées et sauvegardées à l'instar de celles des Musulmans, sujets également du même Trône Impérial et dont les Chrétiens partagent naturellement et les joies et les peines. Elle se rappelle avec reconnaissance des faveurs signalées dont elle a été l'objet de la part de Sultan Mehmed le Conquérant, d'illustre mémoire, et des autres Souverains de la dynastie glorieuse d'Ali-Osman. Mais ce qui rend encore plus profonds les sentiments de gratitude dont elle est pénétrée en ce moment, ce sont les bienfaits innombrables qui ont résulté pour elle par le Tanzimati-Hairyé que Sa Majesté Impériale, notre gracieux Souverain et Maître actuel, dans sa bonté inépuisable pour ses peuples et dans sa sollicitude sans exemple pour le bien-être et la prospérité de tous ses sujets sans distinction, a bien voulu octroyer, et dont les dispositions sages et salutaires préservent intacts devant la loi les droits de toutes les classes de sujets; ce sont les différents rescrits autographes Impériaux, par lesquels Sa Majesté a daigné confirmer et consolider les privilèges religieux spirituels et les immunités accordés à notre nation et à notre Patriarcat, et en outre, les ordonnances Impériales successivement promulguées, et par lesquelles tous les sujets de l'Empire, natifs du même sol, appartenant à la même patrie et destinés à la même condition, sont appelés et exhortés à se conduire avec bienveillance les uns envers les autres et à observer entre eux une union cordiale. Par conséquent la nation Grecque, dans sa profonde reconnaissance, ne cesse d'adresser au Ciel des prières ferventes pour la conservation des jours précieux de Sa Majesté Impériale et pour sa prospérité et sa gloire, et elle est prête à offrir au Trône Impérial, en tout temps et lieu, en paix et en guerre, tous les services, quoique faibles, dont elle est capable, pour faciliter la réussite des projets généreux du Gouvernement Impérial, et pour les intérêts de l'Empire.

Il est notoire à tout le monde, et d'une vérité incontestable, que non seulement par la position que la Providence nous a accordée sous l'autorité bienveillante des Augustes Souverains de la Dynastie Ottomane, mais, en outre, par l'effet d'une reconnaissance sans bornes et de notre attachement naturel à la terre de nôtre naissance, il est le devoir constant et sacré de nôtre nation de servir fidèlement les vues magnanimes et la gloire de Sa Majesté Impériale, nôtre gracieux Souverain et Maître, qui est pour nous l'unique refuge de bien-être et de sécurité.

Encore est-il facile à concevoir quelle satisfaction immense nous a procurée et combien nous a rendus fiers la résolution digne et généreuse que le Gouvernement Impérial vient de prendre dans les circonstances actuelles, pour préserver les droits sacrés de souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale et l'indépendance de l'Empire, et combien cette attitude ferme et intrépide du Gouvernement Impérial a stimulé notre zèle et notre promptitude à remplir nos devoirs. Et quoiqu'il soit notoire que les habitants de Roumélie, pour la plupart Grecs, Bulgares et Albanais, nos coreligionnaires, ainsi que ceux qui se trouvent dans l'Anatolie, sujets fidèles et reconnaissants du Trône Impérial, et animés des mêmes sentiments d'intérêt et d'enthousiasme que les sujets Musulmans de l'Empire, leurs compatriotes, leurs proches et leurs associés de condition et de devoirs, continuent à faire preuve d'un dévouement réel pas des services qu'ils rendent aux armées Impériales, autant que les facultés de chacun le comportent et que la légalité et l'équité le permettent, notre Patriarcat s'est empressé d'écrire et d'expédier aux populations susmentionnées, nos coreligionnaires, de nouveaux conseils et de nouvelles exhortations pour qu'elles aient à veiller jour et nuit et à consacrer tous leurs efforts à l'accomplissement de leurs devoirs de fidélité et de reconnaissance envers notre gracieux Souverain et Maître, et à se conformer strictement et avec empressement aux ordres de leurs Excellences les Généraux de l'Empire et les Gouverneurs des provinces.

En conclusion, la nation Grecque, dans l'impossibilité où elle est d'exprimer d'une manière complète par des paroles ses sentiments de profonde gratitude pour les bienfaits immenses dont elle est redevable à Sa Majesté Impériale et à son Gouvernement éclairé, se borne à adresser des prières ardentes à l'Etre-Suprême pour qu'il accorde à Sa Majesté sa divine assistance pour amener à une heureuse et glorieuse réussite ses hautes résolutions et ses entreprises, ainsi que les conseils sages de ses illustres Ministres.

No. 291.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 328.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 4, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is a memoir on the subject of raising a Turkish party in the mountainous portion of Wallachia, with a view to facilitating the ejection of the Russian troops in due season from that Principality, and laying the foundation of a state of things at once more favourable to Turkish and to local interests in that part of the Ottoman territory which lies beyond the Danube.

The accompanying paper was drawn up by an intelligent Wallachian, having good connections in that province, and now residing here.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 291.

Memoir on the subject of raising a Turkish Party in Wallachia.

Constantinople, le 1 *Octobre*, 1853.

IL y avait un temps où l'action de la Russie était considérée par les habitans des Principautés comme toute favorable aux principes de justice, de progrés, et de civilisation.

L'exportation des céréales, et le commerce de l'occident avec la Valachie et la Moldavie était encore très peu de chose, il y a vingt-cinq ans, et une occupation Russe était accueillie par les Roumans comme une époque de prospérité et de bien-être; c'était cent ou deux cent mille consommateurs, payant d'excellents prix et toujours au comptant.

Les jeunes Valaques et Moldaves se tenaient prêts à prendre fait et cause pour l'Empereur Chrétien; et les généraux Russes formaient, à chaque guerre, d'excellents corps de volontaires qui combattaient vaillamment contre les Turcs.

En evacuant les Principautés, les Russes emportaient les regrets de toute la population. Ils semblaient avoir pour but de gagner l'affection des Moldo-Valaques et de les rendre favorables.

Mais depuis la guerre de 1828, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a changé de conduite; soit l'idée qu'une Puissance aussi formidable que la Russie saurait se passer de l'affection d'une population sans organisation; soit l'impossibilité de pourvoir convenablement aux besoins d'une armée qu'on a augmenté dans les derniers temps dans une progression qui ne correspond en aucune façon au développement des ressources de l'Empire Russe; soit simplement conséquence du caractère personnel de l'homme qui a pris place à la tête de cet Empire; le fait est que depuis 1828, le Gouvernement Russe a pris pour système de passer sans scrupule et sans conscience par dessus toutes les considérations de justice et d'humanité à l'égard des Principautés.

A cette époque le Général Withenstein franchit le Pruth; une proclamation à la main pleine de bonnes assurances et de belles espérances; toutes les fournitures, disait-il, seront payées en argent comptant; la guerre ne devait rien couter aux habitants des Principautés: il n'est pas moins vrai que plus de deux cent mille soldats Russes s'abattaient sur les pays non point en troupes d'une grande Puissance, mais en hordes affamées et devastatrices. Pendant deux hivers soldats et officiers furent logés, nourris, et chauffés aux frais des familles Valaques et Moldaves sans la moindre indemnité, soldats voraces, pillarces, et brutaux; ils gaspillaient trois fois plus qu'ils ne pouvaient consommer; volaient ce que ne pouvait être mangé pour le vendre au Cabinet. Des demandes exorbitantes de provisions et de fournitures en farine, orge, pailles, et viandes, furent faites et prises chez les fermiers et propriétaires contre les bons qui souvent ne portaient que de 40 à 60 per cent de ce qu'on delivrait. Les paysans avec leurs voitures et leurs bœufs furent obligés de transporter ces approvisionnemens jusqu'à Schoumma et à Gabrovu. Les meilleurs maisons furent transformées en casernes et hôpitaux.

Sans tenir aucun compte des vols, des gaspillages, des dégâts et des vexations, on peut estimer des trois cent à quatre cent millions de piastres ce qu'a couté aux Principautés l'occupation de 1828 à 1836. Or, pour tout cela il a été payé, à grande pompe, environ vingt millions de piastres des bons de fournitures.

Pendant ces six ans d'occupation Russe les habitans furent disputés entre la peste, la famine, et le choléra; pas une famille ne fut épargnée par l'un de ces fleaux—pas une maison de commerce s'échappa à la faillité.

De 1848 à 1851 un corps Russe de trente à soixante mille hommes a été logé, nourri, et chauffé aux frais et à la charge des habitans des Principautés; et, malgré cela, le jour de l'évacuation le Consul de Russie présenta aux Gouvernemens de ce pays une note de quarante millions de piastres qu'il fallait se résigner à accepter et transformer en dette nationale.

Ce qui se passe cette année depuis le mois de Juillet, donne à penser qu'en fait de vexations et de gaspillage, on soutiendra la réputation qu'on s'est faite précédemment.

Les Valaques, sans armes et sans organisation militaire, ne sont pas en mesure de résister à une corps Russe, ne fut-il de vingt mille hommes; mais ils

sont disposés à prendre fait et cause pour toute combinaison qui pourrait les garantir à l'avenir contre les envahissemens de la Russie, qu'ils considèrent comme la plus grande calamité pour leurs pays.

Une proclamation du Sultan, qui annulerait tous les Traités avec la Russie relatifs aux Principautés, accompagnée d'un Hatti-Schérif que renouvellerait les anciens droits des Valaches et des Moldaves, et assurerait leur existence nationale—proclamation appuyée par un petit corps de troupes, soulèverait et amènerait successivement tous les habitans valides contre la Russie.

Dans l'état actuel des dispositions stratégiques dans le bassin du Danube, il serait peut-être imprudent de hazarder sur la rive gauche de ce fleuve un corps d'armée Turc, tant soit peu sérieux. Mais si les Russes viennent à passer le Danube et s'avancent jusqu'à Nisre, Pristina, ou par Gabrova, il serait facile, surtout lorsque la saison sera peu plus avancée, de jeter un corps d'environ quinze mille cavaliers irréguliers sur la rive gauche du Danube en Valachie. Cette troupe, en masse ou par petits détachements, attendrait facilement la ligne des montagnes; une fois cette ligne prise, il n'y a pas de force qui puisse la déloger. (En admettant toutefois que l'Autriche se tienne dans un état de neutralité.) Si le corps de quinze mille hommes sous le commandement d'un bon général est composée de trois divisions de cinq mille hommes chacune, la première de Valaques, la seconde de Cossaques, et la troisième de Tartars, qu'on peut récruter et organiser sur la rive droit du Danube, et particulièrement dans la Dobrodza, avec des officiers et des chefs de ces trois populations, ils trouveront dans les sympathies et les espérances des habitans de la Valachie tous les moyens et toutes les facilités pour se martailler, pour se récruter, s'augmenter, et harceler les Russes, lorsqu'ils viendraient à prendre leurs quartiers d'hiver. Les drapaux Valaques, Cossaques, et Tartar, agiraient sur un grand nombre des soldats de l'armee Russe, et même sur des officiers.

Si les Russes se tiennent dans la Valachie, sans passer le Danube avant le printemps, dans deux ou trois mois d'ici ils se trouveraient dans l'impossibilité de faire de grands mouvemens stratégiques; il sera facile alors pour un bon général de passer le Danube avec ces quinze mille cavaliers, et de se jeter sur les villes qui bordent les montagnes, et de déloger les Russes qui s'y trouveraient cantonnés.

Cette troupe, si elle a bonne discipline et les moyens de payer ses fournitures partout, et si elle est un peu intelligemment conduite, elle peut faire le plus grand mal à la Russie, en harcelant ses troupes et en organisant les régimens dans les Principautés; c'est une action qui peut être propagée jusqu'en Podolie et même en Crimée.

Il faut à la tête de cette action un homme qui sache, tout en enthousiasmant les Valaques et les soulévant, éviter tout ce qui pourrait prendre le caractère ou l'apparence d'un mouvement révolutionnaire, afin d'éviter la division entre les habitans. Tout doit se faire au nom de Sultan; c'est au nom du Suzerain que l'organisation militaire et administrative des deux Principautés doit être accomplie; c'est au nom du Souverain qu'on doit agir.

Les points les plus faciles pour se jeter du Danube dans les Carpathis se trouvent depuis Tzernetz jusqu'à Calafat; les montagnes des Mébédintz et de Gorgi entre les Portes de fer et le Gil sont les plus favorables pour organiser des troupes Valaques; ce sont là les deux distriets qui conservent encore des traditions guerrières, et dont les habitans ont tenu en échec, pendant la guerre de 1828 et 1829, sous Solounon et Maghéro; c'est dans ces montagnes que ce dernier chef avait organisé en quelques semmines en 1848 quinze mille volontaires, excellentes troupes, qu'il n'a licenciées que par les conseils du Consul-Général d'Angleterre.

Les points les plus favorables pour tomber de là sur les Russes se trouvent dans les montagnes de Bonzeo et de Rimerico; ils ne sont qu'à une étape de la route militaire des Russes.

Si on tient un corps de troupes Turques dans le Dobrodzi, à la moindre petite bataille perdue par les Russes, les quinze mille hommes de la Valachie peurent compromettre toute l'armée Russe du Danube.

No. 292.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 329.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1853.

I HAVE already informed your Lordship of the occurrences on the Danube which constituted the opening of hostilities against Russia on the side of the Turks.

We have since received intelligence, not only of the passage of that river by several battalions of the Turkish army under Ismail Pasha, but of their having effected a lodgment on its left bank, with some appearances of being able to fortify and hold their position.

We have also received information of an action between the batteries at Isaktcha and a flotilla of Russian gun-boats and steamers passing that fort on their way to Galatz, where they arrived in part after undergoing some damage and loss of life.

I have to add, with respect to the Asiatic frontier of Turkey, that hostilities have commenced on that side also, and that the detachment of the Ottoman army which was engaged there succeeded in taking a small fort, and killing or taking prisoners several hundreds of the enemy.

Statements which I have obtained from Reshid Pasha of these several occurrences are inclosed herewith; and I also transmit, in original, a letter which I have lately received from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa with reference to a part of them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 292.

Selim Pasha to the Seraskier.

(Translation.) *October* 28, 1853.

IN your Highness' instructions to me dated the 19th October, and received by your aide-de-camp Edhem Effendi, orders were transmitted to me to postpone hostilities on receipt of them, in the event of their not having already commenced; as although my previous instructions ordered that hostilities should be commenced at the expiration of fifteen days, it was now expedient to delay them for a short period. This period was to expire ten days after your Highness' instructions, which would be equivalent to adding seven days to the first period, extending it thus to Sunday the 27th instant (October 30). I was then to await further instructions from your Highness. In the event of hostilities having already commenced, your Highness' instructions were to be no longer applicable; as it would be then unsuitable to abandon or to delay the operations. I was then in pursuance of His Majesty's orders to report without delay on the state of matters. It was also stated in your Highness' instructions that similar orders had been sent to Omer Pasha and to Abdi Pasha.

In obedience to your Highness' first instructions some troops had been sent to Shokotil a day previously to Edhem Effendi's arrival. Owing to the movements of the enemy on their arrival there, our troops engaged with them, and I was obliged to reinforce them. Shokotil, which is a strongly fortified place, was thus taken possession of under the Imperial auspices and by your Highness' able dispositions. The enemy brought succours from Ouzdourket, and returned several times, but he was attacked again and completely routed. Three guns were captured in a battery inside Shokotil, two brass and one iron.

The troops, regular and irregular, acted with great bravery. On the side of the enemy 800 Cossacks were killed in the first onslaught, and above 200 afterwards; 70 or 80 were taken prisoners. Owing to the precautionary disposition of the irregular troops, only two regular soldiers were killed and nine

wounded. Thirty of the irregulars were killed and about fifty wounded. The wounded have been sent into hospital.

Please God, greater victories will crown the just cause of His gracious Majesty.

Four of the prisoners have been handed over to Edhem Effendi.

Inclosure 2 in No. 292.

Selim Pasha to the Seraskier.

(Translation.) 26 *Moharrem*, 1270. (*October* 29, 1853.)

SOME ten or fifteen Russian ships have been cruising about Sokhum and the neighbourhood. It would appear from inquiries made by me, that their intention is to attack Batoom and the Chorookseu, and to land a force there and march into the interior: although the mouth of the Chorook, however open to the sea, is inaccessible to ships with any wind, yet the port of Batoom is a place deserving, on account of its size and position, of much strengthening and fortification by land and by sea, and it is, moreover, the port of Kars, Childir, and other places: notwithstanding all this, there is not seen a cutter of the Ottoman fleet there. Although there is not indeed, under the shadow of His Imperial Majesty, much cause for fear and apprehension here on the score of the Russians executing their decisions, as lately reported, and suddenly surprising Batoom with a naval force, yet the utter absence of any Imperial ships of war from that port causes a certain degree of perplexity in the public mind; and consequently, in addition to the steamer which it had been decided, upon a petition of mine, by His Imperial Majesty to send to Batoom to be employed in the conveyance of stores and provisions and the communication of intelligence, it would be most desirable to send, for the more complete defence of the ports and coasts, a frigate and six or seven smaller vessels, corvettes, brigs, or cutters, with all practical speed, to be stationed here: and it is implored that this request may be complied with speedily, as it is of urgent necessity.

Inclosure 3 in No. 292.

Extracts from the Constantinople Journal, "Echo de l'Orient."

Le Passage du Danube par les Troupes Turques.—Le fait Impérial qu'on vient de lire a fait un grand jour du 31 Octobre. Le 28 du même mois ne sera pas moins grand. Deux Tartares, partis de Vidin le 29 et arrivées hier à Constantinople, ont apporté la nouvelle au Grand Vizir et au Séraskier Pasha que le 28 Octobre, le Général Ismaïl Pasha a passé le Danube, à Calafat, avec 25,000 hommes, infanterie, cavalerie, et artillerie (20 pièces de canon), en moins d'un jour. Les Russes ont d'abord fait une assez vive résistance; mais en voyant l'inébranlable résolution des troupes Impériales, ils se sont retirés vers Cruyova, en laissant des canons au pouvoir des Turcs, qui se sont fortifiés dans cette position, en attendant les renforts qui leur venaient de tous côtés. Omer Pasha a dû se trouver sur les lieux vers le 1er Novembre, et il saura utiliser le courage des habitans de cette partie de la Valachie, qui sont tous dévoués à la Turquie, et qui savent se battre bravement.

La Porte a reçu par le bateau à vapeur de Galatz arrivé hier, la nouvelle que le Prince Gortchakoff avait proclamé la loi martiale dans les Principautés Moldo-Valaques, et que le Prince Stirbey, fidèle à ses sentiments de dévouement envers la Sublime Porte, se disposait à quitter le pays où le pouvoir de son Souverain légitime est injustement méconnu par les autorités Russes.

On s'attend à recevoir d'un moment à l'autre la nouvelle que le Prince Ghyka, obéissant aux mêmes sentiments et aux mêmes devoirs, a également quitté la Moldavie.

On nous écrit d'Ibraïla, en date du 26 Octobre:

"Le 23, dans la matinée, deux bateaux à vapeur Russes, chargés de munitions, et huit barques canonnières, ayant voulu remonter le Danube près d'Issatjé, ont eu à éprouver le feu des canons Turcs, qui leur ont fait beaucoup de mal. Un grand nombre de matelots des deux pyroscaphes ont été tués ou blessés, et deux des huit chaloupes canonnières ont été coulées à fond."

Arrivée des Escadres.—Dimanche dernier, vers 2 heures de l'après-midi, le paquebot à vapeur de guerre Français le "Solon" est arrivé de Besica, porteur de dépêches pour M. de la Cour. Ce bateau a poursuivi directement sa route pour Thérapia, où il a attendu sous vapeur jusqu'à 11 heures du soir qu'il est reparti pour rejoindre l'escadre.

Le lendemain matin, le "Chaptal" est arrivée et s'est également dirigé vers Thérapia; il est redescendu vers midi et est allé rejoindre la division Française mouillée depuis Dimanche, vers 8 heures du soir, près de St. Stéfano, et attendant la division Anglaise. La division Française, qui est sous le commandement de M. le Contre-Amiral Le Barbier de Tinan, se compose des vaisseaux: le "Henry IV," de 100 canons, commandé par M. Jehenne; le "Jupiter," de 86 canons, commandé par M. Lugeol; des frégates à vapeur; le "Gomer," de 24 canons, commandée par M. Legras, et portant le pavillon de Contre-Amiral commandant la division; le "Sané," de 14 canons, commandée par M. Le Saulnier de Vauvello; le "Magellan," de 14 canons, commandée par M. Magré: enfin de la corvette à vapeur le "Chaptal," commandée par M. Poutier.

Hier matin, l'Amiral Anglais, Sir Dundas, Commandant-en-chef l'escadre Anglaise, est arrivée sur une frégate à vapeur. En passant devant St. Stéfano, le vaisseau Français le "Jupiter" a salué le pavillon de l'Amiral Anglais de 17 coups de canons qui lui ont été rendus par le frégate Anglaise.

Le Vice-Amiral Français M. Hamelin, Commandant-en-chef l'escadre Française, est arrivé peu après sur la frégate Française le "Mogador." Les saluts d'usage ont été échangés en doublant la Pointe du Sérail par ces deux frégates.

Le vaisseau Anglais le "Vengeance," remorqué par deux frégates à vapeur, a remonté hier le Bosphore et est allé mouiller à Beycos. L'autre vaisseau Anglais "l'Albion," après avoir louvoyé jusqu'à 3 heures de l'après-midi, a jeté l'ancre devant Psamatia, où se trouvait ancré plus en avant et près du fanal, le vaisseau Français le "Jupiter." Le "Henri IV," remorqué par le "Magellan" et le "Sané," a pris hier son mouillage à Beycos. Les saluts ont été échangés en doublant la Pointe du Sérail avec la goëlette Ottomane de station à l'entrée du port.

Voici la composition de l'escadre Française qui a franchi les Dardanelles et dont fait partie la division arrivée à Constantinople:

Vaisseaux: la "Ville de Paris," de 120 canons, commandé par M. Rigault de Genouilly, portant le pavillon du Vice-Amiral Hamelin, Commandant-en-chef l'escadre de la Méditerranée; le "Valmy," de 120 canons, commandé par M. Serval, portant le pavillon du Contre-Amiral Jacquinot; le "Friedland, de 120 canons, commandé par M. Chaigneau; "l'Henri IV," de 100 canons, commandé par M. Jehenne; "l'Iéna," de 90 canons, commandé par M. Mallet; le "Bayard," de 90 canons, commandé par M. Favre; le "Jupiter," de 86 canons, commandé par M. Lugeol; le "Charlemagne," de 90 canons, commandé par M. Chabannes, vaisseau mixte de la force de 600 chevaux; le "Napoleon," de 90 canons, commandé par M. Depouy, vaisseau à vapeur de la force de 960 chevaux; le "Gomer," frégate à vapeur, de 24 canons, commandé par M. Legras (450 chevaux), portant le pavillon du Contre-Amiral Le Barbier de Tinan; le "Sané," de 14 canons (450 chevaux), commandé par M. le Saulnier de Vauhello; le "Mogador," de 16 canons (650 chevaux), commandé par M. Forten Nanton; le "Magellan," de 14 canons (450 chevaux), commandé par M. Magré; le "Chaptal," corvette à vapeur (220 chevaux), commandé par M. Poutier; le "Caton," (260 chevaux), commandé par M. Pothuau; le "Solon," (160 chevaux), commandé par M. Poussin; le "Heron," (120 chevaux), commandé par M. le Begue; le "Sérieuse," corvette de 30 canons, commandé par M. Dalmas de Lapeyrouse; le "Mercure," brick de 18 canons, commandé par M. Gicquel Destouches; le "Narval," (160 chevaux), commandé par M. Lefébvre.

Ce matin, huit heures, "l'Albion" remonte le Bosphore, remorqué par deux frégates à vapeur Anglaises. Le salut qu'il fait à la ville lui est rendu par la goëlette de station.

Inclosure 4 in No. 292.

Consul-General Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Odessa, October 29, 1853.

My Lord,

MY last letter was dated the 15th instant, and went by the "Jamaica," P. Lewes, master, under cover to the Consulate.

Before this time your Excellency will probably have been apprized of the hostilities which commenced on the Danube last Sunday, the 23rd instant.

Eight gun-boats, with six companies of infantry on board, had on the preceding day been detached from the Russian flotilla stationed at Ismail, to proceed up to Galatz and Ibraila, in tow of two steamers, the "Pruth," of 100, and the "Vodimoretz," of 60 horse-power. On nearing Isaktcha it became evident that the further progress of the boats would be opposed; upon which four guns were hastily brought down to the left bank from Satanova, where 6,000 Russians are posted, in order to cover the passage, and a cannonade immediately ensued from both sides across the river. The Turkish fire was soon diverted by the approach of the flotilla, upon which it was then directed. The cannonade was returned by the heavy guns of the boats, and continued till they had ascended beyond the line of the Turkish fire.

The passage was thus effected, and its success is said to have caused some animation along the Russian line.

The loss on this side is reported to be two men killed and three wounded, at the Satanova battery; and in the boats, six killed and twenty wounded, the commanding officer of the expedition, Captain Vichaborsky of the navy, being among the former.

I have seen no account of the extent of damage done to the boats and steamers, but am told that it is not very material; and it is, on the other hand, asserted that the Turkish battery was dismantled, and that the village of Isaktcha was seen in flames in two places.

On the night of the same day, namely, the 23rd instant, a Turkish force crossed over to Tchetul, one of the islands in the Delta, opposite to Ismail, and opened a fire upon the pontoons lying in the northern channel, prepared for a bridge. The particulars are unknown to me, but I am told of one Cossack being killed, and that the enemy retired before the morning. Great, however, was the fright of the inhabitants of the lower town of Ismail, who fled in numbers into the country.

This last exploit was a brilliant affair; and the opposition at Isaktcha has given cause to a low estimation of Turkish batteries and of their artillerymen.

General Lüders with his staff is now in Ismail, and his particular command extends to Ibraila.

I know of no movements, and believe that there are none, to reinforce the Russians in the Principalities; and I may therefore still refer to the account of their numerical strength contained in my letter of the 22nd August. Of the sick I am told there are about 5,000 men in hospital. Intermittent fever is said to terminate in typhus, after which the convalescent seldom become again fit for service.

Here the cholera is still lingering, most virulent in individual cases, but as an epidemic not active. The authorities of the town have hitherto persisted in declaring the disease not to be Asiatic cholera, notwithstanding the testimony of facts and of the best physicians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 293.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 330.)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 5, 1853.

THE respective Commanders-in-chief of the two combined squadrons now within the Dardanelles having come up to Constantinople at the request of M. de la Cour and myself, a meeting of the Ambassadors and Admirals took place at my house on the night of the 1st instant, the latter not having been able to arrive here till that day.

The result of our conversation, founded on the professional opinions expressed by Vice-Admirals Dundas and Hamelin, was that the remaining portions of the two squadrons should be brought up to this part of the Bosphorus, and that considering the large Russian force at Sevastopol, supposed to be ready for sea, it would not otherwise be expedient either for the Turks to undertake any naval operation of consequence in the Black Sea, or for the commanders of the British and French squadrons to send detachments thither with the view of protecting any part of the Ottoman coast that might be exposed to attack.

The French Ambassador agreed with me in making a previous reference to Reshid Pasha, for the purpose of putting him in full possession of our views, in so far as concerned the principles on which we were prepared to act, and to ascertain in return the real intentions of the Porte, as well with respect to negotiation as to the course of operations contemplated by the Sultan's Ministers by land and sea. We felt that it was indispensable for the honour of our respective Governments, no less than for the successful prosecution of our common purposes, that the Porte's communications to us should be wholly unreserved: and that we should be at full liberty to express our opinions thereon, with a certainty of their receiving a proper degree of attention from the Sultan's Ministers.

The accompanying copies of my instructions to M. Pisani, and of his report to me, will best acquaint your Lordship with the terms in which my agreement with M. de la Cour was carried into effect, and with the answer obtained from the Ottoman Secretary of State.

I have to add that on the morning of the 2nd instant I went down to Constantinople and had an interview with Reshid Pasha, on which occasion I urged the several points of my instruction to M. Pisani, and endeavoured to make it clearly understood that the Porte could not be allowed under present circumstances to follow out its own notions, without a suitable and constant attention to the advice of its allies. I further impressed upon his Highness' mind the importance of keeping a door open for pacific arrangements, notwithstanding the commencement of hostilities; and I repeated my exhortations against any attempt on the part of Omer Pasha to cross the Danube with his army at the present juncture. The Pasha's language was moderate, and he evidently shared my opinion as to the last-mentioned point. He told me, however, that he could state nothing officially without the authority of the Council; and I left him after obtaining a promise that he would assemble his colleagues in Council that very evening, and put them in possession faithfully of whatever I had submitted to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 293.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir,

Therapia, November 1, 1853.

IT is desirable that you should wait on the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with the least practicable delay. I wish you to inform his Highness that the intended detachments from the squadrons are arrived here

after a detention of several days, owing to bad weather. The Commanders-in-chief of the two squadrons are also here. Hostile operations having already commenced between Turkey and Russia, and ships of war from both countries being in the Black Sea, it would be very imprudent to continue in a state of uncertainty as to the most advisable course of proceedings.

The British and French Ambassadors are entitled to receive from the Porte an unreserved explanation of its intentions; and a knowledge of the intended operations, whether naval or military, is absolutely necessary for them to determine, in concert with their respective Admirals, in what manner their instructions may be most efficiently and prudently carried out.

On the one side their Governments are still at peace with Russia, and desirous not only to maintain a state of peace with that Power, but also to effect a reconciliation on just and honourable principles between the two belligerents. On the other, they are prepared to interpose their forces when necessary, in order to protect the Sultan's territory from aggression and attack.

It is to be understood that the present position of the combined squadrons, though one of cordial friendship and sympathy with the Porte, is not intended to display an aggressive attitude against Russia, but an effective readiness to protect the Sulton's dominions against any directly aggressive operation from that quarter.

Having given this explanation to Reshid Pasha, you will receive from his Highness and report to me whatever communications, declaratory of the Porte's intentions, he may think proper to make in reply to this appeal, and they will be duly considered by the Ambassadors and Admirals, with a view to the adoption of such measures as may be deemed most serviceable to the Sultan's interests, within the limits of their respective instructions.

It cannot be necessary for me to add, that we consider it an essential part of the friendly duties which we are called upon to perform, that we should not withhold from the Turkish Government the frank expression of our opinions as to the expediency or probable result of any operations which they may contemplate under present circumstances.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 293.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, November 3, 1853.

My Lord,

IN reply to your Lordship's instruction of the 1st instant, which I have duly communicated to Reshid Pasha, I have the honour to report that his Highness informs me that the Ministerial Council having met last night at the Grand Vizier's residence in order to deliberate upon its contents, came to the conclusion that Omer Pasha and Selim Pasha shall be officially instructed, the former not to attempt the passage of the Danube by the army under his command in person, to keep upon the defensive, and to have the heights taken possession of by Ismail Pasha at Calafat, carefully fortified to preclude the possibility of the enemy regaining them. The latter (Selim Pasha) is also directed to be prudent, keeping on the defensive as much as practicable, and not venturing too much.

The Turkish squadron, with the exception of the three-deckers, is to proceed to the Black Sea, and will probably be ready by Sunday. It is intended to cruise along the Asiatic shore, returning round by the Crimea and the European coast. Should it fall in with the enemy's squadron an attack is contemplated.

The combined squadrons are requested to go into the Black Sea for the purpose of interposing their forces in order to protect the Sultan's territory against invasion or attack. The Porte leaves it to the Admirals to decide how they will divide their forces; and furthermore, should the British and French Commanders deem it expedient, they are at liberty to order up the remainder of their fleets. For the convenience of that portion of the combined squadrons that may be ordered to the Black Sea, five ports are proposed as offering good

shelter; namely, Sinop on the Asiatic shore, and Burgos, Baltzik, Cavarna, and Kiegra-Alti on the European side.

The Porte will be willing to come to an amicable arrangement of the pending question, if such a wish be expressed by Russia, and she begin by evacuating the Provinces and renouncing altogether her former demands, considering them null and void. The Porte, besides, thinks itself entitled to demand an indemnification for expenses of war.

These are the results of the Council held last night, but the sanction not having yet been obtained, this communication is to be considered for the present as private.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 331.)

My Lord,

Therapia, November 5, 1853.

I HAVE succeeded in dissuading the Porte from sending a detachment of line-of-battle ships and sailing-frigates into the Black Sea at this moment, and also in obtaining the transmission of orders to Omer Pasha to postpone any attempt which he may have in contemplation to pass the Danube at the head of his army; and to Selim Pasha, on the Asiatic frontier, to keep as much as possible on the defensive for the present.

But I cannot answer for the strict execution of these expressive instructions; and I am not without apprehension that such interference with the plans of the Commanders-in-chief may embarrass their proceedings, and give an unfair advantage to their opponents.

Her Majesty's Consul at Trebizond informs me that the officer sent from Constantinople with orders for Selim Pasha to suspend the commencement of hostilities for ten days, arrived at the camp some hours before any aggressive movement had taken place, but that an attack on the Russians was nevertheless made soon after, the bearer of the instruction himself taking part in the attack.

On applying to Reshid Pasha for an explanation of so strange a contradiction, he assured me that Mr. Stevens had not been correctly informed; and that the attack had been made from the advanced post where Hassan Pasha held the immediate command.

It is impossible not to view with regret and anxiety this prolonged state of vacillation between peace and war. However well meant our efforts may be, it is impossible not to deny the embarrassment which they occasion to the Porte under its present circumstances; and it is therefore to be hoped that some manifestations of reluctance at the Porte to continue in a state of such dangerous indecision may be viewed with friendly indulgence.

I inclose herewith some extracts of my later and hurried instructions to M. Pisani, for the purpose of throwing some additional light upon the character of my communications with Reshid Pasha in that respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Therapia, November 5, 1853.

I HOPE you understand fully the grounds on which I propose to act with respect to the squadrons. In the first place it is generally desirable that, being so far engaged in support of the Turkish Government, we should know beforehand what course is to be followed for obtaining the common object of our exertions, and have an opportunity of expressing an opinion thereon. In the second place, we have a more immediate concern with operations in the Black

Sea. The presence of the combined squadrons in these waters is the basis of any Turkish operations to be undertaken there; and among the consequences of those operations may at any time be our active participation in measures calculated to commit us with Russia. The Porte and her allies stand, therefore, in relations of mutual responsibility towards each other; and we must at least be careful, on our side, that we are neither drawn into operations contrary to our better judgment, nor confounded with those who, against calculation and experience, incur hazards which are out of proportion with the results in view. We do not pretend to lay our commands upon the Porte, or to deprive her in any degree of her free liberty of action; but we claim for ourselves the right of not partaking in measures which we do not approve, and of keeping aloof—and marking to the public that we keep aloof—when attempts are made to carry them into effect against our declared opinions.

Thus it is that, in the present instance, we suspend the orders for bringing up the remainder of the squadrons until we know the Porte's final decision with respect to the proposed expedition into the Black Sea.

Read and explain the above to Reshid Pasha.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Therapia, November 4, 1853.

(Extract.)

WE are both (the French Ambassador and myself) ready to send for the remainder of the squadrons, according to the wish of the Council, and we are sensible of the courage and patriotic spirit manifested by the Turkish Ministers in being ready to send their squadron of two-deckers into the Black Sea. We have reason, however, to think that the professional opinions, both English and French, are unfavourable to the latter enterprise. It may well be doubted whether, at this late season of the year, and knowing the large disposable force at Sevastopol, it would be at all prudent to risk so large a portion of the Turkish fleet. The danger, assuredly, would be very considerable, and a failure at this moment would do a world of mischief to the Porte. At all events, I am decidedly of opinion that it would be madness to move the ships before our squadrons are in position here; and, even when they arrive, it would be far better, in the opinion of our Admiral, to send three or four large steamers than sailing-vessels of the line. Finally, if the Porte determines on sending the steamers, it would be most desirable to wait for an approach towards the full moon, which would greatly diminish the danger of navigating the Black Sea in November.

Inclosure 3 in No. 294.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Therapia, November 5, 1853.

(Extract.)

MY impressions against sending the Turkish line-of-battle ships into the Black Sea are confirmed, not only by the Pasha's ignorance of the report in circulation that two Russian liners had been seen near Batoum, but also, and more particularly by a professional opinion which has reached me of the general inaptness of the ships, with a single exception among the two-deckers, for encountering the perils of a Black Sea navigation at this season.

Saturday, 12 o'clock.—I have just learnt that orders are come up for sending four line-of-battle ships and ten sailing-frigates into the Black Sea to-morrow. In consequence of this, I shall not order up the remainder of the squadron till I hear from Reshid Pasha that the intended enterprize, in so far as sailing-vessels are concerned, is abandoned.

You must tell his Highness, once for all, that we will not be drawn in the wake of the Porte; and that if they want our support, they must be content to respect our opinions.

No. 295.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 332.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1853.*

COPIES obtained from the Porte are inclosed herewith of a deprecatory letter to Reshid Pasha, from the Hospodar of Wallachia, and of a letter from his Highness to the same Prince, confirming the order formerly issued in the Sultan's name for his retirement from the Principality.

A similar letter has been addressed to the Hospodar of Moldavia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 295.

Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Bucarest, le 11/23 Octobre, 1853.*

VENANT de constater définitivement l'impossibilité d'envoyer à la Sublime Porte le montant du dernier trimestre du tribut annuel dont le terme venait d'échoir, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Altesse que je me fais un devoir de me conformer aux instructions qu'elle a bien voulu me transmettre par ses deux dépêches du 25 Juillet et du 30 Août derniers, qui me prescrivent de quitter provisoirement le pays s'il me devient impossible de continuer mes rapports comme par le passé. Après avoir remis le soin de l'administration pendant mon absence au Conseil Administratif, je me propose de partir après demain (Mercredi) par la voie du Danube pour aller rejoindre la Princesse à Paris, et de là nous rendre dans l'endroit de l'Italie, qui sera jugé le plus favorable à sa santé très altérée.

Avant de m'expatrier je remplis un devoir sacré en sollicitant la bienveillante entremise de votre Altesse pour déposer aux pieds de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan les hommages, &c.

(Signed) STIRBEY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 295.

Reshid Pasha to Prince Stirbey.

Mon Prince, *Constantinople, le 19 Octobre/31 Novembre 1853.*

DANS ma dépêche à votre Altesse en date du 30 Août dernier, je lui ai fait connaître la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale que vous continuerez à rester à votre poste aussi longtemps que les relations habituelles entre la Porte et la Principauté seraient maintenus et qu'il aurait été en votre pouvoir de payer à leurs échéances les versements du tribut établi. Dans la réponse qui nous est parvenue dans le temps de la part de votre Altesse, il était dit qu'elle s'engageait à ce qu'il n'eût pas d'omission dans l'exécution de nos devoirs; mais en attendant, rien n'a démontré depuis lors que les anciennes relations aient continué à subsister, et le versement dont l'échéance était au mois Octobre n'a pas été payé. Au reste, ce n'est pas là actuellement la seule question dont il s'agit. Comme la guerre existe maintenant de fait, il est contraire aux régles en vigueur qu'un fonctionnaire tenant la nomination de la Porte puisse continuer à rester sur un territoire occupé par la partie adverse. Par conséquent, au reçu de cette dépêche votre Altesse voudra bien charger les principaux Boyards de la

formation d'un Gouvernement provisoire requis par les circonstances, et elle s'empressera de quitter la Principauté sans délai.

Telle étant la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale, toute hésitation de la part de votre Altesse de se conformer à cet ordre péremptoire aura évidemment pour elle un résultat préjudicial.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) RESHID.

No. 296.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 334.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1853.

THIS afternoon your Lordship's despatch by the "Fury" reached my hands. From the contents of No. 234 I learn that the official note and draft of note inclosed with it are to be submitted to the Turkish Ministers by the French Ambassador and myself, with the complete concurrence, it is hoped, of the Austrian and Prussian Representatives; but even without that advantage should it be unfortunately withheld.

From the succeeding number I learn that, in concert with my colleagues, I am at liberty to introduce such modifications, not evidently inadmissible at St. Petersburgh, as may be required to satisfy the Porte.

I observe, moreover, that the execution of your Lordship's instructions is made to depend upon the existence of such a state of things in Turkey as would not preclude a final settlement otherwise than by a new Treaty between the Porte and Russia.

Your Lordship will have learn from the preceding parts of my correspondence how difficult, how all but impossible, is the successful execution of the instructions which I have now received, after the hostile occurrences which have taken place on the Danube as well as on the Asiatic frontier of this Empire. By a strict interpretation of those instructions, I ought indeed to hold myself precluded from making the attempt under circumstances such as those in which I am placed: but knowing the immense importance attached by Her Majesty's Government to the restoration of peaceable relations, on safe and honourable grounds, between the contending parties; aware how deeply that feeling is partaken by all the Governments of Europe; and led by the information which has reached me, together with your Lordship's despatches, to entertain a hope that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh is still disposed to a reconciliation with the Porte; I venture to confront the difficulties of the situation, and to exert all the means, contracted as they are, at my disposal, in order to obtain, if possible, a last chance for the cause of European peace.

With this intention I have seen the French Ambassador, and had the satisfaction of finding that his instructions enable him to act in perfect concert with me for the attainment of that important object. We are to meet again to-morrow with the view of settling the most advisable course of proceeding under the circumstances. We have little reason to hope for the concurrence of the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, but we are inclined to think that our proposals may be received in the first instance at the Porte with less distrust if they are understood to proceed exclusively from England and France.

I have sent private messages to the Sultan and Reshid Pasha, with the view of preparing the ground in those important quarters for this new attempt at pacification, so little, as they must necessarily think, in harmony with the present state of things.

In short, my Lord, I enter upon the execution of your instructions with a firm resolution to do justice, and, if possible, to have justice done, to them; But I cannot hope to carry them to a successful issue by my unassisted efforts, and the obstacles to success may be found insurmountable on their first communication to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 297.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 335.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1853.

AN express has this moment come in from Belgrade with a telegraphic message from Lord Westmorland, informing me that the decision of Austria and Prussia, on the propositions sent out to me by the "Fury," is delayed by a communication which it has been thought necessary to address to London and Berlin; that the final resolutions will be forwarded to me as soon as they reach Vienna, and that it remains with me, meanwhile, to wait for them or not as I may judge best.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 298.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 336.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 6, 1852.

I WAS informed last night, by a letter from M. Pisani, that despatches to the 2nd instant had been received in the afternoon from Omer Pasha, who states that he had taken possession of the island opposite Tortoukai, supposed to be an important point, and that he was preparing to seize another position, of which he has not mentioned the name, intending subsequently to keep on the defensive.

The partial advantages obtained by the Turkish forces in Europe and Asia have given occasion to the revival of an ancient usage, according to which the surname of Ghazee, or Victorious, is assigned to the Sultan. This compliment was paid to Sultan Abdul-Medjid the day before yesterday; and His Majesty, whatever may happen at a later period, will continue to enjoy the honours of heraldic victory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 299.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 614.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 11, 1853.

WHEN I called yesterday upon Count Nesselrode, he acquainted me that, according to intelligence received on the 9th instant, there has been a sharp engagement between the Russians and Turks on the Russian territory, not far from Batoum.

This report stated that the Turks, having suddenly crossed the frontier, had driven in an advanced post and captured a small fort, called Fort Nicholas; that they were subsequently attacked by a strong detachment under Prince Gagarin, when an action took place, which cost the Russians 45 men and the Turks 500, the fort remaining, however, in Turkish possession.

Count Nesselrode regarded as inexplicable an attack on the part of the Turks at a moment when a suspension of hostilities was believed to have been agreed to.

The explanation, as I stated, was very plain. Viscount Stratford had been extremely desirous first of obtaining a cessation of hostilities, and then of causing timely orders to be sent off to Batoum; but, from the shortness of the time, his Lordship had felt and expressed his anxiety that the counter orders which he caused to be dispatched would not arrive in time to prevent bloodshed.

We conversed upon the means of putting an end to an unfortunate war, and Count Nesselrode informed me that your Lordship's *projet de note* had been considered at Vienna as inapplicable to the altered condition of affairs. As to the *projet de note* proposed by Lord Stratford, his Excellency professed to be ignorant as to its purport, and as to the impression which it had produced at Vienna.

Count Nesselrode spoke with calm as to the chances of war; admitted that in the first instance these might prove unfavourable to the Russian arms; but, without any expression of threat or anger, gave me to understand that the Emperor could not submit to defeat, and could only lend himself to composition when the superiority of his army was placed beyond doubt.

What fell from Count Nesselrode went to confirm what I had already been told as to the feeling of the Government being that no serious negotiation could be conducted until the Turks, calmed by a defeat, should have been driven out of the Principalities.

According, however, to the Russian statements, it is only at Kalafat that any strong body of Turkish troops have established themselves.

I remarked that Her Majesty's Government, being always disposed to peaceable measures, looked more to the object than to this or that plan of bringing about an amicable arrangement; and that, among the methods which had been thought of, I had reason for believing that the idea had presented itself of a negotiation being opened in London.

Count Nesselrode was disposed to consider this, and any method of the kind, premature (intempestif); the war was begun ("la partie était engagée"), and, until some decisive event should occur, Count Nesselrode was of opinion that negotiation would be out of place and abortive.

I have been asked whether I thought it likely that Russia could ever be brought to a revision of her Treaties with Turkey. Under severe defeat she might be reduced to any concession; but, excepting under defeat of the most decided character, I have no idea that Russia would ever give up that hold which it has been her laboured policy to obtain upon a weak neighbour.

I firmly believe that, unless under such circumstances, any recasting of the Treaties between the two Powers would be but an opportunity offered to Russia for endeavouring to render more onerous the chains which her diplomacy has already succeeded in casting about a country whose existence is grudged, and whose real independence will never be sincerely acquiesced in.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 300.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 615.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 11, 1853.

HAVING noticed to the Greek Minister the circumstances which have led to the instructions given to Mr. Wyse in your Lordship's despatch No. 42 of the 2nd instant, he begged me to call to mind the apprehensions which he had expressed two or three months ago, and the intention which he had manifested of cautioning his Government against the sympathy which the Greeks were likely to display for their co-religionists in Turkey in the event of the misunderstanding between the Porte and Russia becoming more serious.

He had written in that sense, and had done more; he had suggested to Count Nesselrode the expediency of an instruction in the same sense being sent to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Athens.

M. Zographo stated further, that his suggestion was well received, and immediately acted upon, and that having read the instruction addressed to M. Persiani, he was bound to declare that nothing could be more explicit or prudent than the advice offered to the Grecian Government to abstain from all interference in a quarrel in which they were in no way concerned.

I may take this opportunity for remarking, that M. Zographo is one of those Greeks who are very intent upon the aggrandizement of their country;

that he chooses to assume that the Turkish inheritance will shortly fall in, and that considering Greece as the natural heir, he laments deeply that his Sovereign should cling to a religion which is likely to diminish the chance of making good his claim.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 301.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 618. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 11, 1853.

ALTHOUGH at a moment like the present I feel some scruple about troubling your Lordship with a despatch written near a quarter of a century ago, I venture to call your attention to the inclosed copy of a report made to Count Bernstorff by the Prussian Envoy Baron Royer, when dispatched to the camp of Adrianople, at the close of the campaign of 1829.

I do so partly because the history of the past is in general the best guide as to future events, partly because I have thus an opportunity of remarking, that it is in great measure to language and opinions like those of the Prussian diplomatist that I conceive it to be owing that Europe finds herself in her present difficulties.

It is well known (and the opinion was held by the late King of Prussia himself) that the grounds of complaint given by the Porte to Russia very inadequately justified the Russian invasion of 1828 and 1829.

It was known, or it ought to have been known to Baron Royer, that at Adrianople the conclusion of a peace was at least as much required by Marshal Diebitch as by the Sultan, and yet we see the Prussian Envoy, who had not a word of blame to bestow upon an unjust invasion, perplexed how to find expressions strong enough to give utterance for his admiration of the attack not having been followed up to the utter destruction of the Ottoman Empire.

Unfortunately Baron Royer's views have been those of too many of the public men of Europe, and hence it has happened that the Emperor's magnanimity has been regarded as a sort of palladium of Turkey, and that Europe has been constantly reminded that she was under deep obligations to His Imperial Majesty for not having overturned that Monarchy which he had so roughly shaken, and which he is now submitting to the same process.

The evil does not rest there, Baron Royer's report being a fair specimen of that language as to the irrevocably ruined state of Turkey which has been of such infinite service to those who, under the mask of friendship and sympathy, have sought to hasten that ruin.

I will only request your Lordship to consider the accompanying communication as strictly confidential, the paper, of which the inclosed is a copy, belonging to the archives of my Prussian colleague, who would be much compromised were it to be known that it had been brought to your Lordship's knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 301.

Despatch from Baron Royer to Count Bernstorff, at the close of the Campaign of 1829.

M. le Comte, *Adrianople, le 15 Septembre,* 1829.

MON départ d'ici se trouvant retardé d'une demi-journée par la nécessité d'attendre les deux officiers que M. le Comte Diebitch veut bien envoyer avec moi afin qu'il n'y ait pas un jour de perdu pour porter aux flottes et aux armées la cessation des hostilités, je pens profiter du passage de la poste Autrichienne pour compléter mes rapports remis au courier Russe qu'expédie le Comte Diebitch par Varsovie; rapports que tout volumineux qu'ils soient laissent pourtant beaucoup à désirer.

J'ose me flatter cependant qu'ils rencontreront l'indulgence de mon auguste maître, lorsque Sa Majesté pensera au milieu de quelles circonstances ils sont écrits. Je n'avais parlé dans mon rapport terminé hier que d'un seul officier qui viendrait avec moi attendre la ratification.

M. le Comte Diebitch a pensé qu'il ne pouvait être qu'agréable à la Porte que le blocus des Dardanelles fût levé plus tôt que plus tard, et a ajouté un deuxième officier au premier dans cette vue ainsi tandis que l'un se rendra en Asie l'autre fera route pour l'escadre du blocus des Dardanelles, qui est sous les ordres du Comte Diebitch.

Dans les faits tels qu'ils se passent est le plus bel éloge à faire du Comte et l'auguste Monarque dont il ne fait que remplir les magnanimes intentions, comme il a le soin de me le repéter sans cesse.

C'est avec une vive satisfaction que j'ai vu se detruire dans un peu de jours toutes les inquiétudes que je ne pourrai moi-même m'empêcher d'avoir sur la manière dont une armée victorieuse dont les généraux ambitieux prendraient une part qui leur provient du fruit matériel de leurs victoires au moment où le plus éclatant de tous les témoignages venait déclarer combien le prix était en leur pouvoir. Le prix moral leur suffit.

Si j'ai peu insisté sur la déclaration si formelle faite par les Ambassadeurs au nom de la Porte elle-même, qu'elle cesserait d'exister si l'armée Impériale s'avançait sur Constantinople, c'est que cette peur est si décisive pour le jugement des questions si longtemps agitées des défiances si enracinées de l'ambition de la Russie, que ce grand procès est désormais jugé sans appel: la Russie n pu, tout le monde le déclare, est-elle n'a pas voulu.

Et qu'on ne croie pas que c'est le Général-en-chef seulement qui a vu les choses d'un point de vue si élevé; tous les généraux auxquels j'ai parlé pensent et voyent comme lui. Votre Excellence le croira-t-elle, ils me remerciaient des la paix que j'étais venu leur apporter!

Au reste, le Général-en-chef lui-même en a donné l'exemple: lui-même m'a adressé des remercimens pour les peines que j'avais prises; on eut dit que c'était plus encore l'armée Russe que je venais obliger que ce n'était la Turquie que je venais chercher à sauver.

Quand on sait halter, quand on a vaincu comme cette armée, il y a de la grandeur à tant aimer la paix.

Tous les généraux que j'ai vu au quartier-général protestent de vive voix, comme par leurs fait et gestes, contre le projet attribué à la Russie de detruire l'Empire Ottoman. Il a pû exister autrefois, disent-ils; nous ne le nions pas. Mais depuis Alexandre il n'en est plus ainsi, et Nicholas est héritier des vertus comme du trône de son frère; nous sommes presque tous ses élèves ou ses disciples, tous ses admirateurs.

Votre Excellence sentira combien je serai heureux d'avoir de pareils faits,—un pareil langage à opposer à ceux qui pourront encore conserver quelques inquiétude sur les intentions de l'Empereur Nicholas, ou sur l'inefficacité de ses bonnes volontés, et conclura de ce que le fardeau des indemnités n'a pas été allégé par le général dans le Traité, qu'il ne le sera pas par l'Empereur, qui voudrait conserver ce moyen de tenir la Porte dans un état de mort.

Je dois dire encore à ce sujet, quoique je n'aye pas dû l'énoncer dans mon rapport officiel, que le Comte Diebitch a l'entière confiance que cet allégement aura lieu.

S'il n'en était pas ainsi, aurait-il autant allégé qu'il vient de la faire les paiemens des indemnités commerciales pour faciliter d'autant plus l'évacuation? Avant de faire porter une lettre pour les Ambassadeurs et donner définitivement ses instructions à M. Brassier, j'ai communiqué l'un et l'autre à M. le Comte Diebitch pour avoir son assentiment. Il n'y a fait qu'une seule modification, et encore relative aux Plénipotentiaires Mussulmans; il s'agissait d'une expression que la Porte aurait pu interpreter à leur désavantage; ses soins sont jusque là.

Je voudrais, M. le Comte, qu'il m'appartenait de prendre l'initiative sur la gratitude à témoigner au Général-en-chef des armées Russes pour le part qu'il a faite à la mediation de la Prusse dans cette paix qui sauve l'Empire Ottoman; cependant je me console de ne pas avoir ce droit en pensant à celui qui l'a.

Je viens de dire que cette paix sauve l'Empire Ottoman; est-ce bien là en effet l'expression de toute ma pensée? Je ne dois pas le laisser présumer ce que j'ai voulu dire.

C'est que la Porte ne succombera plus sous des coups que la Russie ne veut plus lui porter, mais non que la paix que lui accord l'Empereur Nicholas la sauvera de ses maux intérieurs.

La crise actuelle, M. le Comte, a donné la profondeur de l'étendue de ces maux:—ils sont effrayants; non que le courage manque réellement, les Turcs en ont montré beaucoup. Les Russes se plaisent à leur rendre ce témoignage jusques et inclus la bataille de Kulewtscha: alors la confiance les animait encore, depuis ils l'ont perdue;—ce n'est plus qu'une fuite et une déroute continuelle. En dernier lieu encore le chateau de Ewer s'est rendu avec tous les moyens de se défendre, et il y a bien plus encore que ce découragement; il y a haine et soulévement à redouter contre le Sultan d'une grande partie de la population Turque qui l'accuse de ses revers et des malheurs de l'Ismalism.

Il n'y a plus de Musulman, disent eux-mêmes les Plénipotentiaires et le Caimacan Pasha d'Adrianople que j'ai beaucoup vu; il y a haine entre les deux troupes.

La Porte ne peut plus se soutenir que par l'appui qu'elle trouvera dans les Puissances Chrétiennes, qui heureusement à présent peuvent facilement s'entendre sur les moyens d'étayer cet édifice, qui s'affaisse et s'écroule sur lui-même, mais dont les décombres enfanteront de terribles guerres.

Votre Excellence sera peut-être surprise de mon silence sur l'Article de la Grèce. La cause en est simple. Outre que je n'avais pas à me mêler de cette affaire, je n'approuvais pas entièrement la demande des Ambassadeurs au Comte Diebitch, et les faits ont justifié mon jugement. Le général a refusé d'accéder à leur demande, et a maintenu l'Article X du Traité tel qu'il était. C'est le seul point qui leur ait causé quelque chagrin.

Il aurait voulu que les Ambassadeurs lui eussent épargné la nécessité où il a été de les refuser.

Je serai chargé de porter la réponse, et certainement s'il y avait quelque chose à ajouter aux adoucissemens qu'il aura mis à son refus je le ferai avec le plus grand zèle.

Votre Excellence me pardonnera la peine que lui causera la lecture de ce rapport. Je n'ai personne pour le copier, et trop peu de tems et de repos pour mieux écrire.

J'oubliais un fait qui concorde [sic in orig.] avec tout le reste.

Les armes données aux villages Chrétiens par l'Amiral Greig ne l'ont été expressément que pour les mettre à même de se défendre contre les brigandages de postes Turcs.

(Signé) ROYER.

No. 302.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 621.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

INFINITE as has been the trouble, cost, and anxiety, caused in every direction by the unreasonable demands of Russia, they have the one good effect of sweeping away certain delusions, artificially created, and too generally allowed to subsist.

Of this number has been that belief in the resistless skill of Russian diplomacy—a skill which has been shown in sacrificing, at a dead loss, a great reputation, which a quarter of a century had been employed in building up—in issuing circulars which were victoriously refuted by every provincial paper, in consolidating that alliance between France and England which it was Russia's great object to prevent, and in arousing to resistance those countries which it was hoped that an imposing attitude would have overawed.

Of that number is likewise the idea so industriously propagated, of the impending fall of Turkey, a country, it may be hoped, about to rise in renewed vigour from the power of its own efforts and from the increased interest with which it has inspired its friends.

It is, however, to another delusion that I am now desirous of calling your Lordship's attention.

We have heard much of the dreadful persecutions to which the Christians in Turkey are subjected by their unbelieving oppressors, of the suppliant attitude of the oppressed towards their only friend and protector.

All this points at a devotion on the part of the Turkish Christians to the Russians, which could not fail of rendering them most zealous auxiliaries in the event of a rupture with Turkey: if unable to afford material assistance to their protectors, the natives of Bulgaria would not fail, at all events, to supply them with the minutest intelligence of all that passed in the enemy's camp.

The sequel shows that any such inference must have rested upon very false premises.

The Russian forces are posted on one side of the Danube, and the Turks on the other; and so far from Prince Gortchakoff being well informed as to what is passing in the enemy's camp, I believe that no one at the St. Petersburgh War Office would be able to state within 50,000 men the amount of the forces actually under Omer Pasha's commands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 303.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 622.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

WITH reference to the despatch addressed by your Lordship on the 31st ultimo to Sir John Milbanke, I would take the liberty of remarking that, were M. Von der Pfordten to possess the means, as well as the inclination, of attempting to give effect to his visions respecting the reconstruction of a Byzantine Empire, I have every reason for supposing that he would involve his Government in the most serious embarrassments with Russia, the Imperial Government being as completely opposed to any such scheme as the Governments of England and France can be.

The desire felt by the secondary Courts of Germany to promote the cause of peace is perfectly intelligible, and their views will be best forwarded by the expression of their disapprobation of the aggressive policy of Russia, and by such support as they may be able to afford to the pacificatory endeavours of the English and French Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 304.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 623.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

IT is to be hoped that the observations addressed by your Lordship to the Berlin Cabinet may have the effect of preventing the communication which Austria has been desirous of making to the Diet, and the assurance of neutrality on the part of the Confederation which it is her object to obtain.

In the event, however, of the persistence of Austria in that plan, and particularly if Prussia should feel obliged to concur in it, I would take the liberty of submitting to your Lordship whether it might not be found possible to provide that the proposal should be grounded upon the assurance given by Russia of her intention to abstain from all attempts at territorial aggrandizement at the expense of Turkey.

It appears to me that a resolution to this effect might be so worded as to imply the intention of the Confederate Body to quit their neutral position, if the engagements upon which it had been assumed should be violated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 305.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 624. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

I HELD some conversation the other day with a Russian gentleman, a person of education and good sense, who belongs to that middle class of society of which so little is known in this country of classes and degrees by casual visitors, or by the members of the Diplomatic corps. Upon my asking him what was the feeling in the society which he frequents as to Turkish affairs, he was at first reluctant to reply, observing that the subject of politics was avoided in Russian societies. Upon being pressed, his answer was as follows:—

"The opinion which appears to me to prevail is this, that Turkey is rapidly falling into ruins; that her total downfall is only a question of time, as it is inevitable a few years sooner or later: thinking men ask themselves, therefore, whether the difficulties which must attend that crisis had better be encountered at present, or be left for our children, or it may be for our grandchildren."

Here my acquaintance paused, but upon being encouraged to proceed, he said:—"Well, in general we come to this conclusion, that it may be desirable to guard against difficulties which may beset another generation. We see that circumstances have favoured us; that we are in possession of provinces which it might cost us much effort to conquer; we are therefore very generally of opinion that Russia would act wisely in adding to her territories whatever she considers necessary for her, leaving it to the rest of Europe to divide the remainder of the Turkish territory in the manner they may agree to among themselves."

I should not think it worth while to report the conversation of a person in an unofficial position, if I did not feel convinced that the sentiments thus expressed were those of the great bulk of the Russian nation—of every one but the few enlightened men who consider that too great a price may be paid for new provinces, however fair and tempting.

As regards the guarantee against Russian aggrandizement which Europe possesses in the shape of distinct and formal declarations, upon these I should think myself wanting in duty if I failed to state that I consider them as absolutely valueless.

This lesson at least I have learned in Russia, since nothing could be more explicit than the assurances given to me as to the sole object of Prince Menchikoff's mission being a reparation for what had taken place with regard to the holy places, and a guarantee against a renewal of such an infringement of Russian rights at Jerusalem. The only security which, according to my view, we possess against Russia retaining the Principalities in one direction, and endeavouring to make herself mistress of Batoum in another, is, as regards the first point, the fear of dissolving an alliance as much valued as that of Austria, and in both cases the dread of a war as destructive as that which may be brought on on the part of England and France.

I will only observe, that the language of the Russians to whom I refer above is, after all, not stronger than that which is seen by Lord Cowley's despatch No. 548 of the 28th of July, to have been used (according to M. Drouyn de Lhuys' report) by Prince Gortchakoff; "The Principalities," the Prince is stated to have said, "may be considered as finally separated from the Sultan's dominions."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 306.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 625.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

THE task which is imposed upon Her Majesty's Government of preserving Turkey from injury, or it may be absorption, and of averting war from Europe, is one of the most honourable and arduous which could be undertaken.

Of the extent of its difficulty indeed, no one, I think, who is not acquainted with this country can fully judge.

The reason is plain: this country sees only with the eyes of its master; and, according to his views, contradiction is not allowable, and interference with his intentions upon Turkey an encroachment upon his peculiar rights.

Upon this point more especially there is a perfect conformity of views between the Emperor and his people.

The immense majority I believe to be convinced that His Majesty would be justified in taking possession of Turkey when he thinks proper; but that his right to the possession of an almost exclusive influence at Constantinople should be called into question, is an idea which they appear incapable of entertaining. This is so perfectly true that, in the course of the late transactions, I have been repeatedly asked, and in the simplicity of good faith, why England should interfere about Turkey?—why England should intrude in an affair which, being purely Russian, in no way regards her?

Independently, too, of this national prejudice, there is that religious feeling—as I suppose it is regarded here—which leads a Russian to consider that no measure is to be kept with his infidel brethren. Of this your Lordship will have observed traces in one of my last conversations with Count Nesselrode, who, although of the Anglican Church, is of course compelled by position to be politically "orthodox."

Far from endeavouring to check these fanatical prejudices, they have been, as your Lordship has seen, encouraged and appealed to by the Government; a flagrant violation of the territory of an inoffensive neighbour has been spoken of in language such as may have been employed by a crusader chieftain when departing for the Holy Land; and the prayers of the Church are put up for the success of an aggressive act, which calls rather for repentance and atonement.

All this proves how difficult it will be for the Emperor to recede from the position which he has thought fit to make for himself; and proves, further, how necessary it will be for Europe not to receive as a definitive peace what Russia may only regard as a limited truce.

Once again I would venture to remind your Lordship of the words used to me in early summer, by Count Nesselrode, who perhaps was not aware how carefully I should store them up. "Do what you will," said the Chancellor, "but you will not finally avert war; it may be kept off for a time, but this respite will be considered by the Turks as a triumph, and their insolence will become such that before six months are passed we shall be obliged to go to war with them."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 307.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(No. 626. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1853.*

A CURIOUS fact, by no means unconnected with passing events, has just come to my knowledge.

A Russian employé—an honest man, but not a wise one—has just returned here from an inspection in the provinces, which has lasted during several months.

He describes the religious excitement against the Turks as being very strong among the lower orders in the villages and small towns of the interior.

Upon being questioned as to the cause of these excited feelings, the person in question (not perceiving the inference to be drawn from his reply) answered that the cause was well known; that for the last twenty months or two years the whole country had been overrun by monks, who travelled from village to village making collections for churches which had been robbed, monasteries which had been set fire to or plundered, and families, many of whose members had been put to death by the Turks.

The Russian in question failed to perceive that so extensive an appeal to the religious feelings and the credulity of his countrymen can hardly have been made, except under the countenance of very influential persons.

This statement throws some light upon the report of a traveller from Kieff, to which Sir A. Malet alludes in his despatch No. 111 of the 26th ultimo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 308.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(Télégraphique.)

Milord, *Constantinople, le 11 Novembre, 1853.*

SELON nos derniers avis, les troupes du Sultan continueront à maintenir leurs deux positions retranchées sur le gauche du Danube à Calafat, et vis-à-vis de Tourtoukai; attaqués par un nombre qui décuplait le leur, les Turcs repoussèrent leurs assaillants, lesquels ont subi une perte considérable. De l'Asie nous n'avons rien du nouveau. La dernière opération connue fut une attaque sur la frontière Russe, dont la fin a été la prise par les Turcs d'un petit fort, et une perte considérable en tués et blessés du côté des Russes. La Porte a une nombreuse flotilla—frégates, corvettes, brigs et bâteaux à vapeur—dans la Mer Noire; on a vu plusieurs grands bateaux à vapeur du marin Russe à Sulina et à Varna; les escadres Britanniques et Françaises sont arrivées dans le Bosphore en masse. Conjointement avec l'Ambassadeur de France, j'ai invité les Amiraux à envoyer une escadrille unie de bâteaux à vapeur pour reconnaître le littoral Turc depuis le Danube jusqu'au Bosphore, dans le but simultané du ramener de Varna ici Mr. Colquhoun, et peut être de secourir nos bâtiments de commerce en danger près de la barre de Sulina. Fuad Effendi est nommé commissaire de l'armée au (? en) Bulgaria.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Expédiée de Semlin le 18 Novembre, à 4½ heures.
(Signed) F. DE FONBLANQUE.

No. 309.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 19.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, November 12, 1853.*

SECONDED by the French Ambassador here, I am engaged in carrying out your instructions of the 24th ultimo, but under such adverse circumstances that success, which might have attached some weeks ago, is now in the utmost next to impossible. My only hope is that, by strongly urging the acceptance of the propositions they contain, I may prepare the Porte for accepting recommendations [by which] alone would the Northern Alliance be now practicable,—namely, a short Treaty of Peace, restoring *previous* [query] Treaties, with an amnesty, evacuation of occupied territory on both sides, and a cautious Article concerning the religious privileges, which however, on the other hand, would still be unpalatable to the Porte. For the success [of this,] or of any other distinct endeavour for peace, a suspension of hostilities for six or eight weeks is evidently indispensable. This point obtained from Russia, would be obtainable of the [query, Porte], I think. Meantime, I am assured that the operations by sea and land will be [carried] on; but such projects are at present precarious; but

* * * *

likely to elapse before I shall be able to write fully to your Lordship on this subject, *viâ* Marseilles.

Could not * * *

[Two or three lines not to be decyphered]

be instructed * * * accept the armistice, say of two months.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 310.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 381.)

Foreign Office, November 19, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Lordship's despatch No. 409 of the 14th instant, requesting, on the part of Count Buol, that I should transmit to Vienna: 1st. The project of note to be addressed to the Porte, inviting the Sultan's Government to treat; 2ndly, The general form and stipulations of the Treaty; and lastly, the draft of a note by which the religious questions may be arranged.

My despatch No. 378 will have placed your Lordship in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the form of note that might properly be addressed to the Porte; but as the note is founded upon Count Buol's own proposal that the Porte should be invited to state upon what terms it is willing to treat, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that it would be useless at this moment to prepare the draft of a Treaty.

With respect to the note for settling the religious questions, Count Buol has already been made aware of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government.

Some variation in form may have been rendered necessary by intervening events in the note that was sent simultaneously from hence to Vienna and Constantinople, or the one sent from Constantinople to Vienna by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe (which, as your Lordship is aware, was originally transmitted to his Excellency by me), but the substance does not admit of alteration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 311.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon—(*Received November* 19.)

(No. 411.)

Vienna, November 15, 1853.

My Lord,

PRINCE STIRBEY arrived here a few days ago from Bucharest. He called in the first instance upon the Turkish Ambassador, who received him with courtesy, and he afterwards called upon the principal members of this Government, and upon the Corps Diplomatique, and amongst them upon myself. He lamented very much the misfortunes which he feared would be brought upon his country by the present events, and the interruption which they would occasion to the improvements and ameliorations which were being so successfully carried out.

The Prince is almost immediately proceeding to Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 312.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received September* 19.)

(Télégraphique.)

Vienne, le 17 *Novembre*, 1853.

LE Baron Meyendorff vient recevoir par télégraphe le bulletin suivant du Prince Gortchakoff, daté Budeschte, le 3 de courant:

"Au moment où les mesures contre l'établissement des Turcs sur la rive gauche en face de Tourtoukai, étaient en voie d'exécution, ils ont évacué leur position, et se sont retirés sur la rive droite en conservant seulement l'île qui se trouve entre les deux rives.

(Signé) "PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF."

Les dépêches télégraphiques reçues par le Gouvernement Autrichien confirment les nouvelles ci-dessus, en ajoutant que les forces Turques se sont retirés de leur position à Kararasalz, et de celle qu'ils occupaient vis-à-vis de Guergevo. L'avant-garde du Général Osten-Sacken avait passé le Pruth, et lui-même était attendu à Bucharest le 20.

No. 313.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 859.)

Paris, November 18, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a telegraphic despatch from M. de la Cour, dated from Pera, on the 7th instant, stating that, at the request of the Porte, and after concerting with each other, the two Ambassadors had addressed an invitation to the Admirals to anchor in the Bosphorus with the fleets under their command.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 314.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November* 20.)

(No. 863.)

Paris, November 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I WENT early this morning to Fontainebleau, for the purpose of seeing M. Drouyn de Lhuys and executing the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 457.

Before stating the nature of them to the French Minister I said, that as M. de Hübner was at Fontainebleau he had probably made his Excellency a communication similar to that which your Lordship had received through Lord Westmorland, and on which I had your directions to consult the French Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that a courier from Vienna had reached M. de Hübner yesterday; and that he had last night received a communication from that Minister, the substance of which coincided with advices which had been received previously by the French Government from M. de Bourqueney. As the communication is identic with that made to your Lordship by Lord Westmorland in his despatch No. 402, I need not dwell on it further.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys went on to say, that he had given the proposition of the Austrian Government no encouragement; that he had told M. de Hübner that the spirit of it was in contradiction with the policy which France had prescribed to herself since the commencement of this question, inasmuch as it recommended a direct negotiation between Turkey and Russia, while the efforts of France had been directed to bring the Eastern question within the pale of general European jurisdiction; that France, moreover, could not participate in making demands upon the Porte which she knew beforehand would be refused; that Turkey could not agree to an armistice on the terms proposed by Austria; and finally, that there was some peril in asking the Porte to state on what conditions she would consent to make peace, for she might put forward pretensions in which her friends even would not be able to support her. "You see," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "that my remarks to M. de Hübner were not very encouraging; but I have not, since I made them, had an opportunity of speaking with the Emperor." I rejoined, that from what I had heard, I could not doubt that his Excellency would approve the answer which your Lordship had made to the Austrian Government; and I proceeded to read to him your despatch No. 378 to Lord Westmorland. After reading it, I said, that if it met with his concurrence, I trusted that he would instruct M. de Bourqueney to hold a similar language.

The French Minister replied that, since Her Majesty's Government wished it, he would not refuse to direct M. de Bourqueney to regulate his language by

the instructions sent to Lord Westmorland; but he must add, that he did it unwillingly (à contre cœur), because he felt convinced that it would lead to no good result; nor could he shut his eyes to the inconvenience which must arise were the Porte, as was too probable, to put forward pretensions which could not be realized. I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that so long as the two Governments were bent on endeavouring to preserve peace, they should make the best of any proposition which was submitted with that view to their consideration. The instructions which I had read to him were, he must recollect, addressed to Vienna and not to Constantinople, and it was only in the event of Count Buol concurring in your Lordship's suggestions, that you proposed addressing instructions founded on them to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. Should Count Buol refuse, the language of Her Majesty's Government would, I presumed, not differ from that which he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) had described himself as having held to M. Hübner. On the other hand, should Count Buol acquiesce, the two Governments would have succeeded in obtaining of the Austrian Government a more impartial view of the relative interests of Russia and Turkey. With regard to the pretensions which the Porte might put forward I remarked, that a firm language on the part of the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople would soon convince the Porte that the support of England and France was not to be reckoned upon, except for the attainment of that which was due in strict justice to Turkey, and was consequently pertaining to the general interests of Europe. After some further conversation of a similar nature, during which I referred to several passages in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Westmorland, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seemed to take a more favourable view of it. He asked me, finally, to leave it with him, promising to draw up a despatch in the same terms for M. de Bourqueney's guidance; and at my suggestion, he agreed to instruct that Minister in the meantime, by telegraph, to put himself in communication with Lord Westmorland, who would no doubt impart to him your Lordship's views on which M. de Bourqueney might act.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 315.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 20.)

(No. 867.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 20, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's attention may not have been called to an advertisement which appears to have been inserted in the "Journal de Constantinople" of the 4th instant, calling for tenders from persons ready to undertake the victualling of the French fleet in the Bosphorus and the Black Sea. I do myself therefore the honour of inclosing a copy of it. Your Lordship will remark that the tenders are to include the coast, from Constantinople to Odessa on the one coast, and from Constantinople to Trebizond on the other. The introduction of the name of a Russian port, whither it is unlikely that the French fleet should go, unless with a hostile intention, has excited some surprise, and I inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning, whether any explanation had been asked of him by M. de Kisseleff. He replied in the negative, and did not seem to attach so much importance to the advertisement as, I confess, I was myself inclined to give to it. He said that he suggested that it had been inserted in the "Journal de Constantinople" by order of the Turkish Government, in order to mark the intention of the combined fleets to cooperate with the Turkish squadron in the Black Sea; but he either could not or would not inform me, whether the form in which the tenders had been asked for, had been sent from hence, or was drawn up by order of the Admiral commanding the French fleet in the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 316.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 869. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 20, 1853.*

AT the close of the conversation which I had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys at Fontainebleau, on the 18th instant, recounted in No. 863, his Excellency observed that he could not help entertaining the idea that, with a little more pressure, the position of Austria in the Eastern question might be brought more in unison with the policy of France and England. There was not time at the moment to pursue this subject with him, but hearing that he was in town for a few hours, I called upon him this morning, and reverting to what had fallen from him on Friday, I asked him on what he founded his hopes. He replied that M. de Hübner had read to him on the previous day a despatch written by Count Buol, in answer to the observations which M. de Bourqueney had been instructed to make on Count Buol's proposition, that the Four Powers should engage the Porte to enter into direct negotiation with Russia. I beg to refer your Lordship to my confidential despatch No. 816, should the instructions to M. de Bourqueney have escaped your memory. Now, Count Buol, M. Drouyn de Lhuys remarked, had in his answer, transmitted through M. de Hübner, raised no objection either to his (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) arguments, or to the policy which he advocated as that to be pursued by the Great Powers; he had merely remarked on the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the Emperor of Russia. M. Drouyn de Lhuys was therefore of opinion that it might be possible to obtain from Austria a declaration in conformity with that which she admitted to be the policy which ought to guide the Cabinets of Europe in all questions concerning the East.

I inquired whether he had any proposition to offer, in order to attain an object which was certainly most desirable.

He replied that he had no distinct proposal to make, but that he thought that Austria might be invited by France and England to declare, in a Protocol, that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire was part and parcel of the international arrangement of Europe, and the continuation of them necessary to the balance of power. That consequently all questions relating to the welfare of Turkey had been treated as European questions; that in virtue of this principle, the present misunderstanding between Russia and Turkey was matter for European interference; and that the Four Powers would not admit of any permanent change in the territorial possessions of Russia and Turkey as settled by Treaty.

I remarked that such a declaration on the part of Austria would no doubt be of great value, but it might not have much real effect. Russia would continue to give assurances that she intended no permanent occupation of the Principalities, which would probably satisfy Austria. What did M. Drouyn de Lhuys propose to do in that case?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys thought that a declaration on the part of Austria such as he had indicated, could not fail of carrying great weight with it, and must produce an impression on the Councils of Russia. A conference might then be proposed at some place to be decided on, and Russia and Turkey invited to send Plenipotentiaries to assist at it. Should either refuse to appear, it would place itself so completely in the wrong, that the united action of the conference ought to be brought to bear on the recusant party.

"Let us comprehend each other," I rejoined. "I understand your proposition as applied to Russia; but suppose Turkey to refuse, do you mean to abandon her in that case, and to leave the aggressor in quiet possession of his spoils?"

M. Drouyn de Lhuys answered that the fleets would still cover Constantinople, because it was a European and not a Turkish interest they were protecting; but he begged me to recollect that he was only stating his own ideas, and that any official communication upon the subject we had been discussing must depend upon the orders he might receive from the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 317.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 870.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 20, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that instructions both telegraphic and written have been sent, as promised, to M. de Bourqueney, desiring him to support Lord Westmorland in the answers which his Lordship is to make to the last proposal emanating from Vienna. Copies of these instructions have likewise been transmitted to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and he will be ready to act at Constantinople in the sense intimated by your Lordship, should the Austrian Cabinet consent to adopt your suggestions in respect to the communication to be made to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 318.

Mr. Forbes to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Dresden, November 16, 1853.*

I HAVE latterly not alluded in my despatches to the Oriental question, from the conviction of the little value which could be attached to the personal opinions of any member of the Saxon Government. I have more than once had occasion to state to your Lordship, that the feelings of M. de Beust were all in favour of Russia; nor can I now add that he personally has altered his views, or perhaps his wishes. But however great her resources, Russia has lost so much ground in public opinion in Germany, that I as well as my French colleague have remarked a considerable deal of embarrassment in his Excellency's manner when speaking on the subject. With me he is perhaps more at his ease, from the wise line of policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government, which all parties admit to have maintained up to this present time the peace of Europe; whilst M. Mercier's language is all in favour of war. The late Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia has deceived no one beyond the limits of his own Empire. In the North of Germany the persecutions and violence exercised against his Protestant and Catholic subjects, to force them to become converts to the Greek religion, are universally known, and are compared with the pious declarations of his sole object being the protection of the Christians against the Mussulmans. So that those who are the best inclined towards him are forced to admit that "it is a bad business, and that somewhere there has been a great deal of mismanagement" (maladresse).

No individual who is acquainted with the unsettled state of Germany—I allude to those persons who look through the surface—can but fear and deprecate the possibility of an European war, and consequently blame the personal ambition of that Sovereign who risks all their existences for the purpose of either satisfying it, or of not disavowing the arrogant zeal of one of his favourite agents. There is hardly a State in Germany where the Government can have any real feeling of security; and in Austria there can be but little public confidence, when, on the propagation a few days back of a report that the Greeks had attacked the Turks, the shares of the Great Northern Railroad fell in one day cent. per cent.

The intolerance in religious matters is becoming very great in Bohemia; and it seems improbable that the rebellious acts of the Catholic clergy in Baden against the Government should remain without imitators in the Prussian-Rhenish provinces. A highly-respectable and clever Protestant clergyman in Prague gave such uneasiness to the Cardinal-Archbishop and his clergy, that, after having accused him of spreading seditious tracts, which he disproved, they

insisted on his removal to Laibach; he then demanded his travelling expenses, which the competent tribunal declined, stating that they had no accusation against him, and that his removal having been ordered, under the existing martial law, at the instigation of the Roman Catholic clergy, it was their duty to provide the money for his journey, which he had a right to demand. The affair made such a sensation, that the Cardinal and his clergy immediately subscribed the required sum. This is only one of the many instances of the same kind which might be quoted; and the reasonable Catholics admit that the dissemination of liberal opinions in religion, and of Protestantism, even in Italy, is a cause of serious uneasiness.

With such elements of discord, an European war would be a most dangerous experiment in Germany; and Russia alone has brought it nearly to an outbreak, and increased the dislike which exists against her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCIS R. FORBES.

No. 319.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 326 of the 31st ultimo, inclosing a translation of an address from the Greek Church in Turkey to the Sultan.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that your Excellency has rendered a signal service to the Porte and the Greek nation by preventing the Patriarch and Synod from addressing the Sultan in terms of ignominious flattery; and they learn with satisfaction that the address in its present form can be considered as fairly representing the improved state of feeling between the Porte and its Christian subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 320.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 282.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the instructions, of which copies are inclosed in your Excellency's despatch No. 323 of the 31st ultimo, which you have addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls in Wallachia and Moldavia, and to Mr. Vice-Consul Cunninghame, containing instructions for their guidance in the present state of affairs in the Principalities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 321.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 284.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 321 of the 31st ultimo, in which you report that Captain Slade has proceeded in a Turkish frigate into the Black Sea, I have to state to you that Captain Slade being in the service of the Sultan may

of course perform any professional duty required of him while in that service; but if made prisoner by the Power with which the Sultan is at war, he would not be entitled to claim the intervention of Her Majesty's Ambassador in his behalf.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 322.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 285.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the instructions addressed by you to M. Pisani, and of which copies are inclosed in your despatch No. 331 of the 5th instant.

Her Majesty's Government have no intention to dictate to the Porte, and no wish to fetter its action, but they will not take part in measures of which they disapprove; and your Excellency has correctly conveyed to Reshid Pasha, the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. The energy and courage displayed by all ranks and classes in Turkey are admirable; but the rashness of enthusiasm must be guarded against, and the Turkish Government, if it understands its own interests, will readily defer to the sound judgment of your Excellency, and the practical experience of Admiral Dundas.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 323.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 286.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 330, containing an account of the Conference which you and your French colleague had on the 1st instant with the Admirals commanding the British and French fleets at Constantinople, and reporting your subsequent communications with the Porte as to the course now to be pursued by Turkey.

I have the satisfaction of informing you, that your language to Reshid Pasha, and your instruction to M. Pisani, of the 1st November, are entirely in accordance with the views of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the dignity of England and the true interests of the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 324.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, November 20, 1853.*

JE me suis rendu chez le Comte Buol pour lui communiquer votre dépêche No. 378. Il a adhéré à toutes les propositions d'arrangement que vous faites. M. de Bourqueney nous a rejoint pour appuyer votre communication. Le Comte Buol est entièrement d'accord avec Londres et Paris sur les bases de la note collectif reduite à la constatation en fait que la Russie s'est déclarée disposée à traiter, et à une question à la Porte sur les conditions auxquelles elle veut négocier. Le Comte Buol demande aux Cabinets de Londres et de Paris d'envoyer sans retard à Vienne un projet de rédaction de cette note, ou d'autoriser leurs Représentants à la rédiger ici en Conférence, et à l'expédier à Constantinople. Il demande en outre si la note doit être signée ici en

Conférence par les quatre Représentants et adressée à Reshid Pasha par l'intermédiaire de nos Ambassades à Constantinople même par les Représentants. Le Comte Buol approuve complètement la substance des instructions proposées par vous et approuvées par le Cabinet de Paris. Il désire que leur envoi suive d'aussi presque possible celui de la note collective.

No. 325.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November 22, 1853.*

THE draft of collective note shall be sent as soon as it is agreed to by the French Government. I had sent to Lord Stratford my despatch No. 378 to you, and I now inform him by telegraph through Marseilles that it is approved by Austria and France. He is endeavouring to give effect to the instructions sent by the "Fury" on the 25th ultimo.

No. 326.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 872.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 21, 1853.*

THE French Government has received accounts from Belgrade to the effect that the Servian Government, although pressed by both the English and French Consuls to show by some public act its continued allegiance to the Porte, hesitates in taking any step of this kind.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 327.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 22, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just been with me. He proposes that you should draw up the note to be addressed to the Porte, and the draft of instructions for Lord Stratford; that you should send them to Paris, whence, after examination and approval by the French Government, they should, with a similar French document, I am now to inform you, be transmitted to Vienna, that the Conference should sign the note collectively, and transmit it with instructions to the Representatives to Constantinople.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys will send to-night or to-morrow a form of declaration which he wishes France and England to make at Vienna when the note is discussed. More by the messenger.

No. 328.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, Tuesday, November 22, 1853.*

YOU may depend on the likelihood to have a corroboration through M. Hübner that Count Buol agrees to all your propositions.

Let me know by the telegraph whether I shall send the information to Constantinople by steam-packet of the 25th.

No. 329.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1853.

I HAVE received from Lord Westmorland an assurance that Count Buol agrees to all our propositions.

Send this information to Lord Stratford, and tell him that it refers to the inclosure in my despatch No. 274 to him. He may therefore reckon upon the support of Austria and France.

The Prussian Minister has general instructions to support Lord Stratford.

No. 330.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 69.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 92 of the 15th instant, reporting the existence of intrigues to awaken suspicion of France on the part of the Prussian Government, I have to express to you the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that there is no ground for such apprehensions, and that all pretext for them will be removed by frank cooperation on the part of Prussia with Great Britain and France on the Eastern question, as their policy is to unite together the different Governments interested in checking the aggressive spirit of Russia, and in maintaining the balance of power in Europe undisturbed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 331.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 94 of the 15th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you had held with Baron Manteuffel on the subject of the instructions which Count Buol proposed to address to the Internuncio at Constantinople, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion; and I have to instruct you to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the course which his Excellency proposes to pursue. Your Lordship will, however, see by my despatch to Lord Westmorland No. 378, a copy of which was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 60 of the 16th instant, under what circumstances only it appears to Her Majesty's Government that an armistice can be proposed with any prospect of success.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 332.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 71.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 22, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by your Lordship to Baron Manteuffel with respect to the position of Foreign Consular Agents in the Danubian Principalities since the departure of the Hospodars, as reported in your despatch No. 93 of the 15th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 333.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 97. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 19, 1853.

I HAD an interview this day with Baron Manteuffel.

His Excellency was anxious to learn what view your Lordship had taken of the proposals submitted by Count Buol to the English and French Cabinets; and inquired of me what was the nature of this note which Count Buol was so anxious to have transmitted to Constantinople.

I thought it so important that the Prussian Cabinet should be fully informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government in order that Baron Manteuffel might report to the King in the same spirit, and give a similar direction to the Prussian policy, that I communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 378 of the 16th instant, addressed to the Earl of Westmorland, which I trust will meet with your Lordship's approval.

His Excellency wholly concurred with the views and opinions expressed in that instruction, and his Excellency requested me to leave a copy of that despatch in his hands for communication to the King.

I replied that I had no permission or instruction to that effect, and that I could not give him a copy of the entire despatch; but that I would take upon myself to give him an extract which would place him in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government, so clearly and ably laid down by your Lordship.

I have, therefore, confidentially given to his Excellency an extract of that despatch commencing from "It seems necessary in the first instance," down to the paragraph, "That would separate the two armies."

His Excellency is in great perplexity on the present state of affairs. He is doubtful and suspicious of Austria. He feels that there can be no result to the proposals with which the Austrian Cabinet have been lately engrossed. He views the negotiations as brought to a stand-still; the peacemakers reduced to despair and inaction, while the combatants are progressing in a sanguinary contest. In short, his Excellency could see nothing but darkness and gloom in this question, without a ray of light or of hope.

I replied to his Excellency that unless the Emperor Nicholas was prepared, even at the eleventh hour, to recognise the injustice of his demands on Turkey, and to take into consideration the fearful responsibilities which he would incur in suffering his ambitious projects to expose Europe to the calamities of war, I feared that all the moderation which has hitherto been displayed, and the unceasing efforts of Europe to maintain peace, would prove unavailing and of no effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 334.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 98. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 19, 1853.

SINCE the communication received from Count Arnim, as reported in my despatch No. 94 of the 15th instant, Baron Manteuffel informs me that further reports have been addressed by that Minister, confirming the desire of Count Buol that some collective note should be presented to the Porte on which might be founded future means of arranging a Treaty between Russia and Turkey.

Count Arnim states that Count Buol, in the event of any such note being framed and accepted, proposed that a Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiary should be invited to take part in the conference for the arrangement of a Treaty. He further stated that there had been some question of establishing a Conference

elsewhere, but this idea had been very distasteful to Austria, on the grounds of the central geographical position of Vienna. Count Buol referred likewise to the question of the medium of communicating any note signed by Turkey to Russia, and was of opinion that it might be collectively transmitted by the Conference, combining at the same time an invitation to Russia to appoint a negotiator.

Finally, Count Arnim stated that Count Buol had expressed his satisfaction at the identity of views between Austria and Prussia on the Oriental question.

Baron Manteuffel expressed to me his opinion that the plan proposed by Count Buol was, under present circumstances, useless and impracticable, and has avowed both to the French Minister and to myself, that he considers this attempt at mediation on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, as being undertaken more with the view of adducing evidence to Russia that the Austrian Cabinet have exerted their best endeavours to promote an arrangement agreeable to the Emperor Nicholas than with any possible hopes of eventual success.

Baron Manteuffel here particularly called my attention to that part of Count Buol's instructions to Baron de Bruck, which reproduces the very objectionable sense of the projected Olmütz note; viz., the non-omission of the term "subjects of the Porte," in connection with the concluding phrase "à d'autres rits Chrétiens."

Baron Manteuffel is totally at a loss to comprehend the views and aim of the Austrian Cabinet. In order that I might not have been mistaken in the substance of what I reported to your Lordship, I read over to Baron Manteuffel my despatch No. 94 (omitting that paragraph relating to his alarm at the aspect of affairs), when his Excellency confirmed the correctness of that report.

He stated to me that he had replied to Count Arnim that he could not instruct Baron Wildenbruch to support the terms of the instructions to Baron de Bruck, as he considered that there was no prospect of the Porte accepting the advice tendered in that instruction, and that Baron Wildenbruch had already received instructions of such latitude, that in the event of any proposal being submitted to the Porte that offered any chance of success, he would be enabled to give it his support.

I was happy on this occasion to inform Baron Manteuffel that his views on the subject of Count Buol's instruction were perfectly in harmony with those of Her Majesty's Government, and I took it upon myself to read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 379 to the Earl of Westmorland, which I trust your Lordship will approve of.

Baron Manteuffel entirely concurred in the justice of your Lordship's views, and told me that he had also stated to Count Arnim that he viewed the proposal which Baron de Bruck is instructed to make as not only being certain of being rejected by the Porte, but that it was calculated to awaken suspicions and distrust in the mind of the Turkish Government, and was likely to indispose Turkey to listen hereafter to European counsels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 335.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 99. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 19, 1853.*

I HAVE been informed that great bitterness has been expressed at Vienna against the Prussian Government for having refused to join in the Austrian declaration to the Diet on the Oriental question; and I have further learnt that Count Buol has insinuated that Prussia was secretly in the interests of Russia, stating openly that Baron Manteuffel had expressed to Baron Budberg that the refusal of Prussia to join Austria in a declaration of neutrality at the Diet had been actuated by feelings favourable to Russia.

I have further reason to believe that this language has been repeated at Paris, and that it is likely to produce a very false and unfavourable opinion of the Prussian Government.

I, therefore, deemed it to be my duty at once frankly to state to Baron Manteuffel the tenour of this language, and the motives which had been attributed to the Prussian Government in refusing to accede to the Austrian proposal.

I most emphatically assured his Excellency that I personally treated these reports with the contempt they deserved; but that I thought it very material that they should be positively denied in other quarters, as unfortunately false statements were always prone to influence and prejudice the public mind.

I was the better able to bring this subject to his Excellency's knowledge, as at the time I had expressed to him my opinion on the importance to Prussia of not acceding to the Austrian proposal, and his Excellency had unreservedly and most confidentially communicated with me on the subject.

His Excellency thanked me for this information, and requested me to convey to your Lordship, in case any such reports should reach you, the most formal denial of the truth, or even of the foundation for the truth, of any such statement.

In discharging this duty, I feel that I should not be rendering justice to Baron Manteuffel were I not to add the high opinion, respect, and admiration which I entertain of his Excellency's honourable, straightforward, and noble character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 336.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

No. 100.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 19, 1853.*

WITH reference to a statement which has been put forth by Austria that the Prussian Government had at first agreed to the Austrian proposal for a joint declaration of neutrality to the Diet on the Oriental question, and had afterwards on Baron Prokesch's arrival at Berlin withdrawn from its fulfilment, Baron Manteuffel explained to me in the following manner the grounds on which that statement rested.

One evening in his salon the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires took him aside, and stated that his Government proposed in the interests of peace to invite Prussia to make a joint declaration of neutrality to the Diet, and sought his Excellency's opinion on this measure. On the spur of the moment Baron Manteuffel replied that he was happy to learn that the Austrian Cabinet were ready to take so decisive a step, and signified in general terms an approval of the proposition.

One or two days after Count Crivelli called upon Baron Manteuffel, and stated that Baron Prokesch would arrive that evening to treat on the subject which he had previously mentioned. His Excellency was rather surprised at this precipitation, and stated that he had not even submitted the question to the King, but that he would be happy to see Baron Prokesch. It was on the same day that his Excellency first mentioned the subject to me, and which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 51 of the 22nd ultimo.

I have the honour to inclose copies of two circulars which were addressed by the Austrian Cabinet to their Missions at the German Courts on this subject.

I have reason to believe that the whole matter originated in the desire to facilitate the negotiation of an Austrian loan.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 336.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Missions in Germany.

(Translation.) *Vienna, October* 30, 1853.

THE Imperial Cabinet, in the present position of the Russio-Turkish differences, believe themselves to be able to entertain the certain hope that the duty of the Courts of Austria and Prussia in this important question of the day, will be confined to preventing by their conduct the quarrel between Russia and Turkey from extending and leading to a conflict between the former Empire and the two Western Powers.

Both the Courts of Vienna and Berlin have in their point of view felt the necessity not only of being neutral with regard to that difference, but also to express on all sides and as openly as possible the position taken by them in common. With this intention we have proposed to the Cabinet of Prussia to make a common declaration to our German allies regarding the neutrality of the two Powers, and for this purpose to profit of the opportunity of the approaching opening of the session of the Diet. The Cabinet of Berlin has approved of this proposition, and I have taken occasion of inviting the President of the Diet to return to Frankfort *vid* the capital of Prussia, for the purpose of there concerting the details for the said purpose.

We flatter ourselves that the intended joint declaration of Austria and Prussia will considerably strengthen the hopes of maintaining general peace, and that in any case it will meet with the most decided concurrence on the part of the Sovereigns of the Germanic Confederation.

It will be agreeable to us if you communicate this despatch confidentially to the Government of ———— if you find a feeling in favour of this measure, and if you will cause similar instructions to be sent to Frankfort.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 336.

Circular addressed to the Austrian Missions in Germany.

(Translation.) *Vienna, November* 6, 1853.

IN Circular No. 2 of the 30th October, we informed our allies that we had proposed in Berlin, in common with Prussia, to make a communication to the Germanic Diet respecting the position of the two Courts in the Russio-Turkish question, and that this proposal had been approved by the Prussian Cabinet.

Nevertheless we are now only able to make a declaration of this sort in Frankfort, not as we hoped in common with Prussia, but in our own name. Explanations are therefore due to the Governments who received that information through us.

It will not certainly be necessary for us to affirm that we were perfectly justified in calculating on the concurrence of the Prussian Government in the present proposition. When at the end of last month we inquired in Berlin whether the Prussian Cabinet deemed it advisable, as that of Vienna, that after the formal declaration of war by the Porte against Russia, a tranquillizing communication should be addressed to the Diet by the two Germanic Powers to demonstrate their neutral position, this proposal was not only willingly accepted by the Prussian Government, but met even with that full concurrence which we believed its evident motives entitled us to expect. We were informed that the Prussian Government entered into our proposition, and that they only entertained the wish to agree on the expressions of the communication to be delivered in common in Frankfort.

As we were very ready for such an agreement, and wanted to leave the particulars of form and language to the Prussian Government, and as time pressed if it was to be laid before the Diet the first session fixed on the 3rd instant, we believed we could not forward the object in view by any better

means, than by causing the President of the Diet on his return to Frankfort to go by Berlin for the purpose of settling verbally all that was necessary with the Prussian Cabinet. We also hastened to address the communication of the 30th ultimo to the Federal Governments, that they might receive in good time the information of the approaching declaration to the Diet.

To our regret doubts in the meanwhile arose in Berlin on the subject of a communication to the Confederation respecting the Russio-Turkish question in general, and Baron Prokesch no longer found there the inclination to participate in it. The Prussian Government persisted in these doubts, although we represented to them that it would be much regretted if the impression of a common action of the two German Powers were lost on this occasion, for which no sufficient reasons were given. We hasten to add that the Prussian Government nevertheless considered their position so little altered, that they, on the contrary, assured us of their concurrence with a declaration to be made in the intended sense by Austria.

Accordingly, nothing was left for us but to instruct our Representative at Frankfort to make a declaration, emanating from Austria alone. Baron Prokesch is directed to deliver it in the session of the 10th instant.

We conclude with expressing the hope that this communication, though not made in the form we originally intended, will, under the above-mentioned circumstances, enjoy in no smaller degree the full appreciation and recognition on the part of our allies of the Confederation.

You will bring the present document to the knowledge of the Government of ———— in the same *confidential* manner as that of the 30th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BUOL.

No. 337.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 101. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November* 19, 1853.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has confided to me that on reporting lately to the King on the Oriental question, His Majesty had expressed himself more decidedly than he had ever done before on the impracticability of engaging Prussia in a triple alliance. His Majesty's words were, "Il ne peut plus s'agir d'une triple alliance pour nous."

Baron Manteuffel stated also that he had observed to the King, that the occasion for a triple alliance now no longer existed. It had been formed under other circumstances, as a defence against the domination of Napoleon. "If," said his Excellency, "similar circumstances were to arise, it is probable that a similar defensive system would be concerted."

I replied to his Excellency, that the Emperor Nicholas in the present day represented the aggressor and the disturber of the public peace. He it was who was now seeking to aggrandise his Empire, and to push his conquests into the heart of Germany.

Baron Manteuffel replied, if not in the very words in language almost similar, "that Germany had no interest to fight on the Rhine in order to be swallowed up on the Danube."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 338.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 416.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 19, 1853.*

I LEARN from Baron Meyendorff that he has transmitted an order to M. Muchin, the newly appointed Russian Consul at Belgrade, to take down his consular flag, and to desist from any attempt to assume the functions to which he is appointed, and which, without an exequatur from the Sultan, would not be legally established.

Baron Meyendorff has also desired M. Muchin, in case any objection should be raised to his continuing to reside in Servia, to withdraw at once, without giving occasion for any dispute or discussion upon the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 339.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 879.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 22, 1853.*

LATE yesterday evening M. de Hübner gave me the gratifying intelligence, that the Austrian Government adopted the whole of the conditions which your Lordship had instructed Lord Westmorland to represent to Count Buol, as those on which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to address a further communication to the Porte, with a view of inducing the Ottoman Government to enter into fresh negotiations with Russia for the settlement of the Eastern question. M. de Hübner was further informed, that M. de Buol left it to France and England to decide whether the note to be addressed to the Porte should be the work of the two Cabinets, or whether they would intrust the Conference of Vienna with the task of drawing it up. He left it equally to those two Cabinets to decide whether the note should be collective, or whether each Representative of the Four Powers at Constantinople should present a separate one to the Porte; observing, however, that Austria would prefer the former mode, as likely to carry greater weight with it.

There was a paragraph at the end of M. de Hübner's despatch which had not been clearly deciphered when I saw him, but the spirit of which appeared to be, that the Four Powers should give the Porte to understand clearly that they expected that their proposal would be accepted.

This morning M. Drouyn de Lhuys called on me, on his way from Fontainebleau. He said that the Emperor was much preoccupied with the present state of the Eastern question, and was anxious to place it in a clearer light (dans une position plus nette) than it was at present. That he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) had consequently, by His Majesty's orders, drawn up a project of Protocol of Conference, which he was about to send to London for your Lordship's approval, when the intelligence from Vienna which I have related above reached him. He read me the project in question. It was to the effect that the Four Powers, convinced that the present state of the relations between Russia and Turkey were dangerous to the peace of Europe and could not be permitted to continue, and having failed in all their efforts to mediate between the contending parties, invited them to send Plenipotentiaries to meet their Representatives in Conference; that, as the Emperor of Russia had constantly declared that he sought no new right, &c. (the declaration of Russia was here reproduced); and as the Porte had stated its readiness to give satisfactory assurances, it might be hoped that, with the aid of the Four Powers, this misunderstanding would thus be put an end to; but should the Four Powers be unfortunately mistaken, they declared that they would continue to watch closely the progress of the war in the East, reserving to themselves the right to interfere whenever they judged it necessary for the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire or the independence of its Sovereign and Government.

This project, M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued, must now be modified to suit the circumstances as they now stood. As it was now decided to ascertain in the first place the Porte's intentions, he wishes that your Lordship should undertake the task of drawing up the note which it is proposed to address to the Porte on the part of the Four Powers, as well as the instructions to be sent to the Representatives at Constantinople, and that you should transmit these papers to Paris for the information of the French Government. He had no doubt that they would be accepted at once, in which case they might be forwarded without delay to Vienna.

Arrived at Vienna, he wishes that the late note should be signed collectively by the Members of the Conference, and sent on to Constantinople. He prefers this to different, even if identic, notes. He is at the same time desirous that France and England should make a declaration to the Conference in the sense indicated above; and he proposes drawing up a document, which he will transmit to-day or to-morrow to London, and which, if it receives the approbation and concurrence of Her Majesty's Government, he is desirous should be sent to Vienna by the same occasion as that employed for the transmission of the note and instructions. He proposes that, at the Conference at which the note is signed, but after the signature, the French and English Representatives shall make their declaration, and unite their colleagues to assent to it; and in the event of the latters' refusal, that they shall demand the insertion of the declarations, as made by them only, into the Protocol of Conference, leaving the others to adhere to it later, if they shall hereafter be so disposed.

In order to save time, the telegraph, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, could be employed by both Governments to signify their acceptance or disapproval of the documents which would thus pass between them.

Being obliged to set out at a given hour for Fontainebleau, this despatch is written in great haste; and I must request your Lordship to pardon me, if it is less clear than I could wish.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 340.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 290.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 24, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course which your Excellency proposes to pursue, as reported in your despatch No. 334 of the 5th of November, with a view to carrying out the instructions contained in my despatch to your Excellency No. 234 of the 24th ultimo, which was written under the expectation that the commencement of hostilities would have been suspended.

That expectation was unfortunately not realized; but Her Majesty's Government consider that no effort should be neglected to stop the effusion of blood, and to effect a just and honourable peace; and they still indulge a hope that these important objects may have been secured by the judgment and ability of your Excellency, notwithstanding the serious obstacles to success that existed at the time when your Excellency was about to make a fresh appeal to the Porte.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 341.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 418.)

Vienna, November 22, 1853.

My Lord,

IN consequence of the hostilities which are at present being carried on in the neighbourhood of Widdin, and on the Wallachian frontiers adjoining Transylvania, the Austrian Government have felt the necessity of keeping the corps of observation which had been sent in that direction at its full complement, instead of reducing it according to the decision which has been carried into effect in all the other corps of the Austrian army. The men who have already received their leaves of absence will rejoin their battalions, so that the force will remain at its original strength. Some artillery will also be ordered to join this force, which will be placed in the neighbourhood of Temesvar.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 342.

Sir J. Milbanke to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 85.)

Munich, November 14, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's No. 42, the contents of which, in conformity with the instructions therein conveyed to me, I have not failed to communicate to the Bavarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

My statement of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government did not elicit from His Excellency any observations worth recording; for he merely observed, or more properly speaking, hinted, that the communication touched the Greek Minister more closely than it did him. This, in reality, may be the truth, for I can scarcely doubt that the language of M. von der Pfordten, in respect to the formation of a Christian State out of the ruins of Turkish domination in Europe, has proceeded more from a feeling that it ought to be in accordance with what are commonly supposed to be the ambitious ideas cherished in the higher regions, than for any great interest taken in the question, either of himself or his colleagues, individually or collectively; whilst, on the other hand, it is equally undeniable that the excitement against Turkey, which daily efforts are made to keep up through the instrumentality of the press, receives its chief impulse from the Greek propaganda, at the head of which in this capital I may, without hesitation, place M. de Skinas, whose zeal, at all events, cannot be questioned. He is, if I am correctly informed, incessantly at work upon the King's imagination by his pictures of the brilliant prospects which the actual state of affairs in the East, according to his appreciation of events, opens to the Greek nation, and consequently, as he lets it be understood, with what sincerity I shall not stop to discuss, to the reigning dynasty. However, as it was impossible to remain under any illusion as to the obstacles which the religious scruples of King Otho must oppose to the realization of these wild schemes, I have some reason to believe that in a recent memorandum, placed in the King's hands, this point was specially adverted to, and was made a pretext for urging the imperative necessity of an immediate conformity to the Greek faith on the part of the Monarch who now occupies the Throne.

What I have here written may suffice to give your Lordship some insight into the motives which have dictated the remarks which I have on more than one occasion thought it my duty to notice, but I am not inclined to attribute much importance to them; for after all, connexity of interests there is none between this country and Greece, and sympathy with the reigning dynasty is confined to those classes alone who seek the favour of the Court.

Latterly, indeed, a change is observable in the language of M. von der Pfordten on the Turkish dispute, which I presume to be regulated by the inspirations of the Cabinet of Vienna. He appears to consider the quarrel to be devoid of all European interest, and insists upon the expediency of the German Powers maintaining the strictest neutrality.

Upon hearing the enunciation of this doctrine a few days ago, I ventured to express my surprise that Austria and the Southern States of Germany could treat as a matter of indifference a question involving the free navigation of a river which traversed such an extensive portion of their territory, and even the temporary obstruction of which was already causing such heavy losses to the commerce of the countries bordering upon it.

In reply to this M. von der Pfordten said that such a contingency as I adverted to might change the face of affairs altogether, but that the Austrian Cabinet had received from the Emperor of Russia the most positive assurances that a permanent occupation of the Danubian Principalities did not enter into his plans, and was not intended; and his Excellency added that similar tranquillizing assurances had been repeated to him not many days previously by the Russian Minister at this Court.

In the midst of all these doubts and difficulties the policy of the Prussian Cabinet on the Eastern question, and its backwardness in acceding to the wishes of Austria that a solemn declaration of neutrality on it should proceed from the Diet at Frankfort in the name of the Confederation, seems to have given no small umbrage here, and to have gone far to revive all the latent embers of mistrust as to the projects of Prussia, which had been smothered for a time by the satisfactory commercial arrangements concluded some months ago.

M. von der Pfordten dwelt, it appears, to my French colleague, with some bitterness on the conduct of Prussia in evincing a desire to abstain from concert with the other States of the Confederation.

To myself, although he gave signs of annoyance and dissatisfaction, he merely said, that as Prussia agreed in the principle with Austria and the other States, he hoped means might be found to reconcile the difference of opinion as to form.

However, the recent announcement of the intention of Prussia to preserve her liberty of action in coming events has clearly aroused unpleasant suspicions, for a person in daily communication with the different members of the Government, and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs in particular, remarked to me a short time since that Prussia was still the Prussia of 1848 and 1849.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

No. 343.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir J. Milbanke.

(No. 50.)

Foreign Office, November 26, 1853.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 85 of the 14th instant, reporting the ideas which exist in various quarters concerning the formation of a Byzantine Empire, I have to instruct you to take every opportunity of endeavouring to dispel these idle dreams, and you may inform M. von der Pfordten that Russia would be as strongly opposed to such a scheme as the other Great Powers of Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 344.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon:—(Received November 26.)

(No. 885.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 25, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that, after seeing me on the 22nd instant, he had been led, in order to complete the proposition which he had through me made to your Lordship, to draw up drafts of a note to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, and addressed by them to the Porte, of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople by which that note was to be accompanied; and finally, of a Protocol to be signed by the Conference at Vienna, of which the note and instructions were to be annexes, and which was to replace the declaration he had been desirous should be made by the Four Powers with respect to the policy which guided them in the Eastern question. These papers, he added, he had sent for your Lordship's consideration; but if you adopted them, he said that the form of the instructions must be somewhat changed, as they had been drawn up under the supposition that they were to be issued by the Conference at Vienna, while it was obvious that they must emanate from the Governments who were represented there.

During the conversation which ensued, M. de Lhuys insisted very strongly on the value which his proposed Protocol would acquire were Austria and Prussia to agree to sign it; but he added, that he attached so much value to the declaration which it contained, that he had proposed to your Lordship that the French and English Representatives should sign it, even if their colleagues refused to do so, leaving it open for the eventual acceptance of the latter.

He was equally desirous, he continued, that the note to be addressed to the Porte, inviting the Turkish Government to renew negotiations with Russia, should be signed by the Representatives in Conference. He attached great importance to this document having a collective form, as it would carry more weight with it when presented to the Porte, and would be a proof to Russia that the Four Powers were acting in concert. On the other hand, Austria had expressed a preference for this form of proceeding, to which it might be prudent to attend. Finally, he must say that he thought every fact, however slight, which bound Austria to the policy of France and England, was of importance. An alliance commenced in the most simple manner, might, with perseverance and caution, be extended to measures of far greater activity and more positive worth.

It will be for your Lordship to consider the value of these observations. For myself, I could not gainsay them, though I was most careful to reserve full latitude of opinion for Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 345.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 886 Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 25, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me yesterday, confidentially, the summary of a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 18th instant, giving an account of a conversation which he had on that day with M. de Buol.

M. de Bourqueney relates that he found the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs under considerable emotion, in consequence of despatches which he had just received from M. de Hübner, giving the account of a conversation which he had had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

On my inquiring the nature of the conversation, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that before going to Fontainebleau he had expressed himself very frankly to M. de Hübner with respect to the policy of France, when pressed by that Minister to join Austria in urging the Porte to agree to an armistice; but that his language on this occasion, although it might have been a little more warm, did not differ from that which he had always held, and which he had on various occasions repeated to me, namely, that France was willing and ready to become the political ally, but not the police agent of Austria; and that if Austria desired to assure herself of the friendship of France in the event of further internal commotions in the Austrian Empire, she must adopt the policy in the Eastern question which would place her in the same line with France and England. With this short explanation, rendered necessary to explain what follows, I return to M. de Bourqueney's despatch, which appeared to me most interesting and important.

"Let us hasten," says M. de Buol, "our efforts in the cause of peace. Russia has declared her readiness to negotiate, notwithstanding the declaration of war by the Porte. If she abides by her declaration, and the Porte also declares its willingness to treat for peace, we have her ("nous la tenons"). If she has altered her mind, you will find me ready to follow the path you indicate. I do not lay now any stress upon an armistice. It will not be the first time that negotiations have been pursued at the same time as hostilities—only let negotiators be named."

M. de Bourqueney observed, that M. de Buol's statement was incomplete, unless he explained what he would do if the spring found the question still more complicated by negotiation pursued through the winter without result, through the fault of Russia. "In that case," said M. de Buol, "we will not separate from you—'Nous irons avec vous jusqu'au bout;' only do not press us unnecessarily—give us time. Were Austria to threaten Russia now, she would be accused of firing the first shot. Trust to us. It is a mere question of dates between us. Pray beg M. Drouyn de Lhuys to take these observations into consideration."

M. de Bourqueney concludes his despatch with this observation: "Austria has more than once seen her hopes destroyed during the last five months: should she be deceived again, she is ours—'Elle est à nous.'"

I may remark, that if this change in Count Buol's tone has been wrought by the language which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has lately held to M. de Hübner, it is probable that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs will be still more impressed by the words which I have reason to know M. de Hübner heard from the Emperor, whose personal sentiments he had an opportunity of ascertaining at Fontainebleau when he was invited.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 346.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 423.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 23, 1853.*

PRINCE GHIKA, the Hospodar of Moldavia, has arrived in Vienna, and in the same manner as Prince Stirbey he has called upon the Turkish Ambassador, the Ministers of State, and the diplomatic corps.

I have returned his visit, and although I have not had an opportunity of conversing with him, I learn that he holds the same language as to the line of conduct he has adopted, and the difficulties of his position as that which I have reported in my despatch No. 411, as being held by Prince Stirbey.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 347.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 424.)

Vienna, November 23, 1853.

My Lord,

HAVING, according to your Lordship's instructions, communicated your despatch No. 379 to Count Buol, he repeated all the explanations he had already given me, and which I reported at length to your Lordship in my despatch No. 406, as to the necessity under which he had felt himself obliged to transmit the proposals he had received from St. Petersburgh at once to the Internuncio, without any longer waiting for the adherence which he expected from your Lordship, and from the Governments of France and Prussia, to the recommendations which he had proposed should be transmitted to the Porte in a collective note, and which were detailed in my despatches to your Lordship Nos. 391, 402, and 409.

He had never intended this communication as one to which the adhesion of England, or of any other Government, would be required. He had merely adopted it as fulfilling the duty which had devolved upon him of informing the Government of the Sultan of the readiness of the Emperor of Russia to enter into a negotiation for the establishment of peace, notwithstanding the declaration of war which had taken place. The fulfilment of this duty in no way interfered with his desire of cooperating with the other allied Governments in those recommendations to the Sultan's Government which (under the modifications which he was perfectly ready to agree to) should ultimately be decided on, and which were according to his own propositions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 348.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 426.)

Vienna, November 23, 1853.

My Lord,

ACCORDING to your Lordship's instructions, I waited upon Count Buol, to submit to him the proposals contained in your despatch addressed to me, No. 378. I read to him this despatch, and delivered to him a copy of it. Count Buol adhered entirely to all your Lordship's proposals. He considered them as agreeing in substance with those he had himself pointed out; and he stated that he was perfectly disposed to adopt them, as the basis of the note to be addressed to the Porte by the Four Powers, as well as of the instructions to be forwarded to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople.

Count Buol received with great pleasure the assurance given by your Lordship of the satisfaction Her Majesty's Government would experience in cooperating with the Austrian Government towards the re-establishment of friendly relations between Russia and the Porte; and he begged to assure you that this satisfaction would be entirely reciprocated by the Austrian Government.

Baron Bourqueney, having joined Count Buol and myself during our interview, produced the instructions he had received by telegraph from his Government to support your Lordship's propositions.

Count Buol stated himself to agree entirely with your Lordship's opinion, that the collective note to be addressed to the Porte should be confined to the announcement that the Government of Russia was ready to enter into negotiation for the restoration of peaceable relations between the two countries, and to a question addressed to the Porte upon what conditions they were ready to negotiate. With a view of carrying out this object with the least possible delay,

Count Buol requested the Cabinets of London and of Paris to transmit to Vienna either a draft of this note, for the signature of the Four Representatives at Vienna, or an authority to those Representatives to draw up that note in accordance with the basis which had been agreed upon, and then to be transmitted to the Representatives at Constantinople. Count Buol requested also that the Cabinets of London and Paris would decide whether this note should be addressed from Vienna to Reshid Pasha, to be transmitted to him by the Representatives at Constantinople, or whether it should be signed and addressed to him by those Representatives upon their receipt of it from Vienna.

With reference to the nature of the answer which the Porte might address to this communication, Count Buol (in case the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople were consulted with regard to it) entirely concurred in the substance of the instructions your Lordship proposed should be sent to them; and he only expressed his anxiety that they might be transmitted as early as possible after the collective note had been forwarded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 349.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 105. Confidential.)

Berlin, November 24, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL has received intelligence from Vienna that differences of a serious nature were likely to arise between the Bosnians and Servians, which might lead to a collision between those two provinces; and that the Austrian Government had directed a corps of observation to be stationed on the Servian frontier in the direction of Temesvar.

His Excellency is fearful that any conflict between these two races may increase the complications of affairs in the East, and views with some alarm any demonstration on the part of Austria which, whilst it might seriously compromise the neutrality she had so overtly made at Frankfort, might also cause umbrage to France, and give rise to counter-demonstrations by that Power on the borders of Italy.

His Excellency had accordingly instructed Count Arnim to recommend to the Austrian Cabinet the greatest caution and prudence, and to take no steps which might be interpreted in an adverse or even in a doubtful sense by the western Powers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 350.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 106.)

Berlin, November 24, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL read to me a few days ago a private letter which he had received from Greece. His correspondent stated that on leaving Trieste he had seen four Russian ships of war somewhere on the coasts of Istria, and that they were reported to have been stationed there for the protection of the Montenegrins.

This gentleman, writing from Athens, reports that great excitement existed among the Greek population; that Russian emissaries were pervading the whole

country; that a phil-Hellenic club was originated at Athens, at the head of which was Count Metaxa; that on board the steamer on which he arrived at the Piræus, there was a band of Greek students returning from German universities singing songs of "Liberty and Freedom," and that in conversing with them they seemed confidently to look forward to the establishment of a Greek Byzantine Empire on the approaching downfall of Turkish rule.

In connection with this topic, I may likewise report to your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel has been informed by General Rochow that the Emperor of Russia had received a petition from the Bulgarians claiming his protection, and detailing the ill-treatment they suffered from their Turkish rulers.

His Excellency appeared very justly to view this as intentionally put forth to foster the religious fanaticism against Turkey, and as a palliative for the unjust demands which Russia has addressed to the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 351.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 107. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 24, 1853.*

REPORTS from St. Petersburgh, dated the 16th, have been received here from General Rochow.

From what I can gather they seem to represent the Emperor Nicholas as very much excited and extremely incensed against the Turks; but I could not learn what ultimate course was likely to be pursued, either in a military sense or in the way of negotiation.

Baron Manteuffel seems to be of opinion that Count Nesselrode is at present allied with the old Russian party, and that Count Orloff represents the more moderate counsellors of the Emperor. If such be the case (which does not appear to be borne out by the valuable opinion of Sir G. H. Seymour) I can only draw this conclusion, viz., either that the far-seeing politician may look to gain through diplomacy a triumph for Russia which the distinguished General can scarcely hope to achieve by arms, or that the wily veteran of diplomacy may seek by apparent concessions to dominate a party in the Russian Empire which he could no longer risk openly to oppose.

Baron Manteuffel has given me to understand, that he has been bitterly reproached by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh for the line of policy which Prussia has pursued in the Oriental question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 352.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 25, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL called upon me this evening, on his return from Potsdam, anticipating the hour at which he had appointed to meet me at his own house.

His Excellency told me that he had received a despatch from the Chevalier Bunsen, informing him of the *projet de note* which your Lordship had drawn up for presentation to the Porte collectively by the Representatives of the Four

Powers, and stating that the text of this note would be forwarded by your Lordship to Berlin and Vienna on Saturday the 26th instant.

I informed his Excellency that the terms of this note, and of the instructions to accompany it, were in exact conformity with the opinions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 378 to the Earl of Westmorland, of which I had already given his Excellency a copy; and I likewise stated that they had been most favourably received by the Austrian Cabinet.

I then inquired specifically what opinions the King had expressed with respect to the views of Her Majesty's Government as set forth in that despatch.

His Excellency replied, that the King had entirely approved of them, and had further authorized him to give his adhesion to any note conceived and drawn up in the sense and spirit of the views expressed by your Lordship.

His Excellency remarked that, although perfectly willing to cooperate with the other Powers in the sense conveyed in your Lordship's despatch, he should not, however, wish to embroil himself with the Emperor Nicholas by submitting to His Imperial Majesty proposals as emanating from Prussia alone.

Baron Manteuffel stated that, from intelligence he had received from St. Petersburgh yesterday (which confirms the report of Sir H. Seymour), he much feared that the Emperor would never consent to a Conference at which a Russian and a Turkish negotiator should take part; and he is likewise convinced that the Emperor will never consent to evacuate the Provinces until some final arrangement has been concluded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 353.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 631.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 16, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Consul-General Yeames, and, although the information it contains is probably in your Lordship's possession, I think it advisable to forward Mr. Yeames' letter, as, in consequence of the interruption of postal and steam communication on the Danube and the Bosphorus, it may prove to be the quickest means of transmitting to Her Majesty's Government the information which that gentleman has to offer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 353.

Consul-General Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *Odessa, November 7, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your letters of the 17th and 18th ultimo, and very thankfully, for they in part relieved me of apprehensions from which no one under present circumstances can be entirely free.

The affair in the Island of Tchetal, mentioned in my letter of the 28th ultimo, turned out to be nothing more than an attack of marauders upon a post of Cossacks.

No further event has since occurred in that quarter, and all attention is now directed to the passage of the Turks from Widdin to the left bank of the Danube, and to the position which they have taken at Kalafat. A large quantity of corn has fallen into their hands, and it is said that no Russian force is for

advanced into Little Wallachia. Rumours do not fail here daily; and, indeed, such a state of things cannot continue long without bringing on some acts of importance.

The Asiatic frontier is now supposed to be sufficiently covered by the reinforcements brought last week from the Crimea, and by troops from Georgia, detached after Shamil was driven back into his mountainous fastnesses.

Of the late events, however remarkable in the Caucasus, I have seen no official account published. It is only known that, during three weeks, Shamil with 15,000 of his warriors remained in Balokan investing the chief place of that province, the fortress of Zakatal, and intercepting for a time the communication between Tiflis and Honha. By a force brought together by Prince Orbelian, and by the co-operation of Prince Argoutinsky Dolgorouky from the Samur, he was at length forced to retire.

All steam and postal intercourse with the Bosphorus having ceased we now depend upon sailing-vessels for intelligence from Constantinople, and unluckily the wind for several days has been from the north.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 354.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 632. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, November 16, 1853.

My Lord,

NO impartial person, I imagine, can contest the Sultan's full right to respond to the unwarrantable aggression of Russia by an attack upon any part of the Emperor's dominions which he may consider vulnerable. But abstract right and expediency do not always go hand in hand.

It may, I think, be assumed that as the permanent exclusion of Russia from the Principalities is not only a Turkish, but an European interest, good policy should have induced the Sultan to concentrate his attention, and his attacks, as much as possible upon these provinces.

In this manner a strictly defensive character would have been given to the war into which Turkey has been goaded.

In this manner even Austria would have been ultimately compelled to take part in resistance against the aggrandisement which her overgrown ally would have been the most likely to attempt.

In this manner the military operations of Russia would have been circumscribed in a circle which would have exposed them to continual observation and control, and every precaution would have been taken against affording the Emperor an excuse for departing from those declarations with which the entry of the Principalities was accompanied.

I cannot, for my own part, believe in the possibility of the Turks carrying on with success a protracted struggle with Russia, and it appears to me, therefore, that the Sultan was deeply concerned in choosing for the theatre of his military endeavours the countries in which he might the most readily have received assistance from his friends.

As it is, fresh excuses, or at least fresh motives, have been afforded to Russian ambition, and supposing (as it is to be anticipated) that active operations, begun with such vivacity by the aggrieved party, should end to their distinct advantage, it is hardly to be doubted that the Emperor will endeavour to render the Black Sea much more of a Russian lake than it ever has been, or ever can be, if any remains of vitality are to be left to Turkey.

I have before alluded to Batoum; the holding of that post by a rival country has already cost Russia much more heart-burning. She has watched with great jealousy the supplies of ammunition, arms, and provisions which have been dispatched thence to the insurgents, as they are here esteemed, of the Caucasus; and, without having any precise information upon the point, I do not

doubt that Batoum is one of those places for acquiring and retaining which great efforts will be made.

The best proof, however, that can be afforded that the Sultan has been ill advised in choosing Asia as the battle-field on which his differences with the Russians is to be settled, will be, if that theatre of operations is found to suit the Emperor's views, and this, I am inclined to believe, will be seen to be the case.

Although I speak with great diffidence of matters of which I am so wholly ignorant as of all that relates to war, I imagine the Emperor to be, for the present, quite contented to carry on nothing but a defensive war in the Danubian Provinces, and to have, or to believe that he has, a sufficient force to effect this purpose.

At the same time he is known to have been much incensed at the initiative of operations having been taken by an enemy of whose power he had long spoken so contemptuously, and the feeling is believed to have been increased by the recent events at St. Nicholas.

This affair is indeed spoken of by the Russians as a victory, although not of a decisive kind; but its real character is of course as well known to themselves as to the rest of the world.

The result, as I fully expect, will be that the appeals of Prince Woróntzow (who has been more clear-sighted than his master) will be attended to; that large reinforcements will be sent to him, and that he will be encouraged to wipe out a partial surprise and failure by some signal successes.

This will suit Prince Woróntzow, who is known to be anxious about obtaining the only honour which it remains for the Emperor to bestow upon him—the staff of a marshal; and it will suit his Imperial master, who must be supposed to be not otherwise than well satisfied at having an excuse for not being fettered by such obligations as are imposed by voluntary assurances.

If, in the place of positive information, I submit to your Lordship conjectures and hypotheses, I will beg of you to remember that the former I have not to offer.

The Emperor's real intentions are known to himself and to two or three of his confidants,—probably not even to the most trusty and experienced of his ministers; and in this well-trained society not only is any information as to passing events sought for in vain, but allusion to them is as much as possible avoided.

I will venture upon one concluding observation. I am well aware that, if the necessity of any expansion on the part of Russia is admitted, Austria, Germany, France herself, would infinitely prefer her frontiers being enlarged at the expense of Asia.

England, on the contrary, has interests which make it extremely desirable that even the easternmost limits of Russia should not be extended, since every step taken by a Russian army in an eastern direction brings it nearer to the Indus.

In the midst of the anxieties caused by the numerous contingencies to which the aggressive policy of Russia gives rise, one ground of confidence and comfort appears to be afforded.

I do not allude to declarations and promises, the value of which I consider as infinitesimal, but to those financial embarrassments of which the commencement is already to be perceived,—embarrassments which have been prepared by the practice of collecting large armies when they were assembled only for amusement, and which will render it difficult to increase, maintain, and move them about when they are required for mischievous purposes.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 355.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 635.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1853.

THE despatch No. 278, which your Lordship has done me the honour to address to me, has relieved me from considerable anxiety, by showing that you have been pleased to approve of the communication which I thought it advisable to make to the Chancellor respecting the instructions given to the Admiral of Her Majesty's fleet at the Dardanelles.

As well what preceded as what has followed that communication, satisfies me that a serious warning was called for by ideas which had been too long prevalent here.

The axiom "War between Russia and England is simply impossible," is one which, as your Lordship will have seen from various of my reports, had become a part of the Russian political creed.

In a modified shape the axiom may still be safely adopted, the late protracted discussions having served to demonstrate that war between the two countries is impossible so that Russia can but restrain herself from acts hostile to English interests and hostile to those of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 356.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 636.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1853.

FROM Lord Augustus Loftus's despatch No. 69, which formed one of the inclosures of your Lordship's despatch No. 272, I learn that M. de Manteuffel remains of opinion "that nothing efficacious or durable can be effected but by a thorough revision of all the Treaties now existing between Russia and Turkey."

Your Lordship will, I hope, pardon me if I observe that this plan appears to be open to considerable objections.

As regards Russia, unless she is to gain by this re-casting of Treaties, her consent to such an arrangement would, I apprehend, be obtained only at the point of the bayonet, by the use, that is, of means which Europe has shown such manifest reluctance to employ.

As regards "un remaniement pacifique des Traités," every one must recollect the general apprehensions which the mention of this idea awakened.

No one more than myself appreciates the statesmanlike views and the steadiness of conduct which the French Government have exhibited during these difficulties, which have been brought on by the grasping policy of Russia, but these wise and prudent dispositions should not, I think, be too highly tried; it might prove that a remodelling of Treaties in which France was called to take part, might lead her to insist upon a renewal of the process with regard to engagements in which her interests are more nearly concerned.

The cause, too, which France in all probability is already anxious to plead, would be considerably strengthened when she is armed with such a precedent as that with which the Prussian Cabinet is eager to provide her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 357.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 637.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1853.

IN a late despatch I had the honour of making known to your Lordship a wish conveyed to me in the shape of an inquiry on the part of the Emperor by Count Nesselrode.

Upon reflecting upon that wish, I am more and more convinced that it cannot safely be complied with.

The railway to Warsaw will be used either for military or for commercial purposes; in either case the interests of England and Russia lie in opposite directions, the interests of humanity, I will likewise observe, agreeing with those of England, since both require that a war should be brought to the quickest possible conclusion, and since every facility given to commerce would render it more easy for Russia to prolong the struggle.

As the disposal of its agricultural produce is the great resource upon which this country has to depend, every art will of course be tried, in the occurrence of war, to carry on trade by indirect means. The great facility indeed which Russia possesses for indirect exportation would make any attempt to injure her in this manner difficult, unless Prussia could be induced to join heartily in the effort.

Supposing friendly relations to be continued between Russia and Prussia, the Niemen and the Vistula would be crowded with Russian produce, and the ports of Memel and Dantzic would be the resort of hundreds of vessels which now never enter them.

It may be expected indeed that Russia will bid high for the amity or the continued neutralization of Germany. The newspapers have lately stated that in case of a rupture with England the Russian tariff will be modified in favour of the Zollvercin, and an acquaintance of mine asserts not only that this plan really exists, but that some intimation of it has been already made to the Cabinet of Berlin.

I have some reason for believing that the Emperor and his military advisers have a very inadequate idea of the importance of trade to this country; yet even His Majesty was struck with the scarcity of vessels at Cronstadt, and learned with surprise that vague rumours of war had been sufficient to cause this unusual blank.

This perception it was which led to the communication lately made to the British merchants of St. Petersburgh; and the customs' returns of the season must make it a matter of regret that the notification had not been made at an earlier period.

Various circumstances combine to make me infer that the Government is already suffering from financial difficulty. Thus, small payments which are usually made without hesitation are now deferred, the Government finding it more convenient to pay interest thereupon; thus the works of the Warsaw Railway have been suspended, and the building of all public edifices, except those under construction by contract, is given up.

One of the persons here, whose opinion is of the most value in all that relates to financial matters, has not hesitated to express to me his conviction that these symptoms are only the forerunners of more serious ones; and considers it almost certain that the Government will be unable to proceed beyond the month of February, without either having recourse to a loan or to a depreciation of the currency.

Truly it may be said that supposed diplomatic superiority is producing results in this country which must render it a matter of regret to its inhabitants that their foreign relations are not conducted by more sober and better-established mediocrity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 358.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No 638.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1853.

FOR the last three days an engagement, very honourable to the Imperial arms, has been spoken of by the Russians as having taken place near Oltenitza, opposite to Turtukai.

The "St. Petersburgh Gazette" of this day gives the inclosed relation of the affair, from which it would appear that General Dannenberg's attack was made with such impetuosity that the Turkish force which had passed the Danube retreated precipitately, the cavalry rushing into the river.

These particulars are not to be found in the account of the engagement previously given by the foreign newspapers.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 358.

Extract from the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg."

NOUVELLE DU DANUBE.

Le 20 Octobre, à une heure de l'après-midi, plusieurs navires Turcs, chargés de troupes, et un pyroscaphe remorquant une galiote armée de 3 canons, profitant d'un épais brouillard, tentèrent de descendre le Danube, en partant de Roustchouk.

Deux pelotons d'artillerie, l'un de la batterie de position No. 2, l'autre de la batterie légère No. 2 de la 10e brigade d'Artillerie Légère, detachés à Jourja (Giurgevo), accueillirent les navires ennemis par un feu bien dirigé et les forcèrent de se replier sur la rive droite du fleuve, pour réparer leurs avaries.

Le 21, les troupes Turques campées près de Tourtoukaï, passèrent sur la rive gauche du Danube, où elles occupèrent le bâtiment de la quarantaine, construit en pierre.

L'Aide-de-Camp Général Prince Gortchakoff ayant été instruit de ce mouvement, donna ordre au Commandant du 4e corps d'Infanterie d'attaquer l'ennemi, avec un détachement composé de la 1re brigade de la 11e division d'Infanterie, de 6 escadrons du régiment de Lanciers d'Olviopol, de 3 sotnias du régiment de Cosaques du Don No. 34, de la batterie de position No. 3 et de la batterie légère No. 5 de la 11e brigade d'Artillerie Légère, et de 2 pièces de la batterie No. 9 d'Artillerie du Don.

Le centre de la position de l'ennemi était formé par l'edifice de la quarantaine, armé de 6 pièces de canon, d'où partaient, à droite vers le Danube et à gauche jusqu'à l'Arjis, des retranchements avec fossé palissadé. Le flanc droit était enfilé par le feu de batteries à trois étages situés sur la rive droite escarpée du fleuve, et le flanc gauche par deux batteries élevées sur une île située au confluent de l'Arjis.

A l'approche de nos troupes l'ennemi ouvrit le feu le plus vif de toutes ses pièces.

Deux de nos batteries, ayant pris position à 450 sagènes des retranchements, commencèrent à jouer de leur côté. Après une heure de canonnade dans cette position, ces batteries se portèrent en avant, et commencèrent à tirer à mitraille. En même temps, notre infanterie se lança sur les retranchements, au milieu du feu le plus meurtrier, et commença la descente du fossé.

Cette attaque audacieuse et rapide surprit les Turcs à tel point, que leur cavalerie se jeta dans le Danube. Sur ces entrefaites, le feu bien dirigé de notre artillerie produisit deux explosions dans la quarantaine, et les canons qui s'y trouvaient cessèrent de tirer et se replièrent en toute hâte vers le rivage. L'infanterie qui occupait la quarantine et une partie de celle qui se trouvait dans les retranchements s'enfuirent également vers le Danube et s'embarquèrent à la hâte.

Alors le Général Dannenberg, voyant que la position abandonnée par l'ennemi se trouvait sous le feu de 40 pièces de canon postées sur la rive droite du Danube (qui n'a que 212 sagènes de large en cet endroit) ordonna de cesser le combat et occupa une position prés du bourg d'Olténitsa.

Dans cette brillante affaire, l'infanterie a donné de nouvelles preuves d'élan et d'intrépidité, l'artillerie de sang-froid et de justesse de tir.

Nous avons à regretter 3 officiers subalternes et 150 hommes tués, 7 officiers supérieurs, 19 officiers subalternes et 629 hommes blessés.

La perte de l'ennemi n'est pas encore exactement connue, mais, d'après les renseignements recueillis, elle a été considérable, particulièrement en hommes noyés dans le Danube.

Il ne s'est rien passé de remarquable dans les autres cantonnements de l'armée, sauf de légères et fréquentes escarmouches le long de la rive du Danube.

No. 359.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon,—(Received November 27.)

(No. 639.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 19, 1853.

SO much secrecy is now observed with regard to the movement of troops, that I feel some hesitation in submitting to your Lordship information which may prove to be incorrect.

I do not, however, doubt the Government having received intelligence two or three days ago of the arrival of Baron Osten-Sacken's corps d'armée on the Pruth. It is to be supposed that no time was lost by them in crossing the river, as for some days every exertion had been made for hastening the march of the troops.

With regard to the sixth corps d'armée, stationed in and about Moscow, no one appears to doubt that it is intended to proceed southwards; and, as I am assured, small detachments of the force have already marched.

I believe—but here I must speak with less confidence—that the bulk of this corps will proceed, if requisite, to the Principalities, but that a portion of it will be sent to reinforce Prince Woronzow's army.

Upon the sixth corps leaving Moscow, their place will be taken, as I learn from various quarters, by the Grenadiers.

According to reports, which I believe to be well founded, some misunderstanding exists between General Lüders and his superior in command, Prince Gortchakoff.

I hear the conduct both of Prince Gortchakoff and General Dannenberg sharply criticized; some of the officers here representing that instead of attacking the Turkish forces upon their landing on the left bank of the Danube, their onward march ought to have been encouraged.

To these observations of persons far removed from the scene of action, I am disposed to pay very slight attention.

The detractors of Prince Gortchakoff assert that he is slow and hesitating in council; but even these admit that his courage and coolness in action are very remarkable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 360.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 27.)

(No. 640.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November* 19, 1853.

UPON calling on Count Nesselrode yesterday I observed to him that, according to the intelligence which I had received, the Cabinet of Vienna were more intent than ever upon an armistice between the Russian and Turkish forces

being agreed upon, and that it appeared from advices from England that these views were shared by Her Majesty's Government.

However, I said, the great difficulty for obtaining the object appears to be the objections entertained by the Turks to assent to a suspension of hostilities; the Turks being sensible that the pause would be decidedly to the advantage of their opponents, you having it in your power to pour fresh troops into the Principalities; the Porte having despatched all their available force to the Danube, and having rather to fear that their numbers may be diminished by inaction than to hope that they can receive any reinforcements. What, then, I would desire to suggest, would be that you should give the English representations a fair chance of being listened to favourably at Constantinople; and that to effect this that you should consent to a month's suspension of hostilities, and to withdrawing your troops from the Principalities. Those of Turkey might be induced simultaneously to fall back behind the Danube, during which time negotiations, which could hardly fail of proving successful, might be conducted, and probably with improved chances if the negotiation were to be removed from Vienna to London, where the parties principally interested might be represented.

The arrangement would be the less open to objection, as I would venture to remark that, in London, Russian interests would be entrusted to the management of a negotiator second in ability to none of the diplomatists of Russia.

The Chancellor, after requesting me to repeat the propositions to him, observed, but entirely without anger or excitement of manner, that he was really surprised that such a proposal should be made to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government; that the position assigned to Russia was too disadvantageous and too humiliating to be accepted; that for 150 years no such position would have been thought of for Russia in her "démêlés" with the Porte; that upon entering the Principalities the Emperor had declared that he should only withdraw his troops when he had obtained satisfaction, and that to do so sooner would be to lower himself in the eyes of the world.

He, Count Nesselrode, had done much in the way of conciliation; he had been blamed by many for having gone so far; but to this point he could not proceed. He could not possibly advise the Emperor to listen to such proposals.

I replied that I threw out the suggestions on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, knowing that the hopes of the Vienna Cabinet were founded upon the chances of a suspension of hostilities being obtained, and that the means I had proposed were those the most likely for procuring the assent of the Turks.

Count Nesselrode desired to remark that the Turks were more interested than Russia could be in bringing the war to a close; that it would be made known to the Porte through M. de Bruck that their wisest course would be to place themselves in direct negotiation with Russia; and that he must say that the idea of causing a conference to be attended by a Turkish Plenipotentiary appeared to be to sit in judgment upon Russia, to summon her to appear before the European tribunal.

He wished to remind me that there was no instance of a Turkish Plenipotentiary having taken part in deliberations having an European character.

I begged not to be suspected of any wish of making an observation which might give offence, but felt obliged to remark that all the provocation which had been given was attributable to Russia; that her only complaint—that referable to the holy places—had been redressed; and that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces, although certainly involving very important European questions, was an act bearing so directly upon the interests of Turkey that it could not be wondered at if those interests were mainly looked to, and if Turkey were allowed a voice in the decision to be taken upon them.

Count Nesselrode then made some observations which I do not think it of any importance to report, on the effect of the interference of England and France in an affair which but for the encouragement so given would long ago have been settled to the satisfaction of the Powers now at war.

His Excellency proceeded to speak of the position of England and France, which had been changed from that of mediators to that of countries he might almost say at war with Russia.

Baron Brunnow had been informed, both by your Lordship and by the Earl of Aberdeen, of the eventual orders sent to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's fleet in the Bosphorus, and notice of this communication had already been sent off from hence to Prince Menchikoff.

It was highly improbable, Count Nesselrode stated, that before the spring any operations would be taken by the fleet at Sevastopol: still, what a position had been taken by the English and French Governments towards that of Russia! The Turks, it was evident, were at liberty to attack any part of the Russian territory, whilst, as it had been made known, any attempt on the part of the Russian ships to land troops on the coasts of Turkey would be met by the armed resistance of the allied fleets.

All this was said in a tone of deep regret and feeling, but without the slightest indication of anger, so much so as to render it unnecessary for me again to point out by whose fault an anomalous state of affairs, as well as a very deplorable one, has been brought about.

In the course of our conversation, Count Nesselrode enumerated the various concessions which had been made by Russia, since her first demands for satisfaction signified through Prince Menchikoff.

He concluded the conversation by saying, that for the moment there was nothing to be done; that the affairs between the two armies had been unimportant; but that it was possible that a few days might change the features of the case, and that a decided success obtained by Prince Gortchakoff might open the way to a speedy and satisfactory Treaty of Peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 361.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received November 27.*)

(Telegraphic.) *Paris, November 27, 1853.*

DROUYN, who is here, approves everything. All the papers will be sent to Vienna to-morrow. Drouyn writes privately to the French Ambassador at Constantinople, that the French Government expect this proposition to be accepted, and to do all in his power to obtain the Porte's consent.

No. 362.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 28, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve your having furnished Baron Manteuffel confidentially with an extract of my despatch No. 378 to the Earl of Westmorland, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 97 of the 19th instant. The amendments of Count Buol's proposed draft of instruction have been agreed to by the Austrian Government, and another, and possibly a last, effort in the cause of peace will now be made; but it must be unavailing unless Russia desists from her pretentions upon Turkey. With this object it is to be hoped that all the influence possessed by Prussia will be brought to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 363.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to Baron Manteuffel with respect to the future means of arranging the differences between Russia and Turkey, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 98 of the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 364.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 74.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 28, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 99 of the 19th instant, stating that reports had been set on foot that the refusal of Prussia to join Austria in a declaration of neutrality at the Diet, had been caused by feelings favourable to Russia, I have to inform your Lordship that no such reports have reached Her Majesty's Government, and, if they had, they would have obtained no credit.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 365.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 395.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1853.

INFORMATION has reached Her Majesty's Government that, in the event of any quarrel between the Bosnians and the Servians, Austria meant to interfere. Her Majesty's Government cannot give credit to this rumour, which is contrary to the statement contained in your despatch No. 418 of the 22nd instant; and because any interference between subjects of the Porte would not only complicate all existing difficulties, but would be a departure from the peaceful policy and principle of neutrality professed by Austria.

It would, however, be satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to learn from Count Buol that the rumour in question is unfounded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 366.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 396.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government have learned with much satisfaction, that the form of a collective note, suggested in my despatch No. 378 to your Lordship, together with the amendments to Count Buol's proposed draft of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, have met with the concurrence of the Austrian Government. And as Count Buol conveyed to me through your Lordship and Count Colloredo, his wish that the draft of note and

of instructions should be prepared in London, I lost no time in communicating upon the subject with the French Government, to whom it appears that Count Buol had addressed a similar request. No difference of opinion existed between the two Governments, and by both my despatch No. 378 has been strictly adhered to. The French Government preferred our form of note, and we adopted their draft of instructions with some amendments which were approved of by the French Government. Copies of the two documents are herewith inclosed.* Your Lordship is instructed to sign the note on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney, and Count Arnim; and you will then transmit a copy of it so signed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who will receive from me the instructions as to the advice which his Excellency will tender to the Porte.

I inclose also a Protocol of Conference, to which the concurrence of Austria is earnestly invited by Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, who desire to place on record a principle which at the present moment may be conducive to the restoration of peace between Russia and the Porte, and which will be vitally important to the existing balance of power and to the future tranquillity of Europe.

Her Majesty's Government are convinced that this principle must be in accordance with the policy and the true interests of Austria, and they will deeply regret that she should decline to join England and France in a declaration of which the moral effect cannot fail to be advantageous.

If, as Her Majesty's Government confidently expect, the Protocol is agreed to by the Austrian Government, your Lordship will sign it with Count Buol and Baron de Bourqueney, and with Count Arnim, who will probably receive instructions to that effect; but if for any reason which Her Majesty's Government cannot anticipate, Count Buol should decline to do so, your Lordship will not sign the Protocol until you have made known to Her Majesty's Government the reason of Count Buol's objections.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 367.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 471.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 29, 1853.

THE drafts of a collective note to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, of a Protocol of Conference, and of instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had prepared, and which are referred to in your Excellency's despatch No. 884, were communicated to me by M. Baudin, and were attentively considered by the Cabinet on the 26th instant. As M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to prefer the form of collective note prepared here, it was adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and they agreed to the French draft of instructions, with some amendments, which I explained to M. Baudin, and which he transmitted to Paris. I had the satisfaction of learning yesterday from your Excellency that those amendments had met with the approval of the Government of the Emperor.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of the Protocol of Conference, and concur in the reasons assigned to your Excellency by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as stated in your Lordship's despatch No. 884, for pressing it upon the acceptance of the Austrian Government. But if the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs should unfortunately decline to become a party to the Protocol, Her Majesty's Government recommend that until the nature of his objections are known, it should not be signed by the English and French Ministers at Vienna.

I inclose a copy of the despatch† I have this day addressed to Lord Westmorland, which your Excellency will communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* Inclosures in Nos. 368 and 369. † No. 366.

No. 368.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 292.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE the copy of a note which Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna has been instructed to sign, together with the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia, as a fresh proof of the identity of views that exists between the Four Powers, and of their earnest desire to contribute by their union to the re-establishment of peace between the Porte and Russia.

The remarkable moderation which has characterised the various documents emanated from the Porte induces the Four Powers to hope that the proposition they now make will be regarded by the Turkish Government as alike consistent with the dignity and the intentions of the Ottoman Empire. The Four Powers frankly address an inquiry to the Porte to which it will doubtless reply in a corresponding spirit, without extending its differences with Russia beyond their true limits, or introducing elements of discord beyond those which already exist.

With this expectation the Four Powers feel that the answer to their inquiry should be left entirely to the wisdom and experience of the Turkish Government; but in the event of your Excellency and of your colleagues being consulted upon the subject, it would be desirable to advise the Porte to declare that the Four Powers have done justice to its conciliatory intentions by assuming that it is still desirous, upon honourable conditions, to terminate its difference with Russia, and to come to an understanding with that Power; and that with reference to the assurances that Russia has on various occasions given that she asks for no new concessions, nor for any right derogatory to the sovereignty of the Sultan, the Porte is prepared to renew its offers and to discuss the form in which peace shall be re-established and the religious question settled, upon the condition of not being asked to accede to any demand that it has already refused, and of an arrangement being concluded for the evacuation of the Principalities.

That discussion must naturally take place between a Turkish and a Russian negotiator furnished with full powers to treat; but in order to facilitate agreement between them the two Plenipotentiaries should not meet alone—they should assist at conferences where Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia would be equally represented

It is presumed that the Porte would not negotiate with Russia in any portion of its own territory occupied by the troops of that Power, while Russia, on the other hand, might object to any other place belonging to Turkey; and the two parties ought, therefore, to agree together upon a neutral town in which the conferences should be held.

The object of the Four Powers would not be fully attained if the preliminary negotiations for peace were not at the same time a signal for the cessation of hostilities, and they conceive that the Porte would not object to an armistice, the conditions of which should be arranged between the belligerent parties, if it received from the Four Powers an assurance that the terms on which the Porte was disposed to treat would be accepted also by Russia.

But even if the terms proposed by the Turkish Government were not such as Russia would be likely assent to at the commencement of negotiations, the Four Powers would still counsel the appointment of a Turkish Plenipotentiary and the choice of a neutral place where the Plenipotentiaries of Turkey and Russia might meet the Representatives of the Four Powers.

It is the earnest hope of those Powers that the Turkish Government will carefully weigh against the risks and eventualities of war the proposal which they now submit for the consideration of the Porte.

Inclosure in No. 368.

Collective Note to be signed at Vienna.

The Undersigned, Representatives of Austria, France, Great Britain, and Prussia, assembled in Conference at Vienna, have received instructions to declare that their respective Governments view with deep regret the commencement of hostilities between Russia and the Porte, and anxiously desire by mediating between the belligerent Powers to stop the further effusion of blood and to terminate a state of things which seriously endangers the peace of Europe.

Assurances have been received that Russia is willing to treat, and the Undersigned not doubting that the Porte is animated by a similar spirit, request, in the name of their respective Governments, to be informed upon what conditions the Turkish Government is willing to negotiate a Treaty of Peace.

No. 369.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 293.)

Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE the copy of a Protocol of Conference to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers, which originated with the French Government, but which is entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who concur in the reasons for pressing it upon the acceptance of Austria, which your Excellency will find stated in a despatch* from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, a copy of which is herewith inclosed.

Your Excellency will learn from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, whether the Protocol has been agreed to by the Austrian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure in No. 369.

Projet de Protocole.

LES Soussignés, Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, conformément aux instructions de leurs Cours, se sont réunis en Conférence à l'effet de rechercher les moyens d'aplanir le différend survenu entre la Russie et la Sublime Porte.

Les proportions que ce différend a prises et la guerre qui a éclaté entre les deux Empires, malgré les efforts de leurs alliés, sont devenues pour l'Europe entière l'objet des plus sérieuses préoccupations. En conséquence, leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et le Roi de Prusse, également pénétrées de la nécessité de s'employer pour mettre un terme à des hostilités qui ne pourraient se prolonger sans affecter les intérêts de leurs propres Etats, ont résolu d'offrir leurs bons offices aux deux Hautes Parties belligérentes, dans l'espoir qu'elles ne voudront pas elles-mêmes encourir la responsabilité d'une conflagration, alors que, par un échange de loyales explications, elles peuvent encore la prévenir en replaçant leurs rapports sur un pied de paix et de bonne entente.

Les assurances données à différentes reprises par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie exclurent, de la part de cet auguste Souverain, l'idée de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. En effet l'existence de la Turquie, dans les limites que lui ont assignées les Traités, est devenue une des conditions nécessaires de l'équilibre Européen; et les Plénipotentiaires soussignés constatent avec plaisir que la guerre actuelle ne saurait en aucun cas entraîner dans les circonscriptions territoriales des deux Empires des modifications susceptibles

* No. 344.

d'altérer l'état de possession que le temps a consacré en Orient, et qui est également nécessaire à la tranquillité de toutes les autres Puissances.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ne s'est du reste point borné à ces assurances; elle a fait déclarer que son intention n'avait jamais été d'imposer à la Porte des obligations nouvelles ou qui ne fussent pas exactement conformes aux Traités de Koutchouk-Kaïnardji et d'Andrinople, stipulations d'après lesquelles la Sublime Porte a promis de protéger, dans toute l'étendue de ses États, le culte Chrétien et ses églises. La Cour de Russie a ajouté, qu'en réclamant du Gouvernement Ottoman un témoignage de sa fidélité à des engagements antérieurs, elle n'avait nullement entendu amoindrir l'autorité du Sultan sur ses sujets Chrétiens, et que son but unique avait été de demander des éclaircissements de nature à prévenir toute équivoque et tout motif de mésintelligence avec une Puissance amie et voisine.

Les sentiments manifestés par la Sublime Porte, pendant les dernières négociations, attestent d'un autre côté qu'elle était prête à reconnaître toutes ses obligations contractuelles, et à tenir compte, dans la mesure de ses droits souverains, de l'intérêt que porte Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie à un culte qui est le sien et celui de la majorité de ses peuples.

Dans cet état de choses, les Soussignés sont convaincus que le moyen le plus prompt et le plus sûr d'atteindre le but désiré par leurs Cours sera de faire en commun une communication à la Sublime Porte pour lui exposer le vœu des Puissances de contribuer, par leur intervention amicale, au rétablissement de la paix, et la mettre en demeure de faire connaître les conditions auxquelles elle serait disposée à traiter.

Tel est le but de la note collective ci-jointe, adressée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan, et des instructions, également ci-annexées, transmises aux Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse à Constantinople.

No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 78.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 29, 1853.*

I HEREWITH transmit the copy of a despatch* which I have this day addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, together with three inclosures, which you will communicate to Baron Manteuffel, who will see that the collective note, and the instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople, are in strict conformity with my despatch No. 378 to Lord Westmorland, of which his Excellency possesses a copy, and which has met with the concurrence of the Prussian Government.

Your Lordship will express to Baron Manteuffel the hope of Her Majesty's Government that Count Arnim may be directed to sign the note at Vienna in conjunction with his colleagues, and that instructions similar to those which will be addressed to Lord Stratford may be transmitted to the Prussian Minister at Constantinople.

Your Lordship will further inform Baron Manteuffel that Her Majesty's Government, upon the grounds stated in my despatch of this day to Lord Westmorland, earnestly desire that Count Arnim may receive instructions to sign the Protocol of Conference with the Representatives of Austria, England, and France.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 366.

No. 371.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 892. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 27, 1853.*

THE French Government seems bent on profiting by the present favourable disposition of the Austrian Government to alienate her as much as possible from the Russian cause. M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me yesterday that he had had another long conversation with M. de Hübner, and that he had written on the subject to M. de Bourqueney. His object is to show the great danger to which Austria may be exposed by allowing the Russians to remain in the Principalities, while she herself affects neutrality. To effect his object M. Drouyn de Lhuys admits that France and England cannot undertake by the aid of their fleets alone to dislodge the Russians from their usurped possession of the Moldo-Wallachian provinces; but he argues that by assisting the Turkish cause in Asia, by exciting the wild populations in the Russian-Asiatic provinces to rise against the Czar, by giving them arms and ammunition, and aiding them in the transport of men and materials, the combined fleets, together with a Turkish army, may cause a considerable loss of territory to Russia. Perhaps even they might burn or do considerable damage to Sevastopol and the Russian fleet. At all events, they would be masters of the Black Sea and its coasts. But Russia, M. Drouyn de Lhuys argues, could not remain indifferent to such events. For the reverses with which she would meet in Asia, she must compensate herself elsewhere; and where would this elsewhere be but in the European provinces of Turkey, Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, Bosnia, Montenegro? these would be the make-weight to Russia for the loss of her Asiatic provinces. For every ship she lost in the Black Sea, she would send a regiment to her southern European army. And who would be the greatest loser by this? Why Austria, clearly. In fact, France and England in disputing the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, were fighting the battle of Austria rather than their own. Strictly speaking, France and England might be satisfied to see the Danube the boundary of the Turkish Empire in Europe. They resisted the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia by Russia, because it gave the latter a position most dangerous to Austria, and threatened eventually the balance of power in Europe. But if Austria was not sufficiently alive to her own interests to speak out, while she was sure of the sympathy and support of France and England, the day might come when she would ask in vain for assistance to deliver her from the toils in which her present obsequiousness to Russia had involved her.

M. de Hübner appears to have taken these observations in very good part, and to have urged M. Drouyn de Lhuys to state them vigorously at Vienna. The latter has communicated to M. de Hübner (I hope it may not turn out imprudently) the draft of protocol which the French Government is desirous should be signed by the Conference at Vienna, and which has been submitted for your Lordship's consideration. M. de Hübner, according to the French Minister's assurances, highly approved it, and expressed the conviction that Count Buol would not refuse to sign it.

As M. Drouyn de Lhuys alluded to the possibility of an attack of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea by the combined squadrons of France and England, I may as well mention that the French Minister of Marine has stated to me that Admiral Hamelin's reports make that fleet to be much more formidable than was supposed. The Admiral remarks that it has been too much the custom to depreciate it; while his information tends to show that it is of considerable strength, and that picked men have been sent from all parts of the Russian Empire to man it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 372.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 29.)

(No. 894. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 28, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received yesterday despatches dated the 24th instant, from Vienna. M. de Bourqueney continues to represent the language of Count Buol as indicating a nearer and nearer approach to the policy of France and England. The Austrian Minister, however, tries to represent the neutrality of Austria as evincing an hostility to Russia equal in degree to the naval demonstrations of France and England, and he says that it is so considered by Russia.

Pressed by M. de Bourqueney to declare further what Austria will do if events produce a collision, on the issue of which a question of vital interests to her depends, Count Buol gives it to be understood that he can have no choice; but that what he wishes to avoid is bringing about that collision by firing the first shot from an Austrian cannon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 373.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

HIER en répondant au discours du nouveau Ambassadeur de France, lors de sa première audience, le Sultan déclarait que aucune proposition pour la paix était admissible sans l'abandonnement total des prétentions élevées par la Russie. Quand je m'entretenais aujourd'hui avec l'Ambassadeur de France, son Excellence, sans me faire part de la déclaration du Sultan, refusait de faire des démarches à l'appui de la proposition de votre Seigneurie, en exprimant toutefois un empressement général d'agir de concert avec moi, mais en éludant la suggestion de toute autre proposition ou procédé. Reshid Pasha m'a informé depuis, en réponse à mes questions, que la Porte désirait la paix, sous la condition que la Russie abandonnasse toutes les demandes antérieures et qu'elle abandonnera immédiatement les Principautés. Après ma manière de comprendre, il voulait dire qu'il fallait cesser toute mention des privilèges religieuses. J'ai l'intention d'expédier mes dépêches par un exprès à Marseilles après demain.

[The above despatch is without date, but was despatched from Semlin on the 27th instant, and forwarded from Vienna on the 28th instant.]

No. 374.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Berlin, November 28, 1853.*

IN reply to my inquiry, Baron Manteuffel informed me that he has received no telegraphic intelligence from the Principalities for some days.

He has, however, received a letter from Bucharest by post, stating that the Russian authority is daily consolidating itself in those Provinces, and that the chiefs of the Wallachian Administration are divided among themselves.

There is a report here (on which I cannot wholly rely) that the Emperor has ordered another corps d'armée to Bessarabia. In such an event it would probably be the second corps d'armée, now stationed in Poland, which would probably be relieved by a corps of grenadiers from St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 375.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 613.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 21, 1853.*

THE messenger had hardly taken his departure on the 19th instant, when I was informed (and, as I believe, upon good authority) that Prince Woronzow has written to the Emperor, proposing that he should be directed to attack Erzeroum, with a corps d'armée composed of excellent troops, such as he is now able to select from those under his command.

The Prince's forces have now been strengthened by a corps of some 10,000 or 12,000 men, commanded by Prince Dolgorouky, who, after repelling Schamyl, has made a most remarkable march from the north to the south of the Caucasus, leading his men across the highest ridges of that mountainous district by paths which were never before trodden by a Russian soldier, and it is possible, as it has been explained to me, that this movement may have a very decisive effect upon the operations now in progress in Asia Minor.

It appears, accordingly, that Prince Woronzow has represented that it would be useless to attempt an aggressive war with a numerous army, which the miserable resources of the country he desires to attack would be unable to maintain; but that, with some 25,000 of picked troops, he shall be able to overcome any resistance which may be made to him.

Up to this point my informant does not doubt of the correctness of his intelligence.

Beyond this he can only express his belief in the Emperor's consent to the proposal of his lieutenant having been given.

He believes the Emperor to have hesitated during several days as to the expediency of resorting at present to offensive operations; but at length, under the influence of excitement caused by the late reverses on the Danube, and by the representations of some of the more ardent of his advisers, to have adopted the views of Prince Woronzow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S. Since writing this despatch, I have been informed that Prince Woronzow has been attacked by dangerous illness.

G. H. S.

No. 376.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 647. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 23, 1853.*

A VERY good effect appears to have been produced by the conversation which your Lordship has held with the British merchants concerned in the Baltic trade, as to the probabilities and contingencies of war. The effect has been that the British merchants of St. Petersburgh have declined entering into any contracts for goods to be delivered to them next year, and thus that a salutary foretaste has been given to the Russians of the losses to which a rupture with England will expose them.

One of the leading merchants of the town is reported to have said, "In the event of war breaking out, it will depend upon the English Government whether hostilities shall last five years or five months; it will be the shorter period if the Government should find means for stopping every outlet of Russian commerce."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 377.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 651. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 23, 1853.*

IF the Emperor has brought himself into severe difficulties, he is at least paying a heavy penalty for his imprudence; accounts upon which I can entirely rely proving to me that His Majesty is in a very unenviable state of mind.

His depression is such as to be very painful to himself, and his irritation of a nature to be occasionally very trying to those about him.

I know from the most certain source of the Chancellor having said that his position became very disagreeable to him, that he was hardly able now to transact business with his master.

The same thing has been more obscurely expressed by the Grand Duke Constantine, who until very lately has been his father's constant companion.

Mr. Baird, who is the owner of some very extensive iron-works at St. Petersburgh, is as eager to dispose of them as the Grand Duke is desirous that they should be secured with a view to the manufactory of machinery for the steam navy. Knowing this, one of the Grand Duke's attendants asked him the other day, "Why, if your Imperial Highness is so eager about the purchase, do you not speak upon the subject to the Emperor?" "It is precisely because I am anxious about it," replied the Grand Duke, "that I do not speak to him."

His Majesty's manner, as I hear, is more generally expressive of dejection than of anger; and as I understand, this observation was made the other day by several persons when the Emperor, with an English newspaper in his hand, entered the great room at Gatchina, in which the whole Court are in the habit of assembling. Throwing the paper upon the table, the Emperor said slowly, "Voilà donc les Anglais qui me brulent en effigie. Quelle démence!"

No reply was made, no observation offered, and the Emperor after walking up and down the room several times with his arms folded, withdrew.

The Emperor possesses several very devoted servants, but unfortunately devotion in this country never takes the turn of making known unpalatable truths to its object, the result being that errors as to plain

facts have been allowed to prevail in the mind of the Sovereign which have led to his own misery, and to those prospects of war and confusion by which all Europe is troubled.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 378.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 652. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 23, 1853.*

THE French Minister was good enough to read to me last night the despatches and private letters which he had received on the preceding day from M. Drouyn de Lhuys. I can only say that they might have been written by your Lordship, so closely do the views they take of the great question of the day agree with those entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

General Castelbajac read me likewise a short, but very interesting, private letter from the Minister at War.

"We are eager," the French Marshal writes, "to avoid war with Russia; among other reasons, because we understand that our great enemy is Socialism. With Socialism, indeed, some of these days, we shall probably have a decisive affair, and we shall come out of it victorious.

"Russia, however, must not misunderstand us; she must not imagine that France is unprepared for war: on the contrary, she was never able to take the field under such favourable circumstances.

"As soon as they are required we can dispose of 600,000 men, and 1,200 pieces of artillery."

At the conclusion of our conversation, General Castelbajac shaking me by the hand, said, "Maintenant je vous dirai ce que j'écris dans une lettre particulière à mon Gouvernement;—Le vin est tiré, il faut le boire: qu'il soit doux ou aigre buvons le franchement, buvons le avec l'Angleterre."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—The only point in which I could observe the French despatches to differ from those which I have received, is that M. Drouyn de Lhuys expresses his opinion as to Vienna being the place at which it will be most expedient that the Conferences upon Turkish affairs should continue to be held.

G. H. S.

No. 379.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 654.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 23, 1853.*

IT appears that the conversation (reported in my despatch No. 640) which I held with Count Nesselrode on the 18th instant, has given great offence to the Russian Government. The conversation, related with considerable accuracy, must have been made known through the Chancellor, who, at the same time, must have signified his severe judgment upon the proposal made to him on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

One only error, or what I believe to be an error, is to be noticed in the report of the conversation which is circulated here.

Count Nesselrode is made to express his astonishment at the idea of a

Turkish Plenipotentiary being allowed to sit in a Council in which Christian affairs were to be discussed.

I have no recollection of any such illiberal observation having been made by his Excellency.

If the Russian Cabinet, however, are displeased with Her Majesty's Government, they appear to have been almost equally so with that of Austria.

By way of making my proposition more palatable, I had laid much stress upon the importance attached by Count Buol to the declaration of an armistice; and, as I understand, some surprise and indignation has been expressed by the Chancellor to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, at his Cabinet having been a party to bringing about a suspension of hostilities upon which such a price had been placed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 380.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 656.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 23, 1853.*

I AM inclined to believe that the chances of offensive operations being taken by the Russians in Asia Minor to be diminished considerably by the feeble state of health of General Béboutoff, and by the severe and alarming illness of Prince Woronzow.

Lieutenant-General Bariatinsky is an officer of great merit and promise, but a want of experience disqualifies him at present from taking the command when operations upon an extensive scale may be considered necessary.

The Russians are understood to have had a narrow escape of losing one of their small steam-vessels of war in the Black Sea.

This vessel (I believe a corvette) was running under the walls of St. Nicholas, without being aware of its having fallen into the hands of the enemy, when she ran aground.

A well-directed fire was immediately opened upon her by the Turks which in a few minutes killed the captain and a considerable number of the crew, when by great exertions and by the judicious conduct of a junior officer, the vessel was got off and enabled to leave the coast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 381.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 897.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 30, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he has been made acquainted by M. Baudin with your Lordship's desire that no alteration, however slight, should be accepted by the Representatives of France and England at Vienna in the draft of Protocol to be proposed for the signature of the Four Powers, without previous reference to Paris or London. He will instruct M. de Bourqueney by telegraph to conform rigorously to this desire.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed to me at the same time his satisfaction at finding that your Lordship had instructed Lord Westmorland to act on the instructions sent to M. de Bourqueney in regard to the fresh proposition to be made to the Porte, should the French messenger reach Vienna before the one despatched by your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 382.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 1.)

(No. 899. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, November 30, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this morning part of a confidential letter, dated the 19th instant, which he had received from General Castelbajac, and which mentions the irritation evinced at St. Petersburgh by the news of the commencement of hostilities on the part of the Turks, and the little expectation he had of the success of any negotiation, until some signal advantage had been obtained by the Russian army.

It appeared to be M. de Castelbajac's opinion, at that moment, that it was in Asia that this advantage was to be realized; and he states that Prince Woronzow, who was to take the command of the Russian Asiatic army, had conceived a plan for advancing on and taking Erzeroum. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, said that the General had, in a letter of subsequent date, modified this opinion, and given it to be understood that the expedition was abandoned in consequence of the illness of Prince Woronzow and the difficulties of provisioning an army on its march to Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 383.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 902.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 1, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just informed me that, in addition to instructing M. de Bourqueney to accept no alteration in the project of Protocol without referring to Paris, he has desired him, in conformity with your Lordship's wishes, conveyed through M. Baudin, to send to Constantinople the note for the Porte and instructions for General Baraguay d'Hilliers, leaving the signature of the Protocol for after consideration, should the Austrian Government object to any part of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 384.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 903. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 1, 1853.*

ADVICES received by the French Government from Warsaw state that the public mind in Poland is much excited by the levy which has been ordered of 11,000 men, instead of 7,000. There had, however, been no open appearance of disaffection.

The same letters state that Prince Paskewitch blames the strategic plans of Prince Gortchakoff, and that he has submitted one himself for

the Emperor of Russia's approval, the basis of which is the attack and capture, by a Russian flotilla, of the Turkish fortresses on the Danube as far as Silistria, and an advance from thence on the Balkan. This plan, however, could not be capable of realization before the month of May.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 385.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 344.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 19, 1853.*

GENERAL BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS, who arrived here on the 15th instant, and had his first audience of the Sultan to-day, has sent me word that an express steamer will start for Marseilles with his despatches in the course of the afternoon; and I therefore avail myself of the opportunity to inform your Lordship that, although no official answer has been yet given by the Porte to the new proposition sent in to Reshid Pasha by M. de la Cour and myself, with the view of ascertaining the Council's disposition respecting it, I conclude, from the language of Reshid Pasha, and from other indications, that there is now even less chance than in the outset of obtaining its acceptance, even in a modified shape.

As the language of M. de la Cour's successor, in so far as it has been addressed to me, is eminently pacific, there is still a possibility of a change in the counsels of the Porte, consequent upon a joint representation, by both of us, in the sense already expressed and urged by me. For this chance, I have been anxious to keep the door open, especially as the Prussian Minister has received, within the last few days, authority to act in concert with me; and as the Austrian Internuncio appears to expect some instruction of a similar tendency by the next courier from Vienna.

I have hitherto exerted my almost solitary efforts in favour of peace under every conceivable disadvantage, including even that which results, in Turkish estimation, from the presence of the allied squadrons in these waters.

The unexpected change which has taken place in the French Embassy, by the substitution of General Baraguay d'Hilliers for M. de la Cour, has naturally increased the embarrassment and delay to which I was previously exposed.

I abstain from going into further particulars at present. The day after to-morrow a safe and expeditious opportunity of forwarding despatches to your Lordship will probably be at my disposal. Should I be disappointed in this expectation, I have no doubt that Vice-Admiral Dundas will readily afford me the means of transmitting my correspondence to your Lordship with the least practicable delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 386.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 345.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 18, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government a report addressed to me by M. Pisani almost immediately after the new proposition with the accompanying notes had been submitted to Reshid Pasha. Your Lordship will observe that the Ottoman Minister is therein stated to have declared his opinion that the proposal in question would have been received by the Porte with satisfaction two months ago. I have been careful to verify the correctness of

M. Pisani's report by directing him to show it to Reshid Pasha, and he assures me that his Highness has given it his full and unreserved confirmation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 386.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, le 12 Novembre, 1853.*

CONFORMEMENT aux instructions que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date d'hier, je me suis rendu chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et après les lui avoir communiquées mot à mot, et après qu'il a lu attentivement le mémorandum y annexé, son Altesse m'a répondu qu'elle apprécie autant que votre Excellence la convenance du projet de note, et la portée de la déclaration, qui forment dans leur ensemble la proposition que vous et l'Ambassadeur de France lui ont fait communiquée par l'entremise de vos dragomans respectifs; que ses objections personnelles se bornent à la difficulté causée par le commencement des hostilités et d'autres circonstances qui s'y rattachent, et que si le projet, dont il s'agit, était arrivée deux mois plutôt, il était persuadé que la Porte l'aurait accueilli avec satisfaction.

Quoi qu'il en soit, Reshid Pasha m'a chargé de dire à votre Excellence qu'il ne manquera pas de soumettre votre proposition, telle qu'elle est, au Conseil Ministériel, et qu'il fera ce que depend de lui pour faire apprécier vos raissonnements.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) E. PISANI.

No. 387.

The French Minister of Marine to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, December 4.)

M. le Vice-Amiral, *Paris, le 12 Octobre, 1853.*

LES dépêches que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire à la date du 20 Mars et du 26 Septembre, vous ont invité à vous concerter avec M. de la Cour pour la direction des forces navales placées sous votre commandement. Jusqu'à ce jour, j'ai pris le soin de ne vous donner aucune instruction déterminée, si ce n'est celle de suivre les directions qui vous seraient données par notre Représentant à Constantinople. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur ayant compris que les divers mouvements de votre escadre devaient se subordonner à l'état des négociations sur le théâtre même des évènements, il n'a pas voulu s'exposer à vous tracer une ligne de conduite qui, suivant les éventualités, aurait pu contrarier les efforts du négociateur.

Il est possible aujourd'hui que des circonstances urgentes nécessitent une démonstration des forces navales Françaises et Anglaises au-delà du Bosphore. Le moment est donc venu pour moi de lever tous vos doutes par des instructions précises et spéciales.

Aussitôt que M. de la Cour vous aura fait connaître qu'il n'y a plus rien à attendre des négociations, vous reprendrez toute votre liberté d'action et vous deviendrez le maître des opérations qui auront pour objet d'assurer la défense de l'Empire Ottoman ou la sécurité de votre escadre.

Dans l'intention de l'Empereur, le caractère de l'appui que nous prêtons à la Turquie doit être essentiellement défensif. Nous n'excitons pas la Porte à entamer les hostilités contre la Russie; nous espérons encore que l'on finira par trouver un moyen de prévenir les extrémités de la guerre; mais si nos prévisions étaient trompées, nous sommes décidés

à concourir, autant que nous le pourrons, à repousser les agressions dont le territoire Ottoman serait l'objet par mer. La défense de Constantinople se trouve tout naturellement au premier rang de nos préoccupations, et votre premier devoir sera non seulement de repousser une attaque, mais encore de la prévenir. Je suis disposé à penser que le mouillage de Buyukdéré, sauf les considérations nautiques dont je vous laisse juge, vous permettrait sans doute d'atteindre ce double but. Il est, en effet, plus facile de Buyukdéré que de tout autre point d'éclairer les approches de Constantinople et de quitter le Bosphore pour pénétrer dans la Mer Noire, si la flotte Russe sortait du port de Sebastopol et semblait vouloir menacer le littoral Ottoman ou essayer d'y opérer un débarquement. La côte qui s'étend de l'embouchure du Bosphore à Varna appellera particulièrement votre surveillance, et, si vous étiez informé d'un mouvement suspect des Russes dans les parages que je viens d'indiquer, vous auriez à vous porter immédiatement à leur rencontre.

Vous êtes autorisé à vous entendre avec M. le Vice-Amiral Dundas pour distribuer les forces que vous commandez l'un et l'autre de la façon la plus avantageuse et la plus utile. Afin de rester fidèle au plan de conduite que s'est tracé le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, vous devrez éviter avec soin de rechercher une occasion de conflit, et vous vous abstiendrez, avant le commencement de tentatives agressives, de faire paraître vos vaisseaux dans des parages où leur présence ne serait pas justifiée par des appréhensions réelles, et ressemblerait soit à une provocation à la révolte, soit à un encouragement à la guerre.

Immédiatement après la réception de ces instructions, vous devrez me tenir directement informé de tous vos mouvements et de toutes vos opérations. Je vous recommande expressément de me faire part des combinaisons que vous aurez conçues, comme aussi de votre sentiment personnel sur les forces que vous pourrez avoir à repousser. Je ne dois ignorer aucun détail, car si la confiance de l'Empereur vous rend l'instrument de sa politique active, elle m'impose, à moi, l'obligation de pourvoir à tous vos besoins.

Recevez, &c. (Signé) TH. DUCOS.

No. 388.

The French Minister of Marine to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Baudin, December 4.)

M. le Vice-Amiral, *Paris, le 2 Novembre*, 1853.

MA dépêche d'hier vous a transmis quelques instructions qui vous parviendront par le "Prométhée," sur lequel s'embarque M. le Général Baraguay d'Hilliers, notre nouvel Ambassadeur à Constantinople.

Comme il importe au plus haut dégré, à des distances aussi considérables que celle qui nous sépare, et en prévision des graves événemens qui peuvent s'accomplir, que les attributions respectives du Commandant de notre escadre et de notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople soient très exactement définies, je crois devoir préciser davantage encore l'esprit des instructions que je vous ai envoyées.

Tant que l'action diplomatique aura quelques chances de succès, vous continuerez à recevoir votre direction de notre Ambassadeur, ne mettant d'autre réserve à vos obligations que celle de l'appréciation des convenances ou des nécessités nautiques.

J'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire que lorsque le Général Baraguay d'Hilliers vous aura fait connaître qu'il n'y a plus rien à attendre des négociations, et que votre rôle actif doit commencer, vous reprendrez la liberté de vos mouvements, et dans la conduite de vos vaisseaux vous aurez à suivre vos propres inspirations.

Cette latitude qui vous sera peut être donnée, ce pouvoir spécial que vous pourrez acquérir suivant la gravité des circonstances, n'implique pas, bien entendu, de la part de notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, l'abandon

de son droit permanent de règler le haut emploi et la direction politique de l'escadre que vous commandez. Il doit, effectivement, appartenir au Représentant immédiat de la politique de l'Empereur de juger, d'après les instructions qui lui sont données et selon les phases plus ou moins diverses que peuvent suivre les événements, s'il convient de précipiter, de suspendre, ou même d'arrêter complètement les démonstrations de nos forces armées.

Ce sont les moyens d'action, ce sont les ressources d'exécution qui doivent être livrés exclusivement à votre appréciation; et tout en conservant sur ce point, comme sur tous les autres, la meilleure harmonie dans vos relations avec le Général Baraguay d'Hilliers, il importe, à un haut degré, que vous conserviez, sous votre responsabilité personnelle, la liberté de vos mouvements et le choix des moyens.

Recevez, &c.

Le Ministre Secrétaire d'Etat de la Marine et des Colonies,

(Signé) THÉODORE DUCOS.

No. 389.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 910.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 4*, 1853.

DESPATCHES up to the 19th instant have been received from General Baraguay d'Hilliers. I am told that they contain nothing more than the details of his reception by the Sultan and the Turkish Ministers: but they notice the conviction which he had already acquired, that the Porte had made up its mind to listen to no terms which did not comprise an immediate evacuation of the Principalities, and to enter into no arrangement which did not leave the Sultan unfettered in his Sovereignty over all his subjects, whether Christian or Mussulman. The French Ambassador remarks, that the attitude of the Porte is that of a Government that has weighed well its decision before taking it, and is determined to abide by it at all hazards.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 390.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 911. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 4*, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me this afternoon, that he had received this morning from M. de Hübner a communication of considerable interest. It appears, as the sequel of this despatch will show, to have been caused by conversations which M. de Hübner had held lately with the Emperor and with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the general tenor of which may be gathered from the details of one held with the latter given in my confidential despatch No. 886.

The summary recounted to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the communication made to him this morning, is taken partly from an open, and partly from a confidential (reservée) despatch written by Count Buol: I could not learn the date.

M. de Buol observed that the interests, and consequently the policy, of Austria in regard to Turkey, are identic with those of France, namely, the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; that Austria has, on more than one occasion, given Russia to understand that the latter must expect no support from her in her quarrel with Turkey; and that, in truth, the opinion of Austria on the question does not differ from that of France and England; that Austria has

received from Russia assurances so often reiterated, and so positive, that the Russian Government seeks neither an increase of territory nor an extension of power; that Count Buol cannot but believe in them.

The course to be pursued in order to effect a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey, Count Buol thinks should be as follows:

1. The Four Powers should, by firm but friendly language addressed to both, induce the two parties to treat for peace under their mediation. Threats to obtain this should be avoided.

2. When peace is made between the two parties, means should be sought to induce a general understanding as to what guarantees can be given to prevent a renewal of the present crisis and danger to Turkey.

3. Should either party refuse to co-operate in this endeavour, the remaining Powers should seek those means among themselves, and enter into reciprocal engagements not to permit either the "velléités" of the Porte to produce trouble or difficulties, or the ambition of any other Power to gratify itself at the Porte's expense. The allusion to the Porte seemed to me very obscure.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself as much pleased with this communication. He said, however, that it had not been made without a sort of protest against the language which the French Government had held respecting the position of Austria, and an asseveration that the latter was not to be considered as acting under pressure or yielding to threats.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys represents himself as having observed to M. de Hübner, that it was difficult to satisfy Count Buol. If the French Government said nothing, they were accused of coldness and reserve; if they spoke the truth, they were warned not to threaten. The truth was, in his previous conversations he had merely stated matters as they were, and had endeavoured to make Austria understand that there were two questions involved in the Eastern quarrel—the maintenance of Treaties, and the maintenance of order. That so long as Austria, France, and England, were united in their policy, both points were secured; but that if Austria wavered in her determination to uphold by all means at her disposal the Treaties on which Turkey existed as a Power, she encouraged the enemies of order to profit by the disunion thus naturally established among the Four Powers; and she could not, in respect to those Powers, invoke the observance of Treaties in the West, if she was indifferent to the maintenance of the said Treaties in the East. That in saying as much he had no intention to threaten, but to place before the Austrian Government natural consequences. He repeated the assurances which he had given on previous occasions, that France would not be guilty of the disloyalty of holding out one hand to Austria and withholding the other, and that Austria, acting with good faith in the East, need never fear the lack of the same good faith on the part of France in the West.

The only other point worth noticing which M. Drouyn de Lhuys mentioned to me was, that M. de Hübner insisted constantly that his Government could not be hurried onward in the course which it was prepared to follow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 391.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 428.)

My Lord, *Vienna, November 29, 1853.*

I RECEIVED last night from the Telegraphic Office a copy of the telegraphic message from Lord Stratford dated the 20th instant, from Constantinople, together with the notice that as it was addressed to your Lordship, as well as to myself, it would be forwarded direct to London.

I have not communicated the contents of this despatch, upon which I shall await your Lordship's instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 392.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL stated to me this evening that he had learnt from Jassy that Prince Urusoff (a Russian General) had taken the entire government of the Province of Moldavia into his own hands; and that his language towards the inhabitants was as insulting as his acts was oppressive.

He said that on one occasion some Jews were called into his presence, and on his accosting them in his accustomary hard language they claimed the privileges of Austrian subjects, on which the Prince ordered them to leave at once for Lemberg. His Excellency cited this act as being in some way demonstrative of displeasure towards Austria.

I again expressed a hope that strict care would be taken by the Prussian agents not to recognise, by any official act, the Russian Government of these Provinces. His Excellency replied that he was anxious to leave those agents at their posts, as it had been reported to him that through their means the Prussian subjects had been relieved from having the military quartered upon them, but that they should do nothing which could constitute a recognition of a Russian Government in those Provinces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 393.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 119.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me to-day that the King, on authorising him to accede to the proposals which had been submitted to Prussia for the collective action of the Four Powers at Vienna, had also desired him to address to the Cabinets of the Four Powers a wish that some steps should be ultimately taken in order to provide for the security and welfare of the Christian Church in the East, with due regard to the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

His Excellency was not very clear or explicit as to the exact favour or rights which His Majesty seemed to desire. But he stated that it was a subject which interested His Majesty most intimately, and which he had deeply at heart.

His Majesty also desired Baron Manteuffel to instruct his Ministers at the Courts of London and Paris to inquire what steps the English and French Governments were prepared to take should Turkey refuse to accede to the collective invitation that will now be addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 394.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 120. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

GENERAL ROCHOW has reported to Baron Manteuffel that he had inquired from Count Nesselrode what opinion his Excellency entertained of your Lordship's and Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's projects for an arrangement of the differences between Russia and the Porte.

The Chancellor positively refused all attempts to extract an opinion, and was mute on the subject.

General Rochow, from what I can learn, gives full evidence in his reports of his Russian predilections. He states always that the Emperor will yet prove himself to be magnanimous, but at the same time he dwells on the obduracy of Russia, and expresses the misfortune that the professions and assurances of the Emperor are so mistrusted in England and France. In his opinion Russia will only listen to direct negotiation with Turkey; and he further seems to consider that Russia will never be satisfied to assent to a Treaty of Peace until she has gained some decided victory over the Turks.

No fresh intelligence of any interest has been received here from the seat of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 395.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 122.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 2, 1853.*

THE messenger Johnson delivered to me yesterday your Lordship's despatches to No. 79 inclusive.

I was unable to see Baron Manteuffel till early this morning, when I communicated officially to his Excellency the inclosures contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 79, including a collective note to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, the Protocol of Conference, and lastly the instructions which your Lordship has addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

These documents had already been communicated to me by the French Minister (who had received them on the 29th ultimo), and I had been thus enabled to prepare Baron Manteuffel for their official communication.

The collective note and the Protocol of Conference transmitted by your Lordship were precisely similar to those which had been submitted to his Excellency by the Marquis de Moustier, with the exception that the former was in English, the original text of the French version being notified by its being headed "Traduction." The instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, though not commencing in the identical language, embodied all the essential points of the despatch in a literal translation of the words used by your Lordship in your instruction to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

I have thought it right to be thus precise in relating these facts to your Lordship.

At my interview this morning I commenced by reading to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 78, and I informed him that another and probably a last effort was now to be made in the cause of peace, and that Her Majesty's Government earnestly hoped that all the influence possessed by Prussia would on this occasion be brought to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I then read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 396 to the Earl of Westmorland, as well as the Protocol of Conference. I represented to his Excellency the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government, in union with that of France, that the Prussian Government should concur with them in placing on record a principle which at the present moment may be conducive to the restoration of peace between Russia and the Porte, and which will be vitally important to the existing balance of power and future tranquillity of Europe; and I expressed the hope of Her Majesty's Government that Count Arnim would be directed to sign the collective note and the Protocol of Conference with the Representatives of Austria, England, and France, and that instructions similar to those which are addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would be transmitted to Baron Wildenbruch.

His Excellency at once informed me that he concurred wholly and entirely in the views set forth in these documents, and that His Majesty the King had authorized him to instruct Count Arnim to sign the collective note and the Protocol of Conference.

His Excellency also informed me that instructions to that effect would be sent this day by telegraph to Count Arnim.

His Excellency likewise stated that instructions, if not identical in language similar in substance, would be transmitted to the Prussian Representative at Constantinople.

A similar communication has been made to the Marquis de Moustier.

I have furnished his Excellency with copies of the collective note, the Protocol of Conference, the instructions conveyed in your Lordship's despatch No. 292 to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, as also an extract of your Lordship's despatch No. 396 to the Earl of Westmorland, from the commencement to the paragraph ending with "advantageous."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 396.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 660. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

I WAS sitting on the evening of the 23rd instant with the Prussian Minister, who is confined by illness to his room, when the Chancellor, who is a daily visitor, entered the room.

His Excellency read us a despatch which he had just received from Baron Meyendorff, giving an account of the Turks having withdrawn precipitately from the Principalities, leaving only a small corps at Kalafat.

The intelligence appeared to have given great satisfaction to the Chancellor, from whose observation I am disposed to infer the intention on the part of Prince Gortchakoff of occupying Little Wallachia.

What struck me the most forcibly in M. de Meyendorff's report was the assurance which he has given his Government of the general sympathy which the cause of Russia, as he learned, meets with from all classes.

My mental reflection upon the phrase was—either this is true, and then the Court of Austria is wanting in that impartiality which should characterize a mediating Power; or it is not true, and we have here a fresh illustration of the disposition of Russian diplomatic agents to mislead their Government by representing matters not as they are, but as they are desired to be.

The substance of M. de Meyendorff's despatch will be found in the bulletin published in the "St. Petersburgh Journal" of this date, a copy of which is inclosed in another despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 397.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 662. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

WITH reference to Lord Cowley's despatch No. 848, a copy of which was inclosed in your Lordship's confidential despatch No. 293 of the 16th instant, I would venture to observe that it appears to me that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' plan, if adopted by the Four Governments, would be the best which could be devised, either for putting an end to the war between Russia and Turkey, or for guarding against those consequences by which a war might very possibly be attended.

It is indeed to be feared that the Courts of Austria and Prussia would be reluctant to give their assent to a measure, which although conformable to their best interests, might be repugnant to the personal feelings of the two Sovereigns towards the Emperor Nicholas. But on the other hand, there appears to be little reason why they should not avail themselves of a precedent which His Imperial Majesty provided.

When after the revolutionary movements of 1848 the relations of Austria and Prussia became of so unfriendly a nature that the attack of one of these Powers upon the other was considered imminent, the Emperor of Russia, looking to the welfare of Germany, did not hesitate to declare that whichever country took the initiative of war would find his battalions on the side of the party attacked.

His Imperial Majesty then will have no right to complain if a system (and that devised by himself) be resorted to in the interests of Europe which was found very efficacious when the interests of Germany were at stake; and Austria and Prussia need have no scruples in following an example set them by their illustrious friend and ally. A resolution which was excusable for guarding against war, becomes much more so when it is for the purpose of putting an end to war.

As regards M. Drouyn de Lhuys' altered opinion as to the Vienna Conference, the change appears to me to be reasonable after the overtures for peace which Count Buol persisted in making single-handed to the Porte.

It is impossible that the Austrian Minister should not have foreseen the result of this isolated attempt; and the suspicion which it suggests is, that in making it he was acting with partiality, with the object of further establishing the pacific intentions of Russia and the intractable disposition of the Turkish Government.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys—as Lord Cowley reports—is of opinion that the Emperor Nicholas intends, if possible, to keep possession of the Principalities. I grieve to learn that such are his expectations, for he has taken throughout these deplorable transactions so correct a view of the course which would be followed by Russia, that his past judgments give great weight to those which he now makes known.

Some months ago a distinct declaration of the Emperor's would in my mind have outweighed opinions however sagacious, and appearances however suspicious. As it is, I must fairly state to your Lordship, that as regards myself confidence in Russian promises is wholly destroyed.

I have witnessed the violation of a series of distinct engagements, and whether any addition is to be made to the number must, I infer, depend more upon the profit or loss to be expected than upon impossibility that His Imperial Majesty should be wanting to his word.

I regret to be obliged to write in such a style of an exalted personage, but in moments like the present I should feel to be wanting in duty if I hesitated to express an honest opinion in plain language.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 398.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 666. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

I WAS not quite sure, from your Lordship's despatch No. 292, whether it was intended that my protest against the incorporation of the Principalities should be verbal or in writing, but I inclined to giving it the latter form.

After anxious consideration, I have revised this partly-formed resolution, from reflecting—

1. That a written protest would give offence to the Russian Government at a moment when the evacuation of Wallachia by the Turkish troops may possibly render them more disposed to negotiation than they have been of late.

2. Because, interested as Austria is in seeing the Principalites freed from their present occupants and restored to their legitimate Sovereign, I feel tolerably confident that the Russian Government will not expose the most valued of her alliances to such a trial as would be incurred by an attempt to keep possession of these Provinces. And,

3. Because, if I do not greatly err, the quarter in which the Sultan has to apprehend territorial spoliations is rather on the eastern coast of the Black Sea than in Europe: an apprehension which, if judged to be well-founded, would suggest the expediency of the protest being extended from the Principalities to the whole of the Turkish dominions.

It will be very satisfactory to me if the conclusion at which I have arrived should meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 399.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.).

(No. 667.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

IN obedience to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 292, I waited upon the Chancellor on the 24th instant, and recapitulated to him the various acts of the Imperial authorities in the Principalities which gave a colour to the inference of its being intended that these provinces should remain under the dominion of Russia.

I was instructed, I said, to inquire of him whether any such purpose existed.

Count Nesselrode replied, that he had hardly got over the surprise which the proposal which I had made for the evacuation of the Principalities by the Emperor's troops, when I addressed him an inquiry so extraordinary that he was at a loss how to answer it.

After a pause, his Excellency said that the intentions of the Emperor as to evacuating the Principalities had been made known in papers to which every publicity had been given; if these assurances were not credited, it would be useless to repeat them in another form; that if it was intended not to attach credit to positive assurances, no repetition of them would be availing. Upon his Excellency remarking upon the constant disposition now manifested to find faults with the acts of Russia, I replied that I really could not admit the correctness of the assertion: that, for instance, a very unfavourable impression had been produced in England by accounts which had been received of Prince Gortchakoff having signified to the members of the Council at Bucharest that any reflections upon Russian policy would be punished by hanging, and that

it would be very agreeable to me to have his authority for contradicting the statement.

Count Nesselrode had no knowledge of such a decision, but that which he had derived from a French despatch. He totally disbelieved the statement, but added that certainly any person carrying on a clandestine correspondence with the enemy during war, would be put to death and would deserve his fate.

At the close of the conversation, a part of which was carried on with considerable animation, I said that in pursuance of orders which I had received from Her Majesty's Government it became my duty to protest formally against any attempt now or at any future time on the part of the Russian Government at incorporating any portion of the Danubian provinces, and that I must reserve it to myself, if I considered it expedient, to repeat this protest in a note.

Count Nesselrode, with some excitement of manner, replied that I was of course at liberty to write such a note or such a protest if I thought fit, but that he must doubt whether the object which he still believed Her Majesty's Government to have in view, would be promoted by my giving the signal for an angry correspondence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 400.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 5.*)

(No. 668.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH I did not feel at liberty to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch No. 296, I was convinced that it was written with the intention of its contents being made fully known to his Excellency, and according I communicated to him faithfully the feelings with which Her Majesty's Government have taken cognizance of the last Imperial manifesto.

My report was listened to without interruption, but evidently not without some impatience; and, when it was concluded, Count Nesselrode observed, that it appeared that it was a fixed resolution (parti pris) on the part of Her Majesty's Government to find fault with every act of the Russian Cabinet. Russia had been assailed in the most virulent manner from every quarter, and when her voice was heard in reply, a shout was raised against her. It came really to this: all that was done by Russia was wrong; all that was done by the Porte was right.

This he must consider was a very strange way of showing impartiality, and certainly it was not by pursuing such a course that the difficulties of which all complained would be solved in a peaceable manner.

I requested that his Excellency would bear in mind that the fact was, that Her Majesty's Government had from the outset considered that Russia was exclusively to blame in this affair; inasmuch as demands had been made, and violent measures adopted, for which no grounds had ever been adduced; having been wrong too, I added, at the outset, every step you have taken in that direction made you more so.

This of course the Chancellor could not admit. He spoke much of the bad return made to the Emperor to the friendly dispositions towards Her Majesty's Government exhibited with regard to Belgium, and at the time when England was alarmed by rumours of invasion; and ended by saying, that it was evident that an attempt was making to place Russia on the same line as Turkey.

He should like to ask what would be our conduct if the interests of the Queen of England were in dispute (en litige) with the Porte? Would England show the same patience which Russia had exhibited?

As regarded the first point, I observed, general interests were at stake as much as our own. With regard to the last, my answer would be very

distinct: Certainly there cannot be that close connexion and friendship between the Sovereign of a Christian country and the head of a Mahomedan State that exists between Christian Princes; but as regards sovereign and territorial rights, I must say, as I have before stated, that England recognizes no such distinction as that which it appears to be your wish to establish.

The Chancellor then spoke, and with some warmth, of the position which it was wished to assign to Russia. Russia was at war with Turkey, and claimed the right of settling her disputes by means of direct negotiation with her adversary. She could admit of no interference. She was not so fallen as to accept a position which might be suitable to Belgium or to Denmark. At the present moment he was aware of Her Majesty's Government being occupied in drawing up the very Articles of a Treaty which Russia was to be called upon to sign.

I replied, that unquestionably Her Majesty's Government was very intent, as they had been all along, upon bringing about a pacification by whatever means could be found availing; that the wish was felt as strongly at Vienna as at London, and had given rise to as much exertion there; that, obviously, neutral and friendly Governments were called upon to narrow as much as possible the ground of disagreement between belligerent Powers; above all, that I must remind his Excellency that the question of Turkey's existence was one as interesting to Her Majesty's Government as it could be to Russia.

You know very well, Count Nesselrode replied, that the existence of Turkey has never been in danger; had Russia and Turkey been left to themselves, the quarrel would have been ended long ago.

M. le Comte, I replied, you must permit me to remind you that Turkey was represented by yourself as being in so infirm and tottering a state, that her fall might be at any moment expected; and you know perfectly well that the preservation of Turkey is an English interest: this fully explains the solicitude taken in the business by Her Majesty's Government.

Again the question so often discussed as to the difference between the objects professed by Russia and those which Prince Menchikoff attempted to carry was gone over, and again Count Nesselrode (while complaining of the use which had been made of his confidential despatch to Baron Meyendorff upon the Turkish modifications) argued upon the injudicious course taken by Her Majesty's Government in not insisting upon the acceptance by Turkey of the note agreed to by the Emperor; when, feeling convinced that nothing was to be gained by a revival of these subjects of disagreement, I said that at the beginning of our conversation I had spoken in the name of Her Majesty's Government, that I would now, by permission, say a few words in my own.

You may believe me, I observed, M. le Comte, that, like Her Majesty's Government, I have no wish to find fault unnecessarily; all that I desire is to discover some way out of these entanglements. Negotiation is becoming more difficult, because, as you must perceive, mistrust has been excited; it will be desirable that this should be allayed: put it then in my power to state with some precision what your views are. Here is the *projet de note* lately drawn up by Lord Clarendon; do me the favour to read it, and tell me, if you feel at liberty, whether this is the sort of arrangement to which you are looking. You will tell me that you are now at war with Turkey, and that you require a Treaty and not a note; be it so, the English Government raises no objections; only tell me whether the provisions sketched out in this paper would satisfy you if they were consigned to the Articles of a Convention.

Count Nesselrode looked over the paper, and after saying that two French *projets de note* had lately been drawn up, one of which had appeared to him better adapted to the circumstances, observed that a hasty perusal of your Lordship's note, of which however he admitted to have previous knowledge, did not enable him to return me any answer.

I told Count Nesselrode that I would take it upon myself to leave it in his hands, and that when we met I would beg to learn his opinion as to its value as the outline of the Treaty to be concluded. I have omitted to

state to your Lordship that in speaking to Count Nesselrode of the means possessed by the Sultan of carrying on the war, I took occasion to remark that His Highness' resources would be immensely increased if, following the example which had been set here, he were to make an appeal to the religious feelings of his people.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 401.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 669. Confidential.)
My Lord. *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the French *projet de note* alluded to by Count Nesselrode, as is stated in my despatch No. 668 of this date.

A promise of strict secrecy which I was obliged to give to the person from whom this paper was obtained has prevented my being able to communicate it to my French colleague, who, singular as it may appear, has no knowledge of any note prepared in France except that so well-known under the name of the Vienna note.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 401.

French Projet de Note.

SA Majesté le Sultan n'ayant rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, a pris soigneusement à tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend. Un iradé suprême en date du lui ayant fait connaître la décision Impériale, la Sublime Porte se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de déclarer que, en référant aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji, confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, la Sublime Porte est fermement resolue à observer la promesse qui s'y trouve et à protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et ses églises.

Quant aux privilèges religieux de l'Eglise du rit Grec, le Soussigné est autorisé à déclarer également qu'il est de l'honneur de Sa Majesté le Sultan de les maintenir en vigueur et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit pour le présent, soit pour l'avenir, les immunités spirituelles accordées à cette Eglise par les augustes prédecesseurs de Sa Majesté confirmées par elle-même, et, en outre, de faire participer le culte Grec, dans un esprit de bienveillance et d'équité conforme aux principes qui dirigent le Gouvernement Ottoman, aux avantages de même nature concédés, ou qui seraient concédés, à tout autre communauté Chrétienne sujette de la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné, du reste, ne pouvant mieux témoigner des dispositions qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan, a l'honneur de transmettre à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode une copie du firman relatif aux privilèges du clergé Grec qui a été dernièrement délivré au Patriarche de ce rit. La promulgation de ce firman, qui a inspiré partout de la confiance, suffira pour dissiper toute appréhension à l'égard de la protection due dans l'Empire Ottoman au culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

En ce qui concerne la garantie contre tout changement dans l'état de choses actuel de saints lieux de visitation à Jerusalem, la Sublime Porte

promet officiellement qu'aucune modification ne sera faite à ce qui a été réglé à cet égard par les derniers firmans Impériaux sans une entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie.

Sa Majesté le Sultan accède volontiers au vœu exprimé au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie relativement à la construction dans la ville de Jérusalem d'une église qui sera desservie par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice destiné aux pélerins indigens ou malades de la même nation. La Sublime Porte, en conséquence, se déclare prête à souscrire à cet égard une Acte solennel.

Son empressement dans cette circonstance prouve, une fois de plus, que si Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan tient, en veillant elle-même au maintien des privilèges spirituels octroyés à l'Eglise Grecque, à s'attirer la bénédiction de ses peuples et à exécuter les Traités existants entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, elle est toujours disposée à satisfaire, dans la mesure de ses droits souverains, à tout désir exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie son auguste allié, et dont l'accomplissement est de nature à resserrer plus étroitement les liens d'amitié qui unissent les deux couronnes.

En communiquant ce qui précède à votre Excellence par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale mon auguste Souverain, je saisis, &c.

No. 402.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 670. Secret.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 26, 1853.*

I HAVE reason to believe that an autograph letter has been received from the Emperor of Austria by the Emperor of Russia, in which His Imperial Majesty is earnestly conjured to settle his differences with Turkey; the state of Italy and Hungary being such that some great commotion may be expected before the spring, if peace be not speedily re-established.

This intelligence requires confirmation, but as I expect will prove to be correct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 403.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 672.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, November 28, 1853.*

THE intelligence contained in my despatch No. 670 of the 26th instant is fully confirmed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 404.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 914.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 4, 1853.*

I HAVE inquired of M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether information similar to that which has been conveyed to your Lordship (vide No. 395 to Lord Westmorland), that Austria meant to interfere in the event of any quarrel between the Bosnians and Servians, had reached him. He replied

in the negative, and he added that he had some weeks back, in a conversation with M. de Hübner, alluded to the possibility of Austria having some idea of indemnifying herself for the occupation of the Principalities by Russia, by taking possession of some other European province of Turkey, and that Count Buol had in a private letter, which M. de Hübner had read to him, answered with some asperity that Austria had no project of the kind, and had no intention of arbitrarily interfering between the Porte and her subjects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 405.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 6.)

(No. 916.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 5, 1853.*

A FEW days ago M. de Lhuys mentioned to me that from despatches received at the Ministry of Marine it would appear that some misunderstanding had occurred between the Ambassadors and Admirals at Constantinople, and that the latter had refused to obey a requisition of the former to send a combined squadron into the Black Sea. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that M. de la Cour made no mention of this in his despatches.

Yesterday he informed me further that one of General Baraguay d'Hilliers' despatches alluded to this misunderstanding, and he supposed in consequence that it had really occurred. It had been deemed necessary therefore to send additional instructions to Admiral Hamelin, giving him distinctly to understand that he was under the orders of the Ambassador. These instructions, M. de Lhuys added, had been or would be communicated to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 406.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 323. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your confidential despatch No. 366 of the 26th ultimo, that I approve of your having abstained from making, in a written form, the protest which by my despatch No. 292 of the 15th ultimo, you were instructed to make to Count Nesselrode against any project which might be entertained at St. Petersburgh of incorporating with the Russian Empire the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 407.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 324.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch No. 667 of the 26th ultimo, with reference to the late proceedings

of the Russian authorities in the Principalities, and the tendency of those proceedings to give an impression that it was the intention of Russia permanently to retain possession of those Provinces.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 408.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 325.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch No. 668 of the 26th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on making known to his Excellency their opinion of the late Russian manifesto, as stated to you in my despatch No. 296 of the 10th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 409.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 326.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint you, in reply to your despatch No. 669 of the 26th of November, that the draft of note inclosed in that despatch, marked No. 2, was, equally with the corresponding draft of note which formed Inclosure No. 1 in my despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 234, of the 24th of October, and of which a copy was transmitted to you in my despatch No. 251 of the following day, prepared by me, and they were both forwarded to Paris for the consideration of the French Government.

The French Government approved of both drafts, but rather preferred the one of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 410.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 81.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 118 of the 2nd instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you had held with Baron Manteuffel, respecting the continuance of the Prussian agents in the Principalities, I have to observe that it is much to be regretted that those agents are not withdrawn from their posts, as until there is uniformity of acts among the Four Powers, Russia will not believe that they agree in opinion respecting her policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 411.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 85.)

Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 122 of the 2nd instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with Baron Manteuffel on communicating to his Excellency the copies of the Note and Protocol on the Eastern question, proposed to be signed at Vienna by the Representatives of the Four Powers, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 412.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 404.)

Foreign Office, December 7, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 428 of the 30th ultimo, reporting that you had not communicated the contents of the telegraphic despatch to me from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of the 20th ultimo, which passed through your hands on the 29th, I have to inform your Lordship that you are at liberty to communicate the contents of that despatch to Count Buol.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 413.

Baron Manteuffel to M. de Wildenbruch.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Chevalier Bunsen, December 7.)

Berlin, ce 2 Décembre, 1853.

Monsieur,

VOUS connaissez par mes dépêches antérieures le profond regret avec lequel le Roi, notre Auguste Maître, a vu éclater la guerre entre la Russie et la Turquie. Vous savez que Sa Majesté appelle de tous ses vœux le prompt rétablissement de la paix, et vous a chargé de vous associer à toutes les démarches propres à atteindre ce but. Les Cabinets de Vienne, de Paris, et de Londres, étant animés du même désir, cette identité de sentiments a fait naître l'idée de leur donner une expression collective.

A cet effet les Représentants des Quatre Puissances à Vienne ont reçu l'ordre d'adresser directement une note au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan. Le Comte d'Arnim est chargé de vous en transmettre copie, et vous en rencontrerez les instructions du Roi, notre Auguste Maître, en prêtant franchement votre concours aux démarches que de concert avec MM. vos collègues vous jugerez convenables pour seconder cette tentative de conciliation

L'esprit de modération dont la Sublime Porte a fait preuve dans plusieurs phases de son différend avec la Russie, nous fait espérer que Reshid Pasha appréciera les motifs puisés dans le véritable intérêt et la dignité de l'Empire Ottoman, qui ont dicté la démarche des Quatre Cours. A une question loyalement posée le Divan saura répondre de même en circonscrivant son différend avec la Russie dans ses véritables limites, et en le dégageant de tout ce qui y est étranger. Reshid Pasha, avec ce jugement éclairé et mûri par une longue expérience des affaires

qui le distingue, pésera la réponse à faire à la communication des Quatre Cours. Si toutefois à titre de cette confiance que le sincère intérêt de notre Auguste Maître pour tout ce qui regarde la Porte a plus d'une fois value à son Représentant à Constantinople, vous vous trouviez dans le cas de donner des conseils au Ministre Ottoman, vous n'hésiteriez pas à le faire, en l'engageant à déclarer que les Quatre Puissances n'ont fait que rendre justice aux sentiments de la Porte, en la supposant toujours prête à s'entendre à des conditions honorables avec la Russie; qu'en se fondant sur les assurances réitérées de cette Puissance, de ne point réclamer ni de nouvelles concessions ni des droits attentatoires à la souveraineté du Sultan, la Porte est prête à discuter la forme dans laquelle la paix sera rétablie et la question religieuse réglée, pourvu que cette discussion ne l'oblige pas à revenir sur des demandes qu'elle a déjà refusées, et que quelque arrangement sur l'évacuation des Principautés vienne à être conclu.

Cette négociation devrait naturellement être confiée à un Plénipotentiaire Turc et à un Plénipotentiaire Russe. Le lieu où ils se rencontreraient serait le plus convenablement choisi dans un terrain neutre: puisque, par des motifs faciles à apprécier, la Turquie ne répugnerait pas moins à établir le siége des négociations dans la partie de son territoire occupée par les troupes Russes, que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ferait des objections contre une autre ville de l'Empire Ottoman. En outre, pour faciliter l'accord des deux négociateurs, ils n'auraient pas à se réunir seuls, mais en présence des Représentants des Quatre Puissances, qui voueraient tous leurs efforts à l'œuvre de paix et de conciliation, appellée par les vœux de tous les Cabinets. Or ce but semble ne pas pouvoir être pleinement atteint, si les pourparlers préliminaires de la paix n'étaient pas en même-tems le signal de la cessation des hostilités, et à cet effet la Porte paraît n'avoir aucun motif fondé de se refuser à la proposition d'un armistice sous des conditions, dont les Quatre Puissances pourraient lui donner l'assurance qu'elles seraient acceptées par la Russie. Toutefois, lors même, qu'une pareille assurance préalable ne pourrait être donnée, l'envoi d'un Plénipotentiaire Turc pour s'aboucher dans une ville neutre avec un négociateur Russe en présence des Représentants des Quatre autres Puissances, n'en répondrait pas moins aux véritables intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman.

Voila, Monsieur, la substance des conseils que, d'ordre du Roi, je vous engage à faire entendre de concert avec vos collègues au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan. Reshid Pasha, nous en avons la confiance, y retrouvera la voix de l'amitié sincère et désintéressée qu'à plusieurs reprises nous avons élevée à Constantinople, et qui certes ne saurait se taire quand il s'agit d'abréger les malheurs de la guerre par le poids d'une démarche amicale et conciliatrice.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 414.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 435.)

Vienna, December 3, 1853.

My Lord,

A SHORT time ago the Prince of Servia made an application to the Austrian Government for a loan of arms and of some artillery, to enable him to defend the neutrality which he had determined to maintain in the contest at present going on upon his frontier. Count Buol informed me that he had replied to this request by stating, that His Majesty the Emperor would not object to agree to this application, provided the neutrality was to be defended equally against Russia as against Turkey. The Prince, in the first instance, agreed to make this declaration; but afterwards, on the assembly of his Council, it was explained in a manner

which Count Buol did not consider satisfactory, and therefore he has announced to me that the transmission of the arms had been stopped.

The intelligence which has been received here of some attempts on the part of the Turkish population of Bosnia to enter upon the Servian territory, states that they have been repelled by the Servians, but there is not the slightest indication that the Austrian Government have taken any part in these hostilities, or are in any way likely to be mixed up with them. The constant advice of the Austrian Government, both to the Porte and to the Prince of Servia, has been to maintain the strictest neutrality.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received your Lordship's despatch No. 395, to the inquiries in which the information I have above given may be considered as a reply. W.

No. 415.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 8.*)

(No. 436.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 3, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL begged M. de Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, to call upon him to-day to prepare the mode of arranging and forwarding the communication to Constantinople, the substance of which had been agreed to (as announced by telegraph) by England and Prussia, but of which the documents had only as yet been received by M. de Bourqueney.

Count Buol stated that these having been communicated to him, he had taken the Emperor's opinion upon them, and he had received his orders to state his entire agreement with them.

Count Buol added, that with respect to the draft of the instructions he thought it would be advisable that each Government should also send a confidential communication to its Representative, in which might be set forth more forcibly than in the ostensible instructions the anxious desire of the Four Governments that the Porte should favourably receive and act upon their suggestions, and the deep regret with which any appearance of disinclination on her part to do so would be viewed by them.

In reply to this invitation, it was remarked, that if such a suggestion was proposed to our Governments, they would expect that it would be accompanied by the reciprocity of a similar assurance from the Austrian Government, that if, after the consent of the Porte had been obtained to the proposals of the Four Powers, any reluctance to accept them should be manifested on the part of Russia, they would adopt language as pressing and as energetic to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol consented to take this engagement, and added, that should the case occur, he would in a like spirit consult with and adopt the views of the other Allied Powers as to the most advisable course to be pursued.

Baron Bourqueney, upon this understanding, undertook to recommend the suggestion of Count Buol to the favourable attention of his Government, and I also stated that I had no doubt the same language of friendly interest towards the Porte, which had dictated the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, No. 234, would be adhered to upon the understanding to which reference is above made, relative to the language to be held, if necessary, at St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol inquired in what manner we proposed to transmit the note to Reshid Pasha. He stated that he considered the best line to be adopted would be to desire me, as the organ of the Conference and in their name, to transmit it to Lord Stratford, and to request him, as the senior Ambassador, to take upon himself the duty of delivering it; and he thought that Lord Stratford might judge that the best mode of doing so would be (after consulting with his colleagues) to propose an interview of the Four Representatives with Reshid Pasha, at which he would deliver to him the note, when each of the Representatives would have an opportunity of communicating the substance of the instructions with which they were charged.

In stating this view of the manner of proceeding, Count Buol remarked that he did so merely as a suggestion, but that if Lord Stratford took charge of the note, he considered it due to his high character and great experience to leave him to decide upon what he considered as the most proper method to be adopted.

I stated that I was quite ready to charge myself with this commission, and that I would transmit the note to Lord Stratford, accompanied with the proposed suggestion, but leaving it to him to decide the manner of proceeding.

Count Buol begged to mention a mere verbal alteration which he would propose in the Protocol to be signed by the Four Representatives. He thought the word "plaisir" in the third paragraph, and the words at the close of it "à la tranquillité," would be better altered respectively to "satisfaction" and "au repos." M. de Bourqueney and Count Arnim at once concurred in these alterations as being preferable expressions and bearing precisely the same import, and I also consequently gave my consent to them. As we were quitting Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney remarked that it would be a step in the progress of the important negotiation we were entering upon, if the present meeting, although not a regularly constituted conference, should take some step which might have the character of attesting our joint consent to the documents submitted to us; he therefore proposed that the Note and Protocol should be "paraphéed" by the signature of our respective initials. Count Buol agreed to this proposal, and expressed his pleasure at thus taking a step which gave evidence of the concurrence of the Four Powers in the line of policy which might now be considered as adopted. He then placed his initials to the drafts of the Note and Protocol, which was equally done by Baron Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself.

Count Buol stated that he would charge himself with the preparation of the different documents which were to be signed by the Conference, and with their transmission by messenger to Belgrade, and thence by Tatar to Constantinople; and as it was uncertain when the despatches from London and from Berlin might arrive, he proposed that we should meet in conference on Monday for the signature of the documents and their immediate transmission. He stated also that he would prepare the form of the Protocol of the Conference, which it had been decided should be kept and registered.

Count Buol said that with regard to the communication of the note to the Russian Minister and to the Turkish Ambassador, he thought the best manner of proceeding would be that he should undertake to place a copy in the hands of Baron Meyendorff, and that (at the request of the Conference) Baron Bourqueney and myself should do the same with the Ambassador of the Porte. As to the Protocol of the Four Powers, Count Buol thought it should be considered as a confidential document, of which no copy should be given, but that the contents of it might (after the departure of the messenger for Constantinople) be communicated confidentially to Baron Meyendorff and to Ariff Effendi, in the same mode as had been adopted with regard to the note.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have received by the messenger Holmes your Lordship's despatch No. 369, together with its inclosures, of which I have informed Count Buol; but as Count Arnim has not received his despatches, our conference for signature remains fixed for to-morrow.

W.

No. 416.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 406.)

Foreign Office, December 9, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's despatch No. 436 of the 3rd instant, has been received and laid before the Queen.

Your Lordship will inform Count Buol of the sincere pleasure with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that his Excellency had received the Emperor of Austria's commands to agree to the Protocol, and that the drafts of the note and Protocol has been "paraphéed," in token of the concurrence of the Four Powers in the line of policy which might now be considered as adopted on the Eastern question.

It is the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that this policy, which is honourable and just as respects both the Porte and Russia, may lead to the re-establishment of peace between them, and that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may avert the danger that now menaces the general tranquillity of Europe.

Your Lordship will also inform Count Buol that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople has been made aware of the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government for the success of the propositions now about to be made to the Porte, and that it is most satisfactory to them to know that Count Buol has engaged to consult with and to adopt the views of the other allied Powers as to the most advisable course to be pursued in the event of the Porte agreeing to the proposals of the Four Powers and of Russia being unwilling to accept them.

Her Majesty's Government agree to the verbal amendments introduced into the Protocol, and they consider that the mode of proceeding recommended to the Four Representatives at Constantinople was judicious.

I have the satisfaction to inform your Lordship that your language and conduct throughout in this matter have merited the approbation of His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 417.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 9.)

(No. 924.)

Paris, December 8, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE I last wrote to your Lordship I have had an opportunity of conversing with Namik Pasha upon the present state of the Eastern question, he having inquired of me the object of the late deliberations at Vienna.

Namik Pasha may be supposed to be a faithful interpreter of the sentiments and position of the Ottoman Government at the moment when he left Constantinople some weeks ago, and the tenor of his remarks fully corroborates the view taken by Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte, of the determined attitude of the Divan, and of the difficulties with which his Excellency has to contend in attempting to control, or even guide, the political conduct of the Sultan's Ministers. Namik Pasha said, when I informed him that the object of the Vienna Conference was to obtain of the Porte the nomination of a Plenipotentiary to treat for peace with Russia, and a knowledge of the terms on which the Porte would consent to peace, that the Sultan would never name a Plenipotentiary while the Russians were in the Principalities, nor would he concede any of the demands made by Russia.

I could have but little hope that anything which I could say would make much impression on the Pasha; still I thought it advisable not to allow his observations to pass *sub silentio*, the more so as Vely Pasha was present during the conversation, and I therefore said that I trusted that no such wilful determination would prevent the Porte's accepting the advice of the Four Powers, and nominating a Plenipotentiary to treat; that demanding the previous evacuation of the Principalities was tantamount to a refusal to treat, since the point which it was hoped to obtain by negotiation was that which the Pasha insisted on as preliminary to naming a Plenipotentiary, and it was impossible to suppose that Russia, however much in the wrong, would be more amenable now than she had been during the whole progress of the quarrel; that the honour of Turkey was completely guaranteed, for a Turkish army had not only passed the Danube and entered Wallachia, retiring at the will and pleasure of the General who commanded it, but that the Turkish troops still held a most important point in Wallachia, that of Kalafat, which put them more on equality with their enemy now than when negotiations were broken off; that the cause of Turkey was so just that she had twice succeeded in obtaining a record of the Four Powers in her favour; that she had lost this advantage the first time by not accepting the Vienna note: let her beware of placing it in jeopardy a second time by refusing to treat, except on terms that, it was obvious beforehand, could not be accepted.

Namik Pasha replied that he considered the request of the Conference could not be complied with. Public opinion at Constantinople could not permit the nomination of a Plenipotentiary while the Russians were on Turkish territory; nor, when the composition of Omer Pasha's army was taken into consideration, and the number of irregular troops which it contained, would it be possible to keep them in idleness during the winter. This was a vital question to Turkey; the Sultan's authority was at stake; no terms that could be acceptable to the Porte would be agreed to by Russia; an armed struggle was inevitable. He hoped that the Porte would have the material assistance of England and France, and he should have no fear of the result.

It appears to be so much the habit of the Turks to suppose that it is the individual cause of Turkey which we are defending, rather than the general principles of international law violated in their persons, that I was not sorry to have an opportunity of protesting in a friendly manner against such an imprudent assumption. I said, therefore, to Namik Pasha that the presence of the English and French fleets in the Bosphorus was an earnest of the solicitude of those two Governments for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, or to speak more correctly for the maintenance of the present territorial distribution of Europe; for that the territorial limits of a country was a question distinct from its dynasty or its possessors; that the one could not be altered without influencing the balance of power, while a change in the other did not necessarily disturb that equilibrium: still Turkey having certain possessions in Europe we were desirous that she should retain those possessions, but that if any part of her territory was threatened there were two ways of defending it, by negotiation or by the force of arms—and that it was the duty of every Government to exhaust the former before it had recourse to the latter; that if Turkey claimed to be considered as a member of the European family of States, she must recollect that she could not consider her own interests alone, but must make them in a measure subservient to the general interests of Europe; and that the Porte would best prove its sense of its own superior position in this lamentable quarrel, and of its desire to consult the general good of Europe, by accepting the advice of the Four Powers, and naming a Plenipotentiary to treat for peace.

Namik Pasha still held to the opinion that negotiation was impossible unless the Russians quitted the Danubian provinces.

I then asked him whether he really thought that Turkey was in a condition to support with success a prolonged struggle with Russia. Namik Pasha replied that he was under no illusion on this point; that he had been all his life a soldier, and knew well of what the Turkish army was capable; that he had been also three or four times in Russia, and

had some knowledge of the Russian troops, and was aware that Turkey single-handed was no match for Russia. He hoped, therefore, for the assistance of France and England; Austria, he was convinced, would never dare take up arms against the Czar—she would verify the truth of the fable of the wolf and the lamb; but notwithstanding these disadvantages, so strongly was the Porte impressed with the conviction that Russia was at length come to claim what she called the key of her house, that the Ottoman nation would resist to the last, and if they were destined to perish, would do so with honour.

I mentioned to M. Drouyn de Lhuys my having had this conversation with Namik Pasha, and he said that he was glad of it, for that he himself had held similar language to him, and that he had more particularly reminded him that Europe had a double interest to attend to, the preservation of peace as well as the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and that if the Porte persisted in hostilities contrary to the advice of the Four Powers, a question would arise, which of the two interests was of paramount importance. The Porte, he had told the Pasha, would also do well to recollect that it had not always been in her power to force Europe to take her part, and that every war in which she had been engaged with Russia had ended disastrously for her, and in the acquirement by Russia of some new right, and some further portion of the Ottoman territory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 418.

French Memorandum on the Russian Occupation of the Principalities.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, December 9.)

DANS le Manifeste en date du 26 Juin dernier, par lequel Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie annonçait à ses peuples l'entrée de ses troupes dans les Principautés du Danube, nous remarquons, relativement à l'occupation de cette partie du territoire Ottoman, la déclaration suivante: "Par l'occupation des Principautés, nous voulons avoir entre les mains un gage qui nous réponde en tout état de cause du rétablissement de nos droits. Nous ne cherchons point de conquêtes; la Russie n'en a pas besoin."

Les mêmes assurances se trouvent reproduites dans la Circulaire adressée le 2 Juillet suivant, par M. le Comte de Nesselrode, aux agens de la Russie à l'étranger: "En occupant les Principautés pour un temps," dit le Chancelier de l'Empire, "nous désavouons d'avance toute idée de conquête. Nous ne prétendons obtenir aucun agrandissement de territoire."

Enfin, pendant que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et son Ministre des Affaires Etrangères parlaient de l'occupation en ces termes, l'Aide-de-camp Général Prince Gortchakoff, chargé de l'éxécution de cette mesure, renouvelait plus explicitement encore les mêmes déclarations dans sa proclamation aux habitants de la Moldavie et de Valachie. "Nous n'arrivons point au milieu de vous," disait-il, "avec des projets de conquête, ni avec l'intention de modifier les institutions qui vous régissent, et la situation que des Traités solennels vous ont garantie."

De quelque manière que l'on a du envisager le fait de l'occupation dans ses rapports avec les Traités, l'on était du moins autorisé à penser qu'en effet cette mesure se bornerait à l'objet qui lui était assigné, et que, malgré l'atteinte portée aux Conventions particulières en vigueur entre la Russie et la Porte, le principe général de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman demeurerait intact.

En un mot, l'on se plaisait à croire que l'occupation ne prendrait point le caractère de conquête.

A peine cependant le Prince Gortchakoff était-il entré dans les Principautés, que les Hospodars recevait, l'un et l'autre, du Consul-Général de Russie à Bucarest une communication aux termes de laquelle il leur était enjoint de rompre toute relation officielle avec la Porte, et de cesser, en conséquence, de lui payer le tribut stipulé comme signe de leur

obéissance, lequel devait être tenu désormais à disposition de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicholas. On sait qu'après de longs pourparlers, durant lesquels il a pu se rendre exactement compte de la portée de cette démarche, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg a persisté dans sa résolution d'exiger l'exécution des ordres dont son Consul-Général s'était fait ainsi l'interprète. Par cette pression officiellement exercée sur les Hospodars, et surtout par la saisie eventuelle des ressources destinées au service du tribut, l'autorité Russe agissait comme légitimement investie de la suzeraineté des provinces occupés.

Cette autorité ne s'est point bornée à se substituer ainsi de fait au pouvoir limité du Sultan dans les Principautés. Elle n'a point tardé à prendre des mesures qui ne sauraient appartenir qu'à la plénitude de la souveraineté elle-même.

Tel est, notamment, le caractère de l'ordre signifié aux Conseils Administratifs qui, à Bucharest et à Jassy, ont été nominalement chargés des fonctions administratives après le départ des deux Princes, et en vertu duquel les troupes de gendarmerie connues sous le nom de "Dorobantz" ont du être adjointes à l'armée d'occupation, en attendant que le reste de la milice soit appelé à subir le même sort. Cette mesure était en dehors de toutes les prévisions légitimes, et elle constitue dans les deux Provinces un état de choses essentiellement nouveau. Il en résulte, en effet, que l'occupation a définitivement changé de caractère; qu'après avoir brisé le lien qui, en droit, rattache au Sultan le pays occupé, on n'a pas hésité à lui enlever jusqu'à l'apparence d'autonomie administrative qui pouvait le distinguer encore d'un territoire conquis.

Cet acte de conquête a pris une signification mieux marquée encore par la désignation officielle du Lieutenant-Général Russe, Baron de Budberg, comme President de l'Administration des deux Principautés. L'autorité nominale laissée après le départ des Princes aux Conseils Administratifs, sous la direction suprême du Prince Gortchakoff en Valachie, et du Général Ursoff en Moldavie, est désormais concentrée et constituée entre les mains d'un Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie exerçant tous les attributs de la souveraineté. On laisse, il est vrai, espérer que le Gouvernement ainsi substitué par le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg au Pouvoir local, continuera d'administrer à l'aide d'agens du pays. Mais le maintien même de ces agens secondaires, que l'on ne peut d'ailleurs considérer comme une certitude, ne modifierait en rien la situation exorbitante faite aux Principautés par la substitution de la souveraineté Russe aux droits du Sultan et à ceux des deux provinces.

Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, en annonçant l'occupation, avait déclaré qu'il ne voulait point de conquête, comprenant bien sans doute ce qu'un pareil fait avait de contraire à toutes les prescriptions de la justice internationale et d'inquiétant pour l'Europe. L'ordre actuel des choses dans les deux provinces ne peut cependant s'expliquer autrement que comme une déduction du principe de la conquête.

Il est clair qu'on ne saurait arguer ici du droit de la guerre; car, indépendamment de cette considération que la mesure relative au tribut est antérieure à la déclaration de l'état de guerre, l'incorporation des troupes de Moldavie et de Valachie, ainsi que la nomination d'un Président Plénipotentiare Russe pour le Gouvernement des Principautés, constituent des faits qui ne sont dans les usages de la guerre qu'autant qu'elle a pour but l'incorporation elle-même du pays envahi au territoire de la Puissance envahissante.

Les manières de voir reçues chez les nations Européennes où les lumières de la raison sont à cet égard en parfait accord. Un pays est de fait annexé à un autre, lorsque celui-ci dispose à la fois du trésor, de l'armée, de la souveraineté de celui-là; et nous ne nous souvenons point que dans la longue série des dernières grandes guerres, où, cependant, se rencontrent des exemples de toutes les situations que l'imagination de l'homme d'état peut se représenter, aucun Gouvernement ait pris de semblables dispositions, à moins d'avoir l'intention formelle, et hautement avouée, de conserver sous sa domination le pays occupé, ou de ne traiter de sa restitution à son souverain légitime qu'à des conditions qui dépassent de beaucoup celles que la Russie a solennellement énoncées.

Il est donc vrai de dire que contrairement aux espérances qu'avaient données les déclarations précises et réitérées du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, l'occupation des Principautés du Danube a changé de nature et de portée.

Elle cesse d'être ce qu'elle était à l'origine—une infraction aux Traités qui déterminent les frontières de l'Empire Turc, un véritable envahissement de territoire; et elle est en voie de revêtir le caractère de conquête et d'incorporation.

Les conséquences d'une telle situation ressortent d'elles-mêmes. En prenant cette signification, l'attitude du Gouvernement Russe dans les Principautés Danubiennes ne porte plus seulement atteinte aux droits du Sultan; elle entame le principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman et menace l'équilibre général.

Il devient donc de plus en plus difficile de considérer l'occupation de ces Provinces comme une question particulière aux deux parties belligérentes. Sortie des limites dans lesquelles on avait espéré de la voir restreinte, cette mesure du Gouvernement Russe interesse directement tous les Cabinets désireux de maintenir la pondération des forces qui sert aujourd'hui de garantie à la paix Européenne.

No. 419.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 340.)

Constantinople, November 12, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DE LA COUR has sent to inform me that he can no longer take any part in the pending question, as he has received notice from his Government that he is no longer in a position to perform the functions of Ambassador, and that his successor (General Baraguay d'Hilliers, I believe) will be here in a very few days. He had before informed me confidentially of this intended change, but did not object to act with me, or rather, as he said, to second me in presenting the new proposition to the Turkish Government. I need not observe how fatal this relinquishment, unavoidable as it may have been, must necessarily prove to the last remaining hope, if such there be, of obtaining the Porte's consent to the object of your Lordship's instruction; but I will not omit to remark, though I doubt whether any importance should be applied to the remark, that M. de la Cour did not object at the same time to unite with me in calling upon the Admirals to send some steamers into the Black Sea for purposes mentioned elsewhere.

I have naturally felt some curiosity to know the immediate cause of M. de la Cour's removal, and I understand that amongst his countrymen he is thought to have incurred the displeasure of his Government by not bringing the French squadron into the Dardanelles at an earlier period. This conjecture appears to agree with the peremptory order sent to his Excellency by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, according to Lord Cowley's statement to your Lordship, and the impatience betrayed by that Minister at the delay which had taken place, notwithstanding the anxiety shown from the first by the French Government to put their squadron as forward as possible, and sometimes not a little unsuccessfully so.

It may occur to your Lordship that if M. de la Cour had executed the peremptory command transmitted to him before I was prepared, under my view of the interests at stake, to require the presence of Her Majesty's squadron within the Dardanelles, I should have been reduced to the painful alternative of either consenting to what I did not approve, or of leaving for public comment, with all its inconvenient consequences, a marked difference of proceeding between the British and French authorities on a point of essential importance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 420.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 347.)

Therapia, November 19, 1853.

My Lord,

IN a despatch which I forwarded to your Lordship to-day by a French Government steamer, I stated in substance that, although I had used my best exertions to obtain the acceptance of that proposition, which formed the subject-matter of your Lordship's instructions to me in Nos. 234 and 235 of this year, I had met with no success, and had only kept open a door for further negotiation in the hope that, by acting in concert with the new French Ambassador, whose language is eminently pacific, and obtaining the support of the Prussian, and possibly of the Austrian Representative, I might still be able to make a salutary impression upon the Turkish Government.

It is now my intention to fill up the canvas by adding such particulars as I think likely to have any interest for your Lordship, and by giving, in few words, an account of my proceedings in prosecution of the object in view.

It is necessary to premise that, before your Lordship's instructions reached me, not only was the utmost term of delay for commencing hostilities exhausted, but the actual commencement of them was known here to have taken place under circumstances favourable to the Sultan's arms. The Porte, moreover, was engaged in carrying out measures intended to increase, at much fatigue and expense, its disposable means of prosecuting the war, and to convey to its subjects the impression that results proportioned to the sacrifices which they were called upon to make, would be aimed at.

Such a state of things was anything but conducive to the success of a negotiation founded upon your Lordship's instructions. Moreover it was soon ascertained, partly from communications with the Austrian and Prussian Envoys, partly from advices transmitted to me by Lord Westmorland, that, if anything was to be attempted by me, it would have no other support but that of the French Embassy; and I soon discovered, from M. de la Cour's language, that, with no want of good will on his part, he was rather in a position to second me than to act completely on the same line as myself.

With these obstacles in front, and these imperfect aids at my side, I might well have been justified in declining the task assigned to me, or at least in reserving its execution for a more propitious juncture. But the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid or to shorten the calamities of war, and my own conviction that your Lordship's two-fold proposition, especially as it excluded no reasonable alterations, would, if accepted, effectually secure the Porte against every dangerous admission or encroachment in future, determined me to proceed in defiance of every obstacle and discouragement. I was sanguine enough to believe that my exertions, if they failed as to their immediate object, would at least prepare the way for success under some other form, and at no distant period.

I began by making known, confidentially, to the Sultan and to Reshid Pasha, the nature of the proposition recommended by your Lordship, and my own conscientious opinion of its merits. I learned from the latter that the Porte was already in possession of its terms, a despatch, founded on your Lordship's communications to M. Musurus in London, having been already submitted to the Council of Ministers, and received by them with marks of a decidedly unfavourable character. My next step was to effect an agreement between M. de la Cour and myself, that we should address instructions of similar purport to our respective interpreters, directing them to wait upon the Ottoman Minister together, and to lay before him the two drafts inclosed with your Lordship's No. 234. This was done;

and we also agreed to see Reshid Pasha ourselves separately, and to keep nothing secret from the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, though we knew that they were not then at liberty to support us.

To both of us the language of the Ottoman Secretary of State was unfavourable. Towards me it amounted in substance to this; our proposition might have been received with satisfaction at an earlier period, but circumstances were changed, and such an arrangement no longer suited the position in which the Ottoman Government were placed towards Russia on one side and towards their own people on the other. The terms proposed could not be accepted without an appeal to the General Council, and Reshid Pasha could hold out no prospect of their acquiescence, even if his colleagues were favourably disposed, which they evidently were not.

It was understood between M. de la Cour and myself, that we would not press the Turkish Ministers to a formal decision, but limit ourselves to ascertaining the real state of their opinions.

With this view I drew up a statement of our arguments, which, with M. de la Cour's knowledge, was communicated to Reshid Pasha in French, and to the Council and also to the Sultan in Turkish. Thus far my French colleague acted with me, although he was aware that he had been superseded by the appointment of General Baraguay d'Hilliers; but the arrival of later intelligence from Paris obliged him to stop short, and I was left entirely by myself.

Such were the circumstances under which I made a last effort before the Council met to bring Reshid Pasha into my sentiments. I went over to his house in the evening, and sate in discussion with his Highness until it was time for him to join his colleagues at the appointed place of deliberation. As the interview was one of private confidence and hospitality I will not go into the details of what passed between us; but your Lordship may be assured that I omitted nothing which my instructions, my recollections, or my reflection could suggest, in order to make an impression on his mind. I lament to say that all my efforts were unavailing, and that I could obtain nothing beyond a promise that my arguments should be faithfully repeated to the Council before he expressed any opinion of his own. I might accompany him, he said, to the Council, and make my own statement to the assembled Ministers; or if I thought that he was an obstacle to their acceptance of my proposals, he was ready to give in his resignation. It would evidently have been idle for me to make an appeal from the Pasha to his colleagues, the leading men of whom constitute what is called the war party; and so unusual a step would only have had the effect of proclaiming my failure, and rivetting their resistance. I did, however, the only thing which remained for me to do at the moment. I took my leave with evident marks of disappointment and dissatisfaction, expressing in strong terms my apprehension that the Pasha would one day have reason to look back with painful regret on the issue of our interview; and this I did not do till after I had vainly tried to reconcile him to my advice by changing its form, and suggesting the adoption of its principle in some way more suited to a state of actual hostilities.

I have since received the most positive assurances from Reshid Pasha that the notes and memorandum were submitted by him to the Council, together with an account of our interview; that no decision was taken; but that a paper, expressing the general opinion of the meeting, was in preparation, and that the opinion manifested therein, though not conclusive in a formal sense, would be found altogether adverse to my suggestions. It is proper to note that, while these endeavours were in progress the Prussian Minister received instructions to support your Lordship's proposition; and Reshid Pasha, when the Council met to take it into consideration, was aware of that circumstance.

The new French Ambassador arrived the next morning; and such conversation as I had with him the day before yesterday on the occasion of a first visit, has left me under an impression that his desire to contribute to the restoration of peace, evident as it would seem to be in obedience to his instructions, would nevertheless urge him rather to find

some new channel than follow in the direction of that which I had been authorized to open.

This is a point which remains to be ascertained; and meanwhile I have only to inclose herewith the several documents which relate to this narrative, and to solicit your Lordship's indulgence for the length into which I have been drawn.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFOBD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 420.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Monsieur, *Therapia, le 8 Novembre*, 1853.

M'ETANT concerté avec son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de France, dont l'interprète sera autorisé s'agir de concert avec vous dans cette occasion, je vous invite à vous rendre un moment plutôt chez son Altesse Reshid Pasha, à qui vous direz de ma part que je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de lui remettre la note ci-jointe, accompagnée d'un projet de note proposé, d'après une nouvelle rédaction, pour l'acceptation de la Sublime Porte.

En remettant les deux pièces à son Altesse vous lui observerez que la dernière a été rédigée avec une grande sollicitude pour la dignité et l'indépendance du Sultan, que toute objection élevée contre la note, dite de Vienne, y a été soigneusement écartée, et qu'elle est recommandée à la considération la plus sérieuse de la Porte, qui ne pourrait la rejeter sans faire éprouver à Sa Majesté la Reine et à son Gouvernement les sentimens les plus pénibles, surtout si une décision aussi regrettable viendrait à être prise par égard pour l'excitation du peuple et l'enthousiasme de l'armée.

Vu les assurances déjà données, et les mesures actuellement adoptées par la Grande Bretagne pour appuyer la Sublime Porte et pour protéger son territoire, il est indispensable que tout progrès ultérieur des hostilités soit suspendu, pendant un terme raissonable, et durant la négociation que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a entamée afin de rétablir les relations amicales entre la Porte et la Russie, bien entendu, toutefois, qu'aucun mouvement hostile ne soit fait de la part de celle-ci.

Vous finirez par dire à Reshid Pasha, avec l'instance de mes convictions personnelles, que je recommande cette proposition de mon Gouvernement à sa clairvoyance patriotique et a son zèle ministériel, en attendant que je puisse avoir l'honneur de réitérer mes instances de vive voix auprès de lui.

Votre, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 420.

Memorandum addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.

EN offrant de nouveau à la Porte un moyen de fixer les termes de raccommodement avec la Russie, on croit satisfaire à la fois aux devoirs d'une amitié sincère et aux exigences du bien-être général. La paix est dans l'intérêt de tout les états, de toutes les classes productives. Son interruption dérange les calculs de l'industrie et les rapports du commerce. Elle déchaine les passions, met tout au hazard, et rétarde, si elle n'arrête pas, le progrès de la civilisation. La guerre ne se fait légitimement que pour révendiquer les droits d'une nation, et maintenir l'indépendance, qui doit toujours accompagner la souveraineté. Dès qu'on pourra sauvegarder ces intérêts essentiels par la négotiation, les hostilités cessent d'avoir un objet légitime, et, privées de cette justification, elles perdent le prestige de la gloire, et deviennent une réproche à l'humanité. Il ne s'agit pas ici de

la religion. La Porte a déclaré d'une manière solennelle qu'elle faisait un appel aux armes dans le seul but de maintenir ses droits souverains et l'indépendance de son Empire contre les prétensions de la Russie.

Faisons l'application de ces principes. La proposition soumise actuellement à la Porte n'est, au fond, autre chose que ce que cette Puissance s'est montrée toujours disposée à accepter. Toutes les objections faites par la Porte à de certaines expressions susceptibles d'une sinistre interprétation y ont été soigneusement écartées, et le nouveau projet de note se trouve accompagné d'une déclaration qui lui offre tous les avantages qui se rattachent à la confirmation des principes déclarés par les Cinq Puissances en 1841, dont l'efficacité à l'avenir ne saurait à peine avoir un meilleur garant que celui de leur application efficace dans la circonstance actuelle. Ce qu'il y a, en outre, de positif, c'est que le plan recommandé aujourd'hui par les alliés les plus cordiaux du Sultan, aurait été regardé à Constantinople trois mois après le départ du Prince Menchikoff comme propre à résoudre toutes les complications, et à rassurer les esprits les plus méfians.

Il est vrai, pourtant, de dire que, depuis cette époque, la situation a subi des changemens. La Porte a réuni les forces de son Empire à grands frais. Elle a monté l'enthousiasme de la nation. Elle a communiqué sa déclaration de guerre à toutes les Puissances ses amies. Elle a pris l'engagement de commencer les hostilités, et les hostilités se poursuivent à l'heure qu'il est à son avantage. Elle pourrait à peine les suspendre sans le consentement de l'ennemi, à moins que de risquer la sûreté de ses armées, et le fruit des succès qu'elles ont déjà remportés.

Personne ne voudrait jeter une doute sur l'exactitude de ces faits. On ne saurait même nier que la difficulté d'arranger à l'amiable les différends qui ont amenés la lutte actuelle, ne soit visiblement augmentée par le recours aux armes, et par les opérations hostiles qui s'en sont suivies. Cependant, la véritable question ne gît pas dans cette difficulté. Si, d'un côté, les obstacles qui retardent un arrangement sont devenus plus nombreux, les risques et les dangers qui accompagnent la guerre n'en sont pas diminués. La Porte se trouve en lutte avec une Puissance colossale, et il est à craindre que l'épuisement causé par la guerre ne se fasse sentir à la longue plus fortement en Turquie qu'en Russie. L'opinion publique en Europe approuve la résistance de la Porte, et les escadres de l'Angleterre et de la France sont mouillées dans le Bosphore pour la protection du territoire Ottoman. Mais les alliés les plus sincères de la Porte ne peuvent pas sacrifier les intérêts de leurs sujets à son désir, tout naturel qu'il soit, d'obtenir les avantages imprévus dans le commencement de sa querelle avec la Russie, et les nations les plus civilisées sont exactement celles qui seraient les premières à se revolter contre une guerre poussée par quelque motif que ce soit au-delà des limites de la raison et de la nécessité.

Il est tout simple que la Porte doit souhaiter tel résultat de la guerre qui la mettrait dorénavant à l'abri des prétensions injustes de ses voisins. Chercher cet avantage par la prolongation indéfinie des hostilités n'est autre chose que de s'exposer à des périls qui puissent avoir une toute autre issue, et, en cas de quelque succès, à la tentation de réhausser encore les conditions de la paix selon l'impulsion d'un peuple excité, ou d'une armée avide de gloire.

Les alliés de la Porte ne lui conseillent que ce que la raison et une juste appréciation des forces et des éventualités lui ont déjà prescrit. Quelques embarras de position et de forme ne peuvent pas servir de contrepoids aux considérations dominantes et aux obligations d'une portée trop haute pour se laisser facilement effacer. Il va sans dire que l'adhésion du Gouvernement Ottoman à la proposition qui vient de lui être soumise, servirait de motif aux alliés pour tâcher encore plus activement à écarter tout obstacle à son acceptation ailleurs, et, arrive ce qui pourra, la Porte, en déférant à leurs conseils, acquerrait un nouveau titre à leur sympathie, et, en cas de besoin, à leur coopération.

La Porte, enfin, servirait mal sa propre cause si elle faisait trop de cas des obstacles existans, ou si elle se laissait emporter par l'espoir de tout obtenir par la force des armes. Une réconciliation effectuée entre

elle et la Russie dans les circonstances actuelles et dans les termes proposées ne manquerait pas de tourner à son profit durable, autant par l'effet moral de sa modération, de son énergie, et du zèle loyal de ses peuples, que par le rétablissement de son repos et le maintien de ses droits.

Inclosure 3 in No. 420.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, November* 15, 1853.

RESHID PASHA of his own accord gave me an account of the result of last night's Council. He told me that he read to them the projet de note, the note to be signed by the Representatives, and also the memorandum containing the arguments put forward by your Excellency, and stated to his colleagues the conversation which he had with your Lordship on the subject of the new proposal. He abstained, said he, from expressing any opinion, either in favour or against it, before ascertaining their own. The decision come to by the Council was that a memorandum shall be drawn up and submitted to your Excellency's consideration. Although Reshid Pasha did not say that the Council rejected the new proposal, yet, according to private information I could obtain, it would appear that the Council is unwilling to accept it under present circumstances. What Reshid Pasha told me to be privately reported to your Excellency is that, having much deference for your opinion, and wishing always to act in harmony with your suggestions, and, as he sees that in the present occasion he will be compelled to swerve from it, should you think it advisable for the success of the affair that he should abandon his office, he is most willing to do so. But, at the same time, he cannot assure you that his successor will yield to the new proposal.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 421.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 348. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 19, 1853.

REFERRING to my ostensible despatch of this date on the subject of your Lordship's most recent proposition to the Porte, I have to state that the draft of a note, prepared for Reshid Pasha's signature, was not presented to his Highness entirely in the words of the copy transmitted with your Lordship's instruction No. 234 of the present year.

In the interest of the negotiation, unpromising as it was, I found it necessary in the very outset to avail myself of the latitude afforded by your Lordship in the following number of your correspondence. The late French Ambassador thoroughly concurred with me in the expediency of making some change in the wording of more than one passage, and this opinion was acted upon with our common consent.

I have now the honour to inclose herewith an exact copy of the note which passed through Reshid Pasha's hands to the Ministerial Council, and I trust that the modified version of it, though still unpalatable to the Porte, will not appear unsatisfactory to your Lordship. The various changes of expression, emanating from different quarters and applied to the original note, may be said to move within the same circle; and in giving them the turn most likely to satisfy the Porte, I hope that nothing has been admitted which, in case of acceptance here, would have increased our difficulties at St. Petersburgh.

The note which was meant to be signed by the Four Representatives, had they been all instructed to that effect, was conveyed to Reshid Pasha, and through him to the Ministerial Council, without alteration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 421.

Projet de Note to be addressed by the Porte to Russia.

SA Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant donné en maintes circonstances les assurances les plus amicales de sa constante bienveillance envers l'Empire Ottoman, et Sa Majesté le Sultan n'ayant de son côté rien de plus à cœur que de rétablir entre elle et son auguste allié les relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui ont été malheureusement altérées par de récentes et pénibles complications, la Sublime Porte a pris soigneusement á tâche de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces de ce différend, et de répondre ainsi au désir de la Cour Impériale de Russie.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer par rapport aux stipulations du Traité de Kainardji, confirmé par celui d'Andrinople, que la Sublime Porte est fermement résolue de maintenir la promesse y consignée, en continuant à protéger constamment la religion Chrétienne et toutes ses églises.

Le Soussigné est, en outre, chargé de faire connaître que Sa Majesté regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient dans la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui lui ont été octroyés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lesquels privilèges sont confirmés par elle. C'est aussi l'intention sincère de Sa Majesté de faire participer l'Eglise Grecque de l'Orient aux autres privilèges religieux qu'il lui plairait d'accorder dorénavant à toute autre communauté quelconque de ses sujets Chrétiens, ou qui leur ont été déjà octroyés par Sa Majesté ou par ses glorieux ancêtres.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint une copie du firman Impériale qui, en confirmation des privilèges du clergé Grec, a été remis en dernier lieu au patriarcat du même rit.

Ce firman, qui est une nouvelle preuve des intentions généreuses et de la volonté souveraine de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan à cet égard, et dont la promulgation a inspiré partout la confiance, suffira, sans doute, à dissiper toute incertitude ou appréhension au sujet de culte professé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé à l'état de choses actuel concernant les lieux de pélerinage à Jérusalem, la Sublime Porte promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à ce qui a été réglé par les firmans Impériaux dernièrement émanés à cet égard, sans une entente préalable avec les Gouvernements de France et de Russie.

Sa Majesté le Sultan adhère au vœu exprimé par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour la construction à Jérusalem d'une église qui sera desservie par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades de la même nation, et la Sublime Porte est prête à conclure un Acte solemnel dans ce sens, et qui aurait de plus pour effet de placer ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

En communiquant à votre Excellence ce qui précède par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale, mon auguste Souverain, je saisis, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 421.

Projet de Note to be signed by the Four Representatives.

LES Représentants de ont reçu l'ordre de porter à la connaissance de la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements respectifs, persuadés de la haute importance de maintenir le principe consacré dans le préambule du Traité de Juillet 13, 1841, et animés du désir le plus sincère pour la conservation de la paix générale, et les dits Gouvernements voulant attester ce désir et en égard aux réclamations de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et aux droits souverains de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et ayant de plus reçu du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg les assurances les plus formelle que Sa Majesté Impériale ne cherche aucune nouvelle concession, ni aucune droit d'ingérence dans les affaires de la Turquie, et de la part de Sa Majesté le Sultan les assurances également formelles qu'elle observera fidèlement ses engagements, et qu'en outre elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de maintenir à tout jamais les privilèges spirituels accordés au clergé et à l'Eglise Grecque, et considérant que ces assurances, appuyées par les firmans adressés au Patriarche Grec, sont aux yeux des dits Gouvernements une garantie suffisante pour le maintien de ces privilèges, les dits Gouvernements, dans le but de mettre fin au différend qui malheureusement s'est élevé entre la Russie et la Porte, ont donné l'ordre aux Soussignés de soumettre à la considération de la Sublime Porte la note ci-incluse par laquelle se trouveront assurés la dignité et les droits de l'une et de l'autre Puissance.

No. 422.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 10.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, November 20, 1853.*

ANXIOUS to show that I have spared no pains to make the Sultan and his Ministers alive to their true interest in the present stage of their contest with Russia, I transmit herewith for your Lordship's perusal a second memorandum which I drew up a few days ago, and placed confidentially in the hands of Reshid Pasha, and of the Sultan's Principal Secretary.

By contrasting what Russia has demanded with what she would obtain by the acceptance of your Lordship's proposition, and all that Turkey would now secure by an arrangement on that basis with the sacrifices and perils which a prolongation of the war would entail upon her, especially if her allies had reason to complain of her indifference to their advice, I had hoped to make head, if possible, against the prevailing tendencies. It appears, however, that the leading Ministers have taken their line in opposition to every form and shade of the old plan of arrangement, by means of a note addressed to the Russian Cabinet, and other incidents or other suggestions are necessary to overcome the existing obstacles to a pacific settlement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 422.

Second Memorandum addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.

LA Russie a déclaré plus d'une fois qu'elle n'accepterait autre chose que la note du Prince Menchikoff; elle ne l'aurait pas.

La Russie a accepté la note de Vienne; elle ne l'aurait jamais.

La Russie a rejeté les modifications de la note de Vienne: elle doit pourtant les prendre de fait.

La Russie a déclaré son intention de ne pas quitter les Principautés sans faire prévaloir ses prétensions: elle sera dans le cas de les quitter sans autre satisfaction qu'une note que laisserait les choses en *statu quo*.

La Russie a compté sur les Rayahs, et surtout sur ses coreligionnaires: les Rayahs ont manifesté leur dévouement et leur réconnaissance à la Porte, et les orthodoxes dans les Principautés ont montré une tiédeur inattendue envers la Russie.

Celle-ci a subi des échecs de tous les côtés: les Gouvernements de l'Europe, les peuples et la presse ont donné gain de cause à la Porte.

La Russie n'a pour soutien à l'étranger que la neutralité de l'Autriche, et le froid respect de la Prusse; la Porte a les escadres de l'Angleterre et de la France dans le Bosphore, et le confirmation des principes énoncés en 1841.

Elle a beaucoup gagné dans l'opinion de l'Europe par sa modération, sa fermeté, son énergie, son esprit d'ordre, par le développement de ses forces et par la valeur de ses soldats.

Encore un dernier effort de modération, qui ne lui coûterait rien qu'une forme, qu'un procédé,—encore un mouvement de déférence pour les alliés, qui lui ont donné de si fortes preuves de leur amitié, et la Sublime Porte sortirait de ses difficultés, de ses vexations, et de ses périls, honorée et triumphante pour le présent, et assurée, quant à ses intérêts essentiels, pour l'avenir.

Si la Porte, au contraire, prenait le parti de refuser la nouvelle proposition, elle mettrait au hazard tout ce qu'elle a gagné jusqu'ici, elle déplairait à ses alliés, et à côté de quelques chances d'un succès plus brillant et plus étendu, elle courrait le risque de s'isoler et de tout perdre, elle aurait la certitude d'augmenter à perte de vue ses dépenses, ses sacrifices, et ses périls.

Au lieu de fixer l'humiliation actuelle de la Russie, elle lui donnerait l'occasion d'en sortir avec éclat, et de manière, comme dans les temps passés, de laisser peu de place à la médiation des Puissances favorables à la Porte.

L'acceptation de la Porte n'est pas sûre d'être suivie par celle de son adversaire, et si elle ne l'était pas, il va sans dire que la position du Gouvernement Ottoman serait infiniment améliorée, et celui-ci n'aurait qu'à porter son étendard en avant, accompagné des vœux de toute l'Europe, et soutenue bien autrement qu'aujourd'hui par les forces actives et zélées de ses alliés.

No. 423.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 349.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 21, 1853.

I SENT last night to Belgrade by express a despatch in the following words, to be forwarded to your Lordship by telegraph through Semlin and Vienna:

"Yesterday, in reply to the new French Ambassador's speech at his first audience, the Sultan said that no proposal for peace was admissible without a total abandonment of the pretensions put forward by Russia.

"On my communicating to-day with the French Ambassador, his Excellency, without apprizing me of the Sultan's declaration, declined taking any step in support of your Lordship's proposition, expressing a general readiness to act in concert with me, but evading the suggestion of any other proposition or plan of proceeding. Reshid Pasha has since stated to me, in answer to my inquiries, that the Porte desires peace on condition that Russia will abandon all her former demands, and evacuate

the Principalities immediately. I understand him to mean, that all mention of religious privileges must be dropped.

"I intend to forward my despatches by an express to Marseilles the day after to-morrow."

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 424.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 350.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 21, 1853.

ON the 19th instant General Baraguay d'Hilliers, the new French Ambassador to this Court, having his first audience of the Sultan, delivered an address to His Majesty, which is not destitute of interest in the present posture of affairs. The Sultan's reply, which was drawn up by Reshid Pasha, appears to be conclusive as to the determination of the Porte to accept no terms of peace with Russia founded on religious assurances. Copies of the two speeches, derived from an authentic source, are inclosed herewith.

Considering that the passage, to which I particularly allude, in the Sultan's speech was suggested to His Majesty at a moment when I was striving to keep open a door for further negotiation on the proposed basis, I felt myself entitled to complain, or at least to require some explanation of so marked a contradiction. I wrote to Mr. Pisani in consequence, and a copy of my instruction to him, intended to be read to Reshid Pasha, is transmitted herewith for your Lordship's further information. I deemed it my duty also to afford General Baraguay an opportunity of putting in a clear light his position with respect to the Porte and Her Majesty's Embassy on the subject of peace with Russia. With this view I addressed a second instruction to Mr. Pisani, and copies of it, and of his answers to both my instructions, are forwarded herewith. I leave them without comment in your Lordship's hands.

The French Ambassador having called here to-day, I had some further conversation with him, grounded on his assurances that peace between Russia and Turkey was an object of earnest desire to his Government, and on his apparent unwillingness or inability to substitute any other mode of proceeding for the plan suggested by your Lordship. I found his Excellency most cordial in all that relates to the establishment of a thorough concurrence between us in matters pertaining to the difference between Turkey and Russia; but I did not find him prepared with instructions to do more than listen, discuss, and report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 424.

Speech addressed to the Sultan by General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

DANS les circonstances difficiles où se trouve le Gouvernement Ottoman, je suis heureux d'avoir été choisi par Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, pour renouveler à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan l'assurance de son amitié.

La France est la plus ancienne, la plus sincère, la plus désintéressée des alliés de la Sublime Porte.

La France ne craint pas la guerre. Fidèle à l'esprit de sa mission, révélée par l'Empereur Napoléon lui-même, la France veut la paix, mais elle la veut durable, loyale, honorable pour elle et pour ses alliés.

Pour atteindre ce but, Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, de concert avec sa puissante alliée la Souveraine de la Grande Bretagne, a envoyé sa

flotte en Orient. Confiant dans les assurances réitérées du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, il espère encore que le différend qui s'est élevé entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie, pourra s'aplanir, que ce trouble passager, en posant nettement la question de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, ne fera qu'affermir une indépendance si précieuse à l'Europe entière, et si nécessaire au maintien de la paix du monde.

Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan peut compter que Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon, qui comprend si bien les besoins, les sentiments et la dignité de la France, prêtera dans ce but son appui à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et je crois être ici le fidèle interprète de sa volonté, en lui en donnant l'assurance.

Je saisis cette occasion d'exprimer à votre Majesté Impériale l'ardent désir de contribuer de tous mes efforts au maintien des vieilles et bonnes traditions que la France a toujours entretenues avec la Sublime Porte, et je mets aux pieds de votre Majesté Impériale l'hommage de mon profond respect.

Inclosure 2 in No. 424.

Answer of the Sultan to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

JE suis on ne peut plus satisfait de toutes les assurances que vous me donnez au nom de mon auguste allié l'Empereur Napoléon, et je vous prie, M. l'Ambassadeur, d'être auprès de Sa Majesté l'Empereur l'organe de mes sentiments de reconnaissance pour ce nouveau témoignage de son amitié et pour l'intérêt qu'il prend au bien-être de mon Empire.

Dans la crise actuelle, comme toujours, je compterai sur l'appui moral et matériel de mes plus anciennes alliés, la France et l'Angleterre. La France ainsi que toute l'Europe ont raison de vouloir la paix : moi, de mon côté, je la désire autant qu'elle, mais tout autant qu'elle ne toucherait en aucune façon ni à mes droits souverains ni à l'indépendance de la Turquie. Aujourd'hui tout arrangement est inacceptable sans l'abandon total des prétensions mises en avant par la Russie, et l'évacuation complète et immédiate des deux Principautés qui sont parties intégrantes de mon Empire.

Je félicite l'Empereur du choix qu'il a fait de vôtre digne personne pour une mission si délicate et si importante, et je me plais à croire que vous emploierez tous vos efforts pour affermir de plus en plus les bonnes relations qui existent si heureusement entre les deux Gouvernements.

Inclosure 3 in No. 424.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Therapia, November 20, 1853.

Sir,

I OBSERVE in the Sultan's answer to the the French Ambassador a declaration which, under present circumstances, gives me just cause of surprise. His Majesty appears to have used the following words with reference to terms of accommodation with Russia: "At present every kind of arrangement is inadmissible without a total abandonment of the pretensions put forward by Russia."

Now, it was only the day before yesterday that in answer to my special inquiries you reported, on the authority of Reshid Pasha, that the memorandum expected from the Ministerial Council would be a mere paper of remarks without any formality or official conclusiveness. It could hardly indeed be otherwise, as the declaration or note which I was authorised to give in, either with or without my colleagues, had been merely communicated without signature, and open to alteration, in order to take the opinions of Reshid Pasha and his principal colleagues.

Yet in this stage of the matter, and fully aware that the Court of Russia had adopted the proposition recommended by England and France, while the Austrian Internuncio had reason to expect instructions on the

same subject by his next post, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs advised his Sovereign to commit himself to a new and conclusive declaration, completely at variance with the known opinions and counsels of those allies whose squadrons are here to protect the Sultan's dominions and to maintain his independence, but not to incur the hazards of war on new grounds, or for purposes not hitherto deemed necessary for the attainment of those objects.

You will ask to see his Highness without delay, and you will read to him what precedes without reserve, adding that the want of consideration manifested towards my Government and me on this occasion merges in my apprehension of the consequences to which the Sultan's most confidential Minister has exposed both himself and his Sovereign by so rash and unseasonable a declaration.

I know not, and care little, to what excuses the Pasha may resort in palliation of his conduct, but you will of course receive with attention and transmit carefully to me whatever it may please his Highness to state in reply to this communication. It is requisite that I should learn, on his official authority, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, what is precisely meant by "the pretensions put forward by Russia," a "total abandonment" of which is required as an indispensable element of peace between that Power and Turkey. I should be glad to find that I had put too extensive an interpretation on those expressions, but at all events I am entitled to know in the clearest manner, and without any shadow of reserve or mystery, what they mean.

If Reshid Pasha should say that the expressions are the Sultan's, and that he can only satisfy me by recurring to His Majesty himself, you will tell him that, on the occasion of a public audience, it is well known that the speeches mutually exchanged are, in so far as the Sovereign is concerned, adopted on the responsibility of his Ministers.

I am, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S. You will apply for an audience of the Sultan on my part, that I may have an early opportunity of presenting Vice-Admiral Dundas and the principal captains of his squadron to His Imperial Majesty.

Inclosure 4 in No. 424.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Sir,

Therapia, November 20, 1853.

I WISH you to call upon the French Ambassador as soon as you can. You will send in your name as having a communication to make from me, and you will make him acquainted with your position in the service of Her Majesty's Embassy. You will then say what follows:

"Comme il est à présumer que le mauvais temps retiendra votre Excellence en ville, l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qui craint de ne pouvoir s'y rendre encore d'ici à quelques jours, désire en attendant avoir une idée de ce que vous pensez faire dans l'intérêt de la paix, que votre Excellence lui a dit être l'objet principal de la sollicitude de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français, laquelle l'est aussi de son propre Gouvernement, et pour le prompt rétablissement de laquelle M. de la Cour et lui se sont concertés pour soumettre, comme en effet ils ont soumis, aux Ministres du Sultan une proposition spéciale adoptée par les deux Cabinets de Londres et de Paris. Je suis chargé d'expliquer à votre Excellence la nature de cette proposition, dont, au reste, il est à supposer qu'elle a déjà une connaissance complète, et de lui rappeler que, d'après les instructions adressées à Lord Stratford, la dite proposition est susceptible de telles modifications qui seraient propres à la faire accepter de part et d'autre. L'Ambassadeur, prêt à s'entendre avec votre Excellence sur cet affaire, serait charmé de s'éclairer aux lumières que le Représentant Français serait sans doute à même d'y répandre, soit pour engager la Porte à entendre raison d'après

les bases déjà communiquées, soit pour chercher à l'amener, dans le même but, sur un terrain mieux adapté aux circonstances. Enfin, l'Ambassadeur, sensible à l'importance de ne pas perdre un temps précieux, prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien l'aider de sa confiance pour fixer la ligne qu'il aurait à suivre dans l'intérêt de la paix et de l'indépendance de la Porte sans perdre l'avantage d'un concours aussi agréable et aussi efficace que celui de la France."

You will read what precedes to M. le General Baraguay d'Hilliers, giving him time, as you go on, to make his remarks or communications as he may please.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 424.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, November* 20, 1853.

HAVING thoroughly and without reserve explained to Reshid Pasha your Excellency's instruction of this day's date, his Highness replied that the speech pronounced by the Sultan, in answer to the French Ambassador, was drawn up by himself (Reshid Pasha), and by introducing "that at present every kind of arrangement is inadmissible without a total abandonment of the pretensions put forward by Russia," he expressed the resolution of his principal colleagues, and his Sovereign's. What he means by the pretensions of Russia, is "the demand of the Emperor to interfere in the religious matters of the Greek Church and its clergy."

With respect to the memorandum, Reshid Pasha repeated again that it would be a mere paper of remarks, without any formality or official character.

Reshid Pasha appears to be most certain that the note will not be accepted, even with alterations; and he cannot induce his Sovereign to accept it without acting against his conscience, and without endangering the independence of his country. The Porte wishes for peace, added he, on condition that Russia will abandon all her former demands, and evacuate immediately the Principalities. Should your Excellency think that he (Reshid Pasha) is an obstacle to the success of the new proposition, you have but to express the wish, and you will find him most willing to tender his resignation at once. Perhaps, added he, his successor will take another view of the matter.

With reference to the want of consideration manifested towards Her Majesty's Government and your Lordship on this occasion, Reshid Pasha protests against such a charge, and begs to observe that none of the Turkish Ministers ever evinced so much respect, deference, and consideration, both towards your Government and yourself in particular.

This is word for word what Reshid Pasha told me to be reported to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 424.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, November* 20, 1853.

IN obedience to your Excellency's instruction of this day's date I waited upon the French Ambassador, and after acquainting him with my position in the service of Her Majesty's Embassy I proceeded to make him the communication contained in the said instruction, and have now the honour to report the result of my interview.

His Excellency, having listened to what I had to tell him, requested me to convey his compliments to your Lordship, and say that you will find him always ready to act in concert with you on every occasion, except in the present one. His predecessor, continued he, was instructed to communicate the proposition in question to the Sultan's Ministers, and after acquitting himself of his mission he reported to his Government the result of his representations. Consequently, under these considerations, he does not think himself authorized to enter into communication with the Porte upon this subject, unless he received special instructions to pursue the same line as M. de la Cour.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 425.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 352.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 21, 1853.

HAVING in a former despatch transmitted to your Lordship a copy of the official letter, by which the Hospodar of Wallachia had apprised Reshid Pasha of his retirement, I have now the honour to forward herewith, in copy, a similar letter received by the Ottoman Minister from Prince Ghyka, the Hospodar of Moldavia.

The Porte's letters confirming its previous order for the retirement of both Princes had not been received by them before their departure from the Principalities. Reshid Pasha has informed me of his intention to forward them to their Highnesses, wherever they are to be found.

My instructions to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy have shared the fate of the Porte's despatches; Said Pasha, Governor of Rustchouk, to whom the latter were addressed, having returned them, stating that the Russian authorities in Wallachia would not allow him to send them on.

I have made another attempt to get the instructions delivered to Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner, by sending them to Mr. Cunningham, at Galatz.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—A copy of the last letter received from Prince Stirbey by Reshid Pasha, is also inclosed.

Inclosure 1 in No. 425.

Prince Ghyka to Reshid Pasha.

Monseigneur, *Jassy, le 14 Octobre*, 1853.

LA fausse position dans laquelle m'ont placé les événements d'un ordre majeur, ayant fini par devenir incompatible avec l'état actuel des choses, j'ai cru de mon devoir de résigner mes pouvoirs entre les mains du Conseil Administratif et de m'absenter du pays. En informant de cette démarche votre Altesse, et en la priant de la soumettre au pied du Trône de Sa Majesté le Sultan, j'ose espérer qu'elle appréciera les motifs de ma conduite, et qu'elle voudra bien me conserver dans tous les cas la bienveillance dont elle m'a constamment honoré.

Je crois de mon devoir, en même temps, de donner connaissance à votre Altesse que je fixerai provisoirement ma residence à Vienne.

Daignez, &c.
(Signé) G. GHYKA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 425.

Prince Stirbey to Reshid Pasha.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 295.]

No. 426.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 10.*)

(No. 354.)

Therapia, November 24, 1853.

My Lord,

THE audience at which General Baraguay d'Hilliers delivered his credentials to the Sultan, afforded an opportunity for presenting the admirals and captains of the French squadron now here, and the manner in which His Majesty received them appears to have been quite satisfactory. Conceiving it desirable that Vice-Admiral Dundas, and the officers under his command, should also present their respects to the Sultan, I applied for an audience, which was immediately granted.

It was not without a feeling of national pride that I performed the duty of presenting to the Turkish Emperor so many gallant officers bearing Her Majesty's Commission, and called to Constantinople, under circumstances of unprecedented importance, for the protection of rights unjustly assailed, and in vindication of those great principles on which the tranquillity of Europe in a great measure reposes.

Reshid Pasha assisted at the presentation, accompanied by the Chief Dragoman of the Porte, and the Master of the Ceremonies.

In addressing the Sultan, according to the practice of this Court, I took occasion to remind His Majesty of those essential objects to which the Queen and Government of England principally looked in giving him so signal a proof of their cordial sympathy and concurrence.

I endeavoured, in particular, to direct his thoughts towards an early restoration of peace under all the advantages of his present position; and I felt more deeply the obligation of doing so, in consequence of the language which His Majesty had been advised to hold on that subject to my colleague, the French Ambassador.

The substance of my address is faithfully recorded in the accompanying memorandum; and the words with which His Majesty honoured me in reply, are also inclosed herewith on the authority of the Minister who attended.

The Sultan gave a most affable reception to the whole party, and expressed in gracious terms the pleasure he felt in seeing them, distinguishing Vice-Admiral Dundas by the inquiries which he particularly addressed to him.

After the officers had retired I saw the Sultan in private, and availed myself of the opportunity, as I had previously done with Reshid Pasha, who interpreted between us, to press the arguments which I had already employed in favour of peace. Whatever impression I may have made on His Majesty's mind,—and his manner encouraged some hope in that respect, especially on the score of humanity, and of the approach of winter,—his language was in complete accordance with that of his Minister. Peace, indeed, was desirable, but his rights were to be maintained, and he threw himself altogether on his Council. When I asked His Majesty whether he had in view the Council of Ministers, or the General Council, his answer was, Both. When I proposed that Reshid should be authorized to confer privately with me and the French Ambassador, as to the practicability of framing a sound plan of arrangement out of the existing elements, the idea was not rejected; neither was it distinctly accepted. When I reminded His Majesty of what I had so often urged as to internal improvements, productive of benefit to all classes of his subjects, the answer was one of acquiescence; but not, I think, such as I was entitled to expect.

Although my conversation with the Sultan lasted some time, I could only repeat the arguments which had been previously submitted to him in writing; and it is but just to bear in mind, that His Majesty's position is one of unusual delicacy, not exempt from contingencies of greater embarrassment, and even of personal danger.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 426.

Speech addressed to the Sultan by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

IN presenting to your Imperial Majesty the admiral and captains of the squadron which my gracious Sovereign has sent at your Majesty's request, and in concert with the Emperor of the French, Her Majesty's powerful ally, to protect the rights and independence of this friendly Empire, I perform a duty honourable and gratifying alike to them and to me.

Their presence here at so extraordinary a juncture shows how wisely your Majesty, and your Majesty's Government, have appreciated the friendship, and relied upon the sympathies of the British nation.

Such binding and generous sentiments derive no small accession from the just and enlightened benevolence displayed in your Majesty's administrative policy. It is not only to the successful maintenance of a great European principle, that the British Government look for the reward of any sacrifice which they may have to make in contributing to the protection of Turkey from unprovoked aggression. They look with equal steadiness to the prosperity and strength which your Majesty could not fail to realize throughout your extensive dominions by carrying into effect a system of improvement, complete though gradual, towards all classes and interests of your Majesty's subjects.

Still, their unrelinquished hope, and the more immediate aim of their effective concurrence, is peace; not, indeed, an illusive or precarious peace, but one which, by simple means, would fix on safe and honourable grounds, without injustice to any other Power, the rights of your Majesty's sovereignty and the independence of your Majesty's Empire.

To obtain such a peace at the earliest practicable moment is always, I must presume, the anxious desire of your Majesty, as it is the point most earnestly recommended by your Majesty's allies. I should be happy to learn that it is also an object duly appreciated, and strenuously promoted, in a spirit of continued moderation by your Majesty's Ministers.

Inclosure 2 in No. 426.

Answer of the Sultan to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

JE commence par remercier l'Ambassadeur de m'avoir procuré le plaisir de voir l'Amiral et Messieurs les officiers de son escadre.

Dans les circonstances actuelles la présence de la flotte Anglaise ici sous le commandement d'un Amiral si distingué, étant une preuve patente de l'amitié de Sa Majesté la Reine de la Grande Bretagne, ma puissante alliée, je prie l'Ambassadeur de vouloir bien lui en exprimer mes sentiments de réconnaissance.

L'Angleterre ayant montré dans maintes circonstances de nombreuses marques de bienveillance à l'égard de mon Empire, je ne doute pas qu'elle ne repousse par tous les moyens les prétensions injustes de la Russie qui toucheraient à mon indépendance et à mes droits souverains, et le monde entier verra quels avantages immenses peuvent résulter d'une Puissance forte et bienveillante comme l'Angleterre, et de la sympathie d'un peuple juste, éclairé, et généreux comme la nation Anglaise.

Quant à la paix, mon Gouvernement la désire autant que les autres, mais tout autant qu'elle serait honorable et compatible avec mes droits souverains.

Pour ce qui regarde les améliorations intérieures et la prospérité de mes sujets, son Excellence est plus à même que personne de connaître mes sentiments à cet égard.

No. 427.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 10.*)

(No. 357.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 24, 1853.*

IN a confidential, I might almost say a private, certainly an unofficial form, the Ministerial Council has consigned to writing explicitly, and, as I am assured, without reserve, its opinions,—the individual opinions of its members,—on the subject of that pacific proposition which was lately presented to them by me through Reshid Pasha. I have written so fully elsewhere on the whole question in its present stage, that I purposely abstain from troubling your Lordship with any observations on the contents of the inclosed paper. I beg only to state that it has been read, and, I presume, approved by the Sultan. Let me add, that although drawn up more particularly for my information, in answer to a memorandum of mine already transmitted to your Lordship, it has been, or is to be, communicated to the French Embassy also.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 427.

Turkish Memorandum.

(Traduit du Turc.)

L'EXCELLENT mémoire sur les bienfaits de la paix et le projet de note relativement à la question actuelle ont été pris en sérieuse considération dans le Conseil.

Les méditations philosophiques et les observations judicieuses que le mémoire renferme, étant une production d'un homme dont les talents et les rares qualités sont bien connus à tout le monde, elles ont mérité l'approbation de ceux qui étaient présents au Conseil.

Et, en effet, la guerre n'est pas une chose à désirer; elle nuit à l'industrie et au commerce, elle trouble la tranquillité générale, et elle empêche, ne fusse que pour peu de temps, la propagation de la société; et puis aussi, elle cause d'effusion du sang—ce qui répugne à l'humanité. Il n'y a pas donc de doute que c'est un devoir sacré pour les hommes de bon sens, et particulièrement pour les employés d'un Gouvernement de l'empêcher—devoir digne de toute leur attention. Aussi la Sublime Porte, agissant dans les différends qu'elle a avec la Cour de Russie, d'une manière pacifique et avec modération, et tandis qu'elle n'avait aucun devoir à remplir envers cette Cour, a-t-elle, au commencement de ces différends, montré de la disposition à faire quelques sacrifices, et cela uniquement dans l'intention franche et sincère d'éviter la guerre et de maintenir de paix.

Mais la Cour de Russie n'a pas suivi la même ligne de conduite; et d'un côté, induisant en erreur les Cabinets des Grandes Puissances, et de l'autre, faisant à la Sublime Porte des propositions inadmissibles, a fait naître l'état actuel des choses, et la Sublime Porte s'est trouvée obligée de recourir aux armes.

Bien qu'il soit possible, au moyen de quelques amendements à faire au projet d'arrangement qui vient d'être présenté, de faire quelque chose d'approchant aux premières idées de la Sublime Porte, comment est-il possible de donner, après que la guerre a éclaté, une chose qu'on avait imaginée uniquement pour conserver la paix? C'est la Russie qui a mis en avant, sans motif et injustement, des demandes choquants, lesquelles

touchaient à l'autorité de la Sublime Porte dans ses bases, et qui, après cela, foulant aux pieds les Traités existants, a envahi les deux Principautés. Plus tard aussi, rejetant l'arrangement pacifique qui a été présenté, elle a levé le voile qui cachait depuis quelque temps ses mauvaises intentions, et c'est encore elle qui a par là mis chaque chose à découvert, comme tout le monde sait.

La Sublime Porte, voyant que de jour en jour les causes qui mettaient en danger son indépendance et son autorité sacrée acquéraient plus de force, s'est trouvée dans la nécessité de soulever toute la nation; elle s'est décidée aussi à faire tant de frais immenses; et à présent, l'affaire a pris une tout autre couleur. Or, dans cet état de choses, il ne sera pas possible de concilier quelque concession à faire aujourd'hui, en remettant la question sur le pied sur lequel elle se trouvait il y a quelques mois, et comme si aucune de toutes ces choses n'était arrivée, concession qu'on ne pouvait même alors faire qu'à contre-cœur, avec les droits de la Sublime Porte: et par conséquent, nul ne pourra montrer de la disposition à faire cette concession.

Quoique l'on puisse dire que les phrases en question offrent l'assurance que par une telle concession la Russie n'aura acquis aucun nouveau droit, et que la Sublime Porte, non plus, n'aura fait aucun nouveau sacrifice, comme toutefois la Russie prétend que ses demandes découleraient des dispositions des anciens Traités, il est clair que ce fait, aux yeux de la Porte, est de nature à lui ôter, d'une manière encore plus forte, toute espèce de sûreté.

Le Traité de Kainardji ne consacre que la seule promesse de protéger la religion Chrétienne en général et les églises qui lui appartiennent; et c'est pour cela que les Puissances alliées et bienveillantes ont avoué avec la Sublime Porte, que cette stipulation ne peut servir de fondement aux privilèges que la Russie demande en faveur de la religion Grecque. En présence de ce fait, personne ne peut douter que l'auteur du mémoire susmentionné, ce personage qui peut-être, à juste titre, qualifiée de la justice personifiée, sera le premier à convenir qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité de donner à la Cour de Russie une note rélativement à la question des privilèges religieux.

En un mot, comme la Cour de Russie a manifesté clairement ses intentions et sa théorie touchant les sujets Ottomans qui professent la religion Grecque, la Sublime Porte doit, car cela est de la plus grande importance, se tenir bien sur ses gardes quant à tout ce qui peut fournir le moindre prétexte à une influence pratique et despotique. Et il est clair que si elle agissait contrairement à ce principe, d'abord, elle ferait un affront aux diverses classes de ses sujets, et puis elle aurait par là mis de sa propre main fin à son existence.

Quant à la nécessité dont on parle, il est impossible que la Sublime Porte viole dans ces temps-ci des privilèges religieux qu'elle a, même dans les anciens temps, respectés d'autant plus qu'elle a, naguères, donné des firmans qui confirment les privilèges spirituels de chaque nation, et qui ont été publiés partout. Après cela il ne devrait plus rester aucun doute à cet égard. Cela étant, donner à la Russie une note séparée pour les privilèges de la religion Grecque, c'est pour sûr lui faire gagner quelque chose, ne fusse que d'une manière sous entendue. D'après cette considération, la Sublime Porte ne fait point difficulté de donner à toutes les Grandes Puissances, la Russie y comprise des assurances qu'elle conservera à jamais aux communautés des Chrétiens qui sont ses sujets leurs privilèges religieux; mais elle déclare franchement à ses alliés qu'elle est justifiée à ne pouvoir donner spécialement à la Cour de Russie, aucune espèce d'assurances, ni trop ni peu.

A l'occasion de l'arrangement de la question des lieux saints, il y a eu des plaintes contre quelques personnes qui auraient mal agi dans cette affaire. Entre autres personnes supposé même que les plaintes dont elles étaient les objets étaient fondées, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a donné sa démission pour faire plaisir à la Cour de Russie. Or, tandis qu'il serait possible de montrer plus d'attentions encore pour calmer sa mauvaise humeur, était-ce agir équitablement que de se montrer peu satisfaite d'attentions, et de mettre en avant une foule de demandes qui

étaient de nature à usurper les droits de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte; c'est-à-dire, d'opposer à affaire qui pourrait être arrangée avec une satisfaction, des demandes telles que celles qu'elle a faites?

De tout ce qui a été dit plus haut, il est facile de tirer la conséquence que si la Sublime Porte a pris le parti de faire la guerre, ce n'a été ni par l'envie du Conseil Général de faire une guerre sans motif, ni pour faire acquérir de la renommée aux troupes Ottomanes; la guerre a été entreprise uniquement pour maintenir, dans toute leur intégrité, l'indépendance et les droits de souveraineté de la Sublime Porte, qui n'avait pas pu accorder ce que la Russie demandait; et cette mesure a réuni les suffrages de tout le monde, à commencer de Sa Majesté le Sultan, notre gracieux Souverain et maître, jusqu'aux Ministres Oulemas, militaires, tous les employés en général, et toute la nation. Plus encore, les sujets de la Sublime Porte qui professent d'autres religions, sont aussi d'accord avec le Gouvernement, et des offres de service arrivent de tous côtés. Même les sujets, à l'exception d'une petite partie qui est soupçonnée de pencher, dans leur aveuglement né de leur fanatisme, pour la Russie, sont pour le Gouvernement. Enfin, cette question étant pour la Sublime Porte une question vitale, tous sont prêts à sacrifier leur fortune et leur vie pour le triomphe de la cause du Sultan. Telle étant nôtre position, le Ministère n'osé pas prendre sur lui un mode d'accommodement, quand même cet accommodement serait conforme à sa propre manière de voir: il est obligé, comme tout le monde sait, de le soumettre au Conseil Général.

Le fait est que dans la disposition actuelle des esprits, il faut pour pouvoir soumettre au Conseil Général un mode d'accommodement qui puisse contenter la Russie, un des trois motifs suivants: 1. Donner raison aux Russes dans leurs demandes. 2. Dieu garde! n'avoir pas du succès à la guerre. 3. Que les Puissances insistent à ce que nous l'acceptions. Si dans le Conseil Général on fait des questions sur le premier motif, il faudra naturellement répéter ce qu'on a toujours dit savoir—que les Russes n'ont pas raison. Lorsqu'on fera des questions sur les évènements de la guerre, la réponse sera que, Dieu soit loué, jusqu'à présent il n'y a que des succès et ces succès seront détaillés. Quant au troisième point, attendu que les Puissances ont donné raison à la Sublime Porte, et que, comme preuve matérielle de leur amitié, leurs flottes se trouvent dans le Bosphore, personne ne pourra croire qu'elles feront une pareille proposition. Or, quelle serait alors la position du Ministère? il est très facile de concevoir leur embarras.

La résolution que la Porte a prise ne veut pas dire qu'elle préfère la guerre à la paix; et les détails susénoncés ne veulent pas dire non plus qu'elle manque de déférence pour les conseils de ses amis et alliés. Mais, vû que dans ce monde il n'y a rien de plus cher que l'indépendance, ses droits, et la patrie, et que celui qui tombe dans un malheur en connait l'étendue bien mieux qu'un autre, la Sublime Porte, considérant le point auquel cette question est parvenue, se propose, avec l'aide de Dieu, de se délivrer tout-à-fait des empiètements despotiques et systématiques de la Russie; et cette intention elle la déclare sans déguisement.

Les forces matérielles de la Turquie ne sont pas considérées comme étant égales à celles de la Russie: mais l'histoire est là pour faire voir comment de petits Etats ont réussi, avec leur énergie et leurs efforts, à se débarrasser de leurs ennemis, et à sauver la patrie et son indépendance; et comme la justice est du côté de la Sublime Porte, elle espère des bontés du ciel réussir aussi.

Comme la Sublime Porte ne se refuse pas à une paix conforme à sa dignité, à ses droits, et à ses intérêts, il ne sera pas convenable, après tout ce qui s'est passé, et après tant des sacrifices, de proposer à la Sublime Porte de donner une note à la Russie; ce qui serait une chose additionnelle à la condition onéreuse de renouveler les Traités abolis. Il y va de la dignité des Cours alliées de supprimer tout à fait le point des privilèges religieux, point qui est la source des contestations actuelles.

Si l'on propose donc un projet de paix qui ne parlerait pas de privilèges religeux, et qui aurait pour base l'évacuation des Principautés de Valachie et de Moldavie, alors la Sublime Porte, faisant les sacrifices nécessaires dans les choses dans lesquelles elle se considère aujourd'hui

comme ayant raison, et que naturellement elle désire, elle donnera aux Cours ses alliées sincères de nouvelles preuves de déférence et d'égards.

Après tout ce que se passe, la sécurité que le Gouvernement Ottoman demande ne consiste pas dans une promesse que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie s'ingérera point des affaires de la Sublime Porte, et il est clair qu'il ne peut pas l'accepter, car l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman étant sur le même pied que celle de l'Empire Russe, et l'un et l'autre étant privés du droit de s'ingérer réciproquement de leurs affaires des assurances à cet égard renfermeraient le sens que le Gouvernement Russe pourrait se mêler des affaires de la Turquie, mais que par générosité il ne le fera pas.

Auparavant, les assurances qu'on demandait de la Russie se bornaient à ceci, savoir: que les Russes ne se mêleraient point des affaires religieuses Grecques; mais comme les assurances en contestation ont été mises de côté, ce point n'a plus d'objet.

Quoiqu'il en soit, ce que la Sublime Porte désire principalement c'est la conclusion, entre elle et les grands Puissances, d'un nouveau Traité qui complète celui de l'an 1841, relativement aux Détroits. C'est là une mesure que la Sublime Porte demande et sollicite de ses alliés, parceque le nouveau Traité mettra le comble à la parfaite sécurité qui sera commune à toutes les Parties par rapport aux Traités généraux existants avec les Puissances; seul moyen de garantie pour la Sublime Porte à l'égard de la Valachie et de Moldavie, soit à d'autres égards.

L'opinion que le Gouvernement Ottoman pense à entrainer l'Angleterre et la France dans la guerre, est inadmissible. Personne n'a le pouvoir de faire tenir à ces deux Grandes Puissances une conduite contraire à leur manière de voir et à leur volonté; voilà ce qu'il y a de bien certain. Seulement, comme ces deux Hautes Puissances ont vu dès le début de la question que la Porte a raison et la Russie tort, et que, guidée par les sentiments de cette justice qui les caractérise, elles se sont mises dans l'attitude de donner des secours à la Sublime Porte, moralement et matériellement, et celà dans le double but de la préserver de tout préjudice, et de maintenir la balance politique, la Sublime Porte espère avec raison que cette position bienveillante se maintiendra jusqu'à la conclusion de la question, et que ces deux Puissances, les plus fortes du monde, et ces deux nations généreuses, continueront toujours de secourir la partie injustement traitée.

La Sublime Porte se voit dans l'obligation de déclarer de nouveau à la fin de ce mémoire, ce qui suit; après tant de faits qui ont eu lieu, non pas donner à la Russie, dans quelque forme que ce soit, des assurances relatives à la question des privilèges religieux, mais même faire mention de cette question, en passant, c'est lui donner du relief, et, en quelque façon, servir ses intérêts, et, au contraire, sacrifier la dignité de la Sublime Porte.

Comme il sera de toute impossibilité à la Sublime Porte d'écrire un seul mot concernant les privilèges religieux des Grecs, ni dans la note, ni dans le Traité, ni enfin dans un papier quelconque, et que ses bonnes dispositions à conclure la paix sont tout-à-fait subordonnées à la suppression complète du mot "privilège," quelques propositions qu'on puisse lui faire ayant trait à des privilèges, seront rejetées. Et comme aussi de pareils modes d'accommodement sont désormais impossibles, si l'on désire le retour de la paix, il faudra faire un nouveau Traité conçu d'une manière conforme aux intentions bienveillantes que les Cours alliées ont de tout temps exprimées touchant le maintien des droits, de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité territoriale de cet Empire; et qui s'accorde avec la dignité, les droits, et les véritables intérêts de la Sublime Porte.

Il est également clair qu'il ne sera pas convenable de proposer à la Sublime Porte de quitter les armes, avant qu'elle ait acquis l'assurance positive que l'objet qu'elle a en vue sera obtenu.

No. 428.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 358.)

Therapia, November 24, 1853.

My Lord,

IN other parts of my correspondence, prepared for transmission to England, I have stated my recent proceedings, and their results, with a degree of fulness trying to your Lordship's patience; and I have done so under a strong sense of the disappointment which my total want of success, however unavoidable, will probably occasion to Her Majesty's Government.

It remains for me to complete the performance of my duty, by explaining the position in which the Porte is placed, as being the main cause of our present difficulties, and by offering some obvious conjectures as to our future prospects in this complicated affair.

Moderation and firmness are the two principles of conduct which the Porte has been most assiduously advised to maintain in the course of her differences with Russia. She has exhibited the former to a striking degree from the time of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum to the publication of her final manifesto. She has displayed the latter most particularly in rejecting the note of Vienna without modifications, and in collecting her means of defence with an amount of energy, good order, and perseverance not easily surpassed.

The great test of her moderation was the course pursued by Her Government when a Russian army crossed her frontier, and insultingly occupied the Principalities. A respectful protest, and a confiding appeal to Europe, were her substitutes for a declaration of war. But half her duty would have been neglected, if, while she gave time for negotiation, she had not provided for the contingency of a failure, by preparing the means of an efficient armed resistance against Russia. Her allies might well have complained, if the Sultan had betrayed a weak indifference to his own cause, and thrown the whole burthen of its vindication on their shoulders.

The Ottoman Ministers, in carrying out the policy prescribed to them, alike by interest and by duty, roused, of necessity, a strong national feeling throughout the Empire; and at the same time, a general expectation that unusual sacrifices would be followed by an adequate return. Among the Mahometans, as your Lordship knows, a patriotic is always more or less a religious sentiment, and the Porte could hardly be expected to restrain the fanaticism of its adherents without directing their zeal to some distinct object of national desire. It was no longer thought enough to resist any specific pretensions of Russia. The mortifying ascendancy of that Power was to be shaken off altogether, and the independence of the Empire to be placed once for all on a level with that of its neighbour. A concurrence of circumstances, originating in the presumption and duplicity of Russia, appeared to favour this very natural ambition, and the united sympathies of the Government, the army, and the people, excited no doubt by the partizans of a war policy, had only to be acted upon with spirit in order to repress all dissensions in the Cabinet, and to avert the danger, whatever may have been its degree, of a popular outbreak. The personal antagonism of Reshid Pasha and the Seraskier no longer disturbs the administration; the former has gained a large accession of popularity, and also of the Sultan's favour; and His Majesty, to all appearance, has accepted frankly the decision of his people as expressed with unanimity by the General Council some two months ago.

If, then, it was true that circumstances for which the Porte is not answerable, naturally brought on a state of things, imparting force, unity, and direction to a general sentiment, laudable in itself, and offering, when adopted by the Government, much advantage and convenience to the Sultan and to his leading Ministers, it is hardly surprising that with considerable armies on the frontier, the squadrons of England and France on the Bosphorus, a pervading enthusiasm in their favour, and some unexpected successes in battle, the Sultan and his Cabinet should receive with reluctance and dislike any proposition invested with the badge of their old inferiority towards

Russia, and calculated to disappoint the hopes of the nation, and with the overthrow of their popularity, to expose them to most serious embarrassments.

It may be alleged with truth, and I have striven to impress the truth in every form of language on their minds, that however natural such sentiments may be, their indulgence on the present occasion is neither just, nor wise, nor humane, seeing that the original difference can now be settled on safe and honourable grounds with every moral and political advantage on the Sultan's side, while an unnecessary continuance of hostilities would involve the most perilous hazards, the most exhausting sacrifices, a vast effusion of blood, and, more than possibly, the horrors of a general war.

Unfortunately, the motives to forbearance are thrown into the shade by the dazzling illusions of hope, and passion is in league with occasion to merge all fears of danger and all considerations of prudence in a wild, though attractive speculation, difficult, at best, to realize, and of which even the accomplishment would not be unattended with formidable drawbacks.

I question whether at all times Reshid himself is entirely free from these delusive influences, though, to do justice both to him and to his colleagues, they still profess a willingness to seek no further advantage from war than a relinquishment of Russia's religious pretensions, and of the notes prepared to embody them. In their hearts they may aspire to arrangements calculated to secure them from future disturbance, and they would gladly put forward claims to a new disposition in the Provinces, to the recognition of Circassian independence, and to the reimbursement of their military expenses. But deference to the advice of their allies would prevail with them to forego such notions, and their cooler aspirations would, I think, be satisfied with a renewal in clear and comprehensive terms of the formal declarations and Treaties already existing in favour of the Porte. What they never cease to insist upon is a clear and unquestionable deliverance from Russian interference applied to spiritual matters. They are persuaded that silence would be the best and safest form of accomplishing that purpose, and they are now bent upon excluding every kind of note, however carefully expressed, as liable to offend their own people, and to afford a dangerous opening for what they presume to be the real designs of Russia.

This apprehension is, I fear, but too well justified by the late proceedings of the Russian Cabinet, and after so many sacrifices forced upon Turkey by that Power, it is but fair that the Porte should be secured from further molestation on the same score, not only virtually, but in a form and manner calculated to leave no room for mistake upon the subject either here or elsewhere.

Should the Emperor of Russia, acting in the spirit of his new manifesto, after giving the lie publicly to his neighbour, and supporting by force of arms his usurpation in the Principalities, decline a form of arrangement accepted by the Porte, and recommended by her allies, your Lordship would probably agree with the Ottoman Ministers in thinking that a wider range would then be opened for diplomatic views, as well as for military operations.

Most sincerely do I deprecate the occurrence of any such case, and no exertion will be wanting on my part, under the guidance of your Lordship's instructions, to dissuade the Porte from wantonly bringing on a necessity of the kind. But should it so happen that Russia herself continues to be the obstacle to a pacific arrangement, the interests of international security, no less than those of Turkish independence, will probably be found to require exertions and remedies little short of those which the more sanguine Mahomedans already contemplate.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 429.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 359.) *Therapia, November* 24, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE already stated in a previous part of my correspondence the reply given by Reshid Pasha to my inquiry as to the commencement of hostilities on the Danube before the expiry of the term appointed for their suspension.

In obedience to your Lordship's instructions, I have now to add that a similar inquiry was rendered necessary by a report which had reached me from Trebizond, to the effect that hostilities had been commenced on the Asiatic frontier after the order of suspension had been received by the Pasha in command.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs assured me in reply, that I had been misinformed, and that the first act of hostility had been committed by the officer commanding the advanced post, before the Commander-in-chief on that side could possibly transmit to him the orders of his Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 360.) *Therapia, November* 24, 1853.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith in copy is a letter which I addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas at the time of its date, in concert with M. de la Cour, who addressed a similar application to Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

The latter objected to taking any measure in measure in consequence of M. de la Cour's requisition, as a new Ambassador was appointed and expected to arrive from day to day.

General Baraguay d'Hilliers, to whom I mentioned the circumstance soon after his arrival, communicated with Admiral Hamelin, and informed me that he experienced some difficulty in joining in the measure on account of his having fewer steam-vessels at his disposal than the British Commander-in-chief.

It so happened that the original object of the proposed excursion had been unavoidably delayed by the return of my despatches to Bucharest and Jassy.

This circumstance enabled me to acquiesce without difficulty in the French Admiral's objection; but I replied to the Ambassador, that although I thought it desirable for the first appearance of any of our ships in the Black Sea, that one at least from each nation should be present, yet that I should feel myself obliged to send for Her Majesty's Consuls, whenever they were known to be at Varna, even if the French Commander were still unable to detach one of his steam-vessels in company with ours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 430.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Constantinople, November* 11, 1853.

THE French Ambassador agrees with me in thinking it desirable, the squadrons being now united here, that measures should be forthwith taken for visiting Bourgas, Varna, and other places on the European coast of the Black Sea between the mouths of the Danube and the entrance of the Bosphorus.

In requesting that you will communicate with the French Admiral in order to direct the performance of this service in concert with him, I have to inform you that according to official advices received from Sulina under date of the 5th instant, "four large Russian Government steamers" had arrived there and were "lying at anchor in the roads outside the bar." It is added in Mr. Lloyd's report that "a large Russian steamer" had also arrived there, and left again after discharging a cargo of cannon and ammunition, and that a small steamer and a gun-boat were still there.

I infer from the same report that British commercial shipping is exposed to much embarrassment, danger, and loss, from the want of water at the bar of the Sulina passage, and you will be the best judge whether any vessels sent in that direction can be instructed, as I hope, to assist them, without prejudice to the more urgent necessities of Her Majesty's service.

Despatches from Varna of the 6th instant state that on that day a large steamer, supposed to be Russian, had looked into the harbour, and that two others had been seen in the offing.

I mention these circumstances in order to assist your judgment as to the rank and force of the vessels, English and French, which it may be advisable to send out on this occasion.

You are aware that Her Majesty's Government are anxious to remain at peace with Russia, and that the employment of force, except for the protection of any Turkish territory attacked, or threatened with a direct attack, by Russia, would involve the commanding officer in a most serious responsibility.

In conclusion, I have to request that you will give directions for the conveyance hither of Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy on board any vessel that you may select to receive them at Varna, together with their respective families and attendants.

They were to proceed to Varna under instructions from me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 431.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 362.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 24, 1853.

THE Austrian Internuncio sent his interpreter yesterday to put me in possession of a despatch[a] addressed to him on the 11th instant by Count Buol de Schauenstein, and communicated by his Excellency this morning to Reshid Pasha.

Though your Lordship is no doubt in possession of this despatch, I nevertheless inclose a copy of it herewith. I am informed that Baron de Bruck has not pressed for an immediate answer to his Government's proposal, but intimates an intention of waiting for further communication with his colleagues, requesting that Count Buol's despatch may in the mean time be submitted, I suppose confidentially, to the Council.

The Porte's unwillingness to accept your Lordship's proposition had already induced me to reflect upon other means of arriving at a pacific

[a] Inclosure in No. 365.

solution, and the receipt this afternoon of your Lordship's instructions to the 8th instant confirm me in that course of proceeding.

Whilst waiting for the draft of a Treaty, which your Lordship authorizes me to expect, I shall take occasion to communicate with Baron de Bruck and our two colleagues of France and Prussia, continuing at the same time to dispose the minds of Reshid Pasha and the other Ottoman Ministers to the adoption of some practicable arrangement for the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 432.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(Private and Confidential.)

Therapia, November 25, 1853.

My dear Lord,

I AM not without hopes of having at last detected symptoms of a change in Reshid Pasha's mind, tending towards an adoption of our views. Since my audience of the Sultan I have sent Mr. Pisani to go over the several points, of which, in some way or other, any pacific arrangement under present circumstances must necessarily be composed. Last night I gave Mr. Alison a similar but more urgent commission, thinking to take advantage of any impression produced by the Austrian proposal, and the pacific language of the French Ambassador, and also to increase any such impression by an intimation of the plan which I had just received from your Lordship.

It would be idle at present to enter into particulars, even if I had time to do so. Reshid, according to Mr. Alison's account, continued to defend his own views and those of his colleagues with much spirit and feeling; but it was evident that he felt himself at a disadvantage, and could not entirely exclude the necessity of giving some kind of assurance, however guarded and curtailed, on the subject of religious privileges. He concluded by promising in the most private manner that he would sound the individual inclinations of his colleagues, and talk the matter over with me in its details.

Your Lordship will remember that nothing can be adopted without the General Council, and that to obtain their consent the national feeling must be consulted.

I wished, and indeed intended, to send off my present despatches to your Lordship on an earlier day. But the difficulties of bringing over the Porte's negative to a clear conclusion, without prejudice to the future, brought me so near the arrival and departure of the ordinary messenger, that I thought it, finally, better to forward my present correspondence by him, and to reserve for an express steamer to Marseilles that more satisfactory conclusion which I now hope, though with very imperfect confidence, to obtain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 433.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 10.)

(No. 437.)

Vienna, December 6, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing herewith a copy of the letter which, as organ of the Conference, I have addressed to Lord Stratford, transmitting to him the note to Reshid Pasha, signed by the Four Representatives, and requesting him, in conjunction with his colleagues, to present it to that Minister.

I have had the honour of announcing to your Lordship the transmission of this despatch in a telegraphic message forwarded this morning, a copy of which is herewith inclosed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 433.

The Earl of Westmorland to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,

Vienna, December 5, 1853.

MY colleagues, the Members of the Conference assembled here, under the instructions of our respective Governments, having, together with myself, affixed our signatures to the note which we have been directed to address to his Excellency Reshid Pasha, have requested me to be their organ in placing in your Lordship's hands, as the senior Ambassador at the Court of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, the original documents.

My colleagues, Count Buol, Count Arnim, and Baron Bourqueney, desire that the mode in which this note should be submitted to his Excellency Reshid Pasha should be left to be decided by you, in concurrence with your Lordship's colleagues. They would, however, suggest for your consideration, whether, with the view of giving all the importance to this document which, as emanating from the Governments of the Four Powers it is calculated to command, it might not be advisable to ask, in conjunction with your colleagues, an audience of his Excellency, when your Lordship might place the note in his hands, and when they might, together with you, explain the objects of the identical instructions, with reference to this note, which each Representative will have received from his Government.

It is the intention of the Conference, that your Lordship's experience and the high consideration you command should be resorted to in the deliberation which will take place between your Lordship and your colleagues as to the most advisable method to be adopted in carrying this commission into execution.

I have only to add, that I feel great satisfaction in being the channel through which this communication is made to your Lordship, and in forwarding to you this important document.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 2 in No. 433.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Telegraphic.)

Vienna, December 6, 1853.

AT the Conference yesterday for the signature of the documents transmitted to Constantinople, the French and Prussian Ministers remarked, that although they concurred in the desire that the original note addressed to Reshid Pasha should be confided to Lord Stratford, yet they thought it was due to their colleagues, the Representatives of their Governments at Constantinople, that its presentation should take place in their presence in the form agreed to collectively by them. Count Buol agreed that the presentation of the note would acquire greater weight from this manner of proceeding, which was in accordance with the suggestion he had made at the last Conference. I was, therefore, obliged to modify the note to Lord Stratford, which I had drawn up in accordance with the impression I had received at the previous Conference, and which I reported to you in my despatch of the 3rd instant. I forward a copy to you by post of this note as sent yesterday to Constantinople, but I think it essential that you should be informed before my despatch reaches you, that the part of it relating to the presentation of the note should be modified, so as to accord with the suggestion of Count Buol to which I have above referred.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 434.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 676.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 1, 1853.*

I AM very little able to offer your Lordship any details of the various military preparations which are in progress throughout this vast empire, but I am certainly not in error when I state that these arrangements assume the great probability of war being resumed upon an extensive scale in spring, even if its operations should be restricted or put an end to by winter.

My belief is, that as far as regards Asia Minor the seasons will have very little effect upon the war, and I have some reason for expecting that the offensive will very soon be taken by Prince Woronzow's army.

As your Lordship was informed, Prince Woronzow was supposed to be suffering from severe or even dangerous illness, and under this belief his son was sent off to him from St. Petersburgh.

Two days after his departure news arrived here of the Prince's convalescence, and of his having placed himself at the head of his troops.

The frontier which he has to defend being ragged, and of great extent, I am inclined to believe that his views have been approved of here, and that he has been directed to advance upon Kars and Erzeroum.

A person who from his position in the army ought to know what is passing, acquaints me that it has been desired to bring some of the Polish regiments to St. Petersburgh and Moscow, and to garrison the towns of Poland with Russian regiments.

The difficulty with regard to this operation applies just now to all other movements of troops—the great want of forage felt throughout the country in consequence of the long droughts of the summer.

Owing to this cause extensive movements of troops in a country where money is scarce, and which is eaten up by overgrown armies, becomes more than usually ruinous.

I happened the other day to mention to a person in the Russian service the fact, or at least what is stated as a fact, of the nobles of Volhynia and Kieff having presented the Emperor with 1600 oxen for the transport of military stores.

"Nothing," this person replied, "would surprise me less, nor should I wonder if they gave him their horses likewise, for it is hardly possible to maintain them through the winter in consequence of the failure of the hay crops."

Your Lordship will, I do not doubt, have received from Bucharest or Jassy some accounts as to the amount of disaffection shown by the Poles under the orders of Prince Gortchakoff.

I do not venture to do more than allude to circumstances, which although universally spoken of by persons who are not afraid of conversing of public affairs, are related very differently.

I may, however, state to your Lordship, that a general belief exists here, even among the Russians, of Prince Gortchakoff having been betrayed by some Polish officers, who being about his person, and in possession of his secrets, had placed themselves in communication with Omer Pasha, and as is commonly held, at least one of these persons has been brought to St. Petersburgh, and confined at the fortress.

As I before observed, I am unable to vouch for the correctness of this statement, as likewise of another, according to which several Polish officers had declined fighting in a war to which the character of a war of religion had been given, that religion not being theirs.

It is devoutly to be wished that these feelings may pervade the whole Polish army, and that in this manner a just retribution may fall upon those who have given a false colour to one of the most unrighteous wars ever undertaken.

I will only add, that since the preceding part of this despatch was written, I have obtained certain intelligence of the arrest of two Boyards at Bucharest. These two young men having about them what the Russians term incendiary proclamations, were seized and sent off to Bender.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S. Since this despatch was written it has been stated to me with the greatest confidence, that two Polish officers who had been brought here prisoners from Bucharest, were shot yesterday at break of day.

G. H. S.

No. 435.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 679. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 1, 1853.*

MY French colleague informs me that at his last interview with the Chancellor, it appeared to be his Excellency's object to make out that there was some difference of opinion between the English and French Governments, the latter not showing the same disapprobation of Russian acts as Her Majesty's Government had done.

The Marquis de Castelbajac represents himself to have stated that there were no grounds for such a suspicion; that owing to the circumstance of a weekly messenger being sent to the English Mission, Her Majesty's Minister was occasionally a few days in advance of him, but that the accordance of views between the two countries was such, that he was quite ready to consider an English instruction as addressed to himself.

The Chancellor had observed to General de Castelbajac as he did to me, "Qu'il fallait peser un peu moins sur la Russie, et un peu plus sur la Turquie, si l'on cherche une solution amicable."

On two points the General was of opinion that the suggestion might be adopted with advantage. He thought it would be for the Sultan's interests to discountenance active hostilities in Asia Minor; he thought that the evacuation of the Principalities by the Russians should not be made a preliminary condition of peace with Russia, however much desired. Should the point be insisted upon, he was convinced that it would be tantamount to a declaration of war on the part of England and France.

In this respect my own opinion, as I would state to your Lordship, agrees with that of my French colleague: should Her Majesty's Government, however, not insist upon such an evacuation as a preliminary condition, I would venture to submit that merit might be taken for the consideration thus shown for the difficulties of the Emperor's position, and that this very consideration might be made the ground of increased insistance upon His Majesty's acceptance of those terms which the two Allied Cabinets are disposed to grant him.

I alluded in a former despatch to a private letter received by General Castelbajac from the French Minister of War, in which (as I did not state) there was an incidental phrase complimentary to the high character of the Emperor Nicholas.

The Chancellor requested General Castelbajac to permit him to read this letter to His Majesty, observing that as he had been much hurt at the mistrust shown of his word, the letter would prove very acceptable, and adding, as though he were a party to the appeal to be made to his own master, "Cela nous viendra peut-être en aide dans nos tentatives de ramener Sa Majesté à des dispositions plus favorables."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 436.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 680. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 1, 1853.*

I WILL take the liberty of requesting that your Lordship will regard the communication which I am going to have the honour of making to you as strictly confidential.

I am about to speak of two men who from their respective positions are obliged to be extremely cautious, and it is only upon my having given the strongest assurances of secrecy that one of the two has opened himself to me.

On the 29th ultimo I received a friendly summons from the Prussian Envoy, who is confined by illness to his room, when upon going to him he told me that he desired to make me acquainted with the particulars of a highly confidential communication which he had held on the preceding day (the 28th) with the Chancellor.

This conversation, I hasten to say, strikes me as having been brought about by General de Rochow, in consequence of the Imperial autograph letter received by the Emperor from Vienna.

My Prussian colleague represents himself as having spoken with the greatest frankness to the Chancellor, as having spoken "en véritable apôtre de la paix" (to use his own expression), as having laid before him the extreme danger of the present situation, and as having stated in so many words, that for the incalculable mischief which a perseverance in the present policy of Russia would bring upon Europe, the Emperor will alone be held responsible.

The result of a long dialogue appears to have been to impress General de Rochow with the belief of his views being shared in great measure by Count Nesselrode, though, as his Excellency signified, the difficulties of his position have become such that he is no longer able to speak with any confidence of what he may be able to effect.

This I can readily believe, knowing as I do the Emperor's extreme impatience of contradiction, and the singular habits in which more than ever His Majesty indulges: thus, he is in constant correspondence with his generals, more especially with Prince Gortchakoff, Prince Menchikoff, and Prince Woronzow; whilst of the orders sent off to them not only is no intimation given to his Minister, but of the papers transmitted no copy or memorandum is preserved. Count Nesselrode spoke much of the Emperor's conviction of its being the object of Her Majesty's Government to humble Russia, of the difficulty of receding from the position which His Majesty had assumed, and of the impossibility of allowing foreign interference in an affair which belonged only to Russia: he undertook, however, willingly to do all in his power to moderate the Emperor's views, and begged to know whether General de Rochow had any suggestion to make.

The Prussian Minister replied that he would earnestly entreat of him to take care that the propositions, whatever they might prove, which may be expected from London, should not be rejected. Accept them, he said, if it is in your power: if you cannot, meet them by counter-propositions: talk the business well over with Sir Hamilton Seymour in the first instance, speak to him openly, inspire him with confidence, and abate as you can those demands upon Turkey which England believes conscientiously to be dangerous to the Sultan's interests and safety.

After this, and after allusions not only to the financial difficulties which a war would entail upon Russia, but to the English habit of putting off war as long as possible, but of not allowing much time to intervene between the menace and the undertaking of war, General de Rochow had, as he stated, concluded by recommending that, upon the receipt of the English proposals, some person of confidence, Count Orloff, for instance, should be despatched to London with powers to negotiate.

Count Nesselrode thought the plan a good one,—imagined that the Emperor would be little disposed to regard it with favour, but would be ready, if necessary, to press it upon His Majesty's acceptance.

General de Rochow was eager to hear what I thought of his suggestion, I could only say that it appeared to me very judicious, provided that the Emperor was disposed to abate his pretensions, and to leave tolerably full powers in the hands of his representative.

As I have repeatedly endeavoured to make Count Nesselrode understand, I continued,—Her Majesty's Government are very desirous of bringing about a peace between Russia and Turkey; but mind, a peace, not a truce: if it is desired only to suspend war for a few months, and then to begin afresh, as far as I understand the feelings of the Government, I believe they would be as well pleased that hostilities should take their course.

Before quitting General de Rochow, I observed to him that his assistance might be valuable to me in clearing up two points, upon which great misapprehension prevails here.

The Russian Government, I said, imagine that we are anxious to blame Russia and to consider Turkey in the right; no abstract feeling of the kind exists, only as a matter of fact we are obliged to state that the wrongs and the breaches of Treaty are on the side of the Russians, and that nothing of the kind is to be imputed to the Turks: if they are open to such accusations let the charges be plainly stated, and they will be impartially examined.

As regards the other point, it appears to be held that England is interfering in an affair which in no way concerns her; but pray combat this illusion. England comes forward, not from any love of interference, but because, independently of feelings of justice, her own interests are engaged in the question. If the Emperor can make up his mind to involve Europe in a war for the sake of imaginary claims, England may well be excused for not declining the contest when she is called upon to defend very precious interests.

I concluded by reminding General de Rochow, that Prussia and Austria had a debt of gratitude to the Emperor which I thought both Powers would do well to liquidate; that by his threats His Majesty had prevented their engaging in a senseless and injurious struggle; and that the time was come when a firm attitude on their part might prevent the Emperor from embarking in a war for which no sort of reasonable motive could be assigned—a war which would be replete with mischief to Europe, and with danger to its author.

You need not, I said, have any scruples: the Emperor boasted himself to me of the service which he had rendered you: do not show yourself backward in requiting the obligation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 437.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 685.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 2, 1853.*

THE attempts now making by the Four Great Powers at Constantinople to induce the Porte to enter into negotiation will, if successful, soon bring to a test the professions made by Russia of her pacific and moderate intentions.

It is unnecessary to say how ardently I desire that the trial may prove satisfactory; but I should deceive your Lordship were I to state that my expectations were on a level with my wishes. Judging from the language of all those Russians who may be supposed to have received an intimation of the position of their Government, it should appear to be this:

The occupation of the Principalities was so far recognised by Great Britain and France that it led to no hostile demonstration on their part, and it was followed by attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the two parties engaged.

Owing to no fault of Russia these parties have now become belligerent; and whilst the right of the Emperor to endeavour to conduct the war to a conclusion conformable to his interest cannot be questioned, any act of hostility on the part of the Western Powers against Russia would throw upon them the onus of aggression, and would leave the Emperor at liberty to consider himself freed from the obligation which he took upon himself by the declaration which preceded the war.

This, reduced to a few simple words, appears to be the meaning of the involved phrases, in which the momentous eventualities now impending are spoken of at St. Petersburgh. "Leave us," the Russian said, six months ago, "in a situation in which, if a little anormal, will enable us to negotiate a peace in the interests of Europe." "Leave us," they now have the appearance of saying, "in a position which you yourselves have recognized, and in which we can negotiate with reference to our own dignity and interests, which latter are always those of Europe."

It has been observed to me lately by several persons, that in the post which I occupy I may render good service to the cause of peace by expressing to Her Majesty's Government full confidence in the intentions of the Russian Government. My answer is always to the same effect; I shall do so very readily upon the first suitable occasion; as a preliminary step, however, I must myself acquire that confidence which I desire to be able to express.

Your Lordship may believe that, at a crisis like the present, it is painful to me to employ the language of mistrust; but it would be infinitely more painful to express feelings which are not mine, and to encourage expectations which I consider as very likely to end in disappointment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 438.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 691. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1853.*

WHEN I entered Count Nesselrode's room on the 2nd instant, he observed at once that he understood that Her Majesty's Government were engaged in drawing up a Treaty between Russia and Turkey.

Being aware that this belief prevailed here, and that it had caused considerable irritation, I replied that his Excellency had been misinformed; that as far as I was aware, it was in devising the preliminaries and basis of a Treaty that Her Majesty's Government was engaged.

The point is of the greater importance, as I cannot doubt that very momentous results may turn upon the nature of these preliminaries, and the manner in which they are brought to the Emperor's knowledge.

His Majesty can hardly fail of being aware of the increasing difficulty of his position; the perception has certainly not escaped Count Nesselrode's experienced eyes, and I have some reason for believing that if an opportunity for extricating his Government honourably from its embarrassments should present itself, his Excellency will not be backward in recommending that it should be turned to account.

After hearing what I had to say respecting the note about to be presented to the Porte in consequence, I observed incidentally, of a suggestion which had been made by the Austrian Cabinet, Count Nesselrode questioned me as to the accounts received by your Lordship respecting the state of public feeling in Turkey.

I did not conceal from him that great exasperation existed among the Turks, and that all the influence which was possessed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and his three colleagues would be required to induce the Porte to listen to peaceful counsels.

I added that I learned from the correspondence sent to me by your Lordship, that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe pursued uninterruptedly the same wise and conciliatory course which he had followed throughout the negotiations, and that I would take the opportunity of remarking, if I might do so without giving offence, that if the Turks had been restrained from following the example set by Russia in giving a religious character to the war, it might be inferred that it was to the prudence of Lord Stratford's advice that this result was attributable.

At the conclusion of a desultory conversation, the details of which are unworthy of your Lordship's attention, the Chancellor spoke of the threatening aspect of affairs, and made the following observation:

"Il est sûr que les affaires sont très embrouillées; néanmoins nous avons l'hiver devant nous pour les négociations. Selon moi donc il en sortira au printemps, soit une paix, soit une guerre épouvantable."

"In my opinion," I replied, "the decision upon this point will be taken long before the arrival of spring."

Count Nesselrode desired to know upon what circumstances my opinion was formed.

"Because," I rejoined, "negotiations have been carried on so long and so ineffectually, that they are now regarded with mistrust, and because the uncertainty which continues to hang over affairs is so injurious to interests of every kind, that all classes unite in desiring a prompt solution by whatever means it is to be obtained."

I would venture to remark to your Lordship, that in my opinion there are many considerations which render it desirable that the idea of Russia being allowed to gain time by protracted negotiation should be discountenanced by every possible means.

Among these not the least important is the necessity which exists for not permitting that Russia should have the means of having a powerful force at sea in the North when a large portion of Her Majesty's ships are engaged in the Black Sea.

In the event of war becoming unavoidable, it is to be hoped that any operations which may become necessary in the Black Sea will be concluded before the breaking up of the ice in the Gulf of Finland, so that by the time the Northern fleet will be able to quit Sveaborg and Cronstadt, they may find the whole of Her Majesty's disposable naval forces in their close neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 439.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 696. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE has signified to me a wish that I would give him some explanation as to a conversation which has been held by your Lordship with some British merchants of London engaged in the Baltic trade, certain expressions employed by your Lordship to those gentlemen having had the effect of causing alarm, and of giving a considerable check to commerce. In general, orders were given and money advanced at this season for the deliveries of next year, whereas at present there was nothing but stagnation.

I regretted my inability to offer his Excellency any official information, but desired to remark that the transaction was not one of an official character. A few British merchants had desired to converse with your Lordship, and as far as my private information went, the anxiety felt subsequently by them and by their friends and correspondents, was caused, not by what your Lordship said, but by what you were unable to say; that expressions of confidence in the continuance of peace had been expected, and that, under circumstances like the present, no Minister of the Crown would be justified in expressing a confidence which it was impossible to feel.

My object is to avoid giving any unnecessary offence, and I refrained (although it cost me to do so) from remarking that the Russian Government

have only themselves to thank for the evils of which the beginning is already felt; that as they have sown so they must be prepared to reap. It is evident that a plentiful crop of distress and discontent awaits them if their present insane policy is persevered in.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 440.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 697. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1853.*

THE only intelligence received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Cronstadt relates to the artillery force of that garrison. It is stated by Mr. Simpson to consist of a battalion of 1000 men.

A person who is exclusively occupied with military affairs, reports an order having been given by the Government for 250,000 sheep-skin pelisses; this he considers very naturally as an indication of hostile operations being likely to be carried on upon an extensive scale during the winter. The same person affirms that orders have been issued for collecting ten years' provisions in the south, by which I apprehend is meant for providing that arrangements should be made for the gradual supply of the forces during that period. What is certain is, that (be the intentions of the Government what they may) whilst according to official language hostilities cannot be actually undertaken till the spring, in the opinion of the Russians they are to be looked for with certainty when spring arrives.

This opinion is expressed very unreservedly by persons of all conditions, and amongst others has been stated in very unambiguous terms by two persons attached to the Emperor's person.

That it would suit the Russians that any extensive war in which they may propose to engage should not commence for the next four months is what I can hardly doubt; but from this perception I only deduce the necessity of ascertaining as speedily as possible what are the intentions of the Russian Cabinet with regard to the terms of composition with Turkey, which may soon be expected from London and Paris.

These terms will, I am confident, be received by the Chancellor with every wish to consider them as acceptable, but how far these conciliatory dispositions may be shared by His Imperial Master remains to be proved.

My fear continues to be that the Emperor, taking a very prejudiced view of his right, will be found little disposed to recede from demands which he considers only such as he is fully entitled to insist upon.

I beg to apologise to your Lordship for the freedom with which I express an opinion upon this and other points connected with the momentous question of peace or war; I do so, your Lordship may believe, with great reluctance, and solely from the consideration that occupying as I do a post of great responsibility, at a moment of the utmost importance, I prefer incurring the risk of being overforward to any appearance of holding back, although local observation gives me facilities for forming a judgment which cannot be possessed by any person not resident in the very centre of Russian society.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 441.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 698. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1853.*

WHEN I saw Count Nesselrode on the 2nd instant, he was very eager to learn from me what would be the position of neutrals in the event of war breaking out.

I begged to assure his Excellency that I had received no communication from your Lordship with regard to the eventualities to which he alluded.

Even if I had not, Count Nesselrode concluded that I had formed some opinion upon the subject, and he should be glad to hear what my unofficial opinion was as to the facilities which neutrals trading here would enjoy during a war between Russia and England.

I begged to state my belief that there would be no trading and no neutrals.

Count Nesselrode did not quite apprehend my meaning; Lord Clarendon had expressed an opinion unfavourable to the old practice of embargoes: it was therefore to be inferred that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the evils of war ought not be increased by the further evils of an interference with general commerce.

The case, I replied, M. le Comte, appears to me to stand thus:—motives of humanity render the English Government desirous that war should fall as little heavily as possible upon individuals, but those same motives will make the Government anxious to bring any war which they may undertake to the speediest possible conclusion. We learned this from the Duke of Wellington. He taught us to avoid all wars as long as possible, but when we engage in them to push them with all possible activity. Russia is a very large country, great parts of which are wholly inaccessible. As regards the coast it is not quite the same thing; and, as you ask my private opinion, I will not conceal from you that a declaration of war is likely to be speedily followed by the disappearance of trade, neutrals, and commercial movements of all sorts from your ports: blockades offer great facilities for weakening the resources of a country, and I think it may be assumed that, in the event of hostilities breaking out, very effectual blockades would be established.

Count Nesselrode said that it could hardly escape the attention of Her Majesty's Government, that the destruction of trade was a weapon which had two edges.

I did not, I replied, doubt that Her Majesty's Government would make that reflection, but that it would be probably considered that it would not be the sharpest of the edges which would be turned towards England.

I will request your Lordship to take note that these statements were not volunteered on my part; explanations were pressingly asked of me by the Chancellor, and I answered his inquiries without reserve and without excitement.

The whole conversation, indeed, although upon a very trying subject, passed in so perfectly amicable a manner, that when his Excellency apologized to me for having spoken upon such painful contingencies, I requested that he would offer no excuses, observing to him at the same time that the arrangement of testamentary dispositions could not have the effect of hastening dissolution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 442.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 699.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 5, 1853.*

JUST as the messenger is preparing to set off I learn that a Feldjäger, dispatched on the 23rd ultimo by Prince Gortchakoff, has brought no military intelligence of any importance.

I have strong reasons for believing that orders have been given to the Prince for dislodging the Turks from Kalafat. What will then happen must of course be subject to doubt; but I lean to the opinion, that having cleared the Principalities of the enemy the Russian forces will not cross the Danube.

According to intelligence from Asia Minor, Prince Beboutoff was in pursuit of the Seraskier.

A person usually well informed has stated to me, that should the Imperial forces obtain a decided victory in Asia Minor, it may very possibly happen that proposals for peace will be made by the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 443.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 7, 1853.*

I INQUIRED from Baron Manteuffel to-day the precise nature of the instructions which had been forwarded to the Prussian Minister at Vienna and Constantinople, with respect to the collective Note and Protocol which were to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna.

His Excellency not only conveyed to me the general terms, but placed in my hands copies of these instructions, which I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship.

His Excellency informed me that he had received no intelligence from Count Arnim since a telegraphic despatch on Monday last, announcing that the Protocol of Conference had been "paraphéed" by the Representatives of the Four Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 443.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.

M. le Comte, *Berlin, ce 2 Décembre, 1853.*

VOTRE Excellence est déjà informé par le télégraphe que je viens de recevoir des mains de M. de Moustier et de Lord Augustus Loftus les projets de note collective et de Protocole à signer par les quatre Représentants à Vienne, ainsi que des instructions adressées au Général Baraguay d'Hilliers et à Lord Stratford de Redcliffe pour appuyer la démarche de la Conférence de Vienne.

Je n'ai pas tardé un moment à mettre ces importantes communications, dont votre Excellence trouvera les copies ci-jointes pour compléter les archives de la Légation, sous les yeux du Roi et à prendre les ordres de Sa Majesté. Vous êtes autorisé, M. le Comte, à signer la Note et le Protocole en commun avec les trois Représentants des autres Puissances. En outre vous voudrez bien faire parvenir à M. de Wildenbruch l'instruction ci-jointe sous cachet-volant, en lui transmettant en même temps copie de la note signée par les quatre Représentants.

En nous associant, dans l'intérêt de la paix de l'Europe, à la démarche collective à faire à Constantinople pour faciliter à la Porte l'initiative d'une

négociation directe avec la Russie, nous croyons rendre un service au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, dont après les assurances réitérées nous ne révoquons pas en doute les intentions pacifiques. En signant le Protocole nous constatons en même temps tout le cas que nous faisons de ces assurances en les introduisant comme point de départ dans un Acte Européen.

Fort de son intérêt sincère et impartial pour les deux Puissances belligérantes, pénétré en même temps d'une profonde et constante sollicitude pour le sort des Chrétiens en Orient, le Roi, notre auguste maître, appelle de tous ses vœux un plein succès de la démarche conciliatrice à laquelle son Cabinet vient de s'associer. Car Sa Majesté a la confiance que les négociations qu'il s'agit d'ouvrir sous l'égide de l'Europe contribueront par les efforts réunis des Puissances, non seulement à hâter la conclusion de la paix, mais encore à établir le sort des Rayas Chrétiens sur des bases propres à les mettre à l'abri de l'arbitraire, et à assurer leur bien-être par un développement paisible et naturel.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure 2 in No. 443.

Baron Manteuffel to M. de Wildenbruch.

[See No. 413.]

No. 444.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 127. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 7, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me confidentially this day, that he had instructed Count Arnim to propose to Count Buol some action in concert with Austria, to move the Emperor of Russia to adopt the pacificatory views of the Four Powers in their present endeavours to bring about a reconciliation with Turkey.

His Excellency conceives that some movement on the part of the great German Powers may have some effect in disposing the Emperor Nicholas to form a due appreciation of his position, and to lend his efforts to the attempts of united Europe in the cause of peace.

His Excellency was not prepared to say what nature of communication would be most judicious; whether a collective step on the part of Austria and Prussia, or a separate instruction to their respective Ministers at St. Petersburgh. But his Excellency was anxious to concert and unite with Austria in any way which she might deem advisable to attain the desired end.

His Excellency also considers that he shall be enabled to judge, by the answer which he may receive to his proposal, as to the real intentions of the Austrian Cabinet, and their ultimate views on the Eastern question.

His Excellency is of opinion that, at the present moment, some good might be effected by the two great German Powers exercising their moral power and influence at St. Petersburgh.

Being informed that his Excellency had taken this step, and feeling that, if acted up to in the sense reported to me by Baron Manteuffel, it could not have any other than a beneficial effect, I did not feel myself authorized to discourage the attempt; but I shall take every precaution in my power to prevent any engagement being entered into between the two Cabinets which may tend to fetter the free action and independence of Prussia, or which may bind her hereafter to any course prejudicial to that pursued by the Western Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 445.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 128. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, December 7, 1853.

My Lord,

IN conversing to-day with Baron Manteuffel I was anxious to learn whether any private correspondence had lately taken place between the King of Prussia and the Emperor Nicholas.

His Excellency said, that to his knowledge no very recent communications had taken place between the two Sovereigns; but he also informed me that he had drawn up a draft of a letter, to be addressed by His Majesty to the Emperor of Russia, which he was to submit to his approbation this evening or to-morrow.

The purport of this letter (from what I could gather) would be to explain to His Imperial Majesty the steps which he had lately taken in acceding to the collective Note and Protocol of Conference transmitted from Vienna. It would declare, that if the Emperor still held out against the voice of Europe, His Majesty could not approve of his policy; and, in general terms, counselled to His Imperial Majesty that moderate and conciliatory course which would ensure a satisfactory arrangement of the pending differences with Turkey, and thereby preserve the peace of Europe.

It is not in my power to give your Lordship more than a faint idea of the tone of this letter, as Baron Manteuffel merely related to me its general tenour; but Baron Manteuffel gave me to understand that it was couched in more than persuasive language, so much so, indeed, that his Excellency feared that the King would not agree to the terms in which that letter was drawn up.

Baron Manteuffel also informed me on this occasion, that Baron Budberg had remarked to him, in rather a haughty manner, on the passage in the speech from the Throne relating to the foreign policy of Prussia, stating that Baron Manteuffel had risked by that phrase to invite a discussion in the Chamber detrimental to his position.

Baron Manteuffel replied to him that this was by no means the case, as the "phrase" to which he alluded was more calculated to prevent any discussion, and that the statement therein made represented the truthful policy and position of Prussia.

His Excellency reports to me, that Baron Budberg still maintains that Russia will never consent to be cited before an European tribunal; but that when she had gained a decisive victory over the Turks, she would then show her magnanimity and the sincerity of her professions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 446.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 132. Confidential.)

Berlin, December 10, 1853.

My Lord,

I SAW Baron Manteuffel this evening, and in conversation I referred to the intentions which he had previously intimated to me (as reported in my despatch No. 128 of the 7th instant) of advising the King of Prussia to address a letter to the Emperor of Russia.

I stated to his Excellency that it was very advisable at this moment to prepare a salutary reception for the work of peace which has been lately agreed to at Vienna, and to dispose the Emperor's mind to receive it in the same laudable spirit in which it had been framed.

His Excellency informed me that he had this very day submitted the project of a letter to His Majesty, and also a memoir which he had drawn up for General Rochow to read to Count Nesselrode.

In both a conciliatory spirit was counselled, and the attention of the Emperor Nicholas specially drawn to the dangerous course he was pursuing.

In the memorandum Baron Manteuffel stated that if war was to ensue, Austria and Prussia were both exposed to its dangerous elements, and that in such an eventuality Prussia would be found opposed to Russia.

The memorandum warns the Emperor against the risks he is incurring, and gives him to understand that isolation will be the result of the policy he has adopted.

Baron Manteuffel told me that the King had evinced some hesitation to adopt this letter to the Emperor, but that he hoped to overcome it.

He told His Majesty that the Emperor of Austria had written to the Emperor Nicholas two letters in the same spirit, and that it did not become him to hold back.

I strengthened Baron Manteuffel in this opinion, stating that His Majesty might hereafter reproach himself with not having exhausted all his influence to avert the calamities of war.

Baron Manteuffel seems to think that there is a somewhat more conciliatory disposition at St. Petersburgh, and is evidently of opinion that the Emperor will appoint a Plenipotentiary to the Conference, if Turkey will do the same.

Baron Budberg, in conversation with him this evening, said in rather an unguarded moment, that of all places he hoped that Vienna would not be selected as the seat of the Conference; to which Baron Manteuffel replied that this was a point of minor importance, and cited Hermanstadt as being nearer the seat of war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 447.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 441.)

Vienna, December 6, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Conference assembled yesterday at Count Buol's, according to the appointment which I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 436.

Count Buol announced that the documents which we were to sign had been prepared, and that he had directed legitimatized copies of them to be made, which would be delivered to each of the Representatives.

He then proceeded to read the note which was to be addressed by the Conference to Reshid Pasha, as also the Protocol which was to be signed by the Members of the Conference.

These documents having been found to be in accordance with the copies which had been transmitted to us by our respective Governments, were signed by Count Buol, Baron Bourqueney, Count Arnim, and myself, and the note addressed to Reshid Pasha was placed in my hands for transmission to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, according to the arrangement which I have already announced to your Lordship in my despatch above referred to. It was settled that the Protocol should be placed in the keeping of Count Buol as presiding over the Conference, and that it should for the present be considered as confidential.

Count Buol then read the instructions which he had drawn up for the guidance of the Internuncio, and which were found to be identical in substance with those which had been addressed by our Governments to M. de Bourqueney and to myself.

Count Arnim also read the instructions he was charged by his Government to forward to M. de Wildenbruch, which although somewhat different in language, were considered as identical in meaning.

In terminating this Conference, Count Buol expressed his anxious hope that the Representatives of our respective Governments at Constantinople should be instructed to use their utmost endeavours to induce the Government of the Sultan, by their adherence to the measure now proposed, to give effect to the earnest solicitude for the welfare and independence of the Ottoman Empire by which the Four Governments had been actuated in framing that measure. The advisers of the Sultan could not fail to see that there was now traced out before them the fittest and most satisfactory course by which with honour to themselves, and with the fullest approbation of their allies, the best interests of the Empire would be secured. He added, that if the fair expectations of the united Governments were realized with regard to Turkey, it would then become the duty of those Governments to use the same exertions to obtain a similar result from the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and by this means he hoped that the present unhappy complication by which the peace and tranquillity of Europe were threatened might be brought to a close.

Count Buol then announced that his messenger was ready to take charge of the documents which each of the Representatives was desirous of forwarding to Constantinople; and after referring to the arrangement already come to, that he would deliver a copy of the note to Reshid Pasha to Baron Meyendorff, and communicate to him confidentially the Protocol, while Baron Bourqueney and myself had undertaken to fulfil the same duty towards the Turkish Ambassador, he delivered to us the legitimatized copies of the documents which had been signed, and of which I have now the honour of inclosing copies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 447.

Note addressed by the Vienna Conference to Reshid Pasha.

Vienne, le 5 Décembre, 1853.

LES Soussignés, Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, réunis en conférence à Vienne, ont reçu des instructions à l'effet de déclarer que leurs Gouvernements respectifs envisagent avec un profond regret le commencement des hostilités entre la Russie et la Porte, et désirent vivement, en intervenant entre les Puissances belligérantes, arrêter toute nouvelle effusion de sang et mettre un terme à un état de choses qui menace sérieusement la paix de l'Europe.

La Russie ayant donné l'assurance qu'elle était disposée à traiter, et les Soussignés ne doutant pas que la Porte ne soit animée du même esprit, ils demandent au nom de leurs Gouvernements respectifs d'être informés des conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement Ottoman consentirait à négocier un Traité de Paix.

Les Soussignés, &c.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 447.

Protocol of a Conference of the Four Representatives, held at Vienna, December 5, 1853.

LES Soussignés, Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne et de Prusse, conformément aux instructions de leurs Cours, se sont réunis en conférence à l'effet de rechercher les moyens d'aplanir le différend survenu entre la Cour de Russe et la Sublime Porte. Les proportions que ce différend a prises et la guerre qui a éclaté entre les deux Empires, malgré les efforts de leurs alliés, sont devenues pour l'Europe

entière l'objet des plus sérieuses préoccupations. En conséquence, leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche, l'Empereur des Français, la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et le Roi de Prusse, également pénétrés de la nécessité de mettre un terme à ces hostilités, qui ne pourraient se prolonger sans affecter les intérêts de leurs propres États, ont résolu d'offrir leurs bons offices aux deux Hautes Parties belligérantes, dans l'espoir qu'elles ne voudront pas elles-mêmes encourir la responsabilité d'une conflagration, alors que par un échange de loyales explications elles peuvent encore la prévenir en replaçant leurs rapports sur un pied de paix et de bonne entente.

Les assurances données à différentes reprises par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, excluent de la part de cet Auguste Souverain l'idée de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman. L'existence de la Turquie dans les limites que les Traités lui ont assignées est en effet devenue une des conditions nécessaires de l'équilibre Européen, et les Plénipotentiaires Soussignés constatent avec satisfaction que la guerre actuelle ne saurait, en aucune cas, entraîner dans les circonscriptions territoriales des deux Empires des modifications susceptibles d'altérer l'état de possession que le temps a consacré en Orient, et qui est également nécessaire au repos de toutes les autres Puissances. Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ne s'est du reste point bornée à ces assurances; elle a fait déclarer que son intention n'avait jamais été d'imposer à la Porte des obligations nouvelles, ou qui ne fussent pas exactement conformes aux Traités de Koutschouk-Kainardji et d'Adrinople, stipulations d'après lesquelles la Sublime Porte a promis de protéger dans toute l'étendue de ses États le culte Chrétien et ses églises. La Cour de Russie a ajouté qu'en réclamant du Gouvernement Ottoman un témoignage de sa fidélité à des engagements antérieurs, elle n'avait nullement entendu amoindrir l'autorité du Sultan sur ses sujets Chrétiens, et que son but unique avait été de demander des éclaircissements de nature à prévenir toute équivoque et tout motif de mésintelligence avec une Puissance amie et voisine.

Les sentiments manifestés par la Sublime Porte pendant les derniers négociations attestent d'un autre côté qu'elle était prête à reconnaître toutes ses obligations contractuelles, et à tenir compte, dans la mesure de ses droits souverains, de l'intérêt de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour un culte qui est le sien et celui de la majorité de ses peuples.

Dans cet état de choses, les Soussignés sont convaincus que le moyen le plus prompt et le plus sûr d'atteindre le but désiré par leurs Cours serait de faire en commun une communication à la Sublime Porte pour lui exposer le vœu des Puissances de contribuer par leur intervention amicale au rétablissement de la paix et la mettre en demeure de faire connaître les conditions auxquelles elle serait disposée à traiter.

Tel est le but de la note collective ci-jointe adressée au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Sultan, et des instructions identiques transmises en même temps par les Cours d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, à leurs Représentants à Constantinople.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

No 448.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 12.*)

(No. 442.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 6, 1853.*

BARON BOURQUENEY and myself waited this day upon the Turkish Ambassador according to appointment, and we stated that we were come to him as representing the members of the Conference who, having adopted a measure which they believed was calculated to serve the most essential

interests of his Government, were anxious that he should be made acquainted with it, and that he should give to it his best support and assistance.

We then read to the Ambassador a legitimatized copy of the note which had been addressed by the Members of the Conference to Reshid Pasha, and placed it in his hands. We also read to him the Protocol which had been signed in Conference, and explained to him that, as it had been determined that this document should be considered for the present as confidential, we were not authorized to leave with him a copy, but only to make him acquainted with its contents.

We then stated that the same mark of confidence which had thus been shown him had also been manifested towards Baron Meyendorff, to whom Count Buol had been charged to make the same communication. The Ambassador received our visit and the communication we were charged to make to him with the greatest courtesy, and with the expression of his sincerest thanks. He stated that, being without instructions, he could not anticipate the decisions his Government might come to as to the measures we had adopted, but he assured us he would not fail to report to them the mark of attention which, on the part of the Conference, he had received from us, nor to point out to them the solicitude we had expressed for the welfare and independence of his country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 449.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 937.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 11, 1853.*

A TELEGRAPHIC despatch received this morning by the French Government from Vienna, announces the destruction, by a Russian squadron, on the 30th ultimo, in the roadstead of Sinope, of six Turkish frigates, two corvettes, a steamer, and three transports. The Turkish Admiral was taken prisoner and carried to Sebastopol. The Russian force consisted of six sail-of-the-line.

Your Lordship will probably have received this untoward news from the Earl of Westmorland; but M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at my request, promised to send it by telegraph, as soon as the London office was opened, to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship.

I found the French Minister greatly chagrined by this intelligence, not so much on account of the loss to the Turks, as to the moral effect which must be produced by this act being committed, as it were, under the guns of the French and English fleets. His Excellency had not seen the Emperor when I visited him, and I shall probably have to recur to this subject by to-morrow's messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 450.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 940.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 12, 1853.*

LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE having stated, in one of his last despatches, that General Baraguay d'Hilliers had refused to support him in his overtures to obtain the acceptance by the Ottoman Government of the note proposed by your Lordship for the termination of the Porte's differences with Russia, I mentioned the circumstance yesterday to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, reminding him that he had engaged to send instructions of a contrary nature

to Constantinople, and observing that, although late events had diminished the importance of General Baraguay d'Hilliers proceeding in this matter, it might have been very serious if another project had not superseded the idea of a note.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assured me that instructions, desiring M. de la Cour to support your Lordship's note, had been sent, as he promised me, and that, when M. de la Cour retired from the Embassy, those instructions had become binding on General Baraguay d'Hilliers, who ought to have carried them out; that the General had not mentioned in his correspondence the circumstance to which I had alluded, and he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) could, in consequence, give me no explanation of the matter. The General had stated that he had been asked by M. de Bruck to support the Austrian proposition, (that of direct negotiation between Russia and Turkey,) but that, seeing its utter absurdity, he had refused to do so.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 451.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 941. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 12, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a confidential communication from Constantinople, stating that after Lord Stratford's audience of the Sultan, to present the officers of the British fleet, His Highness sent for Reshid Pasha, and insisted on a more pacific line of conduct on the part of the Porte: that on Reshid Pasha's showing His Highness the danger to which he would expose himself by such tergiversation, high words passed between them; but that the Sultan sent for his Minister on the following day, and excusing himself for the vivacity of his expressions on the previous day, admitted that the advice of Reshid Pasha was that of a faithful servant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 452.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 942.)
My Lord, *Paris, December 12, 1853.*

DESPATCHES from General Castelbajac of the same date as those from Sir Hamilton Seymour, forwarded yesterday from hence, confirm Sir Hamilton's account of General Castelbajac's language to Count Nesselrode, respecting the difference of opinion which the Russian Chancellor had endeavoured to substantiate as existing between the French and English Governments in regard to the Eastern question.

General Castelbajac corroborates also the intelligence transmitted by Sir Hamilton, that it is the intention of the Russian Government to undertake a winter campaign in Asia Minor, by marching on Erzeroum and Kars. The General gives some statistics respecting Prince Woronzoff's army, and calculates that he can bring 50,000 excellent troops into the field.

Advices from the French agents in Asia Minor represent the Turkish troops to be in a miserable and inefficient state, and their Commander-in-chief to be totally unfit for his situation and hateful to his army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 453.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 943. Confidential.)

Paris, December 12, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that the last accounts received by the French Government from Greece, as also from Epirus, Macedonia, and Thessaly, showed that a great agitation prevailed in the minds of the Greeks, an agitation fomented no doubt by Russian agents: and he asked me, supposing any hostile demonstration against Turkish rule were made in any of these quarters, whether I knew what Her Majesty's Government were prepared to do. Upon my replying in the negative he continued, that he had been induced to put this question to me, because there were reports in circulation that Her Majesty's Government intended to profit by the disturbed state of affairs in the East, to occupy the island of Candia, and perhaps parts of the sea-coast of European Turkey; that personally he was convinced of the absurdity of these reports, and that they were put about by persons desirous of disturbing the harmony which reigned between the two Governments. But for this very reason he was desirous of being able to contradict such reports upon authority. I replied, that if my word could be considered of sufficient authority, I would not hesitate at giving it upon the instant: that to whatever results the present crisis in the East might lead, the policy of Her Majesty's Government would remain the same; they had no selfish objects in view; they intended to continue in the course on which they had entered, of defending, in conjunction with France, the cause of justice and order; that if in so doing they thought the temporary possession of any part of the Levant a necessary precaution, they would inform France of it, and, I thought I could add, would abandon the idea rather than separate their action from that of the French Government. At the same time, I added, it was impossible to foresee what events were in store. It might happen, through some unforeseen circumstance, that one of Her Majesty's ships might be compelled to secure some important post when no French ship was near. In such a case I would take it upon myself to say, that immediate notice would be given to the nearest French authority; and that no objection would be made to a joint occupation, should it be deemed advisable. Having said this much for myself, I added that I would immediately apply to your Lordship to ratify my words.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys begged that I would only do so confidentially; again excusing himself for asking the question, and repeating his former reason for so putting it.

I said that no excuse was necessary; that I had, ten times over, rather that he should ask any question he pleased, than that he should have a doubt upon his mind. There could be no common action on the part of the two Governments, unless the utmost frankness existed between them on all points.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 454.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13, 1853.)

(No. 944. Confidential.)

Paris, December 12, 1853.

My Lord,

COUNT HATZFELDT has been desired by his Government to inquire of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what course the French Government is prepared to adopt towards Turkey, should the Ottoman Government refuse to listen to the late overture made by the Conference of Vienna.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said he might reply by asking Count Hatzfeldt what course the Prussian Government was prepared to adopt towards Russia

should the refusal to negotiate for peace come from that Power. However he added, he did not anticipate a refusal on the part of the Porte; but should he be deceived in his provisions, the instructions sent to General Baraguay d'Hilliers authorized that Ambassador to leave no means untried to bring the Porte to reason. He might, if necessary, have recourse to intimidation.

Count Hatzfeldt having rejoined that this was no answer to his question, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he could not give a categorical reply to an hypothetical case; that since the Four Powers were acting together, they would have to consider together the answer which may be returned to their overtures, but that he had no objection to state that in his opinion a comminatory tone (langage comminatoire) should be used to either Power which should refuse its consent to the proposition of the Conference.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 455.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 945. Confidential.)

Paris, December 12, 1853.

My Lord,

IN my despatch No. 928 I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of an article from the "Moniteur," commenting on the late proceedings at Vienna in regard to the Eastern question. I had a strong impression on first reading it that it was calculated to do more harm than good, that it would alarm the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to find a French official paper giving a character to their late proceedings, which, however true in fact, they could hardly be expected to avow, and that it might make them cautious and unwilling in carrying out the policy in which it was the hope of France and England to see them persevere.

I was not, therefore, surprised when the Prussian Minister spoke to me yesterday in terms of severe animadversion upon this article of the French ministerial paper.

On the other hand, I felt some satisfaction at remarking that Count Hatzfeldt appeared sincerely to regret the difficulties which he was afraid this proceeding of the French Government might occasion to the united action of the Four Powers to curb the aggressive spirit of Russia.

Count Hatzfeldt at the same time informed me, while he begged me to respect the confidence which he placed in me, that as early as the 4th instant, that is, as soon as it was known that an understanding was established among the Four Powers at Vienna, he had warned M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who seemed inclined to attach more meaning to the proceedings of the Conference than was perhaps intended at Vienna and Berlin, to be cautious in expressing his opinion. Fully admitting the tact which had been displayed in bringing the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to sign the Protocol of the 5th instant, Count Hatzfeldt added, that if the same tact was not observed in the sequel, if attempts were made to drive the two Governments prematurely forward, and to make them openly declare themselves against Russia, the attempts would probably fail, and a reaction would be produced. And knowing the use which is too often made of the pages of the Ministerial organ, he particularly cautioned M. Drouyn de Lhuys against employing the "Moniteur" as the means of communicating to the world the satisfaction felt by the French Government at the moral victory which they had gained. But a few days would elapse before the weight of all the influence which the Emperor of Russia could bring to bear on his brother Sovereigns of Austria and Prussia, would be felt at Vienna and Berlin. It would be difficult enough to withstand the appeal which the Emperor Nicholas would make to ancient alliances, to the ties of relationship, to the united policy which had until now bound the three Courts together; if to this was added an expression of undue satisfaction on the part of France at having broken this union, he could not answer for the consequences which so ill-timed a demonstration might produce.

If any one else than Count Hatzfeldt had told me that M. Drouyn de Lhuy's language had abounded in this sense, I should have conceived, considering what has since taken place, that there must have been some misunderstanding of the French Minister's words; but so over scrupulous is Count Hatzfeldt, if such an expression can be used in regard to truth, when he has a statement to make, that I am sure he reports correctly when he says that M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted the prudence and justice of his remarks, and promised to pay attention to them.

Nevertheless the result has been the article in the "Moniteur" alluded to above, and a circular to all French diplomatic agents couched in the same language.

It was natural that Count Hatzfeldt, after reading the former, should reproach M. Drouyn de Lhuys with this infirmity of purpose; for he could not suppose, he said, that there could be in so short a time any change in his opinion, and he must, therefore, attribute the article in the "Moniteur" to some other pen than that of the foreign department.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have defended himself but feebly, and to have said that, seeing that there was a strong wish elsewhere that an article of the kind should be written, he had not thought it his duty to oppose it, and that there was nothing in the article that was not perfectly true.

I should add that Count Hatzfeldt informed me that he had acted in this matter without instructions from his Government, and that he had been careful to state as much to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I have myself expressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys regret at the publication of the article, as I feared that it might indispose Austria to continue in the course into which we had with so much trouble induced her to engage. He did not enter into the subject at much length, but confined himself to remarking, that while all the public papers of Europe were commenting upon the proceedings of the Vienna Conference, it was impossible for the French Government to remain silent. I observed that it would have been better to have stated the case in a few lines, and to have avoided referring in such clear language to the isolated position in which the united action of the Four Powers had placed Russia. He did not gainsay this opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 456.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(No. 946.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 12, 1853.

I SAW M. Drouyn de Lhuys for a few moments this afternoon, when he informed me he had spoken with the Emperor this morning, on the subject of the disastrous intelligence received yesterday from Constantinople. He need not add, he said, that he had found His Majesty preoccupied with this untoward news.

Both the Emperor and his Minister are of opinion that the instructions sent to the Ambassadors and Admirals would have justified them in giving material support to the Turkish squadron, had any French or English vessels been near enough to do so. At this distance from the scene of action they do not see what fresh instructions can be sent, and they opine that, at all events, nothing can be done until accounts are received from Constantinople, giving more ample details of the affair than those which we now possess.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 457.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, le 3 Décembre,* 1853.

LA Russie parle de paix, mais fait la guerre. Son escadre vient d'attaquer la flotille Turque à Sinope. Six vaisseaux de ligne y entrèrent, et ayant mouillés armèrent leurs chaloupes pour prendre des bâtiments Turques au nombre de douze. Ces derniers tirent feu pour se défendre, et en tout que nous le savons, furent détruits à l'exception d'une seule à vapeur, qui vient d'en apporter la nouvelle. Aujourd'hui j'ai eu une réunion avec l'Ambassadeur de France et les deux Amiraux. Nous envoyons deux frégates à vapeur, une de chaque nation, à Sinope, et deux autres à Varna pour recueillir des renseignements exacts. A leur retour les escadres combinées entreront selon toute probabilité dans le Mer Noire. Nous avons adopté cette démarche préliminaire dans l'intérêt de la paix. En cas où les Russes tenteraient faire retourner les frégates à vapeur, celles-ci y persisteraient pour peu que la force fût inférieure ou égale; dans le cas qu'elle fût supérieure, elles se retireraient après avoir protesté.

Notre Chargé d'Affaires en Perse a suspendu ses relations diplomatiques. Les dernières dépêches de l'Ambassadeur Turque représentant la Perse influencée par la Russie comme étant, selon toute apparence, sur le point de prendre partie contre la Porte et d'envoyer deux armées sur les frontières, il est probable que l'Ambassadeur soit déjà en route pour Constantinople. Il est possible que ces circonstances, tout déplorables telles qu'elles sont, contribuent au retour de la paix. Je travaille encore dans ce sens, mais les apparences sont loin de m'encourager. La bonne harmonie et les concerts les plus parfaits existent entre les Ambassadeurs et les Amiraux d'Angleterre et de France. Les Turques continuent remporter des succès par terre.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 458.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 494.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1853.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 924 of the 8th instant, and I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Namik Pasha, as reported in that despatch, upon the present state of the Eastern question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 459.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 496.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1853.

I HAVE received your confidential despatch No. 943 of the 12th instant, reporting the language which you had used to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, with reference to certain reports which his Excellency stated were in circulation respecting an intended occupation by Great Britain of the island of Candia; and I have to state to your Excellency that, as you told M. Drouyn de Lhuys that you would apply to me to ratify your words, your Excellency is hereby instructed to read, or to state, the substance of your above-mentioned

despatch to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to inform his Excellency that your language has been entirely approved by Her Majesty's Government, who would not do M. Drouyn de Lhuys the injustice to suppose that he believed they intended to avail themselves of the troubles in the East in order to take possession of Candia; but such a report having reached M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Her Majesty's Government are obliged to him for having made it known, and, on their part, they will always in a similar way deal with the attempts now making in various quarters to sow dissension between the two Governments.

Count Walewski read to me this day a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating that English agents in Epirus, in Candia, and the neighbouring islands, were said to have declared that, in the event of war, England meant to protect the Christian population against the Turks, and that great excitement had been thereby occasioned.

I told Count Walewski that no instructions whatever, bearing upon the question, had been given by Her Majesty's Government; that, consequently, no British agent was authorized to speak in the manner reported; and that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government in future, as hitherto, to take no step in connection with the Eastern question without the previous knowledge and concurrence of the French Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 460.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 91.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 126 of the 7th instant, inclosing copies of the instructions addressed by Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim and M. de Wildenbruch, with respect to the collective note and Protocol on the Eastern Question, to be signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government have agreed to the Protocol; and Her Majesty's Government hope that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may lead to the results contemplated in Baron Manteuffel's despatch to Count Arnim.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 461.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 14, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 127 of the 7th instant, reporting that Baron Manteuffel had instructed Count Arnim to propose to the Austrian Government a joint recommendation to the Emperor of Russia to adopt the pacificatory views of the Four Powers in their endeavours to bring about a reconciliation with the Porte, I have to state to your Lordship that the proposal of Baron Manteuffel appears to be very judicious. It has been communicated to me by the Chevalier Bunsen, and I told him that it was highly desirable that the Emperor of Russia should be given to understand by the two German Courts that he alone was the cause, and upon him alone would rest the responsibility, of disturbing the peace of Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 462.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 334.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language which you held to General Rochow, in the conversation of which you give a report in your secret and confidential despatch No. 680 of the 1st instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 463.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 303.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 12, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the letter which you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas on the 11th of November, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 360 of the 24th, with a view to a detachment of the English and French squadrons being sent to the European coast of the Black Sea, between the mouths of the Danube and the entrance of the Bosphorus.

Her Majesty's Government consider that your Excellency, in consequence of the information which you had received from Mr. Vice-Consul Lloyd, exercised a sound discretion in directing that a British force should make its appearance in in the Black Sea; and they therefore regret extremely that Admiral Hamelin should not have been in a position to give effect to the instruction of the French Ambassador.

Your Excellency was, however, quite justified in not directing that British ships should at that time enter the Black Sea without a corresponding French force, as it might have caused an erroneous impression that the two Governments were not acting cordially together in behalf of the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 464.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 304.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 13, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 350 of the 21st of November, that Her Majesty's Government approve the instruction which you gave to M. Pisani for communication to Reshid Pasha, respecting a passage in the answer returned by the Sultan to the address made to him by General Baraguay d'Hilliers on the presentation of his credentials by that Ambassador.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 465.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 306.)

Foreign Office, December 13, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 354 of the 24th of November, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having presented to the Sultan Vice-Admiral Dundas and the officers of his squadrons, and of the speech which on that occasion you addressed to His Highness.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 466.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 307.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 347 of the 19th ultimo, giving an account of the steps which you had taken in order to give effect to the instructions conveyed to you in my despatch No. 234 of the 8th of October, for a proposal to be made to the Porte with a view to bringing about a settlement of its differences with Russia.

With reference to my previous despatch on this subject, No. 290 of the 24th of November, I have to repeat to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are fully alive to the great difficulties with which you have had to contend in bringing under the consideration of the Porte a proposal having reference to a very different state of things to that which existed at the time it reached you, and the success of which, in fact, depended upon hostilities not having actually commenced.

Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch No. 347, and of the manner in which you have sought to carry out their views; and Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the very clear and able memorandum communicated by your Excellency to the Porte, are convinced that an honourable peace at this moment will uphold the dignity of the Sultan, and promote the true interests of his people.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 467.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 335.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch No. 698 of the 5th of December, in reply to his inquiry as to the course which Her Majesty's Government would pursue in regard to the commerce of neutrals in the event of war breaking out between England and Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 468.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 336.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode, as reported in your despatch No. 696 of the 5th instant, in reply to his observations on what I am stated to have said to certain British merchants engaged in the Baltic trade, with reference to the present state of relations between England and Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 469.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 411.)

Foreign Office, December 13, 1853.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government approve your letter to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in transmitting to his Excellency the note signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, a copy of which is inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 437 of the 6th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 470.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 413.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 441 of the 6th instant, inclosing copies of the Protocol and Note which were signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers on the 5th instant, and reporting the proceedings which took place on this occasion, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve the conduct pursued by you at this Conference.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 471.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 414.)

Foreign Office, December 14, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 442 of the 6th instant, reporting your communication to the Turkish Ambassador of the Protocol and Note which had been signed in Conference by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 472.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 953.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 15, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me yesterday the draft of a despatch which he proposed to address to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with reference to the late event in the Black Sea. The despatch, he added, would not be sent to Constantinople until it had received the approval of Her Majesty's Government, for which purpose a copy had been transmitted to Count Walewski. It is not necessary, therefore, for me to go into its contents.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys read to me at the same time a despatch which he had received from Count Walewski, recounting a conversation held with your Lordship in consequence of the desire expressed by the French Government to bind Austria in some formal act to a repetition of the promise which Count Buol had made, both to M. de Bourqueney and to Lord Westmorland, to use the same pressing language at St. Petersburgh in order to obtain the consent of the Russian Government to treat with the Porte under the mediation of the Four Powers, as he was desirous to see employed at the Porte, to ensure the consent of the latter to treat with Russia. Count Walewski represents your Lordship to have told him that you had desired Lord Westmorland to take note (prendre acte) of Count Buol's words, but that you objected to the signature of a Protocol binding the Four Powers to make use of comminatory language towards either of the belligerent Powers which might resist their late proposal; that such language ought not to be held until it was to be followed, if necessary, by acts; and that although it might with justice be addressed to Russia, it could not be employed towards the Ottoman Government, who were only resisting an act of aggression. Count Walewski recounts further the arguments of which he made use to induce your Lordship to change your opinion, and he adds that you expressed your willingness to enter upon the subject with him on a future occasion, should the French Government after hearing your objections persist in the proposal which he had been directed to make.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this afternoon that notwithstanding the objections which your Lordship had stated to Count Walewski, he was desirous that Count Buol's words should, if possible, be consigned to a Protocol; that he thought that the sense of the word "comminatoire" was not clearly understood, that it could not well be translated by the English word "threatening," and that the French Government intended to admonish rather than to threaten. I asked him whether some other word or phrase could not be substituted for "comminatoire," such as "frank and energetic," and he did not seem to object, although he gave me no positive answer.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 473.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 503.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 16, 1853.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 916, stating that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had mentioned to your Excellency that it appeared that some misunderstanding had occurred between the Ambassadors and Admirals of England and France at Constantinople, as to the extent to which the naval forces of the two Powers are placed under the control of the Ambassadors; and I have to inform your Excellency, in reply, that I delayed answering that despatch, as no information respecting this disagreement had at that time been received, either from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe or Admiral Dundas.

No instructions had been issued to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople or to the British Admiral, but those which are in possession of the French Government, and Admiral Dundas was then, and is still, acting under the instructions contained in my letter to the Admiralty of the 2nd of June last, of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch No. 196 to your Excellency of that date, at which time the Admiral was instructed "to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet under his orders which he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador."

I inclose herewith copies of the instructions* of the French Government to Admiral Hamelin, which were communicated to me by M. Baudin on the 4th instant. Those instructions are dated the 12th of October and the 2nd ultimo; and your Excellency will perceive that the first are in exact accordance with those which were addressed on the 8th of October last to Lord Stratford, in my despatch to his Excellency No. 221, a copy of which was transmitted to your Excellency in my despatch No. 404 of the 8th of October, while those of the 2nd ultimo in substance leave the French Admiral under the control and guidance of the French Ambassador, unless war be declared between France and Russia; and the power in express terms is reserved to the Ambassador of judging whether it be expedient to "precipitate, suspend, or even completely to stop the demonstrations of the armed forces."

The French Ambassador at Constantinople would thus appear to be invested with full power to declare war or to remain at peace.

The instructions of the French Ambassador have not been communicated to Her Majesty's Government, but when General Baraguay d'Hilliers was about to proceed to Constantinople, I asked Count Walewski if any new instructions had been given to him, and his Excellency informed me that no change had been made in those previously addressed to M. de la Cour.

I have now received a despatch† from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, of which I inclose a copy, by which it appears that the joint instructions of the Ambassadors to the Admirals were not acted upon, because Admiral Hamelin experienced some difficulty in joining in the measure on account of his having fewer steam-vessels at his disposal than the British Commander-in-chief.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 474.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 444.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 12, 1853.*

COUNT BUOL has requested me to bring under your Lordship's consideration the great importance which he attaches to the establishment between the Four Powers of an agreement as to the mode of proceeding which should be adopted upon the receipt of the reply from the Porte to the collective inquiry which has been addressed to them by the letter to his Excellency Reshid Pasha of the 5th instant.

He is desirous that your Lordship, together with the French Government, should more particularly direct your attention to the manner in which a favourable answer from the Government of the Sultan should be transmitted and recommended to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh. He feels that, while we are waiting for the reply, this important question should be decided, so that upon its arrival not a moment should be lost in placing it before the Emperor Nicholas, with all the weight of the collective recommendation of the Four Powers.

The proposal of the Conference to the Government of the Sultan is founded upon an offer to enter into negotiation from St. Petersburgh addressed to the Cabinet of Vienna, and in strict right Count Buol might be expected to return the answer which is received to it; but he would not go alone to St. Petersburgh, nor would he consent to any form of proceeding by which the collective action of the Four Powers (which has now so satisfactorily been established) should be weakened, besides which, as the answer of the Porte will be to a question addressed to them by the Conference, it remains the property of the Conference, which can only be disposed of according to their decision.

* Nos. 387 and 388. † No. 430.

Count Buol conceives, therefore, that upon the receipt of this reply the Conference should assemble for the purpose of taking cognisance of it, and should state in a protocol their opinions with regard to it, and their decision as to the manner of its transmission to St. Petersburgh. It is as to the manner of this transmission that Count Buol hopes Her Majesty's Government, as well as the French and Prussian Governments, will instruct their Representatives. It might be carried into effect by a note addressed by each of the Representatives to their colleagues at St. Petersburgh, calling upon them to support the opinions and recommendations which, under the directions of their Governments, the Conference had decided upon submitting to the Russian Cabinet: or the Conference might charge the Austrian Cabinet, as the depositary of the original offer of the Russian Government, to transmit the answer of the Porte, while the other Representatives, in an identic note with that which Count Buol would address to the Imperial Cabinet, might call upon their colleagues in St. Petersburgh to give to his recommendations their adhesion and support.

Count Buol stated that he threw out these suggestions for the consideration of your Lordship, merely as those which appeared to him the most likely to obtain the favourable consideration of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; he was induced to make them, and more particularly the latter, by no feeling of vanity or any desire to put himself forward, and should they not be approved by your Lordship, any other proposition which should come from you would meet with his best attention. If these modes of proceeding should not be successful, he felt that the Conference would be called upon to consult together for the purpose of taking ulterior measures which would carry with them the sanction of their collective authority.

Count Buol is very desirous that your Lordship's answer to the request he thus addresses to you should be transmitted so as to arrive in Vienna soon after the 20th instant, when he believes the reply from Constantinople may be expected to arrive, and his anxiety upon this subject is the greater as he is persuaded your Lordship will agree with him that, as soon as that reply is received by the Conference, it would be impossible to delay its communication to St. Petersburgh; he also earnestly recommends that, in the instructions your Lordship may think it advisable to address to me, you may provide against all the different terms of modification and restriction with which it may be supposed the Porte may accompany their acceptation.

In the case of the refusal of the Government of the Sultan to enter into negotiation, which Count Buol in no way contemplates, he hopes your Lordship will also transmit your instructions as to the manner of proceeding which you would recommend the Conference to adopt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 475.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 313.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1853.

I HAVE the satisfaction of informing your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely concur in the views contained in your able and interesting despatch No. 358 of the 24th of November, respecting the position in which the Porte is now placed. Her Majesty's Government do full justice to the firmness and moderation which has been exhibited by the Turkish Government. They admit that adequate preparations for repelling an unjust aggression could not have been made, and that great sacrifices on the part of the people could not have been called for, without at the same time evoking a spirit of enthusiasm which, however useful for its immediate object, may prove a source of future embarrassment to the Porte by fettering its independent action, and disabling it from adopting at the right moment that course of policy which would best promote the interests of Turkey.

If the proposal which, on the 24th of October, your Excellency, by my

despatch No. 234, was instructed to make, had arrived before the commencement of hostilities, before military successes had been obtained, and the national spirit highly excited, it would have caused great dissatisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that a reasonable project of settlement should have been declined. But the contingency had arrived that was contemplated by Her Majesty's Government: the form of proposal had become inapplicable to the altered state of circumstances. But the steps taken by your Excellency in the matter were highly judicious, and, though unsuccessful, may still be productive of useful results. For the Porte must now clearly understand the moral force it has acquired during the last few months in Europe, and how imprudent it would be to expose a position that may be productive of so much future advantage, to the hazards and dangers of a protracted war.

It is to be hoped, therefore, that the Porte will have been prepared by your Excellency's arguments to receive in a proper spirit the proposal sent from Vienna, which is applicable to present circumstances, and is calculated to secure that just and honourable peace which must be the object even of the most successful war.

If the terms proposed by the Porte in answer to the collective note are in their spirit and character reasonable; and if, when communicated by the Four Powers to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, they should be rejected by Russia, Her Majesty's Government would then be of opinion that the time had arrived for adopting measures of more active coercion against a Power which, for its own unjustifiable objects, had shown itself regardless of the best interests of Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 476.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 314.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government have received with feelings of deep regret your Excellency's telegraphic despatch of the 3rd instant, announcing the destruction, by a Russian squadron, on the 30th of November, of a Turkish flotilla at Sinope.

The reports which have since reached this country are of a nature so contradictory that Her Majesty's Government are unable at present to judge of the circumstances which led to this attack upon the Turkish squadron. I inclose the copy of a despatch, received through Her Majesty's Mission at Berlin, from Prince Menchikoff to General Gortchakoff, stating that a Turkish squadron, destined to land troops at Sookum-Kali, was pursued by a division of the Russian fleet to the harbour of Sinope, and forced to engage, on the 30th of November, and thereupon entirely destroyed; but Her Majesty's Government are disinclined to believe this statement, or that the squadron was conveying provisions to Batoum; because at a time when it was known that a Russian fleet was cruizing in the Black Sea, the Turkish Government would have been guilty of extreme imprudence in sending so small a force upon either of the above-mentioned services without sufficient convoy and protection.

If, however, the Turkish squadron was at anchor in the harbour of Sinope, which is Turkish territory, and being found there was attacked and destroyed by the Russian Admiral, such an act would come entirely within the instructions of the 8th of October, No. 221.

Whatever may have been the motive of the attack, the dignity of this country and the interests of Turkey alike require that the most effectual means should be taken to guard against the recurrence of a similar disaster.

Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that on the return of the ships sent to Sinope and to Varna, your Excellency, acting in concert with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, will have directed that the combined fleets should enter the

Black Sea. Special instructions as to the manner in which they should act do not appear to be necessary. We have undertaken to defend the territory of the Sultan from aggression, and that engagement must be fulfilled.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 477.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

Constantinople, 9 Décembre, 1853.

(Telegraphic.)

LES bateaux à vapeur Anglais et Français sont revenus de Sinope, et de Varne à Sinope. Ils ont appris que tous les bâtiments Turcs, au nombre d'onze, ont été détruits; plus de 4,000 Turcs ont péri; les survivants, à quelques exceptions près, ont été apportés ici à bord de la "Retribution" et du "Mogador;" presque tous sont plus ou moins blessés. Ils n'excèdent pas le nombre de 400. La ville de Sinope a beaucoup souffert. Les batteries, qui sont peu de chose, ont aussi souffert. Il paraît que les Turcs ont été les premiers à tirer; ce que n'empêche pas que les Russes n'aient été les agresseurs. Tout en plaignant leur manque de prévoyance, on ne saurait suffisamment admirer le courage et le dévouement des matelots Turcs. Les 6 vaisseaux de ligne Russes ont quitté Sinope le lendemain du combat; on ne sait pas quelles avaries ils ont souffert. A Varne le Capitaine Tatham n'a rien appris des Consuls de Bucharest et de Jassy. Aucun des bâtiments à vapeur n'a vu des bâtiments Russes, ni en allant ni en revenant.

Le Commandant Russe a déclaré que son unique but était de combattre la flotille Turque, pour empêcher de nouveaux soulèvements sur la côte de l'Asie. Il est probable que les escadres sortiront.

L'intention de faire sortir celle du Sultan nous est annoncée; dans le sens de nos instructions sera envoyé à Sevastopol. Je travaille en attendant pour la paix avec un peu plus d'espoir de succès; trois ou quatre jours doivent suffire pour tirer les choses au clair.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

J'apprends par la lecture d'un rapport officiel que les Russes ont continué leur feu avec une cruauté inusitée.

S. DE R.

Expédiée de Semlin, le 17 Décembre, 1853.

(Signé) J. DE FONBLANQUE.

No. 478.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 956.)

Paris, December 16, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me this afternoon that he had received an answer from Count Walewski relative to the instructions which the French Government were desirous of sending to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, but which they had submitted previously for your Lordship's consideration. Allusion was made to these instructions in my despatch No. 953.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that your Lordship wished to separate that part of the instructions which prescribed the prevention for the future of such events as had lately occurred at Sinope, from that which hinted at the manner in which the combined fleets might render assistance to the Turkish Government by furnishing convoys for the safety of their transport service, and that you desired that the latter should be made the subject of a confidential despatch only.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that he had no objection to adopt the division

suggested by your Lordship, and that, although the distinction of general and confidential despatches was unknown to the French service, he would inform General Baraguay d'Hilliers that the question of furnishing convoys from the vessels of the combined fleets must be matter of confidential communication between himself and Her Majesty's Ambassador, and undertaken only on a joint understanding between them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 479.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 957.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 16, 1853.

LATE yesterday afternoon M. Drouyn de Lhuys made me acquainted with the outline of a proposition, to be laid before your Lordship this morning by Count Walewski in the name of the Imperial Government, which has for its object to prevent the repetition of such sanguinary scenes as that lately enacted at Sinope, and to make the Russian Government understand that France and England are determined to hold possession of the Black Sea as an equivalent for the Russian occupation of the Danubian Provinces. This afternoon his Excellency read to me the despatch on this subject, addressed to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship. Whatever Her Majesty's Government may think of the proposition itself, they will do justice to the clearness and precision with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has placed it before them.

Supposing, then, your Lordship to be in possession of this document, I abstain from offering any analysis of its contents, and propose confining myself to a statement of the arguments put forward by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in a lengthened conversation in support of the plan of action which he recommends.

He first examined the abstract right of France and England to interfere in the summary manner which he proposed. He argued that, it being both their interest and their duty to protect the Turkish territory from all aggressive attacks on the part of Russia, motives of humanity should impel them to prevent the repetition of such a carnage as must have accompanied the destruction of the Turkish flotilla at Sinope. They had not, unfortunately, the means (he observed) of enforcing a suspension of hostilities, either upon the Danube or in Asia Minor; but they could enforce it in the Black Sea, and the interests of peace and humanity not only gave them the right, but enjoined them so to do. If the two Governments had not sent their fleets into the Black Sea at an earlier period, it was because they confided in the voluntary assurances of Russia not to prosecute the war by offensive operations, and they were unwilling to meet so laudable a declaration by any act of theirs which could imply distrust, or which might give the Russian Government an excuse for taking a less conciliatory course. Now, however, that Russia had thrown off the mask, he saw no certain means of controlling her action in the Black Sea, but by sweeping that sea of the Russian flag.

That the two Powers were strong enough to enforce their will in this respect, M. de Lhuys would be ashamed to doubt. The Russian fleet must either remain shut up in Sebastopol, or expose itself to certain destruction if it attempted to resist.

But there were other considerations of hardly less importance which M. Drouyn de Lhuys said must be taken into account in the consideration of his proposition. He alluded to the material, moral, and commercial consequences by which it must be followed, should the short-sightedness of Russia give any permanence to its execution.

1st. As to the material effect which would be produced. Besides the forced suspension of hostilities between Turkey and Russia within the limits of the Black Sea, the latter would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to advance from the Principalities on Constantinople, unless she had her sea communications with Odessa and Sebastopol assured; she would be equally unable to transport reinforcements, arms, ammunition, or provisions for the use of the

troops engaged on the Asiatic coast. On the other hand, the various resources of water communication would remain open to the Turks.

2nd. As to the moral effect. At this moment the Russian flag of war was paramount in the Black Sea. In fact, that sea was little better than a Russian lake. The races which inhabited its shores believed probably that there was no navy which could compete with that of Russia, or dispute her maritime preponderance. They would now be taught that there were other nations with superior naval means at their disposal, ready to exert them for the protection of the oppressed. They would be encouraged to rise against their hereditary enemies, and thus render the position of the latter far more perilous.

3rd. With respect to commercial effects. Vessels from the combined fleets would visit every nook and corner of the Black Sea; would sound its coasts and examine its harbours and roadsteads. A more intimate knowledge would thus be gained of the races which people its shores; of their wants; of their means; and of the productions of the countries which they inhabit. Foundations might thus be laid for commercial intercourse of great future value.

It was perhaps natural that in addressing the agent of a Government whose approbation of his plan M. Drouyn de Lhuys was anxious to secure, he should endeavour to show that the individual and general interests of that Government equally invited them to adhere to it. He accordingly took great credit for the disinterestedness of the French Government in proposing a scheme of action which must be of such immense advantage to British interests in Asia, by crippling the means of Russia; imposing on the vacillating policy of Persia; and thus giving greater security to Her Majesty's possessions in India; and he added that he could not conceive that Her Majesty's Government would refuse their consent to a plan which would be productive of such benefit to them.

I was not inclined, with a question of such pressing necessity under my eyes, to enter into a discussion foreign to the purpose. I allowed, therefore, M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations to pass unnoticed, reserving to myself to recur to this exaggerated view of his whenever a fit opportunity occurs.

Passing from the superior claims which M. Drouyn de Lhuys supposed his proposition must have to the sympathy of the British Government and nation, he dwelt with some emphasis on the consequences which it must produce on the policy of Austria. Russia, he argued, excluded from the Black Sea, and humiliated in the eyes of those wild tribes who had thought her invulnerable, would seek compensation elsewhere, and would try to counterbalance her maritime inferiority in the Black Sea by extending her conquests on land. The European provinces of Turkey would become the object of her ambition: Servia, Bosnia, and Montenegro would be menaced, and it would be impossible that Austria should not then attach herself body and soul to the cause for which France and England were striving.

I have left to the last, though it is almost the first in importance, the novel but ingenious idea of holding exclusive possession of the Black Sea by the combined fleets as an equivalent for the continued aggressive occupation of the Principalities by Russia; in other words, of making the reappearance of the Russian flag in those waters depend on the Russian army recrossing the Pruth. This idea is but faintly indicated in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch to Count Walewski, but it is in fact the essence of his proposition. It is in the opinion of the French Government the vindication of the honour of the French and English flags, somewhat compromised by the unremitting efforts of their Governments to solve the Eastern question without compromising the peace of Europe. It is the tardy but merited punishment of Russian presumption. It will be a heavier blow to the pride and prestige of the Czar than an extension of his present iniquitous aggression can counterbalance.

On this latter point, I have thought it my duty to caution M. Drouyn de Lhuys against placing the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by Russia, and the presence of the combined fleets in the Black Sea, on the same footing of irregularity. To do so would be to allow that the Euxine was a "mare clausum," and would be a dangerous admission to make. True, our late Treaties with the Porte effectually shut the Black Sea to our ships of war in time of peace; but the exclusion was the effect and not the stipulation of a Treaty; and it behoved us, in any negotiation on this matter, to keep this distinction in view.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed in this remark.

It only remains for me to state that I have had an opportunity of speaking to the Emperor on the subject of this proposition, and that His Majesty partakes entirely the sentiments of his Minister. He desired me to recommend it in the strongest terms to the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government as a measure incumbent upon himself and them to take, avowing the disappointment which he should feel if a difference of opinion prevented its adoption.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 480.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, December .)

M. le Comte, *Paris, le 15 Décembre*, 1853.

LA dépêche que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous écrire sous le No. 159, vous a fait connaître la première impression du Gouvernement de l'Empereur à la nouvelle de la destruction de la flotille Ottomane dans la rade de Sinopé, et je ne doutais pas qu'elle ne fût complètement partagée par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Je vois par la dépêche télégraphique de Lord Stratford que Lord Clarendon a bien voulu vous communiquer, que nos Représentants à Constantinople ont tout de suite compris la nécessité d'une démonstration de nos forces navales dans la Mer Noire, et je me plais à penser qu'au retour des frégates à vapeur envoyés en reconnaissance à Bourgas et à Sinopé même, ils n'auront pas hésité à faire sortir du Bosphore le gros des deux escadres. L'opération qu'ils se proposaient de seconder, et qui est celle dont Lord Clarendon et moi nous avions eu également l'idée, sera un premier indice de la surveillance qu'il est devenu nécessaire d'exercer sur un côte où nous n'avions pas supposé qu'une agression pût si vite se produire.

En effet nos dernières informations de St. Pétersbourg nous représentaient encore la Russie comme disposée à traiter, et décidée surtout à ne prendre, nulle part, l'offensive. Cette confiance expliquait l'immobilité de nos flottes. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain; et nous ne voulions pas que notre apparition prématurée dans les parages plus rapprochés du territoire Russe risquât d'être prise pour une provocation. L'état de guerre rendait, sans doute, une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre entre les parties belligérantes, mais nous avions été autorisés à inférer des déclarations réitérées de la Russie, que notre réserve serait imitié par elle, et que, ne se méprenant point sur le véritable but de notre démonstration, elle éviterait avec le même soin que nous les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures agressives dans ces limites où, si nous avions pu la croire animée d'intentions différentes, notre action aurait naturellement dû s'exercer concurremment avec la sienne.

En un mot, M. le Comte, nous admettions, sans le dire cependant, que la flotte de Sebastopol protégeât le littoral Asiatique de l'Empire Russe, en éclairât les approches, et en ravitaillât les garnisons; et dans aucune de ces circonstances, nous n'aurions eu à intervenir pour gêner ses mouvements. C'eut été attaquer la Russie; et nous n'avions franchi les Dardanelles que pour défendre la Turquie.

L'expédition dirigée contre Sinopé a donc dépassé toutes nos prévisions. Ce fait modifie également le rôle que nous aurions désiré pouvoir garder jusqu'au bout. A l'usage que nous lui laissions de la mer, dans l'intérêt de sa défense, la Russie a substitué comme une sorte d'abus de sa position pour attaquer notre allié dans ses ports, et non contente d'exercer une souveraineté illégale dans les Principautés du Danube, elle semble vouloir encore étendre, avec toutes les horreurs de la guerre, sa domination absolue sur l'Euxin.

Lorsque le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique ont décidé le mouvement de leurs escadres vers Constantinople, il avait été question, vous vous rappelez, d'inviter nos Amiraux à informer le Commandant-en-chef des forces navales Russes de l'objet de leur mission. Le moment est venu d'accomplir cette démarche, puisque nos ménagements n'ont en définitive servi qu'à empirer la situation.

Je propose donc, M. le Comte, d'ordonner à MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas de déclarer à M. le Prince Menchikoff ou à M. le Vice-Amiral Korniloff, que les Gouvernements de France et d'Angleterre sont résolus à prévenir la répétition de l'événement de Sinopé; que tout bâtiment Russe rencontré en mer par les nôtres sera dorénavant invité à rentrer dans le port de Sébastopol, et que toute agression tentée, malgré cet avertissement, contre le territoire ou le pavillon Ottoman sera repoussée par la force.

Par suite de cette déclaration, nous nous trouverons, conjointement avec la Turquie, les maîtres d'un vaste bassin qui baigne les provinces à la fois les plus importantes et les plus exposées de l'Empire Russe; et à l'occupation de la Valachie et de la Moldavie nous opposerons, tant qu'elle durera, une occupation correspondante dont les conséquences seront assurément plus graves pour le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que celles de la prise de possession des Principautés ne saurait être pour la Porte. Ou l'armée commandée par le Prince Gortchakoff repassera le Pruth, ou nos vaisseaux, autant que la saison le permettra, croiseront dans l'Euxin et intercepteront toutes les communications maritimes de la Russie avec ses Provinces Asiatiques. Nous conserverions ainsi la Mer Noire comme un gage jusqu'à l'évacuation des Principautés et le rétablissement de la paix. En attendant, l'influence de l'Occident, presqu'inconnue dans ses parages, y pénétrera; les dangers auxquels notre présence exposera une domination mal assise; les rapports et les intérêts nouveaux qu'elle peut développer dans des contrées perdues pour le commerce du monde; tels sont, M. le Comte, les sérieux motifs de réflexion qu'une pareille démonstration, accomplie avec vigueur, est faite pour inspirer au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

L'attitude de ce Cabinet, les prétensions qu'il a affichées, l'envahissement de la Moldavie et de la Valachie en pleine paix, l'agression hardie dont Sinopé était le théâtre il y a peu de jours, tout cet ensemble de circonstances annonce des vues et des résolutions que l'Europe ne saurait changer qu'en prenant, à son tour, un parti énergique; et je n'en vois pas, pour le moment, de plus efficace que celui que je viens d'indiquer. La France et l'Angleterre par l'indépendance de leur politique et les moyens dont elles disposent, se trouvent appelées à se décider les premières. C'est une tâche, M. le Comte, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est de son côté disposé à la soutenir avec lui. La volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale est donc que vous en transmettiez l'assurance à Lord Clarendon, en lui remettant copie de cette dépêche.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 481.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 963.)

Paris, December 18, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this afternoon a short despatch which he had received from Count Walewski, written after that Ambassador had submitted to your Lordship yesterday the proposition of the French Government respecting the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea.

Count Walewski says that your Lordship had put two questions to him:

1st. Whether the French Government proposed to prevent the Turks from undertaking any maritime expedition against Russia.

2nd. Whether they proposed making any communications on the subject to the Austrian and Prussian Governments.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys will answer Count Walewski, that for the present it would be perhaps advisable to interdict all maritime operations on the part of the Turks against the Russian territory; that this would be more in accordance with the humane intentions of the two Governments put forward in his proposition; and would perhaps give them greater authority in urging the adoption of analogous measures by land on Austria and Prussia; but he is of opinion that no engagement should be taken on the matter, and that while a summary declaration should be made to Russia that the Black Sea is shut to her, the action of the Turkish fleet should be regulated by a friendly understanding between the Ambassadors and the Porte.

With regard to making a communication to the Austrian and Prussian Governments, M. Drouyn de Lhuys conceives that it will be impolitic to consult those Governments respecting the operations of the fleets, but that whenever France and England have agreed on the measures which are to be taken, it will be proper to make Austria and Prussia acquainted with their intentions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 482.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 140. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 15, 1853.

THE Chevalier Bunsen has written to Baron Manteuffel saying that your Lordship had mentioned having heard from an undoubted source that the King of Prussia had lately written a private letter to the Emperor of Russia explanatory of the political position which Prussia had assumed on the Oriental question.

Baron Manteuffel told me that on addressing to the King an inquiry on this subject, His Majesty said that he had written to the Emperor, and that he had quite forgotten to show him a copy of the letter which His Majesty then placed in his hands.

Baron Manteuffel expressed his regret that His Majesty had written this letter; but he assured me that it did not contain anything of that positive nature which apparently had been reported to your Lordship.

Baron Manteuffel, on my referring to the conversation I had with his Excellency as reported in my despatch No. 128 of the 7th instant, stated that at that time he had no cognisance of His Majesty having addressed any private communication to the Emperor.

I inquired of his Excellency whether the King was still steady in the opinions he had represented to me at different periods as being entertained by His Majesty.

Baron Manteuffel replied in the affirmative, saying that, that very evening His Majesty had impressed upon him the necessity of acting upon France through England, "comme c'est notre allié naturel;" to which I added, "et le plus sûr."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 483.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 17, 1853.

IN conversation with Baron Manteuffel on the 14th instant, his Excellency informed me that he had not yet been able to induce the King to sign the letter to the Emperor of Russia which, as I reported to your Lordship in my despatch No. 128 of the 7th instant, he had submitted to His Majesty's approbation.

His Excellency told me, however, that His Majesty had given his assent to a despatch which he had drawn up to General Rochow, instructing him to use his best endeavours to urge the Russian Government to accept the propositions which the Four Powers had lately agreed to at Vienna.

His Excellency has further addressed, by this evening's courier, a private letter to General Rochow, stating that the Emperor of Russia would be held responsible if the peace of Europe were disturbed; and that he could not conceive it possible that His Imperial Majesty would, after all his assurances and protestations, determine to plunge Europe into war for a mere "form," for, in fact, the question at issue could only be viewed in that light.

His Excellency received this morning, from Count Arnim, a reply to his invitation to Count Buol, to address a joint recommendation to the Emperor of Russia to adopt the pacificatory views of the Four Powers to bring about a reconciliation with the Porte.

Count Buol replied, without refusing positively to concur in this proposal, that he had already addressed a despatch in this sense to Baron Lebzeltern; and that he did not think that any further advice tendered would be either necessary or useful.

Baron Manteuffel tells me that the terms of the proposal he made were very explicit; stating that it behoved the Two German Powers to use all their influence at St. Petersburgh in the cause of peace, and in furtherance of their own essential interests to oppose the present policy of Russia.

His Excellency expressed his opinion of the sincerity of the present Austrian policy, viewing it rather as a matter of necessity than of choice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 484.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 143.)
My Lord,

Berlin, December 17, 1853.

I WAITED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, and in conformity with your Lordship's despatch No. 91, communicated to his Excellency the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government that the Prussian Government had agreed to the collective note and protocol, by which a means of reconciliation is sought to be attained between Russia and the Porte; and I expressed to his Excellency the hopes of Her Majesty's Government, that the firm and united action of the Four Powers may lead to the results contemplated in his Excellency's despatch addressed on that occasion to Count Arnim.

I took this opportunity to refer to the continuance of the Prussian agents in the Principalities. I stated that the departure of the Hospodars, and the entire assumption of the civil and military government of those provinces by Russia, would place those agents in a very embarrassing position; and that some occasion would undoubtedly arise where they would be brought into relationship with the Russian authorities, which, even were it not to occasion a virtual, would be viewed as a tacit recognition of Russian usurpation.

Baron Manteuffel said that he had looked into the original instructions which had been furnished to these consular servants, and he found that they were purely for commercial and not for political purposes; that they were under the Prussian Minister at Constantinople accredited to the Sultan; that they had only their commercial duties to perform, and that they had received the strictest injunctions to take no step which could compromise their Government by any recognition of Russian dominion.

His Excellency stated that they had not only the interests of Prussian subjects, but those of the Zollverein to watch over; and he had been informed, that there had lately been several failures of Prussian merchants in those provinces whose affairs, in default of their administration, would have fallen into the hands of the Russians.

I could plainly see that Baron Manteuffel is further indisposed to take a

step which might give umbrage to Russia, and is of opinion that they should remain at their posts, confining themselves strictly to their commercial relations.

His Excellency, however, informed me that the Consul-General at Jassy, M. König, is at present here, and, under present circumstances, will not return to Jassy. The Prussian Consul at Galatz, M. Moroni, has lately been called to Constantinople, as an assistant to Baron Wildenbruch; so that the question of their recall merely relates to Baron Meusenbach, the Consul-General at Bucharest.

I did not press the matter further on his Excellency, as I perceived that it would be useless for me to do so, and I thought it better to await another opportunity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 485.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 144. Confidential.)
My Lord,

Berlin, December 17, 1853.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that Baron Budberg, the Russian Minister, in a late interview with his Excellency, had expressed himself in very strong and excited language, such as he could not repeat; his anger had been kindled at the reproduction in the Berlin press of the announcement in the French "Moniteur," of the unity of the Four Powers on the Eastern question, and his object was to induce Baron Manteuffel to insert an article to contradict the assertion as relating to Prussia.

Baron Manteuffel flatly refused this request; adding that he would not have done so, had it even been expressed in much stronger terms.

Baron Budberg then endeavoured to inspire Baron Manteuffel with fears of the eventual consequences which the signature of the Protocol might produce to Prussia, saying that the Emperor of the French would now force them to act up to it, and that they would be obliged to sign further acts destructive of their independence and free action.

Baron Manteuffel replied that the Protocol contained nothing that could or ought to be distasteful to Russia, and that the Emperor ought rather to be thankful for the assistance thus offered to the work of pacification.

Baron Budberg said, that even though Europe was against Russia, it would not deter her from making war. He then continued: "Vous voulez donc forcer l'Empereur à refuser les offres qui pourront lui être faits après tous les sacrifices qu'il a fait pour le repos de l'Europe. Eh bien! nous n'en ferons plus; vous verrez ce qui vous arrivera."

From the tone in which Baron Manteuffel repeated to me this conversation, I could discern that neither Baron Budberg's irritable manner, nor his excited language, had produced any effect on his Excellency's calm and sound judgment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 486.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 417.)
My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 441 of the 12th instant, stating the anxiety of Count Buol that the Representatives of the several Powers at Vienna should be provided with such instructions as may enable them, on the arrival of the Porte's answer to the collective note, forthwith to adopt the further measures which may thereupon be found necessary.

The point particularly adverted to by Count Buol is the manner in which

the communication is to be made to St. Petersburgh, on the receipt, which he scarcely doubts, of a satisfactory answer from the Porte; whether the communications should proceed from the Ministers of the Four Powers, or from the Austrian Minister alone, but supported by a subsequent communication on the part of his colleagues. But Count Buol also wishes to know how an unsatisfactory answer from the Porte is to be dealt with.

I have to state to your Lordship in reply, that the subject has received the careful consideration of Her Majesty's Government, who agree with Count Buol that the Conference should, as far as is practicable, be furnished with instructions, in order to avoid delay upon the arrival at Vienna of the answer of the Porte to the collective note. That answer, as Count Buol justly observes, is the property of the Conference, and can only be dealt with in the manner that may be unanimously agreed upon by the Four Powers.

It is difficult to provide for the various contingencies that may arise, and for circumstances that cannot be foreseen; and Her Majesty's Government, while endeavouring to guard against delay, are anxious that no course should hastily be adopted which might prove a cause for regret hereafter.

It is only upon the following cases that Her Majesty's Government consider that precise instructions can with safety be given to your Lordship:

Should the terms proposed by the Porte be in conformity with the instructions given to the Four Representatives at Constantinople, and such consequently as in the unanimous opinion of the Conference ought to be accepted by the Emperor of Russia, your Lordship is instructed to agree to their being sent forthwith to St. Petersburgh. Should those terms, however, be of a character to render them unacceptable to Russia, your Lordship is not authorised to agree to any change or modification of them. The answer of the Porte must then be transmitted to London for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

Your Lordship will inform Count Buol that Her Majesty's Government would think it neither proper nor expedient to be party to any communication to Russia in a form different to that which was observed towards the Porte. A collective note was sent to Constantinople, and a similar document should therefore be transmitted to St. Petersburgh. But as the basis of the recent communication to the Porte was an assurance given by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, in answer to an inquiry from the Austrian Government, that the Emperor was ready to treat, notwithstanding the commencement of hostilities, and as Count Buol has suggested that he might be authorised to communicate the answer of the Porte to the Russian Government, your Lordship is authorised to agree to a collective note to Count Nesselrode, stating the terms (I assume that those terms are unanimously adopted by the Conference) on which the Turkish Government is prepared to negotiate a Treaty of Peace, and earnestly recommending, in the name of the Four Powers, that they should be adopted by Russia, in order to put an end to the deplorable effusion of blood and, to a state of things in the East which, if further prolonged, must involve Europe in a general war. This note might then be placed in the hands of Count Buol by your Lordship and your French and Prussian colleagues, in the same manner that the collective note to Reshid Pasha was confided to your Lordship for transmission to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, upon the condition, however, that Count Buol shall cause it to be presented at St. Petersburgh, when it will be supported by the Ministers of the Four Powers at that Court, in the event of any proceedings not being successful which in the meanwhile Count Buol may think proper to adopt for the purpose of securing the assent of the Emperor of Russia.

On the other hand, should these proceedings lead to the result desired, and Count Buol be charged to express the willingness of the Emperor of Russia to agree to the terms proposed, and to send a Plenipotentiary to treat with a Turkish Plenipotentiary under the mediation of the Four Powers, no further demand on the part of the Conference would be necessary. Your Lordship will, however, clearly explain to Count Buol that in this matter Her Majesty's Government can make no distinction between Russia and the Porte, and that they can be no party to a communication with the former Power except in conjunction with Austria, France, and Prussia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

P.S.—The Government of the Emperor of the French concurs with Her Majesty's Government upon this course of proceeding, and similar instructions will be sent to the Baron de Bourqueney.

C.

No. 487.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.

(No. 368.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 4, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH the operations of the Sultan's armies, both on the Danube and in Asia, whether acting offensively or defensively, have been hitherto attended in every instance with more or less advantage, Fortune has by no means shown an equal degree of favour to His Majesty's naval forces in the Black Sea. Two frigates under Ottoman colours, one of them belonging to a Turkish Navigation Company, have been captured by the Russians, who in their turn have undergone some loss of men, if not, in one instance, of shipping. But far worse than this, there is much reason to apprehend that a Turkish flotilla, composed of seven frigates, three corvettes, and two war-steamers, have, with the exception of one of the steamers, been utterly destroyed by a Russian squadron in the port, or bay, of Sinope.

Our information is still imperfect; but we know enough of the circumstances to warrant the most painful forebodings.

At my request, on a full understanding with the French Ambassador, and agreeably to a wish expressed by the Captain Pasha, Vice-Admiral Dundas has sent Her Majesty's steam-frigate "Retribution" to Sinope this morning for information. A French steam-frigate has been sent simultaneously on the same errand.

We have also sent two steamers, one of each nation, to Varna and other places on the Turkish coast in Europe.

The nature of the instructions addressed to the respective commanders may be collected from the accompanying copy of my despatch to Vice-Admiral Dundas. That part of it which relates to Her Majesty's Consuls at Bucharest and Jassy, is exclusively a British concern.

Rumours of Russian ships of the line being at sea have occasionally prevailed for some time. Uncertainty of information, a wish to avoid as long as possible the chances of collision, the arrival of a new French Ambassador, and the state of the weather, were natural causes of demur in coming to a decision as to sending the squadrons into the Black Sea at this time of year.

Soon after my return to town for the winter, four or five days ago, I received an official note from Reshid Pasha, announcing the appearance of six Russian sail of the line off Sinope, and of several Russian frigates off other parts of the Asiatic coast. Copies of this note, and of the statement annexed to it, are inclosed herewith.

After seeing Reshid Pasha at his house, I had an interview with General Baraguay d'Hilliers, which terminated in our agreeing to meet again the next day, in company with the two Admirals, who were at some considerable distance up the Bosphorus.

Scarcely three hours had elapsed from the time of our separation when we heard of the disaster at Sinope, of which I obtained next morning a melancholy confirmation.

Although the intelligence had not been conveyed to us officially, it was evident that a heavy loss had been suffered by the Turkish Government, and, consequently, our meeting was so far changed in character that we had less to consider how to prevent than how to redress the misfortune which had occurred.

Our first thought was to send out a sufficient force to Sinope with the view of delivering the town and port from whatever portion of the Russian squadron might have remained there after the action. The extreme probability that such a measure would have led immediately to war with Russia, a result which Her Majesty's Government are anxious, if it be possible, to avoid, inclined us to take

the preliminary step which I have stated above. I felt at the same time how desirable it was in other respects that the combined squadrons should at once appear in the Black Sea, and your Lordship's instructions would have borne me out in taking that course, after we had acquired a positive knowledge of so large a portion of the Russian fleet as six sail-of-the-line being not only at sea, but employed in carrying destruction into the very ports of Turkey. But other considerations required a share of my attention. The cordial concurrence of our ally was an object of primary importance. A professional opinion was expressed in favour of our waiting for the return of the steam-frigates. That opinion was grounded on the risk of missing them at sea by reason of the fogs and violent winds prevailing in the Euxine at this time of year. It was also advisable for the Admirals to be within reach of consultation when the intelligence from Sinope should enable us to come to a conclusive decision.

The time necessary for this purpose is not likely to exceed an interval of five days; and we shall in all probability have to make our choice between two courses; one being to send out the squadrons with the immediate view of clearing Sinope of the Russians, and the other to protect the coasts generally, apprising the Russian Admiral at Sebastopol of our intention.

In either case, my Lord, it is painfully evident that the peace of Europe is exposed to the most imminent danger; nor do I see how we can either with honour or with prudence, taken in its larger and truer sense, abstain longer from entering the Black Sea in force at every risk, and thereby redeeming the pledge which has in fact been given, not only to the Porte, but to all Europe, by the presence of our squadron here. God knows that we have carried forbearance and the love of peace to an extent productive of much embarrassment, and fraught with perilous contingencies!

It cannot be denied, that the necessity which now impels us, when traced to its origin, leaves the whole responsibility with those who have trampled on principles which the Powers of Christendom united with Turkey ten years ago to proclaim and to respect.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I may as well add, that according to the opinion intimated by both Admirals, it will not be prudent to send out a part only of the combined squadrons, in the present state, as far as we know, of the Russian fleet at Sebastopol.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 487.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, December 3, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to request that you will send one of Her Majesty's steam-vessels under your command, with the least practicable delay, to Sinope, in order to make inquiry there, and to report as to the exact circumstances attending the action which took place in that port on the 30th ultimo, between the Turkish flotilla at anchor there, and a Russian force consisting of six line-of-battle ships.

It is particularly desirable to know what has since become of the Russian squadron, and in what condition the port, town, and batteries, if any, of Sinope, now are.

The French Ambassador writes in a similar sense to the Commander-in-chief of the French squadron; and Vice-Admiral Hamelin is prepared to send a French steam-frigate with the one to be dispatched by you.

We desire that the officers respectively in command are to avoid communication with any Russian man-of-war; but should a necessity for communicating appear, to state that they are destined for points on the Ottoman coast in connexion with the interests of the two Governments. If told not to proceed, they are to retire, after protesting, if the Russian force be superior to theirs; but to persist in going to their destination, if that force be equal or inferior.

I have further to request that you will send a steam-vessel to Varna for the purposes stated in my despatch of the 11th ultimo, the execution of which, as you know, has been delayed by unavoidable considerations. The French Admiral is also to send a steam-vessel in company; but as there are objections to going at present beyond the Turkish line of coast, that part which relates to Sulina had better remain suspended.

In case of favourable weather, it might be well to include Kavarna in the inspection of the Turkish coast; and should the Consuls from Bucharest and Jassy not have reached Varna, to wait two or three days for their arrival.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 487.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Traduction.) 28 *Safer*, 1270. (*November* 29, 1853.)

J'ENVOIE ci-inclus à votre Excellence, à fin qu'elle en prenne connaissance, copie d'une dépêche arrivée de la part du commandant des bâtiments de la flotte Impériale qui se trouvent à Sinope, et par laquelle il nous informe qu'une division de vaisseaux de guerre Russe croise à l'embouchure du port de Sinope, et dans les eaux de Sinope, et qu'une division croise dans les parages de Bartin et d'Amastra.

J'ai fait la même communication à l'Ambassade de France.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

Inclosure 3 in No. 487.

Annex to Note of Reshid Pasha of November 29, 1853.

(Traduit du Turc.)

LE lendemain du départ de son Excellence Moustapha Pasha, jour de Mercredi, vers les sept heures (à la Turque) on a aperçu à la distance d'environ dix milles de l'Ile de Sinope sept bâtiments à voile et deux bateaux à vapeur. Ces bâtiments viennent avec un vent de nord-est vers le port de Sinopé. Nous avons fait faire immédiatement bran-le-bas aux bâtiments de la flotte Impériale que nous avons, et les deux bateaux à vapeur, savoir, le "Taif" et "l'Erighly," ont mis leurs roux en état de tourner, et nous nous sommes préparés.

Des sept bâtiments les quatre se sont separés et sont entrés dans le port, et les autres trois vaisseaux, ainsi que les deux bâtiments à vapeur, sont restés devant le Cap Indjé Bournou. Trois vaisseaux de ligne et un brig, c'est à dire, quatre bâtiments, sont entrés dans le port susmentionné, et puis ils ont fait de longues bordées vers Cinrgé, après quoi ayant fait tira-mola (une espèce de manœuvre) ils venaient droit à nous, et quoiqu'ils sont venus à une distance qui était loin de la portée des boulets, ils se sont mis à louvoyer à pleines voiles, et vers le soir ils se sont éloignés de la terre et ont gagné le large.

Le lendemain, Jeudi, vers les six heures, on a aperçu de nouveau sept bâtiments, savoir, six vaisseaux de ligne et un brig, et deux bateaux à vapeur. Les trois ont convoyé, portant peu de voiles, à l'embouchure de l'endroit sus-mentionné jusqu'au soir, et vers le soir ils ont repris le large. Enfin, six vaisseaux, un brig, et deux bateaux à vapeur sont toujours à l'embouchure du port sus-dits, et tantôt ils se mettent en panne, et tantôt ils convoyant.

Six à huit frégates et deux bateaux à vapeur ont été vus à la hauteur du port de Bartin et d'Amastre, et cette nouvelle est certaine. Or, l'arsenal de l'ennemi est près d'ici, il peut donc se renforcer, ou bien nous attaquer avec des brulots, ce qui est présumable. Cela étant, si on ne nous envoye pas des renforts, et que notre position reste la même pour quelque temps—Dieu nous en préserve!—il se peut bien que la flotte Impériale essuye quelque perte.

No. 488.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 370.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 5, 1853.*

COPIES of three despatches, which I have recently received from Her Majesty's Vice-Consul at Samsoon, are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. They relate, in general, to the naval operations in progress along the Asiatic sea-board of Turkey; and show how greatly a confirmed ascendancy on the part of Russia is likely to prove injurious to the interests of commerce, and to the Porte's maritime establishments on that line of coast. The scarcity of grain in Western Europe presents an additional consideration of no small importance.

Your Lordship will perceive from Mr. Guarracino's reports, that the danger to which the Turkish flotilla at Sinope was exposed had not escaped observation before the catastrophe. Unfortunately, our knowledge of the position was not obtained in time to prevent the disaster which has occurred. I have proposed to my French colleague a joint expression to the Porte of our opinion that an inquiry into the causes of that occurrence ought to be instituted. It is probable that the step will be taken as soon as complete information arrives from the scene of action. Meanwhile, it is whispered that the Captain Pasha will find it difficult to retain his office. In case of his dismissal, a professional man will probably be appointed in his place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 488.

Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Samsoon, November 22, 1853.*

I AVAIL of the departure of an express dispatched by land by our Pasha, to report to your Excellency that, two days ago, a Turkish steamer, called the "Medari Tidjaret," was captured about fifteen miles outside of Sinope by a Russian squadron of seven sail and one war-steamer, which has been cruizing within sight of Sinope for some days back. The "Medari Tidjaret" was proceeding to Constantinople, and had taken on board at Sinope a quantity of rice for the use of the arsenal, a number of packages of merchandize belonging to merchants and groups, to the amount of 150,000 piastres, they say.

At the time the "Medari Tidjaret" was captured, there were seven Turkish sailing men-of-war at anchor at Sinope. After hearing of the capture of the steamer, the commander of this squadron gave orders that the ship should put to sea directly; and the steamers lit their fires to prepare, but a contrary order was issued soon after.

I am not exactly aware in what position English vessels would be placed were they met by Russian men-of-war at present; but I think it well to report to your Excellency, that several British merchant-vessels are about to load corn on this coast, and that an English merchant screw-steamer will commence to ply on this line, running backwards and forwards between Constantinople, this place, and Trebizond, this week, carrying Turkish passengers and merchandize.

As the express leaves immediately, and is calling out for this despatch, I must beg your Excellency to excuse haste.

I have, &c.

(Signed) F. GUARRACINO.

Inclosure 2 in No. 488.

Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Samsoon, November 25, 1853.*

I HAD the honour to report to your Excellency on the 22nd instant, by overland post, the capture by the Russians of the Turkish steamer "Medari Tidjaret." I now beg to acquaint your Lordship that a merchant-vessel, which arrived here the day before yesterday with a Jerusalem flag, met the Russian squadron which I mentioned as cruizing in the neighbourhood of Sinope, and was boarded by several boats from one of the Russian ships, and examined to see if there were any ammunition or Government stores on board for the Turks. The captain of the merchant-vessel, who is a Greek, was then ordered to go close to a Russian frigate, the captain of which interrogated him about the news from Constantinople, the number of English and French men-of-war at anchor in the Bosphorus, and asked exultingly if the capture of two Turkish steamers by the Russians had been heard of at the capital. The Greek captain tells me that this Russian squadron is composed of seven sail of frigates and corvettes, and one large steamer; that the vessels appeared to form a line across the Black Sea, or from north to south, and commencing about fifteen miles from this coast, so that it would be almost impossible for any ship to pass to and fro, between this and Constantinople, without being observed by the Russians. There are two or three Turkish craft at Sinope laden with corn from this, the captains of which are afraid to proceed with their cargoes lest they should fall into the hands of the Russians.

The Greek captain before mentioned told me that he was also accosted by a Russian corvette about 100 miles on this side of the Bosphorus, and that this corvette ran foul of his vessel in approaching her, and carried away her jib-boom and fore-topmast; the vessel in port is now minus this part of her rigging. These Russian cruizers will prove very prejudicial to the trade of this coast, and to many Constantinople merchants who have Turkish vessels laden with corn, because the masters of these are kept in port now from fear of the Russians, and in two or three weeks hence they will be afraid to venture out to sea on account of the weather, so that the cargoes of corn will most probably remain on their way until spring.

Yesterday nearly 100 horses, for the use of the Turkish army, left this for Trebizond and Batoom under an escort provided by the Pasha. The horses were voluntarily and gratuitously given by merchants and other natives, both Mahomedans and Rayahs, of this place and the neighbouring towns of Baffra and Charshambah.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FREDK. GUARRACINO.

Inclosure 3 in No. 488.

Vice-Consul Guarracino to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Samsoon, November 26, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that Tufan Pasha read a "mazbata" to me yesterday afternoon which he had just received from the medjlis of Unieh (a town twenty hours eastward of this), stating that the captain of a Turkish vessel, which had arrived on its way to Trebizond from Penderikli, laden with coals for the Ottoman Steam Company, had deposed before the Council that, not far from Cape Kerempeh, he had met four Russian two-deckers, two frigates, and a steamer; that the latter boarded him and ordered him to surrender, upon which the Turkish captain told the Russian commander that his vessel contained a cargo of coals, going to Trebizond for the Austrian Lloyd's Company; that, hearing this, the Russians made him take an oath that his statement was true, and that, on his swearing to this effect, the commander of the steamer made him give up about 1,800 kintals, or nearly 100 tons of coals, for which a receipt was delivered to him, with directions to give it to the Austrian

agent, telling him to pass the coals taken in his accounts, and that they would be paid for. The Turkish captain was then obliged to give up what ready cash he had on board (the "mizbata" mentions nearly 10,000 piastres), with a small cannon and a brace of pistols, and was allowed to continue his voyage.

Tufan Pasha said he would report this occurrence to the Porte; and mentioned that, if some steps were not taken to prevent it, the trade of this coast would be completely stopped, and that he likewise felt some anxiety respecting the fate of the vessels loading in this roadstead, as no assistance or defence that could be afforded from the miserable town-batteries could prevent Russian men-of-war from approaching and capturing them while at anchor. I consider the Pasha quite right in this conclusion.

Tufan Pasha's remarks about the Turkish squadron lying at Sinope were also not very flattering.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDK. GUARRACINO.

No. 489.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 271.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1853.

The Turkish Council of Ministers assembled yesterday to take the late unfortunate occurrence at Sinope into consideration. An official note, addressed to the British and French Ambassadors, containing a request that the combined squadrons should be sent forthwith into the Black Sea, was in consequence ordered to be drawn up. A draft, sanctioned by the Sultan, was immediately prepared for transmission to the two Embassies, and a translation of it, which is inclosed herewith, reached me this morning.

I have since communicated by message with the French Ambassador, and, according to the tenour of his Excellency's reply, as reported to me, we are agreed as to the propriety of complying with the Porte's request, under a reserve of consulting the Admirals professionally. We are also, as it appears, of the same opinion as to recommending an inquiry into the causes of the late disaster at Sinope, and referring to the Admirals officially for advice as to the expediency of sending the Turkish squadron to sea. We believe their impression to be that the Porte's line-of-battle ships are not in a condition to navigate the Black Sea with impunity at this season.

I shall be careful to make the Ottoman Ministers understand that, whatever nautical assistance may be given by the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, it will not be intended thereby to make any difference as to the desire of peace, and the ground on which the principle of a pacific arrangement is to be looked for.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 489.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Traduction.) *8 Rebiul-evvel*, 1270. (*December* 4, 1853.)

VOTRE Excellence a été informée dernièrement par une note officielle que des vaisseaux de guerre Russes croisaient dans les parages de Sinopé.

Nous apprenons par le rapport du commandant du bateau à vapeur le "Taif," qui vient d'arriver de Sinopé, que Mercredi le 29 Safer (30 Novembre), trois vaisseaux Russes à trois ponts, trois vaisseaux de ligne, et deux frégates sont entrés dans le port de Sinopé, et ont attaqué une division de la flotte Impériale que s'y trouvait et qui était composée de frégates et de corvettes.

Le résultat du combat n'est pas encore connu; mais à juger de la

position de cette division et de la supériorité des forces de l'ennemi, elle doit avoir beaucoup souffert.

Or, l'objet salutaire de la présence des flottes Anglais et Française dans le Bosphore est de protéger le littoral Ottoman; et, quant aux forces maritimes Russes, ce qu'elles viennent de faire montre qu'elles attaqueront telles parties des côtes où des succès leur paraitront possibles.

La défense d'une si grande étendu de côtes exige, d'ailleurs, la présence dans la Mer Noire d'une force maritime suffisante. La Sublime Porte a l'intention d'expédier sa flotte dans la Mer Noire. Mais, comme ces forces maritimes qui seront expédiées, à cause de ce qui vient de passer à Sinopé, ne pourront pas suffire, il est devenu nécessaire de recourir aux efforts actifs des deux Puissances alliées.

C'est ce que je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance, comme je l'ai porté à celle de l'Ambassade de France, et je saisis cette occasion de renouveler à votre Excellence des assurances de ma haute considération.

(Signé) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

No. 490.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 20.)

(No. 272.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 5, 1853.

THE despatches from Persia, which I forward to-day by the messenger Pardie, will inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the Shah's Court had found it necessary to suspend his diplomatic relations with the Persian Government. Your Lordship will observe that Mr. Thompson attributes in part to Russian influence that temper of the Government which prevailed against his earnest and repeated demands of reparation for the offence of which he had to complain.

A day or two before Mr. Thompson's correspondence reached me, I received from the Persian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court two communications, putting me in possession of notes which he had just addressed to Reshid Pasha on the questions of Kotoor and the Kerbela indemnity. On both subjects his language is sufficiently peremptory, and, unhappily, on both the claims of his Government are more or less well-founded.

On visiting Reshid Pasha immediately after my arrival in town, I drew his attention to the above-mentioned circumstances; and, expressing an apprehension of some hostility on the part of Persia, made no concealment of my regret at the indifference with which my repeated admonitions on the subject had been heretofore received.

On the same afternoon an express arrived at the Porte with despatches, later by seven days than the date of Mr. Thompson's, from the Ottoman Ambassador at Tehran. Copies, or rather translations, of these despatches are inclosed herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government. I received the originals before they had been sent to the Sultan. Your Lordship will learn from their contents that Russia has bribed high with promise and menace to obtain the concurrence of Persia in her present war against Turkey. Unfortunately it is to be feared, indeed it is all but certain, that the Russian offer has been accepted; and it would seem that the Turkish Ambassador, despairing of any successful resistance, intended to leave his post, after going through the formality of ascertaining by diplomatic application the correctness of the conviction which he had already acquired, that nothing could be done against the preponderance of Russia.

The Porte is waiting for the last conclusive information from her Ambassador. I need not point out to your Lordship the extreme gravity of the circumstances related above, not only as affecting the Porte's immediate interests, but also as bearing on those of our trade.

It is not improbable that the courier charged with the Russian proposals to the Shah left Petersburgh about the time when the Emperor Nicholas decided

upon the promulgation of his last manifesto against Turkey, but long after the adoption of those measures which appear to menace the independence of Khiva, and, eventually, the remains of our influence in Affghanistan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 490.

The Persian Chargé d'Affaires to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Translation.) *Constantinople, November* 20, 1853.

THE Turkish authorities, in contravention of Treaty and of the *status quo*, have seized upon and taken possession of Kotoor, a dependence of the province of Khoï, and notoriously the undisputed property of Persia. The Commissioners of the high mediating Powers visited the place, and most justly declared that it belonged clearly to Persia, and had nothing to do with the question of delimitation; and it is unjust that it should not have been evacuated before this.

The Sublime Porte has in consequence been officially requested to cause Kotoor to be evacuated without delay, and to communicate the decision taken upon this subject to me.

A copy of my official report is herewith inclosed for your Excellency's information, and I beg to solicit your good offices in the matter in question.

(Seal.)

Inclosure 2 in No. 490.

The Persian Chargé d'Affaires to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) 18 *Sefer*, 1270. (*November* 16, 1853.)

YOUR Excellency is aware that it was stipulated in Article III of the Treaty of Erzeroom that the Contracting Parties engaged themselves, by virtue of that very Treaty, to abandon respectively all claims upon the territory of the other, and, as a corollary to that engagement, to appoint officers and engineers from each Power for the delimitation of the frontiers. The two Mussulman States accordingly dispatched their respective Commissioners to the frontier, with the concurrence of the Commissioners of the Two Mediating Powers; which latter Powers, moreover, decided at the same time that the duties of the Commissioners should be limited to tracing the frontier upon the map, and forwarding it to their respective Governments, and that they should act strictly upon the principle of the *status quo*, abstaining altogether from any interference or occupation, whether open or secret, as regarded respectively the tribes, subjects, and territories at that period actually in the possession of the other party. In spite of these conditions, however, Dervish Pasha, who had been appointed frontier Commissioner by the Ottoman Government, immediately upon his arrival at the frontier, without waiting for the presence of the other Commissioners, and before commencing the survey of the boundary, has proceeded to violate the principle of *status quo* by seizing and forcibly occupying the territory of Kotoor, a dependency of the province of Khoi, and a positive, clear, and indisputable possession of the Kingdom of Persia. He has there erected a stone slab, upon which he has caused the following inscription to be carved:

"The boundary of the Imperial Ottoman Empire in the district of Kotoor, year 1265" (A.D. 1848).

He has also committed numerous acts of aggression and violent interference in the aforesaid territory, such as forming military posts with artillery, appointing a Kaimakam, numbering the families and heads, levying the military conscription, raising the revenue, building numerous and strongly fortified castles, guardhouses, barracks, as also hospitals, mosques, storehouses, mills, and many other buildings of the like description. Such are among the manifold aggressions, territorial and others, committed by the agents of the Ottoman Government upon the Kingdom of Persia, on its frontier. Since, in accordance with the instructions and plan of action which I received from my Government for my guidance, the most important part of the duties of my mission consist in demanding the cessation of the aggressive occupation of Kotoor, and since, on my first arrival upon this mission in Constantinople, I communicated in writing with and informed their Excellencies the Representatives of the two Courts residing there, in virtue of their character as mediators, to that effect; I have now accordingly proceeded to address this official note to the Sublime Porte, and to demand of right and officially the discontinuance of the aggressive occupation of Kotoor, a positive, clear, and indisputable portion of Persian territory. This aggression has been committed by the agents of the Ottoman Government, in violation of the *status quo*, of the explicit declaration of the Treaty, and of the rights of the tribes, before the Commissioners of the Four Powers had commenced the frontier survey; and if now, after the investigations of the Commissioners, a stop is not put to this forcible occupation, what occasion is there for any further settlement of the frontier henceforth? But, please God, considering the unanimity existing between the two States, I trust that the Porte will come to the decision of terminating its forcible occupation of the above district, and that your Excellency will speedily acquaint me with its decision to that effect.

Inclosure 3 in No. 490.

The Ottoman Ambassador in Persia to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) 11 *Sefer*, 1270. (*November* 12, 1853.)

I HAVE the honour to represent, that in my report to your Excellency of the last of Shaval it was clearly stated, that although in all the questions which had hitherto arisen between this Embassy and the Persian Government, the greatest regard had been shown on our side for the preservation of friendship between the two countries, yet in proportion as they were hard pressed by the opposite party, and were unable to make any head against them, the Persians would change their language, and accord their friendship to these latter. In fact, indeed, for more than a week past they have been studiously endeavouring to bring forward proofs of their friendly feelings, and, recognizing the force of the considerations relative to the Russian question which I had submitted to them in compliance with instructions from your Excellency, they have presented every appearance of sympathy with us.

However, the Russians having held out threats on the one hand of invading Azerbijan with Behman Mirza, who had been living as a refugee at Tiflis, and, on the other hand, promised to march troops into Khiva, and annex Affghanistan to Persia, the Persians have changed their minds under these inducements; and, though protesting their neutrality and absence of any hostile purpose, they yet are again endeavouring to raise an army by recalling the soldiers whom they had disbanded upwards of a month ago, and this, though they have no money, no military stores, and no provisions; they also talk publicly of taking Kotoor.

As I know by past experience how improbable it is to expect that the Shah can be diverted by advice and reflection from any design which he has once taken into his head and decided upon; in order to understand, at least, of what pretext they are likely to avail themselves, the march of the above army towards the frontier will naturally cause a great deal of excitement. In consequence of this I have demanded verbally and in writing the abandonment of this project, and an explanation of its causes; the execution of such a design without previous communication being unprecedented.

I received in reply a stiff letter, in which they not only utterly deny all their former promises, but even omit the ordinary meaningless assurances.

This senseless document, sent me under the name of an answer, I have the honour to inclose for your information, together with copies of my memorandum to the Grand Vizier, and of his answer.

As Persia is at this moment completely destitute of preparations, and would be unable for at least a month and a half to take the field, the adoption of speedy counter-measures would have the effect of restraining her. Upon this consideration, and it being also obvious that I might stay in Tehran corresponding with them for another year without their having courage to abandon their

fixed resolution, I shall on the day that the General (Serday) leaves Tehran address in decided terms a request to the Persian Government, demanding the diminution of their army, and its removal from the neighbourhood of the frontier.

I shall naturally in the event of receiving an unsatisfactory answer, withdraw with the Embassy according to the usual method to Kermanshah, and shall advise the Persian Ministers, should they have any observations to make previous to the receipt by me of your Excellency's instructions, to forward them to me on the road; but I have no hopes of their being alive to the crisis, or understanding the actual state of Persia.

As it is highly probable that the Embassy couriers may be detained on the journey, the safe arrival of your instructions becomes a matter of the greatest consideration. News has several times been received in twenty days by way of Beyrout and Damascus and Bagdad, and by way of Trebizond and Erzeroom in fourteen. At any rate it is not for me to offer any proposal, but earnestly to request that I may be furnished as speedily as possible with instructions, and remain, &c.

Inclosure 4 in No. 490.

The Ottoman Ambassador in Persia to the Persian Prime Minister.

November 9, 1853.

(Translation.)

THE Persian Ministers having heard that the Kurdish tribes subject to the Porte had invaded the Persian frontier, communicated that report two months ago to this Embassy, and an official reply was immediately given to the effect that the report was altogether incorrect, as it was contrary to the equitable system observed by the Porte that her subjects should violate the frontier of a friendly state.

It has come to my knowledge that troops were to have been sent again yesterday to the frontier, under the pretext of its being a precautionary measure. The Sublime Porte had engaged herself that no aggression should take place on her part on the territory of Persia, and the adoption of this measure by that Power at a time that the Porte is at war with another party is against the rules of friendship.

If there be no grounds for changing altogether now the friendly assurances which the Persian Ministers so studiously made to this Embassy up to yesterday, I demand that your Highness should revoke the measure for the expedition of troops, because there is no doubt that the approach of the Persian forces towards the frontier will cause a rising of the frontier tribes, and lead to dangerous consequences. Such a measure at this unseasonable period might bring on a collision between the frontier tribes, and the responsibility of having disturbed the peace and tranquillity of the two Mussulman States would lie wholly with Persia. As the reply to be given to this official note will be a strong test of the sentiments of friendship and religious unity which the Persian Government professes to entertain, I have no doubt that it will be sent without any delay.

Inclosure 5 in No. 490.

The Persian Prime Minister to the Ottoman Ambassador.

November 10, 1853.

(Translation.)

I HAVE received your Excellency's note dated the 9th instant, inquiring the reason of troops being sent to the Azerbijan frontier, and asking for the abandonment of that measure. It was my intention to have announced this measure officially to you, but I had no opportunity for doing so as [no] inquiries had been made from that quarter. I have now to inform you that, the Sublime Porte having for some time past assembled large bodies of troops on the frontier at Erzeroum, the Government of Persia made no inquiries on the subject, nor did she adopt any precautionary measures. But war having been recently declared by His Majesty the Sultan against Russia, the cause of that assemblage of troops

became evident; and in pursuance of international law, and for protecting the rights of his subjects consistently with the dignity of the Shah, His Majesty felt himself bound to take into consideration the authority of his Government and its real interests, and to protect his own frontier. It is impossible, therefore, to pass over with indifference such circumstances and proceedings; to look upon important matters of this nature as if they had not occurred; and to relinquish the measures which it has been necessary to adopt. The Shah has therefore decided, that a few troops should be stationed on the frontiers of the two Mussulman States, and that they should not be left unprovided.

Inclosure 6 in No. 490.

The Ottoman Ambassador in Persia to Reshid Pasha.

(Translation.) *November* 12, 1853.

I HAD the honour to represent in my eleven preceding despatches that it had been the intention of the Shah, ever since the 21st of Mouharem, 1269 (November 3, 1852), to assemble troops at Sultanieh; that as His Majesty had concerted this measure with the Representatives of the mediating Powers alone, without making any official communication whatever to this Embassy, I had made the most urgent and strong representations to the Ministers of Russia and England, who had been obliged to oppose the intention of the Shah; that the Persian Government had then appealed to this Embassy; and that when His Majesty the Sultan's permission had been obtained for proceeding to Sultanieh the Shah, without listening to the official representations of the English and Russian Representatives, proceeded thither with a body of about 30,000 troops and followers, with the intention of not remaining more than fifteen days; that the position and policy of the Russian Minister had changed, and that all his efforts for keeping the army in summer quarters had failed; that this mission had even gone before that of Russia; that [the Persian Government] had agreed to disband their troops, which were at Tehran, and to retain only 2,500 troops already armed at Tehran, and 20 battalions for the rest of Persia; that the Imperial instructions, concerning the Russian question, had been duly communicated to the Persian Ministers, and that I had, on each occasion, received from them renewed assurances of friendship. My detailed communications were forwarded not only by the monthly messenger of this Mission, but also by every intervening one sent from the English Mission.

After a month's contention on the subject of a Kandahar merchant, whom the British Mission claimed the right to protect, and which the Persian Government refused to acknowledge, a quarrel ensued between some people of the Mission and the police, and the Mission has broken off its relations altogether. As the question was protracted for several days afterwards, the English messenger was kept two weeks after his time; but although I received your Highness' four despatches of the 22nd September and of the beginning and 10th October ten days ago, it was impossible to reply to them as early as usual. Other occurrences having now arisen, there is neither time nor need for replying to each of your Highness' instructions.

Since the return of the Shah from Sultanieh, His Majesty has been most friendly in his professions towards this Embassy. Indeed, the military Governor of Azerbijan, the Veziri-Nizam, a creature of Russia, having at their instigation prohibited the sale of provisions to Turkey, he was immediately dismissed by the Government. Some of the dignitaries sent once a-week on the part of the Shah with a civil message of inquiry to the Embassy, even broached the subject of renewing the permission to proceed on the pilgrimage to Kerbela, prohibited during the last three years, in order to remove any coldness on the part of the public. I have been myself active in endeavouring to promote the relations of concord, and on the occurrence of the question with the English Mission the Shah sent for me twice, and spoke to me in the greatest confidence and sincerity to the purport that he intended to request of the Sublime Porte, through me, to settle the question between His Majesty and the British Mission, after my friendly interposition had been ineffectual. In short, our relations were on the best possible footing.

On the 6th instant I proceeded to compliment the Shah on his birth-day, according to usage, and met unexpectedly with a cold reception. On inquiring into the cause of this, I learnt this morning that a special courier had arrived from Petersburgh the preceding day, and that the Emperor of Russia had communicated the following resolutions to the Shah; namely, that the Persians were to assemble immediately 40,000 troops at Bayazid, and 30,000 at Zohab, and commence hostilities; that at the end of the war a large Russian force would enter Persia and get all Affghanistan for the Shah; that the debt of 50,000 [500,000 tomaums] to Russia should be expunged; and that if the Shah did not agree to these terms, Russia would immediately seize upon Azerbijan and the coasts of the Caspian. I also learnt that the Shah had four secret interviews with the Russian Minister, and that it was decided yesterday, after a long discussion, that Aziz Khan, the Commander-in-chief, was to proceed to Khoi, and the Commander of the Imperial Guard, Mehmed Khan, to Zohab; that Aziz Khan had acted most tumultuously at the last Council, saying that they had hoped that Kotoor would have been given up to Persia on the arrival of the Ottoman Ambassador, but that they had been disappointed and that there was no remedy but in war; that the Sadri Iran, and the Shah's father-in-law and paternal uncle, Seif ulla Mirza, were loud in complaint, and made some very bold remarks, on which the Shah issued strict orders that they were to meddle no longer in public affairs, but keep within their own province.

It would thus appear that all was over; but before leaving Tehran I shall have an interview with the Sedr and perhaps with the Shah, and send in an official note. It is likely that the roads will soon be impracticable and the Embassy messengers impeded, and I have therefore sent a few hasty lines to apprize the Commander of the frontier, and the Pasha of Erzeroum, of what has taken place.

I shall continue to make every sacrifice for His Majesty's service, and should any change take place write again in four or five days by Erzeroum and Bagdad, if it be possible. Every representation consistently with the Sultan's dignity shall be made, and after communicating with the English Chargé d'Affaires, and when matters shall have come to the last extremity, I will leave the city, according to Embassy usage, and with the Divine aid proceed to whatever part of the frontier I can.

(L. S.)

P.S.—I have forwarded a duplicate of this despatch by Bagdad for better security.

No. 491.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December 20.*)

(No. 374.)

Constantinople, December 5, 1853.

My Lord,

MY exertions in favour of peace have not been relaxed; but no apparent result has yet attended them. Circumstances have not admitted of my taking any further official step. The Austrian proposals, founded in great part on the assurances given by the Emperor Nicholas at Olmütz, have failed. The Porte has made up its mind to reject them; but the communication of its intention has not been called for by Baron Bruck, who prefers keeping the door of negotiation open. The Prussian Envoy has met with no better success; and I am assured that the exhortations of General Baraguay d'Hilliers have hitherto led to no ostensible conclusion. It would seem, in short, that the Porte will no longer hear of notes and Ambassadors to be sent to St. Petersburgh. To judge from the language of its Ministers the main object and ardent desire of the Sultan and his Government are to escape from the necessity of making any concession whatever to Russia on the ground of spiritual privilege beyond a communication of the firmans, and what relates to the holy places in Palestine.

My efforts of late have been necessarily confined to those of a private and confidential character. Individuals must be persuaded, or nothing can be done. It is indispensable to begin with turning the convictions of Reshid Pasha into a

new channel. Though naturally of a peaceful and conciliatory character, he expresses opinions almost entirely identical with those of his colleagues who looked to war from the first. He conceives the very existence of the Empire to be endangered, not only by the declared pretensions, but also by the real, yet clandestine, designs of Russia. I have endeavoured, by all the means in my power, to overcome this tendency of his mind; and in order to increase my chances of success I have admitted fairly all the truths of the question between Turkey and Russia, and laboured not the less strenuously to open his eyes to the dangers of a war pursued on a fresh basis without the full assent and concurrence of the Porte's efficient allies.

I have so far succeeded in these repeated attempts that his Highness has promised to consult unreservedly with his colleagues, and to explain to me with equal frankness on what principle, and in what modes, such proposals for peace might be arranged between him and me as would afford a reasonable prospect of acceptance as well by the General Council as by the Porte's allies.

In ignorance of what he will finally propose, I am inclined to think that the only chance of success is now to be found in setting aside all the preceding modes of arrangement, and forming a new plan, adapted to present circumstances and requirements, out of those elements which cannot be excluded from our calculation.

I am willing to believe that a certain amount of impression has been made upon his mind; but whether it will prove sufficient to counterbalance his national feelings and political views I cannot yet presume to determine. He is to have a meeting with his colleagues to-day, and he has promised to let me know the result of the conference in private to-morrow. Should it be such as to offer a tolerable prospect of arrangement, I shall enter into further communications with the French Ambassador, and in concert with him, and, if possible, with the Austrian and Prussian Representatives also, endeavour to elaborate a proposal which, if approved by the General Council and our respective Governments, may be urged with advantage upon the acceptance of Russia.

I cannot allow myself to entertain a sanguine hope of success. I can only assure your Lordship that I perceive no other mode of proceeding with any good prospect under present circumstances; and I am anxious beyond expression that Her Majesty's Government should not be misled by illusive hopes of peace into a course of uncertainty which would be alike unfair to the Porte and dangerous to its Empire, with no advantage but what the aggressor would reap at our expense.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 492.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 318.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 20, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency will have been prepared by my despatch No. 314 of the 17th instant, to learn that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the decision, announced in your despatch No. 368 of the 4th instant, of sending the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and informing the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol of the purposes for which they are sent.

Her Majesty's Government approve also of the whole of the combined fleets being ordered on this service; as in fact it is only by obtaining the complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments can be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope can be prevented.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 493.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Straiford de Redcliffe.

(No. 319.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1853.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 370 of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government agree in your opinion that a complete inquiry should be instituted into the circumstances which preceded and attended the late fatal occurrence at Sinope; as it would seem from the reports inclosed in your despatch, that if timely notice had been conveyed to Constantinople of the Russian force that was cruizing off Sinope, the catastrophe which ensued might have been averted by the combined fleets.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 494.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 320.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1853.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 371 of the 5th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which you propose to make to the Porte, as to the unabated desire for peace by which the British Government will be animated, notwithstanding the material assistance given to the Porte by the presence of the British and French fleets in the Black Sea.

Furthermore, it must be borne in mind, and your Excellency will make it clear to the Porte, that when the combined fleets are in the Black Sea, it will be indispensable that no naval operations are undertaken by the Turkish fleet without the previous sanction of the British and French Admirals.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 495.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 321.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1853.

YOUR Excellency will have learned by my previous despatches that the course which, as appears from your despatch No. 374 of the 5th of December, you are taking, with the view to the adoption by the Porte of pacific counsels, is in accordance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government as being calculated to prepare the Porte to give a favourable reception to the proposals which have been forwarded from Vienna.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 496.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 703. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 10, 1853.

GREAT as my reluctance is to write in a manner which can hardly fail of inducing Her Majesty's Government to mistrust the declarations which are made on behalf of the Emperor, as to the moderation and pacific nature of his intentions, I have no option as to conveying to your Lordship some intelligence which is singularly in opposition with those protestations.

I hear from a person of the highest respectability, and who has peculiar facilities for obtaining correct intelligence, that the Government have made a contract for provisions, of the value of seven millions of silver roubles, which are to be delivered in the Principalities after the month of May; and, secondly, that nine millions of roubles, of which eight millions in gold and one million in silver have been sent from hence to Prince Menchikoff.

The heavy expense of even conveying this amount of silver was urged, but the objection was overruled, as is stated, by the Emperor himself. Prince Menchikoff, His Majesty said, had desired to receive money of a particular description; it should be delivered in a manner perfectly conformable to his suggestion.

The fact of these large remittances being made, acquires additional importance from the circumstance that Prince Menchikoff has been or is to be named commander of the military and naval forces at Odessa, and in the Crimea.

I have, however, no doubt that considerable portions of this money will be applied neither to naval or military purposes; the arts of corruption are at least as well understood by the Russians as those of war; and from his long intercourse with Eastern people, Prince Menchikoff is skilled in the ways of dealing with them.

I may take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that I have the authority of a naval officer of high rank, that a large portion of the Baltic fleet is in a very unseaworthy state, and that the fact being known to the Emperor and the Grand Duke Constantine increases their wish to substitute screw ships of the first class for the ordinary ships-of-the-line.

I have reason for believing that no less than twenty-five of these first-class screw ships are wanted for the northern and southern fleets, and that the machinery of six of them is already contracted for.

I will only add, my Lord, that when I am told, as I am upon every occasion, by various of my diplomatic colleagues, that the English Government commits an error in not placing entire confidence in the Emperor's moderate intentions, I reflect that after all, that error, supposing it to be one, is shared by His Majesty's own officers, who generally appear to believe that a serious war is at hand. I reflect further, that mistrust hardly requires an excuse when entertained towards a Government whose late acts have been almost invariably in direct contradiction of their foregoing declarations.

The history of Prince Gortchakoff's proceedings in the Principalities, as contrasted with the assurances which were given upon the passage of the Pruth, is of itself sufficient to warrant any amount of mistrust and incredulity in Russian protestations.

I have thought it right, upon the terms on which I am with the French Mission, to communicate the intelligence contained in this despatch to General Castelbajac.

It was not difficult to see that he attached no credit to it, and that he is disposed to think that the Emperor's pacific intentions may be safely counted upon.

I said to General Castelbajac, "Ayons les yeux ouverts, et gardons nous de faire le metier de dupes."

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 497.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 705. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 12, 1853.

My Lord,

I AM desirous of offering your Lordship a few observations which are suggested by the despatches from Lord Augustus Loftus, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 311 of the 29th ultimo.

In his despatch No. 106, Lord A. Loftus states a report to have been received from General de Rochow, according to which a petition had been addressed to His Imperial Majesty by the Bulgarians.

I have no doubt that this is the case. The Russian Government have innumerable correspondents and agents throughout Turkey, and always contrive to receive at the opportune moment petitions and representations which bear upon and tend to justify the policy of Russia.

The applications received or supposed to be received here from the Sultan's subjects, offer, as I once before observed, some indication of the course about to be followed in Turkish affairs by the Emperor's Government.

With regard to an observation of Baron Manteuffel's, reported by Lord Augustus Loftus in his confidential despatch No. 107, I am convinced that the Prussian Minister is mistaken in believing Count Nesselrode to be allied at present to the old Russian party. Count Nesselrode is deeply intent upon pacific measures, and if they are adopted it will be in consequence of his untiring exertions. The ultra Russians, on the contrary, would gladly push matters to extremity, and as a step towards this consummation, are very desirous of getting rid of a pacific Minister.

By this party Count Nesselrode has been very much blamed for having remained upon friendly terms with myself, and the feeling was plainly expressed the other day at his own house by Count Stroganoff, who, upon being told that the English Minister and his wife had been dining with the Chancellor, said, "Et depuis quand, s'il vous plait, a-t'on adopté ce système de donner à diner à ses ennemis?"

It seldom happens to me in this country to assert positively, but I am as positive as to Count Nesselrode's efforts being employed in a conciliatory sense as I should be if I had listened to his conversations with the Emperor. He is of course obliged to speak as a Russian, and not as an English Minister; nevertheless it must be borne in mind that his whole political career bears testimony to the correctness of my assertion, the two great objects which he has had in view during a long political life having been to cultivate the alliance of England, and to keep his country out of the arms of France.

If by any of those extraordinary turns which happen in politics, present sympathies and alliances were to be given up, and a close connexion were to be formed between the Cabinets of St. Petersburgh and Paris, I have reason for believing that the Chancellor would immediately request permission to withdraw into private life.

In another opinion expressed by Baron Manteuffel he shows a more correct estimation of Russian feeling. He is quite right in supposing that the late conduct of the Prussian Government has been displeasing here.

Any independence shown by the German Governments, any preference of their own views and interests to those of Russia, are displeasing to a Cabinet which has been accustomed to take the lead on the Continent, and which might be doing so now but for the strange misuse which it has at last ventured to make of its supremacy.

With respect to Lord A. Loftus' despatch No. 108, I would repeat to your Lordship my sincere conviction that the Emperor, except under repeated and signal defeat, would never be induced to withdraw his troops from the Principalities until some arrangement is made with Turkey. In the meantime His Majesty will with difficulty, if at all, be brought to lend himself to the admission of a Turkish Plenipotentiary at a Conference upon Eastern affairs; and if, according to a notion which at one moment appears to have prevailed, he should be called upon to indemnify the Turks for the expense and mischief which he

has occasioned them, he would, I am convinced, only see in the demand an insult, a proposal made only that it might be rejected.

In expressing this feeling I am far from giving it as my own opinion. As an unprovoked aggressor, the Emperor may be considered as having laid himself fairly open to the demand; but I should deplore its being made, as Russia must be at its last gasp before it would be listened to, this being a state of things which nothing but protracted war could bring about.

I would only repeat to your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are, I am convinced, interested in causing the correspondence of this Mission to be controlled by the information possessed by the English Representative at Berlin.

The sum of intelligence collected with toil by all the other foreign Missions in Russia is of less value than that which is put freely at the disposal of the Prussian Envoy, besides which, by means of private correspondence, the Royal Family of Prussia are constantly placed in possession of facts and opinions of which nothing transpires in these regions of mystery.

As regards the movements of the Russian army more especially, I am the first to say, that should there happen to be any difference between Lord Augustus Loftus's reports and mine, his Lordship's are those which may be the most safely trusted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 498.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 706. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 12, 1853.

My Lord,

IT will be my endeavour to return brief but explicit answers to the queries which your Lordship has done me the honour of addressing to me in your despatch No. 300 of the 21st ultimo.

I will begin by stating that the Roman Catholic Church has, I think, the right of considering itself oppressed by the Russian Government; amongst other reasons, upon the main ground of the full intercourse of the priesthood with the mother church being interdicted.

For a religion the chief principle of which is unity, it follows that direct communication with its chief authority is a matter of first-rate importance; this description of freedom, like every other, being wanting in Russia.

The state of the Roman Catholic Church in this country is that of complete subjection or dependence, it may be observed incidentally, which is shared with the Orthodox Greek Church, of which the religion of the State is an offset.

Everything relating to the Latin Church is directed by the head of a department of the Ministry of the Interior, who, besides being of the Greek persuasion, is represented as being a fanatic.

It seldom happens, as the Roman Catholic priests themselves admit, that Government influence, or I should rather say, Government pressure, is resorted to for the purpose of inducing a man to change his religion.

The Greek Church is not proselyting by its nature, and would never interfere with the creed of any one but for political reasons.

Its toleration, however, is far from being extended to persons who abandon the Greek faith for any other. If such a person should happen to be the father or mother of a family, the management of their estate is taken from them, and, practically, every public career would be closed against the children.

There appears, indeed, to be an occult but unceasing working against Roman Catholicism, which is carried on principally in the following manner:

The children born of mixed marriages, when one of the parties is Russian and a Greek, must belong to the Greek Church, a measure which, rigorously carried out, destroys Roman Catholicism in numerous families.

Russian employés are sent into Poland; Polish employés are transplanted to Russia; and the children of such of these persons as contract marriages are brought up invariably in the Greek faith.

The Court of Rome asserts that, as regards itself, the Concordat entered into with the Russian Government in 1846 is faithfully observed, while it maintains equally that its provisions are eluded unceasingly by the Imperial Government; much care and dexterity, however, being exhibited in keeping the infractions from public knowledge.

Thus, for instance: the Bishop of Cherson, formerly a monk at Riga, although consecrated several years since, has never been able to take possession of his diocese. No very open opposition is made to him, but a series of futile reasons are found for preventing his entering upon the discharge of his episcopal duties.

So again with various of the bishoprics in Poland, which remain vacant without its being known, even to those the most concerned, whether this state of things has been produced by the want of necessary presentations by the Russian Government, or by the objections entertained by the See of Rome to the individuals who have been presented by the Imperial authorities.

Further, the churches of the Roman Catholics in the distant provinces, and more especially in the villages of ancient Poland, are left without the most necessary repairs, whilst those of the Greeks are kept in the best order; it is even asserted that, if a small Greek community is formed in a village, the church is made over to their use, the Roman Catholics being left to perform their devotions in any church or chapel which they can find in the neighbourhood.

In one respect the treatment of the Greek and Roman Catholic priests is very similar in Russia: both receive very poor stipends, and both depend merely upon what is termed in France *le casuel*, that is, fees, to which are to be added the gifts of the faithful of both creeds.

The great difference made by the Government is in their treatment of the dignitaries of the two Churches; the one set meeting with great consideration, and the other (although, as they themselves assert, greatly superior to their Greek brethren in attainments and in the apostolical virtues) being kept in obscurity. The Archbishop of Mohileff, the Metropolitan who resides at St. Petersburgh, is the first dignitary of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia. He has, however, no more right than his bishops to communicate directly with Rome, and his correspondence is carried on through the Russian Government, that is, through the office above alluded to, in which, as he asserts, he has to encounter much jealousy, and even hostility.

In a word, the influence of the Court of Rome in Russia is null, more so, if the priesthood are to be believed, than is the case at Constantinople.

The assertion, if it is, as I believe, well founded, suggests the idea that, supposing public affairs to be conducted more by principles of strict justice and less by actual force and power, a Roman Catholic Protectorate is at least as requisite in this country as a Greek Protectorate (even if exercised by a foreign Prince of the real orthodox faith) can be in the Sultan's dominions.

It is commonly stated that the Emperor is more tolerant than his Government, more especially than his Directeur des Cultes, a Lieutenant-General, and a meritorious soldier, but a man who does not perform the extraordinary duties assigned to him in a manner which gives satisfaction to any but to persons of his own creed; His Majesty, however, is careful not to act in opposition to the religious prejudices of his people.

In sum, I would take the liberty of repeating that I cannot doubt that the Roman Catholic Church may justly be esteemed to be oppressed in this country, the affinity of the dominant creed with that of Rome being proved by the fallacies of the latter being placed very much in that state of subjection in which the Greeks would be held, were Roman Catholicism the religion professed by the Emperor and the majority of the Russian nation.

I will only observe that I have a double motive for marking this despatch as confidential.

In the first place, opinions so freely expressed would, if made public, draw down suspicion, and perhaps persecution, upon some of the Roman Catholic clergy with whom I might be supposed to have been in communication; and, secondly, Her Majesty's Government are interested in not coming forward in disapprobation of a system which, however faulty it may be, has few faults of which an Englishman has a right to complain.

Our Anglican Church is perfectly well treated in Russia, and the strangers

who have the happiness of belonging to it are the only dissidents from the religion of the State who are allowed to conduct their church affairs without being exposed to vexatious interference.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 499.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 707. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 12, 1853.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC has communicated to me in strict confidence, not only his last despatch from Paris (December 1), containing copies of the papers sent to Vienna and of other documents, but the private letter which he has received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I allude to this correspondence for the purpose of observing that it bears testimony to the cordiality with which M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to be cooperating with Her Majesty's Government in one of the most arduous negotiations ever undertaken.

General Castelbajac has been furnished with a copy of a report made to his Government by the French Consul at Bucharest.

Unless this account be very highly coloured, the conduct of the Russian authorities in the Principalities must be such as could hardly be expected from the employés of a civilized country; it must be such especially as must make the Wallachians of all ranks and opinions bitterly lament the day when their virtual independence was changed for a protection which is manifested to them by such treatment as none but Russian serfs or Virginian slaves are exposed to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 500.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 709. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 12, 1853.*

I CALLED upon Count Nesselrode on the 9th instant, and was mainly intent upon learning his opinion upon the Protocol drawn up in London and Paris, which I knew to have been communicated to him by the Prussian Mission.

Upon his Excellency asking me what intelligence I had received from London, I replied by an allusion to the collective Note and Protocol, respecting which, in reply to an inquiry, I gave full particulars.

Count Nesselrode, who had evidently made up his mind not to proceed with the conversation, remarked evasively that no doubt the two papers would be soon sent to him from Vienna.

I remarked that the Protocol was a paper to which I was disposed to attach great importance; that it laid down very decided opinions as to the political existence of Turkey, and the maintenance of present territorial circumscription; and that these opinions being entirely conformable to the well known views of the Emperor, while they were expressed in language the most respectful to His Majesty, I was willing to believe that no possible objection could be raised against the acceptance and the signature of so valuable an Act.

Count Nesselrode changed the conversation, and in the course of that which ensued, the difficulties of the winter navigation of the Black Sea having been casually alluded to, I observed that in one respect I was glad to learn that this navigation was attended with danger; that this circumstance would, I was willing to believe, prevent any Russian troops being moved by sea, a good precaution against the chances of collision with English and French ships; a point of great importance to all who are intent upon a peaceful solution of very delicate questions.

Count Nesselrode was convinced that no collisions of the kind adverted to

would occur;—the risk was indeed the more remote, as he believed no English or French vessels to have entered the Black Sea.

Before leaving the room, I observed that I was willing to believe that we were advancing towards peace; but that if there was any shorter road than that which we were pursuing, I should feel grateful to him if he would point it out.

"Une bonne victoire," Count Nesselrode replied; "that is what we wish, and what you should desire as well; only bear in mind what I have told you of the Turks, if you desire to bring them to terms, your language to them must be peremptory."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 501.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 712.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 12, 1853.

I RECEIVED by the French messenger, who arrived here on the 10th instant, a communication from Lord Augustus Loftus, who has had the kindness to send me copies of two of his despatches No. 122 and No. 125.

It is, your Lordship will readily believe, with the greatest satisfaction that I have learned that the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets have given proof of their adhesion to the views of Her Majesty's Government by directing their Representatives at Vienna to sign the Protocol which accompanied the collective note to the Porte.

The step is indeed a most important one, and as I am willing to believe, indicates the line which will be taken in all the phases of the great question of the day by the two leading Powers of Germany.

It has always been held by Russia that the cordial understanding of the Four Powers would be sufficient not only to oppose a successful resistance to France in case of war, but to prevent her attempting so dangerous a course. It might be assumed with equal certainty that the quadruple alliance, of which it may be said that the Protocol just signed has been the first important act, will if properly followed up, have the effect of putting an end to Russian illusions and of proving to the Emperor that there are hopes and expectations which must be abandoned if it is not wished that the force of Russia should be tried against that of the rest of Europe.

The trial would not be made, and if the dangerous visions to which I allude should be finally dispelled, and the Sultan's independent tenure of his throne should be renewed, there would be no great cause for regretting the months of anxious uncertainty at the price of which these results have been obtained.

I have not seen Count Nesselrode since the receipt of the intelligence of the signature of the Protocol, but I am not ignorant of the feelings entertained upon the subject of by the Russian Government.

The Protocol is considered to be highly unfavourable to their interests and very partially favourable to those of the Turks; it is held to be unjust that the Sultan should receive assurances of his not being liable to have any of those demands made upon him which he has already refused, and the idea of a collective negotiation being carried on, in which a Russian and Turkish Plenipotentiary are to meet the Representatives of the Four Powers, is one (if hasty words announce a final resolution) to which, except under force, the Russian Government will never be brought to lend itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 502.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 714.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 12, 1853.

THE Russians have the merit, and it is a very great one, of possessing strong national feelings. These have been exhibited by the excessive satisfaction with which the accounts of the late successes have been received by all classes.

On the side of the Court nothing has been omitted which could excite public feeling.

A *Te Deum* in honour of the victory over the Seraskier was performed yesterday at the metropolitan church; the only captured flag yet received from Achalzikh was carried triumphantly through the streets; a circle was held at the Winter Palace, at which their Imperial Majesties received the congratulations (on this occasion very sincerely offered) of their subjects, and at night the town was illuminated.

In this latter demonstration I found to my considerable annoyance that I was taking part, my house having been illuminated in the coarse manner employed here, by the care of the Russian servants belonging to my landlord, to whom the custody of the house is entrusted.

It is understood that Prince Menchikoff has written to the Emperor to congratulate His Majesty upon the state of his fleet, and to say that, supposing the numbers to be equal, he should be perfectly ready to meet the English and French ships.

That Prince Menchikoff is a fearless soldier is well known, but whether the encounter which he appears desirous of seeking would lead to another *Te Deum* may well be doubted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 503.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 716. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 12, 1853.

I RECEIVED last night from Count Nesselrode the private note of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy. The note contained duplicate copies of the printed report from Prince Menchikoff, giving an account of the destruction of a Turkish squadron in the Black Sea.

As I feel the present to be the critical moment when Russian good faith is about to be submitted to a test, the result of which is at least doubtful, I at once returned his Excellency the reply, of which I beg likewise to transmit a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 503.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Dimanche, 11 *Décembre*, 1853.

JE vous ai promis de vous faire savoir autant le départ de votre courier les nouvelles que nous recevions du théâtre de la guerre.

Je m'en acquitte, mon cher Sir Hamilton, en vous transmettant les deux bulletins ci-jointes, accompagnés de mes plus sincères hommages.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 503.

Extract from the "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg" of the $\frac{9 \text{ Novembre}}{21 \text{ Décembre}}$, 1853.

HIER, 28 Novembre, dans la soirée, Sa Majesté Empereur a reçu le rapport suivant de l'Aide-de-camp Général Prince Menchikoff:

"Les ordres de votre Majesté Impériale ont été exécutées de la manière la plus brillante par la flotte de la Mer Noire. La première escadre Turque, qui a osé se présenter au combat, a été détruite, le 18 de ce mois, par le Vice-Amiral Nakhimoff. L'Amiral Ture Osman Pacha, qui la commandait, a été blessé, fait prisonnier, et amené à Sévastopol.

"L'ennemi était dans la rade de Sinope, où, soutenu par les batteries de terre, il a accepté la bataille. Nous lui avons détruit 7 frégates, 1 sloop, 2 corvettes, 1 steamer et plusieurs bâtiments de transport. Il ne lui est resté qu'un steamer, que la vitesse de sa marche a sauvé.

"Cette escadre était, à ce qu'il paraît, celle qui avait été armée pour s'emparer de Soukhoum et donner la main aux Montagnards (du Caucase).

"Nous avons perdu 1 officier subalterne et 33 matelots tués et 230 blessés.

"Je n'ai pas encore de détails écrits; mais mon Aide-de-camp le Lieutenant-Colonel Skolkoff, porteur de ce rapport, pourra en donner beaucoup de vive voix."

Pour ce brillant fait d'armes, Sa Majesté l'Empereur a daigné conférer les distinctions et récompenses suivantes.

Au Vice-Amiral Nakhimoff, Chef de la 5e Division de la flotte, l'Ordre de St. Georges de la 2e classe.

A l'Aide-de-camp-Général Korniloff, la Grand'croix de 2e classe de l'Ordre St. Vladimir.

Au Contre-Amiral Novossilsky, Chargé du Commandement de la 4e Division de la flotte, l'Ordre de St. Georges de la 3e classe.

Au Contre-Amiral Pamphiloff, l'Ordre de St. Vladimir de la 3e classe.

Aux capitaines de vaisseau de 1er rang Istomine, commandant du vaisseau le "Paris," et Kousnetsoff, commandant du vaisseau "Rostislaff," le grade de Contre-Amiral.

Aux capitaines de vaisseau de 2e rang Baranovsky, commandant du vaisseau "l'Impératrice Marie," et Yéromyscheff, commandant du vaisseau le "Grand-Duc Constantin," le grade de capitaine de vaisseau de 1er rang.

Aux Capitaines-Lieutenants Boudistchef, commandant de la frégate la "Koulevtcha," Spitsyne, commandant de la frégate le "Kagoul," de Kern, commandant du steamer "l'Odessa" et de Stoffregen, commandant du steamer la "Chersonèse," le grade de capitaine de vaisseau de 2e rang.

Au Lieutenant Ostreno, Premier Adjutant de la 5e Division de la flotte, le grade de Capitaine-Lieutenant.

Au capitaine de vaisseau de 1er rang du 32e équipage de flotte Koutroff, commandant du vaisseau le "Tri Svititalia," l'Ordre de St. Vladimir de la 3e classe.

Au capitaine de vaisseaux de 2e rang Protopopoff, commandant du steamer la "Crimée," l'Ordre de St. Anne de la 2e classe.

Au Lieutenant-Colonel Skolkoff, Aide-de-camp du Chef d'État-Major-Général de la Marine, le grade de Colonel et le titre d'Aide-de-camp de l'Empereur.

Aux officiers supérieurs de chaque vaisseau l'Ordre de St. Vladimir de la 4e classe avec la rosette et aux équipages: 10 décorations de l'ordre militaire par compagnie, et une année de solde à tous les matelots qui ont pris part au combat.

The Russian force appears to have been: "Grand-Duc Constantin," 120 guns; "Paris," 120; "Les Trois Apôtres," 120; "Marie," 84; "Svatislaf," 84; "Ragul," 60; "Koulroche," 54; "Crimea," 6; "Odessa," 6; "Bessarabia," 6.

Inclosure 3 in No. 503.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, December* 11, 1853.

I AM very much obliged to you for your note containing the news of your successes in the Black Sea.

The intelligence will become as welcome to me as it can be to your Excellency, provided that it should have the effect of bringing about the arrangement of a question, the increasing proportions of which become very menacing to the tranquillity of all Europe.

I have invariably represented the Russian Government as saying that a decided victory over the Turks would offer the readiest means for getting clear of the difficulties which beset us. You have now news within twenty-four hours of two important victories. A very large number of lives have been lost, the superiority of the Russian arms has been incontestably established, and when these results are placed alongside of the declarations to which I allude, I leave it to your candour to determine what is the inference to be drawn.

Pray believe me,

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 504.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 718.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 12, 1853.

AT the risk of importuning your Lordship by repeating what has been expressed with more or less distinctness in many of my late despatches, I am desirous of stating in a very few words, but in the most explicit manner, my opinions as to the present very momentous state of affairs.

I am anxious to repeat that I have not the slightest confidence in the declarations of the Russian Government, and that, as I fully expect, that line will be taken by them which suits their interests, or as might more properly be said, which will suit the pleasure of the Emperor.

I apprehend then His Imperial Majesty is said to be desirous of peace; this may be so, but I believe the wish to be subject to the condition of his being permitted to obtain from the Turks those terms which would never have been asked if a sounder view of the results to which the demand would lead had been taken, but from which, if I am not mistaken, he has now no intention of receding; I say no intention, and I might add very diminished power, for various circumstances noticed to your Lordship pledge His Majesty more and more to follow the dangerous course which for some months he has been pursuing.

That the Emperor will be fully prepared to go to war with England and France in the spring I cannot doubt, but I believe strongly that it will be very inconvenient to him to declare his final intentions until the spring.

Here then, unless I am grossly in error, is the point deserving of all attention. As it is the Emperor's wish to procrastinate, it must be, I submit, the interest of Her Majesty's Government that the time given for his decisions should be reckoned by weeks or by days.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 504*a*.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 976.)

Paris, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the substance of your Lordship's despatch No. 496, relative to certain reports in circulation respecting an intended occupation by Great Britain of the Island of Candia, as reported in my confidential despatch No. 943. M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed his acknowledgments for the communication, again assuring me that, in bringing the reports to my notice, he had had no other intention than to obtain such an official declaration from Her Majesty's Government as would enable him to contradict all such rumours, with authority, for the future.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 505.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 513.)

Foreign Office, December 24, 1853.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to me the important despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys which forms the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 957 of the 16th instant.

That despatch has received the attentive consideration of Her Majesty's Government, whose views, as it must be superfluous for me to inform your Excellency, are in entire accordance with those of the French Government upon the unjustifiable course that Russia has throughout pursued on the Eastern question, and the absolute necessity of preventing the recurrence of a disaster such as that which has lately taken place at Sinope.

That necessity is in fact so evident that Her Majesty's Government did not doubt that the combined fleets had at once been sent into the Black Sea, and as your Excellency has already been made aware by my despatch No. 314 of the 17th instant, to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, Her Majesty's Government did not consider that any fresh instructions were called for on the occasion, because special instructions having already been given to protect the territory of the Sultan from attack, they must be faithfully and effectually carried out.

Despatches have since been received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by which it appears that on the 4th the fleets were about to be sent into the Black Sea, either to clear Sinope of the Russians or to protect the coasts of Turkey generally, and that the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol was to be apprised of the service on which they would be employed; and, thereupon, I have conveyed to his Excellency the approval of Her Majesty's Government.

In my despatch No. 318 to Lord Stratford, of the 20th December, I have also stated that it was only by obtaining a complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments could be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope could be prevented.

These instructions are in accordance with the instructions that Count Walewski told me would be addressed to the French Ambassador at Constantinople; but the French Government now propose to us in addition that the Ottoman flag, as well as the Ottoman territory, should be protected by the combined fleets, and that all Russian vessels, other than merchantmen, met in the Black Sea, should be required to return to Sevastopol.

Her Majesty's Government having clearly announced that the recurrence of a disaster such as that at Sinope must be prevented, and that the command of the Black Sea must be secured, would have been content to have left the manner of executing those instructions to the discretion of the Admirals, but they attach

so much importance not alone to the united action of the two Governments, but to the instructions addressed to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the Government of the Emperor.

Instructions to that effect will accordingly be addressed to Lord Stratford.

Even if the Governments of England and France were not in honour bound to protect the Sultan, they could not, in the interests of humanity, tolerate that such scenes of horrible carnage, as that of which Sinope has been the theatre, should be renewed, and for both these objects they must exercise complete command in the Black Sea; but they will at the same render a signal service to the Porte; and Her Majesty's Government consider it indispensable that no naval operation should be undertaken by the Turkish fleet without the previous knowledge and sanction of the British and French Admirals, who cannot be made responsible for operations of which they may be kept in ignorance, or of which they may disapprove. Nor can Her Majesty's Government think it just, so long as England and France are not actually at war with Russia, that the combined fleets should aid and protect the Turkish forces in acts of aggression upon the Russian territory, while the Russian fleet is prevented from repelling such attacks or conveying the means necessary for the defence of that territory.

Her Majesty's Government have not hesitated to adopt the course which the honour and dignity of this country prescribe, but at the same time they do not disguise from themselves that it may at no distant period involve England and France in war with Russia, and they consider it equally for the honour and dignity of the two Powers not to allow the peace of Europe to be dependent upon that national spirit in Turkey, which, however admirable in itself, and however useful against the aggressor, is now evidently beyond the control of the Turkish Government. Her Majesty's Government would therefore propose to the Government of the Emperor that, in making known to the Porte the course which the two Governments are about to pursue, the English and French Ambassadors should at the same time be instructed to demand, in the event of the answer to the proposal recently sent from Vienna having been unsatisfactory, that the terms on which a Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey shall be negotiated may be left to the decision of England and France, on the distinct understanding that nothing shall be proposed on her part to which she has already officially objected.

I communicated this proposal on the 22nd to Count Walewski, who engaged to refer it to his Government, and his Excellency has this day informed me that it has been entirely approved of by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 506.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 329.)

Foreign Office, December 27, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency will have learned by my despatch No. 318 of the 20th instant, that the entry of the whole of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and the communication with the Russian Admiral, which were announced as probable on the 4th instant by your Excellency, in your despatch No. 368, met with the approbation of Her Majesty's Government, who considered that no instructions were necessary in addition to those already in the possession of your Excellency, for defending the European and Asiatic territory of the Sultan from attack.

The French Government wrote in the same sense to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

The details which have subsequently arrived, respecting the disastrous affair at Sinope, have given rise to further communications between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French, and the necessity of more stringent instructions have been recognized.

In my despatch No. 318 I stated that it was only by obtaining the com-

plète command of the Black Sea that the policy of the English and French Governments could be effectually carried out, and the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, be prevented. But in order to exercise that command to the fullest and most beneficial extent, we have agreed with the French Government that the Russian naval commander should in appropriate, but unmistakeable terms, be informed that the Governments of England and France are resolved to prevent the recurrence of another such event as that at Sinope; that every Russian ship of war will henceforth be required to return to Sevastopol, or the most neighbouring port; and that all aggression against the Ottoman territory or flag would impose upon the Admirals the painful necessity of repelling force by force.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to communicate this to Vice-Admiral Dundas for his guidance in conjunction with Admiral Hamelin, whose instructions from the French Ambassador will be in all respects similar.

In adopting this course, and in giving this substantial aid to Turkey, England and France are far from intending to abandon the position in which they are now placed with respect to Austria and Prussia. They think, on the contrary, that it is their duty and their right to demand the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals recently made by the Four Powers, and which have for their object to secure the dignity and independence of the Sultan.

Were England and France to act otherwise, they would impair, if not destroy, the union which now exists between the Four Powers, and which on every account it is so important to maintain, and they would endanger the peace of the world by encouraging the prolongation of a war which they would then regard as unnecessary.

In short, if the Governments of England and France are prepared to act with all the energy that the efficient protection of Turkey may render necessary, and if they are prepared to meet all the consequences it may entail, they are not the less anxious to act cordially with Austria and Prussia for the restoration of peace upon the bases established by the Conference at Vienna. The measures they are about to adopt will afford to Europe a guarantee that the Ottoman Empire will be maintained inviolate; and they expect in return that whenever negotiations commence, the Porte will honourably contribute to their success, and will abstain from putting forward demands which might be impracticable, and which the great Powers of Europe could have no interest in sustaining at the cost of a general war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 507.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 345.)

Foreign Office, December 27, 1853.

Sir,

AUTHENTIC information, dated the 9th instant, from Constantinople, has reached Her Majesty's Government, that on the 30th ultimo a Turkish squadron at anchor in the harbour of Sinope was completely destroyed by an overwhelming Russian force; that 4,000 Turks perished; and that the survivors, not exceeding in number more than 400, who have been brought away by English and French vessels, were all more or less wounded.

The feelings of horror which this dreadful carnage could not fail to create, have been general throughout all ranks and classes of Her Majesty's subjects in this country.

The circumstances which have attended this disastrous affair are of the greatest importance, and with respect to them it is necessary that there should be no misunderstanding between Her Majesty's Government and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

The object with which the combined fleets were sent to Constantinople, was not to attack Russia, but to defend Turkey; and the English and French Ambassadors and Admirals were informed that the fleets were not to assume an

aggressive position, but that they were to protect the Turkish territory from attack.

On the 27th of October you informed Count Nesselrode of the nature of these instructions, and the service upon which Her Majesty's fleet would be employed; and Her Majesty's Government hoped that that communication, made in no unfriendly spirit to Russia, would have sufficed to prevent an attack upon a Turkish harbour which is Turkish territory.

Had the Turkish squadron been about to make a descent upon Sevoum-Kalé, as is stated in a despatch from Prince Menchikoff to Prince Gortchakoff, which there is every reason to consider authentic; if it had been fallen in with and destroyed by the Russian fleet off the Russian coasts in Asia, Her Majesty's Government, however much they might have lamented such a disastrous loss of life, would have regarded it as an ordinary though unfortunate casualty of war. But the Sultan's squadron was destroyed while at anchor in a Turkish harbour, and where, consequently, the English and French fleets, if they had been present, would have protected it, and would have repelled the attack.

The Russian Admiral, however, must have acted upon the orders of his Government, which Government was well aware of the instructions which were to guide the British and French Admirals; and Her Majesty's Government are compelled therefore to consider that it was not the Turkish squadron alone that was deliberately attacked in the harbour of Sinope.

The events of the last six months, and the proceedings of the English and French Governments, afford abundant proof of their desire to maintain friendly relations with Russia, and to effect an honourable settlement of the difference between that Power and the Porte; but the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has greatly erred if it has mistaken forbearance for indifference, or has calculated upon any want of firmness in carrying out a policy which those Governments have adopted with a due regard to their own and to European interests.

Her Majesty's Government have not abandoned the hope that peace may be re-established, for they are unwilling to believe that any insurmountable obstacle can exist to carrying out the declared objects of Russia in a manner compatible with the dignity and the independence of the Porte; and it would therefore have been a matter of sincere satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government that the combined fleets should have remained at anchor in the Bosphorus while negotiations were pending. But this has been rendered impossible by the attack on the Turkish squadron at Sinope. The intentions of the English and French Governments, which were long since announced to the Porte, must be firmly and faithfully executed. For this purpose, although with no hostile design against Russia, it is essential that the combined fleets should have the command of the Black Sea; and the necessary instructions have accordingly been addressed to the Ambassadors and Admirals of England and France.

In making known to Count Nesselrode that such instructions have been sent, you will govern yourself by the language of this despatch, and you will inform his Excellency that in order to prevent the recurrence of disasters such as that at Sinope, the combined fleets will require, and, if necessary, compel Russian ships of war to return to Sebastopol, or the nearest port; and it is considered that the Turkish fleet should undertake no aggressive operations by sea so long as matters remain in their present state.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 508.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 721.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, December 14, 1853.

WHEN I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship, I was not aware that the *Te Deum* celebrated at the palace on the occasion of General Andronikoff's victory had been attended by three members of the Corps Diplomatique.

As I now understand, it had been at first intended that the attendance of the whole of the diplomatic body should be called for; but the resolution was reversed

in consequence of the Emperor having considered that the summons might be embarrassing to the French and English Mission.

The three diplomatists who attended the ceremony were Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires; Baron de Werthern, the Secretary of the Prussian Legation (General Rochow being confined by illness to his room); and Count Zeppelin, the Chargé d'Affaires of Wurtemburg, who is considered as waiting upon the Crown Prince, and the Grand Duchess Olga, his consort.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 509.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 725. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 14, 1853.

My Lord,

IN a very confidential conversation which I have held with the Prussian Envoy, he has acquainted me that he has spoken to the Chancellor in the most serious manner as to the necessity of his making every exertion for a restoration of peace.

He had, he stated, remarked that it was evident that if general war should break out the Emperor would be regarded as its author, while with regard to the origin of dispute he had said, "It is impossible that the Russian cause should meet with any sympathy in Germany, because the Greek orthodox faith has been the occasion of your conduct to us, being frequently insolent and harsh," ("grob" and "derb" were the two epithets employed).

This was quite what I could have desired, but it is clear that like almost every one else here General Rochow is strongly under local influences.

He spoke of the Emperor's moderation, and hoped that his late victories would not have the effect of inducing him to increase his demands upon Turkey. He thought not. He believed that His Imperial Majesty would still be content with the Menchikoff note or the Vienna note.

On my side I expressed great surprise not only at the notion of any increase of demands, but at that of persistance in old ones, and only begged that General de Rochow would give me so much of assistance as to lose no opportunity for reminding the Chancellor that decisive military successes had been represented, over and over again, as the opportunities looked for for manifesting the moderation of the Imperial views.

I will only remark that this conversation between General de Rochow and the Chancellor was reported to me upon the condition of the greatest discretion on my part.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 510.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 726. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 14, 1853.

My Lord,

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC has had the kindness to give me some interesting particulars of a conversation of one hour's duration which he held with the Emperor on the 13th instant.

The interview is represented by the Russians as having been sought by General Castelbajac, and by him as having been proposed by the Emperor.

The truth is, that the General had written a note to Count Nesselrode in terms which appear to me imprudent, saying, that as "a Christian, a soldier, and an European," he rejoiced in the Russian victories, and should be still happier should they conduce to peace; and that this letter led to a summons to the palace.

In the conversation which took place, the Emperor began by expressing his gratitude for the manner in which M. de Kisseleff had been received at Fontainebleau, his displeasure at the language of the French press, and his astonishment that such a piece as the "Cosaques" should have been tolerated at Paris.

He spoke of the Black Sea, and of the various motives which might induce the allied fleet to appear there. If it should be to protect commerce, he himself had taken every precaution for commercial security; if it were to prevent the Turks from undertaking rash enterprises, he could only feel obligation to the allies, but at the same time believed that his own forces were sufficient for the safety of the Russian coast; if again the allied fleets interfered to take part with the Turkish ships against his fleet, that would evidently constitute a cause of war.

This was one of the points upon which the Emperor manifested the greatest interest. He was very evidently anxious to learn to what measures on the part of the allied fleets the late Turkish naval disaster was likely to give rise.

His Majesty justified the attack by stating that it was truly a defensive measure; that the Turkish ships were laden with military stores for the Circassian mountaineers; the fact was proved by their decks being crowded with barrels of powder; that circumstance indeed was the cause of their being blown up. As regarded the disembarkation of troops on the coast of European Turkey, His Majesty contemplated no operation of the kind.

General Castelbajac found the Emperor discursive and excited in his conversation; His Majesty passed rapidly from one subject to another, and upon some spoke with considerable animation. He appeared particularly annoyed at the assurance given him by the French Minister of the note and protocol having been signed at Vienna, spoke of the ingratitude of the Emperor of Austria in thus requiting his gratuitous services, and hinted at the possibility of all Europe being arrayed against him. Here a little more than excitement was betrayed; excitement became exultation. Even if this combination should be formed, he would not give in. Russia had already passed through great straights. His cause was just. He could not abandon his faith and the cause of his co-religionists. God would judge his actions and support his cause, &c. &c. As for his position it would remain what it had been and still was, defensive and expectant. He should be ready to receive propositions of peace, and to accept terms if they should prove consistent with his rights and dignity.

These were the principal points of this remarkable conversation which were reported to me by the Marquis de Castelbajac.

At the close of our conference I related a former transaction with a French collegue (referred to in No. 722), in which I had some reason to complain of his want of frankness. General Castelbajac asked why I made this allusion? what was the conclusion which I sought to draw? It is simply this, I said, that I had very little confidence in the person I advert to, and that I have a great deal in you. This was not an empty phrase. My collegue gave me ample assurances of his sincerity, and I attach much confidence to his words. Before dropping the subject, however, I said, Now, in my turn, you shall let me tell you two things the Emperor said to you.

He professed to have great reliance on France and very little on England. "Eh bien, non," General Castelbajac replied, "il s'est assez bien conduit à ce sujet. Je lui avais fait observer que notre union était des plus loyales, des plus complètes; et je vous assure que vous n'avez pas été trop mal traités. Il n'a dit que très peu de chose contre l'Angleterre."

The other point, I rejoined, is this: I am convinced that His Majesty told you that he had the greatest confidence in your Emperor, and not the slightest in his Minister for Foreign Affairs. "Cette fois ci," rejoined General Castelbajac, "vous avez parfaitement raison. Il m'a dit avoir une complète confiance dans la sagesse de l'Empereur Napoleon, mais qu'il n'en était pas de même de M. Drouyn de Lhuys; que ce n'était point un homme aux vues éclairées, qu'en un mot ce n'était point un homme d'Etat."

I thanked General Castelbajac for his very friendly communication, adding, —which I was able to do upon credible authority,—"To prove to you how right you are to look suspiciously upon all these fine phrases, I will tell you in confidence some words which were uttered only last night at the Winter Palace. 'Très

probablement avant le mois de Janvier, toute cette Cour Napoléon aura disparue; alors la France ne pourra pas nous faire la guerre: et quand à l'Angleterre, elle ne voudra pas la faire.'"

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 511.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 734. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1853.

I LEARN from Lord Cowley's despatch No. 911, of which a copy was inclosed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 327 of the 7th instant, that Austria has received from Russia assurances so often reiterated and so positive that the Russian Government seeks neither an increase of territory, nor an extension of power, that Count Buol cannot but believe in them.

Upon this declaration of opinion I can only remark that it may be that Russia has no intentions (that is, present intentions) of increasing her territory at the expense of the Sultan's dominions; the hypothesis is indeed the more probable as the attitude of all Europe is discouraging for such an attempt.

With regard to an extension of power the case is widely different, and it appears to me hardly possible that Count Buol should hold the opinions which he expresses.

Power in the sense employed by the Austrian Minister means the result of power—influence; and so little has any attempt been made by the Russian Government to conceal that an increased influence was sought through the concessions demanded of the Porte that, as your Lordship will have seen by various passages in my correspondence, the common excuse put forward by the Russians for these demands having been made, is the necessity for restoring that influence which by a convenient fiction is supposed to have been neutralized at Constantinople.

Respecting the increase of actual power or influence (whichever the term employed may be), no doubt is admissible only that the wish of obtaining a fresh hold upon Turkey is caused by the pretence of seeking only that which is assumed to have been lost.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 512.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 735. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1853.

I SHOULD find it very difficult to give your Lordship an adequate idea of the sensation which has been produced here by the interview of the French Minister and the Emperor; but I cannot better express the feeling than by saying that this audience is the subject of more general conversation than the military successes which the Russians claim to have obtained.

The language commonly employed is that "France is now entirely with us," that is, with the Russians.

This notion I resist very strenuously, and with sincerity. I cannot indeed bring myself to believe that any such sudden change of policy can have taken place on the part of France.

What appears to me admissible as a conjecture is, that the French Envoy may have received instructions to be careful that personal relations of a friendly character be maintained between the Emperor Napoleon and the Emperor Nicholas, and possibly, beyond this, so to manage that the opposition made by the French Mission to the measures of the Russian Government may be of somewhat less marked a character than that of Her Majesty's Mission; but that from being the close ally of England, France should have suddenly become the well-wisher and the ally of Russia is what I cannot admit even to myself.

I am rather disposed to infer that the recommendations which I conjecture my French colleague to have received must have been very injudiciously acted upon; and that in this manner an impression highly injurious to the good faith of his Government has been created.

One thing appears to me to be very evident: either a total change has taken place in the councils of France, or the official exponent of French policy has acted in a manner which calls loudly for such measures as will neutralize the effect of his late demonstration.

In conversing with Count Nesselrode I thought it well to make some observations upon the absurd rumours to which General de Castelbajac's audience had given rise.

The Chancellor said the transaction was of a simple nature. That the thing (la chose) commenced at Fontainebleau, where during five days M. de Kisseleff had been the object of the very marked attentions of the Emperor Napoleon; that for these the Emperor had been desirous of expressing his thanks, and that he had consequently availed himself of the occasion offered by General Castelbajac's letter, for the purpose of sending for him.

The Emperor Nicholas' conversation had been, Count Nesselrode added, of a very pacific nature, as I had probably learned from my colleague.

I will only add that I cannot be surprised at the Emperor's being struck at the reception given to his Ministers at foreign Courts, differing so widely as it does from that which the Corps Diplomatique meet with at his own.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 513.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 736. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1853.

A PERSON who has a very extensive correspondence in the East acquaints me that he has received a letter which states that the marked disposition of the Court of Teheran to side with Russia in her unprovoked quarrel with Turkey is the result of an arrangement made between the Shah's Mission at St. Petersburgh and the Imperial Government, of which the advantage derived by the Persians has been the partial or the entire remission of the sum which was still owing by them to Russia.

The same letter alludes to a Russian agent of the name of Khanekoff, whose presence in Persia is considered as being connected with this transaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 514.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 737.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 19, 1853.

THE short conversation which I held with Count Nesselrode on the 17th instant, was in so far unsatisfactory that it tended to confirm the notion of the Emperor having made up his mind not to recede from his demands upon the Sultan's Government.

His Excellency took occasion to advert to the Protocol signed on the 5th instant at Vienna, and expressed his belief that it could not operate favourably, and might operate very disadvantageously upon the restoration of peace.

His Excellency had, he said, no objection to the principle of respecting the existing state of territorial possession in Turkey; the principle indeed had been put forward in every paper which had been lately issued by the Imperial Government: but the declaration to this effect at the present moment could not but be expected to have the effect of encouraging the Turks in their actual policy,

and to lead them to believe that their resistance could have no dangerous results.

Before taking leave of the Chancellor, I observed to him that among the many points which caused me anxiety, there was perhaps no one which gave me so much as the possible passage of the Danube by Prince Gortchakoff. I thought such a movement likely to be attended with immediate serious consequences.

Nothing of the sort was in Count Nesselrode's opinion to be apprehended. He believed Prince Gortchakoff to have no thought of passing the Danube during the winter, and were he desirous of doing so, it would not be in his power, the difficulties were so great and the Prince's available forces inadequate.

Some short conversation respecting Kalafat ensued, in which although nothing distinct was said by Count Nesselrode, it was rather intimated to me that there was no certainty as to this position being attacked by the Russian army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 515.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 739. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

I LEARN from a source in which I can place entire confidence, that the Emperor considers himself aggrieved by the signature of the Protocol of the 5th instant, and more especially so at the conclusion of that act having been kept for twenty-four hours from the knowledge of Baron Meyendorff.

I observed to my informant that one of the merits of the late transaction at Vienna appeared to me, that it might have the effect of opening the Emperor's eyes, and of convincing him that his late policy had been very offensive to the whole of Europe.

So little is this the case, my acquaintance replied in good faith, on the contrary His Majesty is under the conviction of his having great reason to be dissatisfied with the conduct of the Imperial Cabinet.

As I have frequently stated to your Lordship of late, my mistrust in the declarations of the Russian Government is unbounded, and this applies in some degree to the professed intention of respecting the actual limits of Turkey. It is not difficult to ascertain that very incorrect geographical notions prevail among the Russian people, and that very many of them consider the Danube and not the Pruth as marking the real Russo-Turkish frontier.

No circumstance would so much tend to dispel this popular error as such a change in international arrangements as would interdict the Russians from entering under any circumstances into the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 516.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 740. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC, who is as friendly and communicative as ever, and who is, I am more and more convinced, unconscious of having done injury to what I regard as before our common interests, has related to me a conversation which he has held with the Chancellor, and a portion of which appears to me of considerable interest.

After stating to the Chancellor what had passed between the Emperor and himself, General Castelbajac spoke of the three Russian victories, adding, "Nous avons en France un proverbe qui nous apprend qu'il faut battre les gens, mais qu'il ne faut pas les assommer."

The application of the saying was, that no further successes ought to be sought by the Russians against the Turks, a conclusion in which, as General Castelbajac assures me, Count Nesselrode appeared to concur heartily.

The point of importance, however, was this. The Chancellor had said: "As you four Powers are now sitting in deliberation at Constantinople, why do not you take the opportunity of exacting something which will be of real benefit to the Christians? Let the Christians be placed, as to all civil and religious rights, upon the same footing as the Mussulman subjects of the Porte, and then you will really have obtained a great result. Do not talk of the opposition of the Turks, of their dignity and honour; all these are words; this is what you ought to attempt, and this is what you will obtain, if you speak loudly and firmly."

In making this suggestion, it is very probable he may have his ends in view. He may hope that the demand which he puts into the mouths of the foreign Representatives in Turkey may render the Four Powers unpopular in Turkey; or, which is more probable, he may be of opinion that the emancipation of the Greeks would at no distant period render them more powerful than their masters; but, however this may be, I was not the less surprised at a plan being brought forward by a Russian Minister which has presented itself to the minds of many persons, as offering the most efficacious system for counteracting the influence of Russia in Turkey.

It may be, however, that Count Nesselrode did not explain the whole of his plan, and that it may be his object, the full, civil, and religious rights which he suggests should be granted to the Christian subjects of the Porte, should (as regards those of the Greek faith) be placed under the protection and guarantee of the Emperor.

Reverting to his conversation with the Emperor, the French Envoy remarked again, that His Majesty appeared desirous of peace, but prepared to go to war with the whole of the Four Powers.

"En parlant de ses droits, de sa dignité, de sa religion, surtout, l'Empereur me paraissait," General Castelbajac said, "dans un état de surexcitation fébrile."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 517.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 743.)

St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

AS I was upon the point of despatching the messenger, the French Minister has had the kindness to call upon me for the purpose of informing me that intelligence, upon which he believes full reliance can be placed, confirms his persuasion as to the Emperor's wish of preserving, as far as possible, a defensive attitude.

General Castelbajac has reason to believe that orders have been sent to Prince Woronzow, directing him on no account to march upon Erzeroum, and only to attack Kars in the event of such an operation being requisite to secure his position.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 518.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 744.)

St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY another *Te Deum* was celebrated at the Winter Palace, to which, as the newspapers had announced, the persons belonging to the Court, and those usually received there, were summoned to take part in a thanksgiving for the late victory of Prince Béboutoff, obtained over the Turks.

This notice is deserving of attention, as it proves that the persons assembled were called together upon an extraordinary occasion, and not upon that of the Fête of St. Nicholas.

The ceremony was attended by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, the Prussian Secretary of Legation, and by the Ministers of Holland, Naples, Bavaria, and Belgium, the last of these accompanied by his son and his Secretary of Legation.

The Austrian and Prussian diplomatists had received special invitations; the rest attended in consequence of the Chancellor (in reply to an inquiry made of him by Count Bray, the Bavarian Minister) having stated that the Corps Diplomatique would not be invited, but that, if they thought fit, they were at liberty to present themselves.

The opportunities of visiting the Winter Palace being extremely rare, my colleagues availed themselves of the occasion unexpectedly offered.

As regards the greater number of these gentlemen, it is probably very immaterial whether they were or were not present at the ceremony; as regards the diplomatic servants of Austria and Prussia the case is different, and I would submit to your Lordship, that they neither ought to have been invited, or, being so, ought to have attended.

Austria and Prussia, as I would submit to your Lordship, besides having loudly proclaimed the neutral position which they have assumed, are acting as mediators in the unhappy quarrel between Russia and Turkey.

It appears to me, therefore, to be perfectly unsuitable that their Representatives, of whatever degree, should take part in any court or religious ceremony intended to celebrate the victories obtained by one of these Powers over the other.

The Turkish Government is probably too sensible to regard any trifling circumstance of the kind, but if their attention should happen to be attracted to what has passed, some surprise may well be felt at the servants of two countries which are professing their feelings of friendship and impartiality, having been among the number of persons assembled on several occasions at St. Petersburg to return thanks to God for the destruction of a great number of the Sultan's subjects, who have fallen victims to a most unholy war.

To guard against the possibility of misconstruction, I think it right to state to your Lordship that neither of the *Te Deums* celebrated at Court have been attended by any member of the French Mission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 519.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 745. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, December 19, 1853.

My Lord,

I AM not sure whether Baron Brunnow took it upon himself to withdraw the money belonging to the Russian Government from the Bank of England, or whether the step was taken at his recommendation. I learn, however, upon good authority, that he is blamed by his Government either for having taken a hasty measure, or for having given injudicious advice.

I have mentioned privately to two or three persons belonging to our English community that for the panic which still weighs upon the Russian markets, the Russians are indebted in the second as in the first instance to their own authorities, an opinion which appears to have found its way (as it had been my purpose it should do) to the Exchange.

The same paralysis of commerce is observable here as when I last addressed your Lordship upon the subject, and confidence in the duration of neutral trade during a war being shaken, little more is doing by foreign than by English houses.

The only large prospective operations of which I have any knowledge is the purchase by a foreign firm of 75,000 quarters of rye for delivery next year in Holland, and the sale of 500 poods of copper by Baron Stieglitz to a German house, to be delivered in France in the spring.

A war of any considerable duration would probably go far towards depriving the Russians definitively of their English customers for tallow and hemp; bristles being almost the only article of commerce upon which the English markets are dependent upon Russia, and the stream of commerce once directed being with difficulty brought back to its former channel.

All this, however, is so little understood by the Russian public that, according to popular opinion, the results of a war cannot fail of being more disastrous to English than to Russian commerce.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch I have learned some facts which may perhaps clear up the step lately taken by the Russian Government in withdrawing their funds from the Bank of England.

At the time when this arrangement was entered into, the inquiry was made as to what would be the consequence in the event of war between the two countries, and the Russian Government were informed that the case being an exceptional one, it would be impossible to say but that in all probability the money would be lost.

I have received this information in a most confidential manner from the very person who negotiated this arrangement for the Government, and whose mistrust of the pacific assurances lately given by the Finance Minister is not to be wondered at, as he was aware when summoned with the other merchants to receive them, that a few hours before orders had been sent to England to withdraw this money.

G. H. S.

No. 520.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 12.)

(No. 137.)

Berlin, December 10, 1853.

My Lord,

THE following telegraphic despatch has been received this evening by Baron Manteuffel from the Prussian Consul-General at Bucharest:

"*Buchrest, December* 8, 1853.

"Prince Menchikoff announces to Prince Gortchakoff:

"A Turkish squadron of seven frigates, one sloop, one steamer, and five transports, destined to land troops at Secoum-Kalé, was pursued by a division of the Russian fleet to the harbour of Sinope, and forced to engage on the 30th of November, under the guns of the newly erected batteries of Sinope, which engagement ended by the entire destruction of the Turkish squadron, and the capture of the Vice-Admiral, Osman Pasha.

"Only one Turkish steamer escaped.

"The Russian squadron suffered considerably."

A similar telegraphic despatch has been likewise received from Count Arnim, at Vienna, who also reported the return of the Russian fleet to Sevastopol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 521.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 148. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 23, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me last night that reports had been received from Baron Wildenbruch, stating that previous to the battle, the Austrian Consul-General at Sinope had been observed to telegraph or signal to the Russian fleet. His Excellency said that this statement was borne out by several witnesses. This circumstance, and other suspicions entertained towards Austria at Constantinople, had induced the Turkish Government to remove all Austrian subjects in their service.

His Excellency said that this information will probably have reached Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe from the same source from which Baron Wildenbruch had received it.

Without being able to judge of its authenticity, it is my duty to inform your Lordship, that it has been reported by the Prussian Representative at Constantinople to his his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 522.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 23, 1853.*

BARON MEUSENBACH, the Prussian Consul-General at Bucharest, reports that some coldness had arisen between him and the Austrian Consul there, out of a diversity of conduct pursued by the latter on the arrival of Baron Budberg, the Russian Commissioner.

He states that they had previously consulted together, and had agreed to act collectively as regarded their official position, and that they had finally decided not to pay their official respects to Baron Budberg. The Austrian Consul, however, without any previous intimation to his colleague, waited on Baron Budberg in full uniform. Baron Meusenbach has not followed his example, and, I am informed by Baron Manteuffel, is instructed not to pay any official visit to that functionary.

I remarked to his Excellency on the great propriety of this reserve, stating that the occupation of these provinces was illegal; that the nomination by Russia of a Civil Commissioner was accordingly illegal also; and that, therefore, any avowal of Baron Budberg's official position would be a virtual recognition of Russian usurpation.

I thought it advisable to inform Baron Manteuffel of the information of the incorporation of the Wallachia militia into the Russian army of occupation, as reported in the Earl of Westmorland's despatch No. 454 to your Lordship, and of the opinion entertained by Count Buol of that measure, in which his Excellency perfectly concurred.

He told me that he had been informed that a portion of the militia, when ordered by Prince Gortchakoff for some special military service, were found to have decamped, and to have disbanded themselves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 523.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 158. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 24, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the King of Prussia has decided to send a secret and confidential agent to London, and has selected for this mission Count Albert Pourtales, formerly Prussian Minister at Constantinople.

Before explaining the nature of this step, I may distinctly assure your Lordship that it has been designed in a Prussian and not in a Russian sense. In the present very complicated and critical state of affairs the Prussian Cabinet are desirous, through some confidential agent, not only of learning the views and opinions entertained by the British Government on Oriental affairs, but also of being able to convey verbally to Chevalier Bunsen the position and policy of Prussia with respect to passing events, as well as those which may successively and rapidly arise.

Baron Manteuffel has informed me that the instructions given to Count Pourtales, though of a general nature, may be summed up under the two following heads:—

1. To confer with the Chevalier Bunsen on the present state of the Oriental question, and to explain to him the present position and policy of Prussia.

2. To endeavour to concert with England for a more complete understanding with Prussia in any eventualities which may arise; to learn the views and intentions of the English Cabinet; and to be able, if possible, to arrange and concert the basis of a cordial understanding between the two Governments.

Count Portales is not charged with power to sign any arrangement which might be agreed upon, but is to report to the King and Baron Manteuffel the result of his conferences with your Lordship and the Chevalier Bunsen.

I am induced to believe that this mission may be productive of most beneficial results, and I have the greater confidence in this expectation from the selection which His Majesty has made of Count Portales.

Possessed of considerable abilities, of great independence of character and of fortune, with great judgment, and an intimate knowledge of the East, his political position in this country, as belonging to the Bethmann-Hollweg party, is a sufficient guarantee that he is free from all Russian and Austrian influences, and that he is anxious to secure for Prussia that independence and liberty of action which is the groundwork of Baron Manteuffel's foreign policy, while it is also his desire that Prussia should be closely allied with England.

I feel confident that your Lordship will derive satisfaction from your communication with Count Pourtales, and I sincerely trust that his mission will be attended with such results as will prepare an intimate and cordial alliance between the two States.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 524.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, le 19 Décembre, 1853, 7 P.M.*

LE Conseil-Général après de vifs débats a décidée pour la négociation sur la base d'évacuer plutôt les Principautés, de sauvegarder les droits souverains du Sultan, et de confirmer la garantie des Puissances.

Le projet des Quatre Représentants d'ici pour établir une négociation avec une armistice était déjà entre les mains du Ministre Ottoman. Il doit être pris en considération par le Conseil Ministériel en deux ou trois jours: les chances du succès sont favorable. La note collective de Vienne est arrivée trop tard,

d'après l'opinion des Quatre Représentants, pour être presentée à Reshid Pasha sans une risque imminente de tout déranger. On a par conséquent pris le parti de la réserver.

Le courier de Cabinet Capel est arrivé le matin. Ma conviction que les escadres devraient sortir vient de recontrer un obstacle dans son exécution.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 525.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 26.)

(No. 457.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 21, 1853.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 454 of yesterday's date, I have the honour of inclosing herewith the extract of a private letter from Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Meyendorff, dated from Bucharest, the 2nd instant, which gives the same explanation with regard to the service in which it was his intention to employ the Wallachian troops, which I reported to your Lordship as coming from Baron Meyendorff.

Prince Gortchakoff, besides what is stated in this extract, gives as his reason for removing the Wallachian artillery from Bucharest that he did not conceive it to be fitting to retain a considerable force of that arm in the town destined for his head-quarters, and which did not belong to his own army.

With respect to the employment of the Cossacks with the gendarmes in the district between Craiova and Kalafat, he states that their service is entirely confined to the duties of the police.

I have, &c

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 525.

Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Meyendorff.

Bucharest, le 2 Décembre, 1853.

LES Valaques ne sont employés que pour le service intérieure et de police, et pour l'occupation, comme durant la paix, des postes d'observation sur la ligne des quarantaines. Du côté de Calafat, où cette ligne est interrompue par l'ennemi, les gendarmes sont chargés d'explorer la contrée en commun avec les Cosaques. J'ai dirigé sur Braila l'artillerie Valaque, parceque je trouve quelle y est mieux qu'à Bucharest.

No. 526.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 352.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 28, 1853.

BARON BRUNNOW called upon me yesterday by appointment to read to me a despatch from Count Nesselrode, respecting the facilities that the Russian Government are desirous of affording to neutral vessels leaving the port of Galatz.

I took the opportunity of informing Baron Brunnow that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with the French Government, had determined to take a more active part than hitherto in the Eastern question, and that effectual measures would be adopted for protecting the territory and the flag of the Sultan, as well as for the suppression of hostilities in the Black Sea. That both Governments would willingly have postponed such measures so long as a prospect remained of terminating the question peacefully, but that the course pursued by Russia had left them no option. The Russian Government was

fully aware of the objects entertained by England and France, after the combined fleets had been called up to Constantinople from Besica Bay, and that an attack upon a Turkish squadron in a Turkish harbour, was therefore an act of defiance to England and France, which assuredly would not remain unnoticed.

Baron Brunnow said he could not accept my interpretation of the affair at Sinope, which was simply an act of war between belligerents, and was not to be considered as a hostile manifestation towards England and France.

After some further and unimportant conversation upon the subject, I expressed to Baron Brunnow my belief, founded upon information from various quarters, that the Emperor would make no concessions, and was determined upon war if he could not make peace upon his own terms.

In reply to Baron Brunnow's inquiry, I informed him that instructions would be sent to you this evening to communicate to Count Nesselrode the determination that has been come to by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 527.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received December* 30.)

(No. 996.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 29, 1853.

THE communications which have recently taken place between Paris and Vienna had inspired M. Drouyn de Lhuys with the belief that no difference of opinion existed among the members of the Conference as to the manner in which the answer of the Porte, if considered favourable to peace, should be transmitted to St. Petersburgh. M. de Buol had indeed, in the first instance, expressed, as your Lordship knows, a wish to be the main channel of communication between the Conference and the Russian Government, but appeared to have yielded to the representations of the Representatives of England and France, who had objected to the Conference employing any other mode of communicating with the Russian Government than had been adopted towards the Porte, and that mode having been, at the desire of the Austrian Cabinet, collective towards Turkey they had demanded that it should remain collective towards Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was, therefore, somewhat surprised when M. de Hübner yesterday morning again put forward the pretensions of Austria to represent the Conferences in its communications with St. Petersburgh. His Excellency, however, met the Austrian claim with a decided negative, and told M. de Hübner that he saw in the renewed proposition a vacillation of purpose on the part of Austria which gave him sincere regret.

It appears now from a telegraphic despatch received yesterday from M. de Bourqueney that this difficulty had been arranged to the satisfaction of the Conference, when a telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford of the 19th instant, was received by Lord Westmorland and laid before the Conference. Your Lordship will have received that despatch before this can reach your hands, and you will have learnt the painful impression which the non-presentation to the Porte of the collective note of the 5th instant, had made upon the Conference, and of the resolution to which the members had come to ask permission of their respective Governments to address a duplicate of that note to the Turkish Minister at Vienna, and thus to ensure its reaching the hands of the Sultan's Ministers.

Simultaneously with this intelligence M. Drouyn de Lhuys had received his mail of the 15th from the Levant. The Vienna note had not then arrived at Constantinople; but the Representatives of the Four Powers had commenced negotiations with the Porte on pretty nearly the same basis as those which were suggested from Vienna, and which appear from Lord Stratford's telegraphic despatch to have been received subsequently. In case your Lordship should not have a copy of the note addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers I do myself the honour to inclose one.

Such was the state of matters when I called on M. Drouyn de Lhuys this

morning. I found him annoyed at the summary way in which the Vienna collective note had been laid aside by the Representatives at Constantinople, and somewhat embarrassed to know what answer to send respecting the new proposition of the Conference.

I said that, until we were informed of the reasons which had induced the Representatives to pursue the negotiations on which they had entered with the Porte rather than present the collective note, we could not form a proper opinion; that, knowing as I did the soil of Constantinople, I could well understand that any alteration in the form of treating a negotiation already commenced would lead to delay, if not to a worse issue; and that as the suggestions made by Representatives to the Porte coincided or nearly so with those which emanated from Vienna, it did not appear to me that the state of things was much altered; a conclusion in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys coincided. I observed, moreover, that the mode of proceeding which had been adopted at Constantinople might come to our assistance at Vienna, as I did not suppose that either Her Majesty's or the Emperor's Government would desire to insist on the collective form at St. Petersburgh, if it had not been made use of at Constantinople. As to placing a duplicate of the note in the hands of Arif Pasha, it might be done if Count Buol pressed it, but on the distinct understanding that a collective note would be presented to the Russian Government. In short, one of two ways was open to us: to await the result of the negotiations pursuing at Constantinople, and to frame our future proceedings in consequence, or to sanction the transmission of a duplicate note to Arif Pasha on the condition that a collective note should also be addressed to Russia.

On the whole M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to lean towards the latter course, which led to my telegraphic communication to your Lordship of this morning's date.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 527.

The Four Representatives to Reshid Pasha.

Péra, le 12 Décembre, 1853.

LE Soussigné (qualités), d'accord avec les Représentants de (désignation des Cours), a l'honneur de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements ayant encore lieu de croire que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie n'envisage pas le fil des négociations comme rompu par la déclaration de guerre et les faits qui ont été la conséquence, et sachant de plus, d'après les propres déclarations de Sa Majesté Impériale, qu'elle désire seulement voir assurer une légalité parfaite des droits et des immunités octroyés par Sa Majesté le Sultan et ses glorieux ancêtres aux communautés Chrétiennes, sujettes de la Sublime Porte;

Et de son côté la Sublime Porte répondant à cette déclaration par la déclaration qu'elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de continuer à maintenir lés susdits droits et immunités, et qu'elle est toujours disposée à mettre un terme au différend survenu entre les deux Empires;

La négociation à suivre serait basée:

1. Sur l'évacuation la plus prompte possible des Principautés.

2. Sur le renouvellement des anciens Traités.

3. Sur la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels octroyés par la Sublime Porte à tous ses sujets non-Mussulmans; communication qui, faite aux Puissances, serait accompagnée d'assurances convenables données à chacune d'elles. L'arrangement déjà fait pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux et aux établissements religieux à Jerusalem serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants des Quatre Puissances qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à négocier sur les [*sic in orig.*] ci-dessus énoncées, avec le concours des Puissances et dans une ville neutre dont elles conviendraient.

Les déclarations faites par les Puissances dans le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, seraient solennellement confirmées par ces mêmes Puissances,

dans l'intérêt de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de celui du concert Européen.

Et la Porte de son côté déclarerait dans le même intérêt sa ferme résolution de développer plus efficacement son système administratif et les améliorations intérieures qui devraientsatisfaire aux besoins et à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

(Paraphé par les initiales des Ambassadeurs de France et d'Angleterre, et par les Ministres de l'Autriche et de Prusse.)

No. 528.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 529.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 30, 1853.

THE messenger having been delayed on the road, I did not receive your Excellency's No. 996 of the 29th instant, this afternoon, until after Count Colloredo had called upon me to read a despatch from Count Buol, precisely similar to that which M. Hübner appears to have communicated to M. de Lhuys.

My answer to Count Colloredo was the same as that which M. Hübner received from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. I expressed my regret that Count Buol should be disinclined to adhere to the arrangement that had been agreed upon, and I informed him that Her Majesty's Government would be no party to any communication to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, except in conjunction with France, Austria, and Prussia.

Count Colloredo stated that Count Buol was chiefly moved to made this proposal by the fear that a collective note to Russia should, like the one addressed to the Porte, find its way into the newspapers before it could even reach the Emperor's hands.

I said that the negligence or bad faith which led to the publication of documents that the Conference had determined should be kept secret, was much to be lamented, but that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was not to be guided by such considerations, and that there was no use in further discussion upon the subject.

I subsequently saw Count Walewski, and held to him nearly the same language as your Excellency to M. de Lhuys, upon the proposal of Count Buol, that the collective note should be delivered to the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna.

That proposal, I said, appeared to be useless in itself, and unjust towards the Four Representatives at Constantinople. The Turkish Ambassador could only transmit the note to his Government, and where would be the advantage of inquiring a fortnight hence of the Porte, whether she was disposed to negotiate for peace, when we already know that she was so disposed, and, in substance, the terms to which she was ready to agree? On the other hand, such a mode of proceeding would amount to a disavowal of the Representatives, and a rebuke to them in the face of Europe for the course they had pursued, without even waiting to know on what grounds, or under what circumstances, they had abstained from delivering the collective note to Reshid Pasha. The Four Governments would thus appear to be less anxious about the settlement of the differences between Russia and the Porte, than about its being effected according to their own project, and that they would run the risk of delay and confusion upon no other data than an imperfect telegraphic despatch from Lord Stratford.

At the time I was conversing with Count Walewski, I had not seen the note which has been addressed to the Porte, but assuming that some reasonable proposition had been made before the collective note arrived from Vienna, I said that the Four Representatives had probably exercised a sound discretion in suspending it, as the Turkish Ministers might otherwise have been induced to depart from what they had already agreed to, and to think that it was open to them to propose fresh terms in replying to the collective note of the Four Powers.

Count Walewski, on finding that I had not seen the note, was so good as to give me a copy he had with him, and it confirmed my opinion with respect to the judicious course pursued by the Representatives, as the terms are such as the Porte has thought proper to accept, and which the Emperor of Russia will put himself more than ever in the wrong by refusing.

Count Walewski having agreed with me, that upon the whole it would be advisable to take no further step until complete information had been received, I forwarded to the Earl of Westmorland by the telegraph, a despatch of which I herewith inclose to your Excellency.*

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 529.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 531.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 31, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 997 of the 29th instant, stating that the instructions for General Castelbajac referred to in your Excellency's despatch No. 998 were to be sent off on the evening of that day, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is anxious that I should desire Sir Hamilton Seymour, by telegraph, not to act upon those instructions which were transmitted to him on the 27th instant, until General Castelbajac is in possession of his despatches; I have to refer your Excellency to Mr. Addington's despatch of the 28th ultimo,† inclosing a copy of a telegraphic message to the above effect, which I had directed to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin to send on to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. † No.

No. 530.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 160. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 24, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL stated to me on the 22nd instant, that the reports of General Rochow received on that day, were far from being satisfactory to the cause of peace.

They represent the Chancellor having stated most positively that Russia would not enter into any pacification other than in direct negotiation with Turkey.

This information your Lordship will perceive is entirely borne out by Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatch No. 737 of the 19th instant, which will reach your Lordship by this messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 531.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 451.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 20, 1853.*

I COMMUNICATED to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 406, in which you direct me to state to him the sincere pleasure with which Her Majesty's Government had learnt that he had received the Emperor's commands to agree to the Protocol and the draft of the note to Reshid Pasha, which had been submitted to him by Her Majesty's Government, and the Government of France, and by which the concurrence of the Four Powers in the same line of policy on the Eastern question might be considered as established.

Count Buol reciprocated these expressions of satisfaction at the important result which had thus been obtained, and coincided with your Lordship in the hope that, by a strict adherence to it, peace might be reestablished between Russia and the Porte, and the dangers which now menaced the general tranquillity of Europe be averted.

Count Buol was perfectly satisfied with the assurance given by your Lordship, that Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople had been made aware of the anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government for the success of the propositions now about to be made to the Porte, and he renewed his assurance that he should consider himself bound to act in consultation and in entire unity with the other allied Powers towards Russia, in case that Government should refuse to accept the proposals of the Four Powers which the Porte might have agreed to.

Count Buol was glad to find that the verbal amendments introduced into the Protocol had been agreed to by Her Majesty's Government, and that the mode of proceeding recommended to the Representatives at Constantinople by the Conference, had been approved of.

In closing this despatch I beg to express to your Lordship my acknowledgments for the manner in which you have conveyed to me the approbation by Her Majesty's Government of my language and conduct throughout the course of these transactions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 532.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 452.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 20, 1853.*

WITH reference to the desire expressed by your Lordship to learn more distinctly than you had done from a communication you had received from Count Colloredo, whether Count Buol was decided to maintain the principle of a negotiation between the Government of Russia and the Porte, to which the Four Powers should be parties, I read to him the despatch I had addressed to your Lordship upon that subject No. 444, in which I had detailed the manner in which he proposed that the acceptation by the Porte of the proposals, transmitted by the Four Powers, should be submitted by the Conference of Vienna to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and the collective form in which he desired they should be recommended and supported. Count Buol entirely assented to the representation of his intentions and wishes which were contained in that despatch, which he conceived would dispel any doubt which your Lordship might have felt as to the policy he meant to pursue.

With respect to the communication from Count Colloredo to which your Lordship referred, Count Buol stated that the instruction he had addressed to that Minister was written with the view only of establishing the fact that, if the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should absolutely object to a Conference of the Six Powers, in which the Treaty for the re-establishment of peace with Turkey should be negotiated, that determination should not be considered as a total bar to any negotiation. He said that he approved entirely of the proposal that the negotiation should be carried on in presence of the Six Representatives, and that this opinion was entirely in unison with that of the Emperor. He, therefore, would neglect no effort to obtain its adoption by the Russian Government; but that if a decided obstacle as to form was at once opposed to that proposal, he had thought it right to call the attention of the allied Governments to the danger which might arise from insisting upon an exclusive form of negotiation, for which it was not impossible that an equivalent might be found without impairing our action as mediators.

In stating this, Count Buol remarked that he meant in no way to admit of a negotiation between the two belligerents without the control of the Four Powers; he disclaimed entirely any admission of that nature; he insisted upon the action of the allied Powers in every stage of the negotiation, upon every difficulty which might arise between the negotiators, and consequently upon receiving a constant report or communication of their proceedings; but he conceived that if an objection which he should look upon as futile should be raised by Russia as to the negotiation being carried on in the presence of the Representatives of the Four Powers, they ought not to bind themselves by a positive refusal to a course which would prevent all negotiation from taking place.

Count Buol stated that this alone was the view with which he had put forward the opinion he had instructed both Count Colloredo and M. de Hübner to submit for the consideration of the Governments to which these Ministers are accredited. He gave his decided preference to the negotiation in presence of the Six Representatives; he would support it with all the means he could dispose of: but he thought the alternative he had suggested might lead to the same general result, for it was impossible that the many questions which must be brought into the negotiation, and which would partake entirely of an European character, should not necessitate the direct intervention of the allied Powers: and as to the question of the re-establishment of peace between the belligerents, even if it was agreed to and signed by their Representatives alone, it would be with the entire approval of all its conditions by the Representatives of their allies. Count Buol repeated that the reasoning he had thus put forward was merely in support of the views he conceived he was bound to submit to the allied Governments, as those which might meet a case of difficulty which it would be advantageous to be prepared for, but he in no way desired their adoption; it was a suggestion with regard to which, if unfortunately the case he apprehended should arise, he was entirely prepared to attend to the views and opinions of the allied Governments, and to adopt the course which, in consultation with them, should be decided upon as most advisable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 533.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 453.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 20, 1853.*

COUNT ARNIM received from Baron Manteuffel an instruction to propose to Count Buol that the two Governments should direct their Ministers at St. Petersburgh by some common action to recommend to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the adoption of the pacific views with which the proposals of the Four Powers had been transmitted to the Porte.

Count Buol, having addressed a despatch, previous to the receipt of this proposition, to the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh in furtherance of this object, communicated it to Count Arnim, who has transmitted to his Government a report upon this subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 534.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 454.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December 20, 1853.*

I INCLOSE the report which has appeared in the Vienna "Presse" of the decision which has been taken by the Administrative Council of the Principality of Wallachia, which was ordered to assemble by Prince Gortchakoff, by which the whole of the militia of that province has been formally incorporated in the Russian army. It is also stated that these troops will be considerably increased in numbers, and it is supposed they will be placed under the orders of the Imperial Russian General Sala.

I brought these circumstances under the notice of Count Buol, who, although not officially informed of them, believed them to be correctly stated, and considered them as highly reprehensible. The explanations upon this subject which he had received from Baron Meyendorff were, that it was not intended these troops should be employed against the arms of the Sultan; but he did not look upon this assurance as being in any way to be considered as a satisfactory explanation of the measure, and he had so expressed himself in his communications on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 534.

Extract from the "Presse" of December 18, 1853.

(Translation.)

INTELLIGENCE has been received from Bucharest that in a sitting of the Administrative Council of the Principalities, by order of Prince Gortchakoff, the whole Wallachian militia had been formally incorporated in the Russian army. This measure was only sanctioned by a majority of four voices to three. The President of the Council protested against it on the grounds that the Wallachian country was not at war with either Russia or Turkey; on the contrary, it belonged to Turkey, and the participation of the militia in a war against the Porte was in fact high treason against their legitimate Suzerain.

The regiments forming the Wallachian militia are to be increased from 2,000 men (their present complement) to 4,000, and an additional infantry regiment raised.

The intelligence received from Bucharest of the 13th instant states that the Imperial Russian General Sala will probably take the command of the Moldavian and Wallachian troops, and that they will be augmented according to the orders already issued.

No. 535.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 27.)

(No. 455.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 20, 1853.

I INQUIRED of Count Buol what intelligence he had lately received from Servia, as to the grounds upon which the Government of that country had claimed a right to maintain the observance of a strict neutrality in the contest now carried on between Russia and the Porte. Count Buol stated, that he considered it as a point of great interest to the tranquillity of Servia, and the provinces adjoining to it, that this neutrality should be acceded to; he had, therefore, directed Baron Bruck to recommend the Government of the Sultan, upon a clear understanding that it was equally to be maintained towards Russia, to concur in its adoption; and he had just received from him a despatch announcing that Reshid Pasha had notified to him the consent which he had been instructed by the Sultan to convey to the Prince of Servia that this neutrality should be so maintained.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 536.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 28.)

(No. 459.)

My Lord, *Vienna, December* 23, 1853.

COUNT BUOL requested Baron Bourqueney and myself to call upon him yesterday, to consult with us upon the important question as to the form in which the reply from Constantinople should be transmitted to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, which we may be called upon very shortly to decide upon. He feels that the great anxiety of the Four Governments must naturally be to adopt the form which will hold out the greatest chance of success in obtaining the object of peace which we are striving to re-establish. It is well worth while, therefore, indeed it is incumbent upon us, to weigh and consider every mode by which we might best proceed.

Count Buol had received the despatches of Count Colloredo of the 16th instant, and from M. de Hübner of the 17th from Paris, which refer to the

communications which had passed between these Ministers and your Lordship and M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon this important question, as well as to the exclusive adoption of the form of negotiation indicated by the instructions to the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople: namely, the Conference of Six, and the place which shall be chosen by agreement between Russia and the Porte.

Count Buol, in submitting to us his reflections upon these communications, which he requested we would bring under the early consideration of our Governments, as establishing a principle of action which he thought it would be impossible to abandon without incurring the risk of compromising the great object of our common efforts, referred to the statements he had made to us upon these subjects, and which I reported to your Lordship in my despatches Nos. 444 and 452.

In conformity with the plan sketched out in the first of these despatches, Count Buol entirely adopted the suggestions made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Hübner: first, as to the Assembly of the Conference to decide whether the answer which should be received from the Porte was of a nature to be transmitted to St. Petersburgh; secondly, that the decision being taken in favour of transmission, and consigned in a protocol, it should be intrusted to Count Buol, as the depositary of the first overtures from St. Petersburgh, to be forwarded to Count Nesselrode; and thirdly, that a collective note, addressed to Count Nesselrode, should be signed by the Four Representatives to be forwarded in case the communication of which Count Buol will have been the organ, should not have had the success which might be expected from it.

Count Buol, accordingly, gives up, in conformity with the representations made in London and at Paris, the plan by which each of the members of the Conference should transmit to their colleagues at St. Petersburgh the answer of the Porte and the result of their deliberations, and in reference to the plan he is ready to adopt, he made a remark upon the communication he had received from M. de Hübner that "M. Drouyn de Lhuys had proposed, as the only amendment to this plan, that the note of the Four Representatives to be addressed to Count Nesselrode should be drawn up and signed at Vienna, upon the receipt of the answer from the Porte; but upon the condition that it should not be made use of, unless the communication of which Count Buol will have been the bearer should have been refused."

Upon this proposition, Count Buol stated, that the lamentable publicity which had been given to the acts of the Conference obliged him to put the question, whether it was to be hoped that any other document could in future escape a similar fate; for, notwithstanding the engagements which the members of the Conference had taken with each other, it was understood that the documents signed on the 5th of December had previously been sent to St. Petersburgh, and communicated to Count Nesselrode, confidentially, by M. de Rochow. Under these circumstances, he thought the collective note, which was only eventually to be transmitted, would have the same fate, and his proposal to Count Nesselrode would be received by him under an impression that it was unfairly brought before him, as it only awaited his refusal to be succeeded by another document of a stronger character, and which was unfairly concealed from him.

Count Buol considers that the two gradations that he proposes would offer a better chance of the success we all so heartily desire, although he is not sanguine in his expectations of it. Should the result disappoint our hopes, we should certainly have lost twelve or fifteen days, but the Conference having in the first instance transmitted through a single organ its decision, would at once proceed to the production of a collective document of the greatest importance.

M. de Bourqueney and I undertook to place these considerations before our respective Cabinets, adding, that the proposals thus modified represent the line of conduct to which the Austrian Cabinet will strictly adhere, and which is in consonance with the unity of object and of principles of which the Conference of Vienna is the result.

With regard to the form of negotiation, Count Buol strongly coincides with the opinion entertained by the Cabinets of London and Paris, in supporting the Conference of Six. Turkey demanding it, the Four Powers will urge its acceptance at St. Petersburgh; but should the Russian Government refuse or modify the proposition, Count Buol begs the Allied Cabinets will deliberate together and

decide whether we are to make it a *sine qua non*, and declare the negotiation to be broken off on a difference of form, when we might find equivalents to ensure the official control of the Four Powers upon it in every phase.

We all feel that a difference of opinion as to form in the Conference would be destructive to its action. Count Buol's language is, "What have we to fall back upon after the collective note? If it is refused there remains only war. It is worth while to risk a small delay for such a stake."

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 537.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 425.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1853.

A REPORT has reached Her Majesty's Government that previously to the attack by the Russian fleet on the Turkish squadron at Sinope the Austrian Consul-General had been observed to make a telegraphic signal to the Russian fleet. Your Lordship will express to Count Buol the disbelief of Her Majesty's Government in the truth of this report, but you will at the same time suggest that an inquiry should be made into the origin of such a rumour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 538.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 426.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1853.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship for your information a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at St. Petersburgh, reporting that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires had attended a religious ceremony performed at the Winter Palace at St. Petersburgh in celebration of a victory obtained by the Russians over the Turks; and I have to instruct your Lordship to take an early opportunity of expressing the regret of Her Majesty's Government that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires was present at the ceremony. Your Lordship should point out the bad effect which must be produced by the fact of a Representative of one of the Powers acting as mediator in the differences between Russia and Turkey taking part in a ceremony intended to celebrate a victory obtained by one of those Powers over the other, and which might be considered a proof that Austria does not disapprove the policy of Russia in the question at issue.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 539.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 106.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 29, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 143 of the 17th instant, reporting your conversation with Baron Manteuffel relative to the collective Note and Protocol, and to the continuance of Prussian agents in the Principalities, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your language on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 518.

No. 540.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 988.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 27, 1853.

THE discussions respecting the instructions to be sent to Constantinople in regard to the attitude to be assumed by the combined fleets on entering the Black Sea having been carried on between Count Walewski and your Lordship, I have forborne troubling you with the details of any conversations which have passed on the same subject between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and myself, and I should observe the same silence still were it not that I wished to place on record the assurance given me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon, that he was authorised by the Emperor to accept the modifications proposed by Her Majesty's Government to the draft originally sent from hence.

The instructions so modified will be sent to Marseilles, to be forwarded to Constantinople by a special steamer, as soon as those for Lord Stratford reach M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Copies of the French instructions will be sent to Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh, to be communicated in copy to the Austrian and Prussian Governments, and in substance, but verbally, to the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 541.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 995. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 29, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has related to me, in strict confidence, the substance of a conversation which occurred between himself and M. de Kisseleff on the 26th instant.

He had not seen M. de Kisseleff for some weeks. The latter called ostensibly for the purpose of lamenting the present misunderstanding between France and Russia on the Eastern question, adding that the solution of this question was in a great measure in the hands of France, that the Emperor Napoleon might cover himself with glory, and secure the gratitude of Europe by not deviating from that pacific policy which he had proclaimed, while if he permitted himself to be dragged into the wake of England, who was acting solely for her own interests, he would find himself engaged in a war from which no profit could result to France. The Emperor, his master, would, M. de Kisseleff continued, be always ready to listen to any suggestions which the Emperor Napoleon, in whose wisdom His Majesty had the greatest confidence, might make.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that M. de Kisseleff was quite mistaken in supposing that France was dragged, as he had intimated, in the wake of England. France had entered into a double engagement—the one with Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, which had for its object the assertion of a great principle of European policy, and which was of a much closer nature than M. de Kisseleff seemed to be aware; the other, with Great Britain for the defence of the Turkish territory, which he might be assured they would pursue to the end. Neither could he assume for the French Government the merit which M. de Kisseleff seemed willing to attribute to them, of being more peaceably inclined than their maritime ally, since, to speak the truth, although the two Governments were unanimous in the decisions to which they had come, yet in discussing them it was France that had advocated more active and decided measures, while more moderate and prudent councils had prevailed in the English Cabinet. If English interests were more directly at stake in the Eastern question, whose fault was it but Russia's? Instead of leaving the question as it originally stood, as one affecting the holy places alone, on which Russia had obtained an advantage over

France, she must needs occupy the Principalities, which had obliged not only England, but Austria and Prussia to take part against her, and now, by her conduct in Persia and other parts of Asia, she had succeeded in uniting the entire opinion of the British nation against her. If then Great Britain profits more than France will by the good understanding which prevails between them, the fault will be with Russia. As for the French Government, they are convinced that it is with no hope of individual benefit that England is ranged side by side with them.

"You say," said M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de Kisseleff, "that the Emperor Nicholas will listen with attention to any suggestions for the settlement of this question which may come from hence. Our suggestions are to be found in the resolutions adopted by the Conference at Vienna. I do not know what else to advise. The propositions are very simple and such as you cannot object to. You tell the Porte that, notwithstanding her declaration of war, you are still ready to treat for peace; and we advise the Porte to accept the offer and to let you know the conditions on which she is willing to treat. You cannot object to that. We advise the Porte to name a Plenipotentiary, without which there can be no negotiation, and to propose a neutral place where he may meet a Plenipotentiary from Russia. You cannot object to that. We advise further, that this negotiation shall not take place in the dark, but in the presence of the great Powers of Europe, who are interested in the result of them. If you are consistent you cannot object to that, for you have sanctioned the right of Europe to interfere in Turkish affairs, by your presence in all the conferences which have taken place on the different questions relating to the integrity of the Turkish Empire. If you have any more feasible plan, I shall be ready to give it the fullest consideration."

M. de Kisseleff rejoined that he had no instructions either to discuss or to propose any plan, and that in fact his visit was a spontaneous effort to endeavour to produce a better understanding between his own Government and that of the Emperor Napoleon.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys what on the whole was the impression left upon his mind by M. de Kisseleff's language. He replied, that it seemed to him that the Emperor of Russia was fully aware of, and regretted, the false situation in which he had placed himself; that he felt the isolated position to which the establishment of a Conference at Vienna had condemned him, though he still hoped that the attitude of Austria and Prussia would be confined to remonstrance. He knew, however, the danger he incurred, were hostilities to ensue on the part of France and England alone; hence his whole tactics were directed to disuniting them. As to what the Czar may be inclined to do towards a pacific arrangement at the present moment, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that the language of M. de Kisseleff was as vague as ever.

In the course of the conversation some allusion was made by M. de Kisseleff to the discourtesy shown to the Emperor by the refusal of the French Government to allow General Guyon, when invited by His Majesty, to attend the reviews at Warsaw; as also to the hostility shown towards Russia by the French press, which enabled M. Drouyn de Lhuys to say that, although the Emperor of Russia had refused the title of "brother" to the Emperor of the French, there was no ill-will in the latter's mind in consequence; that he had a great admiration for the Emperor Nicholas, and would be very glad to take any fit opportunity of showing it.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to M. de Kisseleff on the latter taking his departure, that he reserved to himself to recount to the Emperor what had passed between them, in order that His Majesty might have an opportunity of dissenting from or assenting to the language which he had used.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has since seen the Emperor, who accorded entire approbation to the sentiments expressed by his Minister.

I understand that M. de Kisseleff takes every opportunity of stating that his interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys was perfectly satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 542.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 530.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 31, 1853.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 995, reporting the substance of a conversation between M. Drouyn de Lhuys and M. Kisseleff, as stated to you by the former; and I have to instruct your Excellency if M. Drouyn de Lhuys communicated to you his conversation with M. Kisseleff for the information of Her Majesty's Government, to assure him that Her Majesty's Government admire the tone and spirit of M. Drouyn de Lhuys in replying to M. Kisseleff, and entirely concur in the language which his Excellency held on that occasion, particularly as regards this country, which has no selfish interest and seeks for no exclusive advantage in cordially co-operating with France for the support of a great principle of European policy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 543.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1854.)

(No. 1001.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 31, 1853.

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the objections entertained by your Lordship to the proposition made by the Vienna Conference, of sending to the Turkish Minister resident in that capital, a duplicate of the collective note of the 5th instant. They would, no doubt, have had their weight with his Excellency had they not been rendered unnecessary by the receipt yesterday evening of a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney, stating that Count Buol continued to insist on being the channel of communication between the Conference and the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh; and your Lordship will recollect that M. Drouyn de Lhuys was only willing to agree to the transmission of a duplicate to the Turkish Minister at Vienna, on the condition that Count Buol frankly adopted a collective procedure, should a favourable answer from the Porte enable the Conference to pursue its work of pacification, by addressing itself to the Russian Government.

There is some discrepancy between the assurances given until now by M. de Bourqueney, of Count Buol having adopted the collective form of procedure towards Russia, and the obstinacy with which the Austrian Minister insists at present on being the organ of the Conference at St. Petersburgh. As far as a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney can explain it, it would appear that Count Buol considered the collective form to consist in the signature of a Protocol, after the receipt of the expected answer from the Porte, by the Conference; but that he had never understood that a note was to be signed by the Four Representatives and addressed to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 544.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1854.)

(No. 1002. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, December* 30, 1853.

REPORTS have been current in Paris that General Castelbajac had addressed a letter of congratulation to the Russian Government in consequence of the late successes of the Russian troops. I believe that these reports may be

traced to the Russian Mission; and I have further reason to know, that assertions of a similar nature have also been prevalent in the Russian capital.

I determined, therefore, to mention the subject to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, at the same time that I avowed my disbelief in the possibility of the French Minister at St. Petersburgh having so completely forgotten his character as to have complimented the Russian Government on successes which might possibly be the immediate cause of war between his own Government and Russia.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assured me with so much earnestness that he did not believe in the truth of the report, that I am persuaded he knows nothing of this extraordinary proceeding, if it has really occurred; and it seems so impossible that a man in General Castelbajac's position should take a step that would place him in contradiction with the policy which it was his duty to defend, that I cannot but indulge in the hope, that the rumour is a weak invention of the enemy, intended to throw dust in the eyes of the society of St. Petersburgh as to the real sentiments of France.

Having answered my question, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that he had seen M. de Kisseleff again yesterday, when he informed him that he had communicated to the Emperor the substance of the conversation which had passed between them on the 26th instant, and which is recounted in my confidential despatch No. 995; and that His Majesty had fully sanctioned all that he (M. Drouyn de Lhuys) had said on that occasion. His Excellency added, that in order that the fact might not be falsely interpreted at St. Petersburgh, he would inform me, in strict confidence, that the Emperor had himself written to General Castelbajac, and had told him that were the question for the arrangement of which M. de Kisseleff had asked the advice of the French Government one which concerned French and Russian interests alone, he should be ready with a proposition for its settlement; but that this was a question which concerned European interests generally, and on which he had been consulting with the other Powers of Europe, that he could not now with honour separate himself from those Powers; and that he had no other advice to offer than that which it was known had emanated from the Vienna Conference. If, however, the Emperor of Russia had any proposition to make, he would give it every consideration; but in that case His Majesty had no time to lose. France, who had begun by being a spectator and witness to the contest engaged in the East, was now called upon to take a more active part in it, and he (the Emperor) could not disguise from himself that matters were on a declivity which might lead to a war.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that he was happy to give me this information, of which I might make a confidential use, as it was possible that the Emperor's words might be misrepresented in the mouths of Russians.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys seemed anxious that I should not understand the Emperor's assurance, that he would give his best consideration to any proposal which might come from Russia, as indicating an intention to treat separately with that Power. I therefore said to him, that I was perfectly convinced of the loyalty both of the Emperor and his Government; and that I was sure that your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government had the same trust and confidence in their honour. Moreover, I would venture to add, that if, through any advice given to the French Government to Russia, the Eastern question could be settled without extending hostilities beyond their present sphere, Her Majesty's Government, so far from feeling jealousy of French influence, would sincerely rejoice to see it exercised in so beneficial a manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 545

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1854.)

(No. 1003.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 30, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has communicated to me the despatches which I informed your Lordship he transmitted yesterday to St. Petersburgh. General Castelbajac is furnished with a copy of the instructions sent to General Baraguay

d'Hilliers, respecting the intended entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea; and he is desired, after consultation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, to communicate verbally to Count Nesselrode such parts of them as may be deemed advisable.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys addressed, at the same time, a long despatch to General Castelbajac, in which, after recounting the history of the Eastern question since its commencement, he observes that the moderation of the Governments of England and France having apparently been misunderstood by Russia, more energetic measures on their part have become indispensable; that the Russian Government having declared that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces by the Russian troops was a set-off against the presence of the British and French fleets in the waters of the Bosphorus, England and France might see in the occupation of the Black Sea an equivalent to them for the occupation of the Principalities.

I read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys your Lordship's despatch No. 345 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, which prescribes the line of conduct to be pursued by that Minister. His Excellency expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 546.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3, 1854.)

(No. 1004. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December 31, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this morning a telegraphic despatch, dated late yesterday evening, from Vienna, in which M. de Bourqueney says that, having had a conversation with M. de Buol, the details of which he has sent in the ordinary manner, he thinks a part of it so important that he gives it by telegraph.

M. de Buol, after showing some susceptibility at the non-communication to him of the instructions sent to Constantinople respecting the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea—a susceptibility which must have been removed by M. de Bourqueney's explanations—said to the latter that he must tell him that the inactivity of the combined fleets was aiding the cause of war rather than of peace at St. Petersburgh. M. de Bourqueney concludes, from the general tenour of Count Buol's observations, that the Austrian Minister desires to see the fleets in the Black Sea; and he expresses an opinion that nothing will be obtained from Austria until decided measures are adopted by England and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 547.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 2, 1854.*

MY despatches up to yesterday's date were intended to reach your Lordship's hands this morning, but the messenger to whom they were confided yesterday evening missed the train in consequence of the state of the streets of Paris, and they have been delayed until to-day.

I saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning, who stated to me that he had received yesterday a telegraphic despatch from M. de Bourqueney informing him that Count Buol was in possession of the principal points of the instructions sent to Constantinople respecting the fleets; that the Count was not surprised after all that had occurred, at the measures taken by the two Governments, though he could not shut his eyes to their gravity, and he could only hope that they would come in aid of the last attempt now making for a pacific solution of the Eastern question. "Le langage du Comte Buol," adds M. de Bourqueney, "est parfait."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 548.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 163. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 30, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL expressed to me this evening, with evident satisfaction, that he was reassured as to the King's political views and opinions. His Majesty had stated to him this day his conviction that Prussia in the present aspect of affairs must preserve a neutrality, and was of opinion that no assistance could be given to the Emperor of Russia.

Baron Manteuffel appears to have confidence in His Majesty's present present disposition, although he confessed to me that he was constantly obliged to combat false impressions which irritated the King's mind, and he further confided to me that on this account he held it as indispensable to have daily intercourse with His Majesty.

I am happy to report to your Lordship that the Prince of Prussia is expeted to arrive at Berlin on the 15th proximo. The presence of His Royal Highness at Berlin at this critical moment is most desirable, as he exercises considerable influence over the King, and will give additional support to Baron Manteuffel, and the system which his Excellency is pursuing.

I have to report to your Lordship the death of General von Radowitz on the 25th instant, who has been for some time in a declining state of health. He had retired from public affairs since December 1851, but he maintained to the last the personal confidence and affection of the King; his death, although depriving the country of a distinguished statesman, will exercise no influence on the present state of parties here, or on public affairs in general.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 549.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 4, 1854.)

(No. 164. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 30, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL informed me this evening that the Prussian Consul-General at Warsaw, M. Wagner, who had lately arrived from his post, represents Prince Paskewitch as highly disapproving the war with Turkey, and extremely grieved (désolé) at the course which the Emperor of Russia is pursuing.

M. Wagner is reported to me from another source as having stated that Prince Paskewitch had blamed the line of conduct pursued towards the Wallachians and Moldavians as being unwise and impolitic, and calculated rather to disgust than to gain those populations, and that he had also censured the Russian military operations on the Danube as having been badly devised, and still more inefficiently carried out.

Consul Wagner further reports, that from information he had received, it appeared to be the intention of Russia to possess herself during the winter season, if possible, still of the smaller forts on the Danube, such as Hersovia, Matschin, Isaktshi, and Tultscha, and even to invest Silistria, so as to be thus far advanced for early operations in the spring.

He had been likewise given to understand that some idea was entertained on the part of Russia of crossing the Danube and advancing on Constantinople by the circuitous line of Sophia, thus working round in lieu of facing the Balkan.

This design, however, may probably have been counteracted by the judicious foresight of the Turkish Government in recognising the neutrality of Servia, which territory, in such event, she would have been obliged to traverse.

Consul Wagner reports that the two Russian corps d'armée, the first and

second corps, stationed in Poland and the Baltic provinces, had not changed their position, and that their force had not been diminished.

I have thought this information of sufficient interest to report to your Lordship, taking the precaution of informing your Lordship of the source from which it is derived.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 550.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 165.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December 31, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that a telegraphic despatch has been received from Count Arnim, stating that by intelligence which has reached Vienna from Constantinople, the collective note lately signed at Vienna had not been presented by the Four Representatives to the Porte.

Baron Manteuffel has been informed that a note similar in substance, but more explicit, has been agreed upon at Constantinople by the Four Representatives, and had been collectively presented to the Divan on the 15th instant. It is further reported to his Excellency that the Divan had shown a disposition to accept the invitation, and to enter on the arrangement of a basis of negotiation.

His Excellency refrained, until further reports shall have reached him from Constantinople, from expressing his opinion on the conduct of Baron Wildenbruch in this matter, but he stated that great annoyance had been felt at Vienna on the receipt of this intelligence.

Count Buol had proposed to the Conference, that a copy of the Vienna note should be presented collectively by the Conference to the Turkish Minister at Vienna, for transmission to Reshid Pasha, and Count Arnim had applied for authorization to associate himself to this step.

Baron Manteuffel has replied, that if the proposition to which Count Arnim alludes is supported by the Representatives of the Four Powers, he is authorized to join in it; but that if any difference of opinion should arise, he was to refer to Berlin for further orders.

His Excellency then informed me that he had received a long report from Count Arnim concerning the mode of transmission of the answer of the Porte to St. Petersburgh.

I stated to his Excellency, that Count Buol appeared to have proposed that the collective note, conveying the answer of the Porte to Count Nesselrode should be signed, but kept in reserve, while he (Count Buol) was separately to submit any reasons he might think proper to obtain the Emperor's assent to the recommendations of the Conference; but that, in case of his failure, the collective note should be presented.

In support of this opinion, Count Buol had represented the possibility of Count Nesselrode refusing to recognize the existence of the Conference, or to recognize the validity of the Conference to interfere in the affairs relating to the differences existing between Russia and the Porte, in which latter opinion Count Arnim had coincided with Count Buol.

With respect to the former opinion of Count Buol, I stated to his Excellency that it appeared to me that Count Buol had materially changed his opinion; for he had previously stated that "he did not wish to go alone to St. Petersburgh, and had further acknowledged the answer of the Porte to be the property of the Conference."

I further remarked to his Excellency that, if any other than a collective form was adopted towards Russia, it would be recognizing the very argument of Russia, namely, that the Powers of Europe had no right to interfere between Russia and Turkey. It would also be derogatory to the dignity of the Four Powers to sign a collective note which should be only kept in reserve to be used as Austria should think fit.

I represented also to his Excellency that it could not be supposed that Russia would refuse to recognize the existence of an European Conference on the

affairs relating to the differences existing between the Government of the Emperor and that of Turkey, when Russia had already in public acts referred to that Conference, and had even accepted a note which had issued from their hands.

His Excellency appeared wholly to concur in the justice of my remarks, and seemed to be of opinion that the dignity of the Conference either required a collective action, or that Austria should be deputed to act in the name of the Conference.

In making the foregoing remarks, I took care to inform his Excellency that they must be regarded solely as my own opinions, for his Excellency must be aware that I could have received no instructions on the points to which they refer.

I venture to hope that they will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 551.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 166.)

My Lord. *Berlin, December* 31, 1853.

I REFERRED this evening in conversation with Baron Manteuffel to the presence of the Prussian Legation at the *Te Deum*, celebrated on the 18th instant at St. Petersburgh, in honour of the victories over the Turks; and I observed to his Excellency that at a moment when Prussia was acting as a mediator between the contending parties, being on friendly terms with both, the presence of her Representative at a ceremony of a thanksgiving for the destruction of the subjects of the Sultan was an act highly unbecoming and ill judged, and that it would be well to remind General Rochow that he was not an Imperial General but the Prussian Representative at the Imperial Court.

His Excellency was much embarrassed, and could not refuse the truth of my observations. He said, however, that General Rochow had in his report connected the ceremony with the circumstance of its being the Emperor's fête-day, and had ingeniously represented the presence of the Prussian Legation in this light.

I ventured to submit, that his Excellency would do well to express to General Rochow his disapprobation of the Prussian Legation at the *Te Deum*, taking care to instruct him to abstain in future from demonstrations of this nature.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he had directed a despatch to be written to General Rochow, requiring a fuller report on this subject; and he assured me that he should convey to him privately his desire that the Prussian Legation should abstain from appearing at future celebrations of any Russian victories over the Turkish arms.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 552.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 167. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 31, 1853.

A PERSON on whose veracity I can fully rely, has informed me in the greatest secrecy that an intrigue is carrying on here by the partisans of Russia, at the instigation of the Emperor himself, to induce the King of Prussia to send Prussian officers as military commissaries to the Russian army on the Danube.

There is a double aim sought to be obtained by this move; first, to engage Prussia thus furtively and insidiously in the cause of Russia, or at least

to give to Europe an appearance of Prussian support; and secondly, to obtain the aid and assistance of two officers who possess valuable information on all matters relating to Turkey and the Turkish forces.

The two officers who have been specially applied for, are (as I am informed) Colonel Molthe, who has been for many years employed in Turkey in a military capacity, and has a thorough knowledge of Turkey; and Captain Oerbzel, who is conversant with all matters relating to Turkish fortresses, and has extensive geographical and military information, capable of very great assistance to the Russian army.

Baron Manteuffel in great confidence alluded to this subject in conversation with me this evening, and informed me that he had strongly dissuaded His Majesty against any such measure, stating that great embarrassment might result from it with no counterbalancing advantage.

The King, as Baron Manteuffel informs me, has promised that he will decline the proposal and let the matter drop.

Baron Manteuffel told me that Colonel Thom, an Austrian officer, is now serving as Austrian commissary at the head-quarters of Prince Gortchakoff.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 553.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 169. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 31, 1853.

I HAVE been secretly informed that a letter has been received at the Court here from the Emperor of Russia, the evident object of which is to work on the fears and apprehensions of the Prussian Sovereign. In this letter the Czar states (as I am informed) that on the 1st of March next he will have a million of men under arms.

I am at a loss to know how His Majesty can reconcile this bellicose intention with those pacific assurances and professions of peace so much vaunted by Austria, and in which she appears so confidently to rely.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 554.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 172.)

My Lord, *Berlin, December* 31, 1853.

I WAITED upon Baron Manteuffel yesterday evening, and in obedience with your Lordship's instructions read to him the copies of your Lordship's despatch No. 345 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and No. 329 to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, inclosed in your Lordship's despatch No. 99 to me.

I explained to his Excellency that more stringent measures had been rendered imperative in consequence of the Sinope affair, and that with every desire for a pacific arrangement, the cause of humanity called loudly for those active measures which would prevent the recurrence of such frightful bloodshed and loss of life.

His Excellency informed me this evening that he had reported to the King the decision, as stated in those despatches, which the English and French Governments had taken to send their fleets into the Black Sea, and the nature of the service on which they were to be employed.

His Excellency told me that the King had been already prepared by the reports of the Chevalier Bunsen for this intelligence. His Majesty considered that this step would be followed by the recall of the Russian Ministers at London and Paris, and that it would lead to an open rupture between Russia and the Western Powers.

His Majesty did not appear to be disconcerted by the gravity of this intelligence, and he remarked to Baron Manteuffel that it would not alter or affect his policy, and that he should remain neutral.

Baron Manteuffel informed me that Baron Budberg called upon him this morning. He said that he had learnt that instructions had been sent from London on the 24th, for the fleets to enter the Black Sea, but that he did not appear to think that this measure would be taken by Russia as a *casus belli*, although only ten days ago he had loudly proclaimed to him that such a step would be viewed as war.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to think, from an expression in a report of General Rochow, received this day, that the Emperor Nicholas was not so fully determined not to depart from his declaration of not treating in any other mode but in direct negotiation with Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 555.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 4, 1854.*)

(No. 466.)

Vienna, December 26, 1853.

My Lord,

I BROUGHT before Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 417, relating to the manner of presenting to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh the reply which may be returned by the Porte the collective note of the Conference, and to the general tenor of the documents which accompanied it.

The point to which Count Buol almost entirely confined his remarks upon the contents of this despatch was the preparing and signing a collective note by which the answer of the Porte should be forwarded to Count Nesselrode which he might keep in reserve while he made use of any reasons he thought proper to obtain the Emperor's assent to the recommendation of the Conference, but which should be presented in case of his failure.

Count Buol regretted that your Lordship should recommend this as a first step in the communication to St. Petersburgh; he felt that it ran the risk of a refusal upon a question of form, which he should deeply lament. In the first place, the communication of the documents which had lately been published in the "Journal des Débats," and which had previously been placed in the hands of Count Nesselrode, persuaded him that the existence of the proposed collective note with which he was to be entrusted would be known, and that he should be accused of duplicity if he did not present it. Next, as the proposal to treat with Turkey was made through him by the Government of Russia, and as he alone placed it in the hands of the Conference that Turkey might thus receive the advice and recommendations of her best allies, he did not think it was consequently incumbent upon the Conference to send a collective announcement to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, from whom they had received no communication whatever.

In case the Russian Cabinet refused to the recommendations which he (Count Buol), under the sanction by Protocol of the Conference, should bring before it, then he considers the action of the Powers should be established by a collective note to Count Nesselrode, which he would be ready to sign.

Count Buol stated that he had already brought all these opinions before your Lordship by his own communications of the 24th to Count Colloredo, and as he had previously explained them to me, he hoped your Lordship would be prepared for his present declarations, and that you will be persuaded that the objections to the form your Lordship has proposed are solely produced by his conviction that they would unnecessarily risk the whole success of the negotiation

December 28.

Since writing the above despatch, which in consequence of the late arrival and consequent departure of the messenger has been delayed, the telegraphic despatch of Lord Stratford of the 19th has been received, and I have transmitted

to your Lordship by telegraph, the decision which at the recommendation of Count Buol was taken by the Conference, requesting that each of the members might ask for the authorisation of their Governments to transmit to the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna a duplicate of the note signed and forwarded through Lord Stratford to Reshid Pasha (but which has not been presented). Count Buol feels this proceeding to have been most offensive towards his Government, and he reserves his opinion as to the conduct of the Internuncio in agreeing to it, till he shall have learnt his reasons for thus taking upon himself in such a manner to quash the acts of his Government. In his report to the Emperor he has thus expressed his opinion on this subject, as he believes this to be the first instance in which the Representatives of the allied Governments have taken upon themselves to set aside the orders they had received. He contemplates in case his explanations should not be satisfactory, to replace the Internuncio by another Representative. The only remedy he sees with the view of re-establishing the collective action of the Conference at Constantinople, is that the Turkish Ambassador here should convey to his Government the note to Reshid Pasha, and should call for a reply to it.

In my telegraphic despatch to your Lordship of yesterday, I stated that "Count Buol had invited me to a Conference, at which I was in hopes that your wishes with regard to the signature of a collective note to be transmitted to St. Petersburgh might be adopted." Your Lordship will naturally judge that the subsequent arrival of Lord Stratford's despatch, announcing the decision of the Representatives at Constantinople (by which the chance of our receiving any reply to the note addressed from hence to Reshid Pasha became extremely problematical), diminished the immediate interest of this question; but I did not find Count Buol inclined to alter his original opinions upon that subject, which, from the representations of M. de Bourqueney (through whom I had received the invitation to attend the Conference), I had expected.

Count Buol mentioned to-day a consideration which he thought we ought to bring under the notice of our Governments, which was, that (as a matter of form) Count Nesselrode might say that as the Representatives whose names were attached to the collective note addressed to him were not accredited to the Government of Russia, and as he had received no announcement from the Governments they represented that they were authorized to enter into communication with him; he could not officially recognize their accredited relation to the Cabinet of the Emperor, more particularly as the Russian Government had never recognized, or even been asked to recognize, the existence of an European Conference on the affairs which related to the complications existing between the Government of the Emperor and that of Turkey.

Count Buol stated that this point was well worth the consideration of our Governments, and as there would now be time to consult with regard to it, he could not but consider it as an additional reason against transmitting (in the first instance) the collective note to Count Nesselrode.

Both M. de Bourqueney and myself combated in the strongest manner this reasoning, as we conceived the existence of the Conference (charged to be the medium of the communication of the views of the Four Powers, and which had already fulfilled that mission at Constantinople) had been sufficiently announced to the Government of St. Petersburgh to preclude the possibility of their not being recognized by Count Nesselrode as the Representatives of those Governments. Count Buol, however, maintained his convictions, and Count Arnim entirely coincided in his views.

I shall await with considerable anxiety your Lordship's decision upon the points which have thus been brought before you. Count Buol is in hopes that your instructions, as to the transmission to the Turkish Ambassador of the duplicate of the collective note to Reshid Pasha, may be sent by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 556.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 4, 1854.*)

(No. 390.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 17, 1853.*

IN reporting on the subject of my efforts to overcome the Porte's reluctance to accept the note and declaration which the late French Ambassador and myself were authorized by our respective Governments to present to Reshid Pasha, I stated in substance that the inducement to recommend that mode of restoring peace was not so much my hope of success, which was very faint, as an impression that a failure in that respect, if not invested with an official character, might smooth the way for some proposition better suited to the altered circumstances of the case.

Acting upon this principle, when I had thoroughly ascertained that even a modified note and declaration would not prove acceptable to the Turkish Ministry, I entered into private communication with Reshid Pasha on the ground of taking a common sense view of the existing circumstances, and endeavouring to form a plan of proceeding which in its issue might secure every reasonable advantage to Turkey without injustice or palpable humiliation to Russia.

I was encouraged to embark in this course by the corresponding disposition which I found in my new French colleague, and by the knowledge which your Lordship's correspondence afforded of the views of the several Powers who take a leading interest in the settlement of the Eastern question. The principal difficulties to be encountered were the illusions of frontier success, the national enthusiasm in favour of war, the fears of leading statesmen unwilling to oppose the current of popular sentiment, and, above all, the necessity of applying to the General Council for permission to entertain any plan of pacification with Russia. The Sultan, his Ministers, and the Council, all stood in fear of each other, and though, perhaps, at heart desirous of peace, were reluctant to forfeit their share of the popularity enjoyed by the votaries of war.

The first necessary step towards a negotiation for peace was to wean Reshid Pasha from his new-born propensities to war; the second was to obtain his sincere cooperation in opening a door for his more moderate colleagues to avow their real sentiments with safety. Aided by auxiliary incidents, I succeeded, after a time, in making him a partaker of my own convictions. It was in consequence agreed between us that the General Council should be assembled, that its consent should, if possible, be obtained for negotiating a pacific settlement on safe and honourable terms, and that a more distinct proposition, satisfactory to both of us in the interest of the Porte, should be submitted officially to him and his colleagues.

On my part I followed out this plan by putting together in a practicable form the several points which it was evidently desirable or necessary to provide for in the contemplated negotiation and its preliminary steps. Sufficient elements were fortunately at hand in your Lordship's correspondence with Paris and Vienna. They had only to be combined with some indispensable additions, and adapted to the present state of things and of parties here.

The short memorandum inclosed herewith exhibits the project of arrangement approved in private by Reshid Pasha, and subsequently adopted, in private also, by General Baraguay d'Hilliers, with whose ideas I had made myself previously acquainted.

In concert with him, and after sounding Baron de Bruck, I proposed a meeting of the Four Representatives at the Internuncio's house.

The result of our deliberations there on the 12th instant was the adoption in substance of the plan which, on a perfect understanding with the French Ambassador, I submitted to our colleagues in the terms already made known to your Lordship. A second meeting, which took place at his Excellency's house on the 13th, confirmed, with some verbal alterations, the agreement already made; and I joined in signing it, thus completed, with the more confidence as I had in the interval ascertained privately that Reshid Pasha saw no objection to its amended form.

Our principal difficulty in coming to an agreement lay with the Internuncio, who wished to avoid a collective mode of proceeding, and the insertion of any word which might offend the delicate sensibilities of Russia. With every inclination to meet his wishes, I found it impossible in some instances to acquiesce in his proposals, whether of omission or of insertion. But I trust that in striking out expedients for the removal of his scruples, his colleagues at the meeting, including myself, have retained whatever was necessary to guard the interests of Turkey and of Europe; while his acceptance of our counter-amendments may warrant a sanguine hope that the plan, as it stands now, will, if accepted here, present few points of reasonable objection, even at St. Petersburgh.

The form of an identic communication to the Porte, subscribed separately by each Representative, and presented by their respective interpreters in a body, is referable to the same spirit of scrupulousness towards Russia, on the one side, and of accommodation, as far as principles admit, on the other.

In recording these circumstances, I must in justice acquit Baron de Bruck of any personal disposition to make difficulties; and nothing could be more satisfactory than the support afforded to every just and reasonable view of the points in question by General Baraguay d'Hilliers and M. de Wildenbruch.

Our simultaneous communication of the plan agreed upon was made to Reshid Pasha officially on the 15th; and the manner in which his Highness received it is best described in the words of M. Pisani, a copy of whose report, together with a copy of my instruction to him, is inclosed herewith.

As soon as possible after the decision to be taken by the General Council to-morrow on the broad question of peace or war, our note will be submitted by the Ottoman Secretary of State to his colleagues in the ministry. Appearances are at present in favour of a pacific vote, but not with unanimity, nor without considerable opposition.

The proposition in favour of peace will, if adopted, make room for a negotiation on the two conditions of evacuating the Principalities, and guarding completely the sovereign rights and independence of the Sultan. The hope which I entertain, in common with Reshid Pasha, is that the adoption of such a basis by the General Council will enable him to prevail upon his colleagues to accept the proposal which he has already received from the Four Representatives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 556.

Memorandum of Bases of Negotiation.

LES Représentants déclareraient que la Russie a donné des assurances de vouloir la paix.

La Porte leur répondrait par une déclaration de la même portée.

La négociation à suivre serait basée sur l'évacuation aussitôt que possible des Principautés, le renouvellement des Traités, et la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels à toutes les Puissances, accompagnée d'assurances convenables.

L'arrangement déjà fait pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à negocier sur les bases ci-dessus énoncées dans quelque endroit neutre avec le concours des Quatre Puissances.

Les principes déclarés par les Puissances dans les années 1840 et 1841 seraient solennellement confirmés d'une manière effective par les mêmes Puissances; et la Porte, de son côté, s'engagerait à développer effectivement un système d'amélioration intérieure propre à rasseoir l'indépendance de son Empire sur des bases solides et telles que devraient satisfaire à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

Inclosure 2 in No. 556.

Identic Note addressed by the Four Representatives to the Porte.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, d'accord avec les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Prusse, a l'honneur de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements ayant encore lieu de croire que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie n'envisage pas le fil des négociations comme rompu par la déclaration de guerre et les faits qui en ont été la conséquence; et sachant, de plus, d'après les propres déclarations de Sa Majesté Impériale, qu'elle désire seulement voir assurer une égalité parfaite des droits et des immunités octroyés par Sa Majesté le Sultan et ses glorieux ancêtres aux communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte;

Et, de son côté, la Sublime Porte répondant à cette déclaration par la déclaration qu'elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de continuer à maintenir les susdits droits et immunités, et qu'elle est toujours disposée à mettre un terme au différend survenu entre les deux Empires;

La négociation à suivre serait basée:

1. Sur l'évacuation la plus prompte possible des Principautés;

2. Sur le renouvellement des anciens Traités;

3. Sur la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels octroyés par la Sublime Porte à tous ses sujets non-Musulmans, communication qui, faite aux Puissances, serait accompagnée d'assurances convenables données à chacune d'elles.

L'arrangement déjà fait pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux et aux établissements religieux à Jérusalem, serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants des Quatre Puissances qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à négocier sur les bases ci-dessus énoncées, avec le concours des Puissances, et dans une ville neutre dont elles conviendraient.

Les déclarations faites par les Puissances dans le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, seraient solennellement confirmées par ces mêmes Puissances dans l'intérêt de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de celui du concert Européen.

Et la Porte, de son côté, déclarerait dans le même intérêt, sa ferme résolution de développer plus efficacement son système administratif et les améliorations intérieures qui devraient satisfaire aux besoins et à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

Péra, le 12 *Décembre*, 1853.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 556.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Péra, le 14 *Décembre*, 1853.

Monsieur,

JE vous invite à vous rendre demain chez son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et de concert avec MM. les Interprètes de l'Autriche, de la France et de la Prusse, qui seront munis d'instructions identiques à celle-ci, vous lui remettrez la note ci-jointe, datée le 12 du courant, à laquelle la note, que chacun d'eux remettra en même temps à son Altesse, est textuellement conforme.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 556.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, December 15, 1853.

My Lord,

IN obedience to your Excellency's instructions of yesterday's date, I waited upon Reshid Pasha and presented to his Highness, in concert with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia, the identical note, dated the 12th instant, and signed by each of our respective chiefs.

After attentively perusing the note, Reshid Pasha told us that he could not take upon himself to give any answer previously to communicating it to the Ministerial Council. That, as soon as the meeting of the General Council, which was to be convened on Saturday next, for the purpose of discussing the principle of peace so repeatedly recommended by the Four Powers, had come to some final conclusion, he would then submit to the consideration of his colleagues the basis proposed in the above-mentioned note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 557.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 391.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 17, 1853.

I RECEIVED yesterday from Lord Westmorland, in pursuance of your Lordship's instructions, a collective note addressed to the Porte by the Representatives of the Four Powers at Vienna, acting together in the authorized capacity of a resuscitated Conference.

The sealed letter directed to Reshid Pasha, and containing the note in question, reached me at the same time, with a request that I would personally present it to his Highness, accompanied by my colleagues the French Ambassador, the Internuncio, and the Prussian Envoy.

This note, suggesting the expediency of an early pacification, and inviting the Porte to state the terms on which it is disposed to negotiate with Russia, would, I conceive, be of questionable advantage under other circumstances; but I do not hesitate to express my clear conviction that it could not be delivered to the Porte at this juncture without unsettling our prospects of peace, and rendering the acceptance of the *projet*, received on the 15th by Reshid Pasha from me and my colleagues, still more precarious and difficult than it is even now. Such is also the opinion of my colleagues. The terms of the note are, doubtless, most considerate and flattering to the Turkish Government, but they afford, at the same time, so much encouragement to the pretensions of the war party, that the communication of them could hardly fail to strengthen that interest, and to render a successful negotiation more remote. At all events, by reserving its delivery we retain in our hands an occasion for reopening the question of negotiation in the case of our pending proposal being declined. Such is, therefore, the course which I have determined to pursue, and I trust that it will meet with your Lordship's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 558.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 392.)

Constantinople, December 17, 1853.

My Lord,

MUCH as I regret the necessity, and alive as I am to the objections of more than one kind, I entertain, nevertheless, a decided opinion that reasons of a preponderating order require the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea. I cannot indeed conceal from myself that the late destruction of so many Turkish vessels at Sinope would probably never have occurred if the ships of England and France had been sent thither at an earlier period. Not that I would throw the blame of that disaster anywhere but on the Porte and its officers. They alone, or their professional counsellors, were cognizant of the miserable state of the land defences at Sinope. They alone are answerable for the obvious imprudence of leaving so long in helpless danger a squadron exposed to attack from hostile ships of far superior force. But referring to the simple fact, irrespective of its causes, I am naturally anxious that the loss of the example should not be added to that of the ships.

We have learnt from an occurrence which cannot be sufficiently deplored, that the Russians are willing as well as able to attack and destroy the Sultan's means of defence even in the fancied shelter of a port. They have committed not only an act of overt hostility, but of direct aggression, on the Ottoman territory. Their commander was indeed most careful not to land, and he excused the rigours of his violence by presuming that the Turkish squadron had in view an insurrection in Circassia, and by endeavouring on that presumption to put his attack in the light of a defensive operation. But he seems to have forgotten that the Porte had been compelled to take up arms by the original aggression of Russia, and that a fresh violation of the Sultan's territory was not to be justified by a supposed intention of counter-aggression, in principle defensive, on the part of His Majesty's forces. It is evident that, if a British squadron had been cruizing off Sinope when the Russians advanced on their errand of destruction, it would have been the duty of its commander to interpose for the protection of Her Majesty's ally, threatened in a manner which involved the violation of his territorial rights; and had the friendly intervention failed, he would have felt himself ultimately compelled to enforce it according to his means. It is not hazarding too much to say, that in either case the Sultan's successes on the frontier would not have been cancelled at once by the blow struck at Sinope.

It is true that what has been effected so cruelly there is not likely to be attempted again for the present in the same shape.

But the Russians have a general interest in weakening their adversary. Since they frown upon his progress in peace, and thwart it as occasions offer, are they likely to neglect the opportunities which war presents of crippling his means and curtailing his power? They have already been defeated in an attempt to land troops in the rear of the Turkish positions. The attempt may be repeated by a disembarkation on Turkish territory; and on the same territory are defenceless commercial towns and ports at best imperfectly protected, to say nothing of coal depôts and building yards completely exposed.

Your Lordship's instructions to me are positive as to the employment of Her Majesty's squadron for the protection of the Sultan's territory from direct aggression, and they are equally clear as to its passage into the Black Sea in the event of the Russian fleet coming out of Sevastopol.

Now, the known facts, with respect to the latter point, are these; six sail-of-the-line, half of them three deckers, have come out of Sevastopol at once, and steam and sailing frigates from the same quarter are also known to have been at sea, partly in company with the liners.

Surely a division of such magnitude must be considered as constituting to all intents and purposes the fleet. As to the aggression itself, it was not indeed accompanied with any landing of troops or occupation of the soil. But it was a direct attack on the Sultan's means of defence within his territorial limits, and it involved the partial conflagration of a town, and the destruction of at least one inoffensive merchant-vessel under British colours, to say nothing of the batteries.

So much for the facts, as cases in point and as warnings for the future. But there is more, distinguishable indeed from proved fact, yet worthy of attention as being credibly asserted by competent eye-witnesses. Two British masters of British trading vessels have stated that they saw a Russian fleet—one asserts of twelve or more sail-of-the-line—about nine days ago at sea, in the neighbourhood of the Crimea. Another has deposed to having seen six sail-of-the-line on the afternoon of the 9th instant between Samsoon and Sinope, and the distance, he adds, was such that there might have been more.

From all that precedes it appears that the cases for which your Lordship's instructions provided have actually occurred, that a severe loss which a timely interposition of the squadrons might have been prevented, has been sustained by the Porte, and moreover, that there is a reason to apprehend a renewal of aggressive operations by Russia in some shape or other.

It is further to be borne in mind that the squadrons while stationed in the Bosphorus at this time of year, are powerless for defending the coasts of the Black Sea situated at any considerable distance from the Strait; that the Porte has been officially informed of the objects for which they brought the national colours to these waters; that the two Ambassadors have received an official application from the Porte requesting that the squadrons may go to sea; that we have dissuaded the Porte from sending out its own squadron, and that Russian ships of the line are known to have kept the sea during a part, if not the whole of the late tempestuous weather.

Forgive me, my Lord, if in this combination of circumstances all tending to the same conclusion, I cannot lose sight of public opinion, or of that maturer judgment which later times will pronounce upon our conduct at this unprecedented juncture, and if while stating my reasons for purposing to send the squadrons into the Black Sea now, I feel that an explanation of the causes which restrained them from going sooner, might be more reasonably expected. The causes in question may be reduced to the following heads; want of positive information as to the movements of the Russian fleet, an unwillingness to incur any risk of collision, or to narrow the chains of peace by premature provocation of any kind, and an impression that we should do best to wait for an invitation from the Turkish Government. In aid of these leading considerations come the strong prevailing northerly winds which retarded the squadrons in their passage from Besika Bay, and the delays occasioned by the departure of one French Ambassador and the arrival of another.

The action near Sinope took place on the 30th ultimo; the steamer which escaped, brought the first news of it on the evening of the 2nd instant. In the interval I received an official note from the Porte informing me that three Russian sail-of-the-line had been seen off Sinope, where, as we had heard only a few days before, a squadron of Turkish frigates was supposed to be lying at anchor. This information was the cause of an interview between General Baraguay and myself on the 2nd, and we parted under an agreement to summon the Admirals to confer with us on the following day, with respect to the expediency of their going into the Black Sea. The conference took place accordingly, but instead of discussing how to prevent any disaster, we were called upon to deplore the one which had already occurred. At the close of a discussion which elicited some conflicting views, it was agreed to send two steamers, one of each flag, to Varna, and the same number to Sinope. We purposed by this measure to obtain intelligence on which we could rely, and it was understood between the French Ambassador and myself that, on the return of the steamers, we should send out the squadrons either to dispossess the Russians of Sinope if they were still there, or to cruize round the Turkish coasts on both sides of the Black Sea within the latitudes of that port and of Varna.

During the absence of the "Retribution," the "Mogador," the "Fury," and the "Heron," I received another official note from Reshid Pasha containing an imperfect account of the loss sustained at Sinope, announcing the Porte's intention to send its squadron to sea, and requesting the active assistance of Her Majesty's ships in concert with those of France.

On the return of the steam-frigates from Sinope, I lost no time in exchanging opinions with General Baraguay on the subject of the Porte's request considered with reference to the information obtained from their commanders. The final result, after some discussion and mutual explanations, was that the

ships should go to sea at least on a cruize, with a reserve of any remarks which the Admirals might offer as to the number or risk from weather.

In consequence of this understanding, I addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas the letter of which a copy is inclosed herewith. Some further correspondence ensued between us, and this is now transmitted in copy to your Lordship.

I have not seen Admiral Hamelin's reply to the French Ambassador, nor do I know precisely what impression it has made on the latter, though I presume, until better informed, that his Excellency continues to agree with me as to the principal point at issue.

It only remains for me to state that I have answered the Porte's official notes in terms corresponding, I hope, with the requirements of the case, yet calculated to discourage any unreasonable expectations. My colleague assures me that he has written in the same sense to Reshid Pasha. A copy of my note is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

I shall return to this important and delicate subject, as soon as I am enabled by further communications with the French Ambassador to appreciate more exactly the objections which my view of it is supposed to involve.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 558.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

Pera, December 11, 1853.

THE notes addressed to me by your Highness under the respective dates of the 29th ultimo and the 4th instant, have been duly received, and I should have done myself the honour of acknowledging them at an earlier moment, had it not been advisable for me to consult previously with the French Ambassador, to whom similar notes had been addressed, and, in concert with his Excellency, to wait for the return of the steam-vessels which we sent to Sinope soon after receiving your Highness' second note.

It is with sentiments of deep affliction that we have learnt the full extent of loss sustained by the Porte's flotilla in its late unfortunate conflict with a Russian force of disproportioned magnitude; and, for my own part, I find no adequate consolation either in the heroic devotion displayed by the Turkish seamen on that occasion, or in the relief which has been conveyed to the wounded survivors by the vessels dispatched to Sinope under the respective colours of England and France. There is the more reason to lament a disaster so distressing to humanity, as the exposure of the Sultan's vessels at Sinope to certain destruction might, to all appearance, have been avoided, if earlier attention had been paid either to the dangers of their position or to the means of protecting them by effective batteries on shore. It now only remains for me to hope that greater foresight and more activity will be henceforward employed by the Porte in rendering available for the protection of her coasts, her ports, and her naval forces, such means as are still left at her disposal. I should ill discharge the duties of a friendly Representative, if I omitted this opportunity of pressing once more upon the Porte's most serious attention what I have so often recommended in previous communications.

Your Highness' note of the 4th instant announces the readiness of your Government to send their squadron into the Black Sea, and intimates, at the same time, an expectation that the allied squadrons, which are now anchored in the Bosphorus, will concur in lending their active assistance for the protection of the Turkish coasts.

A friendly attention has already been paid to this appeal, and indeed the presence of the squadrons in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople is itself a very significant fact. It can hardly be necessary either for me or for the French Ambassador to assure your Highness that such measures will be taken by the respective Admirals as the season may permit, and as circumstances may require, for giving effect to the instructions under which they are called upon to act. Their principal object is the protection of the Turkish territory against any direct aggression; but in the performance of that defensive duty, they

cannot be expected to lose sight of those considerations which are prescribed by the earnest desire of both Governments to render their operations as much as possible conducive to the restoration of peace as well as to the maintenance of the Sultan's rights.

With respect to the Turkish squadron, I cannot too strongly advise a reconsideration of the Porte's intention under such further information as may be obtained from the experience and professional judgment of those distinguished officers who are in command of the united squadrons. I cannot conceal from your Highness that the impressions which I have derived from that source are anything but calculated to inspire me with confidence in the fitness of the Ottoman squadron for active service at sea in presence of an imposing enemy, and at this unfavourable season. My observation is particularly directed to vessels under sail.

Your Highness is too enlightened not to appreciate the frankness with which I have expressed my sentiments at a moment of such pregnant importance to the interests of the Empire and its august Sovereign.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 558.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *British Embassy, December* 11, 1853.

IT is my opinion, under the instructions which I have received from the Earl of Clarendon, that the appearance of the combined squadrons, or of an adequate portion of them, in the Black Sea, can be no longer deferred without prejudice to the important interests which their union is intended to protect.

Having conferred with the French Ambassador on the subject, I have reason to believe that his Excellency writes to Vice-Admiral Hamelin in a similar sense. We think, moreover, while submitting to your judgment and to that of your French colleague whatever concerns the due performance of this service, that supposing the Russian squadron no longer at sea, the object in view would be sufficiently attained if the ships of the two Governments were to pass along the coasts of Turkey as far as Varna on the European side, and as far as Sinope on that of Asia.

Her Majesty's Government being at peace with Russia, it is obviously desirable that, in redeeming the pledge of territorial protection given to the Porte, no kind of unnecessary provocation should be offered to the Russian authorities. You will doubtless agree with me that, in order to avoid even the semblance of any offensive intention while a hope of negotiation remains, it would be advisable for the ships under your command to keep out of sight of the Russian coast, and even in crossing the Black Sea, when necessary, to take such course as would be least likely, in case of bad weather and strong winds, to cause any exception to that rule.

The same principle holds good with respect to any Russian vessels which you may meet at sea. Communication, when not to be avoided, is, of course, to be conducted as long as possible in the most friendly forms, even should it be requisite to interpose for the protection of the Sultan's territory from direct aggression and overt hostility, or for that of any Turkish vessel which, to avoid an imminent peril of capture, may have taken refuge beneath your guns.

In these two cases, as in that of being attacked, a resort to force may be ultimately unavoidable, but to justify its employment the necessity must be clear.

I have finally to request that, in concert with Vice-Admiral Hamelin, you will take measures for giving effect to the object of this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 558.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *December* 13, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour of receiving at 11 P.M. last night your Excellency's letter of the 11th instant, and agreeably to your wishes I have communicated with Vice-Admiral Hamelin, and I have seen the letter the Admiral received from his Ambassador, as well as the Admiral's reply.

Admiral Hamelin, on the invitation of General Baraguay d'Hilliers, has fully detailed in his very comprehensive letter the difficulties and dangers to the efficiency of the squadron, if exposed to a cruize in the Black Sea at this season; and I think it right to state that I fully concur in the opinion of my colleague (Vice-Admiral Hamelin), but at the same time I beg leave to add that the squadron under my command is quite ready to proceed to the Black Sea or elsewhere, should your Excellency consider the object to be obtained equivalent to the disadvantages.

To enable me, however, to judge of the expediency of proceeding with the whole, or detaching a part only, of my squadron, in conjunction with that of the French, I must request your Lordship to furnish me with clear and full information as to the nature and extent of the service to be performed, and I have also to ask for precise and positive instructions on the different points or cases in which I shall be authorized to act hostilely against Russia, with whom your Lordship states Great Britain to be still at peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 4 in No. 558.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

British Embassy, December 14, 1853

Sir,

FROM your letter, dated yesterday, and received this morning, I have learnt with much pleasure, but without surprise, that Her Majesty squadron under your command is ready to proceed to sea, and if you will have the goodness to favour me with a more complete explanation of the disadvantages to result from its appearance there now, I shall be better qualified for instituting the comparison which you suggest, between those disadvantages and the object to be attained by encountering them.

In reply to the concluding paragraph of your letter, I have the honour to state, that the nature and extent of the service proposed to be performed by you are comprehended in its object, which is to protect the Ottoman territory in the Black Sea from direct agression or overt hostility on the part of Russia, with whose Government I repeat that Her Majesty is still at peace.

In writing my former despatch to you, I fancied that I had sufficiently made clear the cases in which you would be justified in resorting eventually to force; but if you will do me the honour to state any one which I have inadvertently omitted, I shall hasten to set you at ease to the best of my knowledge and imperfect judgment.

The case of Turkish vessels taking refuge under your guns at sea, is not provided for in my instructions, and I have given it a place in my letter to you only because I thought it might possibly occur, according to naval practice, and I was unwilling to leave the responsibility on you. Should your opinion differ from mine on that point, it would be my duty to take your reasons for the difference into serious consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 558.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *in the Bosphorus, December* 16, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt this afternoon of your Excellency's letter, dated the 14th, and I beg to inform you that the disadvantages to which I referred in my letter of the 13th instant, were those to which the efficiency of the ships would be exposed by cruizing in the Black Sea in the winter, as specially pointed out in Vice-Hamelin's letter to his Ambassador, with which, no doubt, Count Baraguay d'Hilliers has made your Excellency acquainted; but although I fully concur in the statements made by Vice-Admiral Hamelin, I again repeat that the squadron under my command is quite ready to proceed to sea when I receive your instructions, and should I find in them any point I cannot clearly understand, I will then apply to your Excellency for explanation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. D. DUNDAS.

No. 559.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 393.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 19, 1853.

IT is with real satisfaction that I hasten to inform your Lordship of the decision taken by the General Council, assembled on the 16th and 18th instant. It is entirely in favour of peace on just and reasonable grounds. M. Pisani's report, inclosed herewith in copy, will be sufficient to satisfy your Lordship in this respect. The debates, I understand, were far more animated than is usual among the phlegmatic statesmen of Constantinople. The Seraskier appears to have voted with his colleagues, but not without giving signs of the reluctance which he felt. All who were present will, no doubt, be called upon to sign the report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 559.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 18, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to report that the General Council which met to-day for the second time has come to the decision that peace should be concluded with Russia on the following bases, namely: immediate evacuation of the Principalities by the Russian troops; preservation of the sovereign rights unimpaired; and a guarantee from the Four Powers for the future.

Having asked for explanation as to the nature of the guarantee expected by the Council, Reshid Pasha replied, that the note given in lately by the Four Representatives provides for that contingency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 560.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January 4, 1854.*)

(No. 396.)

Constantinople, December 23, 1853.

My Lord,

DURING the last three days the Turkish capital has been in a state which threatened insurrection. The Softas, or religious students, took umbrage at the pacific decision adopted by the General Council, and formed themselves into assemblies of an illegal character; expressed loudly their discontent; and threatened to wreak their vengeance on Reshid Pasha and other obnoxious Ministers. It is supposed that they were secretly encouraged by Mehemet Ali Pasha, the Seraskier, and perhaps also by the Sheik-ul-Islam; the former being leader of the war party, the latter inclined to temporize with the fanatics.

Early the day before yesterday, information reached me to that effect, and it was soon followed by alarming statements of intended violence, including the conflagration of the city and the massacre of its Christian inhabitants. These reports, with other indications of terror, came in so thick that, even making allowance for much probable exaggeration, it became a duty to lose no time in adopting precautionary measures. Such as it was in my power to take, I therefore took, but with as little display or demonstration of alarm as possible. The diplomatic body assembled at my house; I addressed, with their sanction, a letter—copy inclosed herewith—to the Ottoman Secretary of State; and steamers from the British and French squadrons were prepared for any service which might be required.

Before long it became evident that the danger was less urgent than had been at first apprehended; and on sending to the Porte, I found that, although the Ministers were not there, the streets were free from tumult, and the authorities prepared to maintain order. I could not, however, learn till late in the evening where Reshid Pasha, who had left his house in the morning, was to be found.

At an early hour next morning I went to see that Minister, who had taken refuge in his son's house at a distance from the city, and not far from the Sultan's palace. While I was listening to his recital of the late occurrences, and to his opinion of their cause, a message arrived from the President of the Council, to inform him that the Softas were still in a state of agitation and disobedience to the Government; that the effects of their example upon the more dangerous classes of the populace were to be apprehended; and that doubts were entertained of the steadiness of the troops. It was clearly the opinion of both Ministers that the factions were encouraged by the intrigues of Mehemet Ali, and the favour of the Sheik-ul-Islam. There was reason, moreover, to fear that the Sultan hesitated to take those decisive measures which were required by the continuance of danger, notwithstanding the advice given by Reshid Pasha to His Majesty on the preceding day, and seconded, more or less, by his colleagues in office.

Conceiving that under such circumstances there was but one course to pursue, and that further indecision would endanger the most vital interests, and render every immediate chance of peace impossible, I went at once to the Seraglio, and requested a private audience of the Sultan. His Majesty having received me with his usual affability, I made no secret of what I understood to be the real state of things, and placed before him in strong colours the absolute necessity of acting with vigour and determination, so as to leave no time for the rebellion to gather strength and to assume more formidable proportions.

I will not trouble your Lordship with the details of a long conversation, which showed that His Majesty was by no means insensible to the demands upon his resolution, though not perhaps thoroughly aware of those tendencies which called for an immediate exercise of his authority. The interview ended by an assurance from His Majesty that he would forthwith order the measures which I had recommended to be carried into effect; and that he would himself pass over into his city palace in order to make an additional impression on his subjects. He informed me at the same time that he had decided on giving his

formal sanction to the vote of the General Council in favour of peace; and I urged the importance of his accepting also, without loss of time, the plan of negotiation which I had submitted to his Ministers, in concert with my three colleagues.

I had scarcely left the palace when the Sultan sent for the Grand Vizier, the Sheik-ul-Islam, and the Seraskier. He apprized them of his views, and ordered them to summon a Council at the Porte. He then crossed over to Constantinople, and sent an officer of his Court to the assembled Ministers, apprizing them of his assent to the Council's decision, and commanding them to take immediate measures for the maintenance of public order and the apprehension of the insurgents.

His Majesty's commands were executed equally without delay and without difficulty. The Seraskier was compelled to act against his own partizans, and the Sheik-ul-Islam to sanction by his presence the measures adopted for their suppression.

About two hundred of the more active Softas were seized by the soldiery, and taken before the Council in detachments of ten or twelve. They were required to explain what their insubordination meant. They replied that the conditions prescribed by the Koran for peace after war had been disregarded. They were told in return that neither peace nor armistice existed, that the Council had only declared a willingness to negotiate on terms which would keep their territory and their rights entire, and that the war would be maintained with vigour till then. Upon which they declared their loyalty and obedience to the Sultan; but on being required, in proof of their sincerity, to join the Sultan's army, they declined, and were then condemned to exile in Candia, whither they are to be conveyed in a day or two.

It appears that the troops behaved with perfect discipline.

A paper declaring the Sultan's adherence to the last decision of the Council has been published. I have the honour to inclose a copy of it herewith.

Reshid Pasha was the only Minister not present at the meeting of the Council yesterday. The meeting was held at Seraskierat, or what we should call the Horse Guards, as being nearer to the scene of disturbance. He sent in his resignation to the Sultan yesterday, but was commanded to retain his office, being informed in His Majesty's handwriting of the commands which he had issued. I have reason to believe that, all being restored to order, and the designs of his adversary frustrated for the present, the Pasha will return to his house to-night or to-morrow morning.

To-day he has replied to the letter which I addressed to him the day before yesterday in the name of the diplomatic body, and a copy of his answer is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

Inclosure 1 in No. 560.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

M. le Ministre,

Péra de Constantinople, le 21 Décembre, 1853.

JE viens d'apprendre d'une manière digne de foi que les Softas et autres individus ont eu recours à des réunions qui menacent la capitale d'une insurrection immédiate, et les Chrétiens d'un grand désastre.

N'ayant ni le temps ni les moyens de vérifier, soit la cause, soit la portée de cet incident, je crois devoir m'adresser en premier lieu à votre Altesse pour avoir des informations plus exactes de ce qui en est, et en même temps de lui exprimer toute la confiance que je place dans la fermeté, la vigueur, et la loyauté du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

Le Gouvernement n'hésitera pas, sans doute, de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir le bon ordre, et je croirais lui faire tort si je rappelais à votre Altesse la grave responsabilité qui pèserait, aux yeux de toute l'Europe, sur la Porte et son Empire, s'il était permis aux factieux de donner le défi à l'autorité des lois et de fouler aux pieds les droits et la vie des Chrétiens, ou d'autres classes des sujets de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Altesse doit comprendre que dans cette occasion je suis l'organe du corps diplomatique, dont les membres, à l'exception de ceux qui ne sont pas en ville, m'ont fait l'honneur de se réunir chez moi.

Je profite, &c.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 560.

Supplement to the "Turkish Gazette" of December 23, 1853.

SEEING that the Russian Government is constantly manifesting its pacific intentions, the Allied Governments have recommended them to the consideration of the Sublime Porte, and asked its intentions concerning them. The matter was, therefore, reflected upon and discussed in a general assembly, held at the Porte, composed of all the Ministers, Viziers, Ulemas, military and naval officers and functionaries, on Saturday the 17th, and Sunday the 18th of Rebiul-evel.

Considering that war was determined upon in order to maintain the rights and territorial integrity of the Sublime Porte, it was unanimously decided that an answer should be given to the effect that a peace capable of assuring these conditions for the present and for the future, should not be rejected. The fetva, given by the Sheik-ul-Islam, having confirmed the proposal, His Majesty's will has also been expressed in that sense, and the matter has been communicated to the Embassies of the Four Governments in this shape. Now behold that the present stage of the matter is one of question and answer, and that for the present so far from there being peace on the *tapis* there is no talk of an armistice, and the state of war is still in permanency. Letters have been sent to the commanders of the armies of Asia and Europe, and other functionaries, acquainting them with the state of the case, in order that the present movements may undergo no suspension. This has been published in order that every one may know it.

Considering, therefore, that this decision has been come to unanimously in accordance with the prescriptions of the sacred fetva, emanated as above from the holy law, whosoever shall say anything against it will be guilty of raising his voice in opposition to a matter which has been voted unanimously, and he will therefore, without the least delay, be subjected to the punishment he shall have thereby incurred. In order that this may be known to every one beforehand it has been hereby proclaimed.

21 *Rebiul-evvel*, 1270. (*December* 22, 1853.)

Inclosure 3 in No. 560.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Bechik Tache, le 23 Décembre, 1853.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI reçu la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 21 Décembre, par laquelle vous me demandez des informations sur les réunions des Softas.

Je me suis empressé de mettre votre lettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, mon auguste maître; et je me fais un devoir de vous informer que c'étaient quelques étudians de plusieurs Medresehs qui s'étaient permis de faire des rassemblemens illégaux, en déclarant à l'instigation des ennemis de l'ordre public une opinion contraire à la politique du Gouvernement Impérial; qu'aux ordres péremptoires de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, les autorités civiles et militaires ont pris des mesures énergiques et immédiates pour arrêter les plus coupables et les plus récalcitrans.

Je me fais un véritable plaisir d'ajouter qu'à peu près cent soixante personnes des plus turbulens se trouvent aujourd'hui aux arrêts sous la surveillance de la police, prêts à s'embarquer pour être exilées de la capitale, et que la police continue à faire ses recherches nécessaires; que l'autorité des lois est respectée; que les droits et la vie des populations se trouvent à l'abri du danger, et que le bon ordre règne comme par le passé.

En vous exprimant cet état de choses comme à l'organe du corps diplomatique, je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien lui en faire part.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) RESHID.

No. 561.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 397. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 23, 1853.

BARON DE BRUCK called upon me this morning, and expressed a strong apprehension that the war party, headed, if not directed by Mehemet Ali, the Seraskier, would still retain its ascendancy, and succeed in undermining our work of reconciliation. I told his Excellency that after what had happened within the last two days I ventured to entertain a more sanguine hope, and I gave him to understand that I was not a stranger to the proceedings which had rendered Mehemet Ali the instrument of suppressing his own rioters. I agreed, however, with him that the retirement of so headstrong and violent a Minister was highly desirable; but I did not think prudent to let him know that I had already apprised the Sultan of my impressions, and that I hoped to find through Reshid Pasha the means of acting upon them with good effect.

Whether a peace or a war policy is finally to prevail in the Sultan's Councils, the apparently incurable antagonism between those two Ministers renders their continuance in the same Cabinet a source of disorder and of weakness to the Government. If the welfare of the Empire calls for the retirement of one of His Majesty's Ministers from office, there could hardly be two opinions on the subject. The Seraskier is an active head of department, but he has not hitherto displayed those moral attributes and intellectual qualities which are indispensable for guiding the helm of Government in difficult times. He appears to feel his deficiency in those respects, and to seek the means of making up for it in boldness and popularity, reckoning also, it may be presumed, on the Sultan's favour in right of his wife, who is sister to His Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 562.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 398.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 23, 1853.

SINCE I addressed your Lordship last week relative to—what I still conceive to be most desirable—the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, I have had several communications on that subject, partly in writing, and partly by word of mouth, with General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

Vice-Admiral Hamelin's reply to the letter, which he addressed to that officer at the same time that I wrote to Vice-Admiral Dundas in the terms already known to your Lordship, has had, to all appearance, the effect of indisposing him completely to the measure which I recommended, and which I conceived at one time that he also was inclined to adopt. All I know of Admiral Hamelin's letter is that it points out the risk of sending line-of-battle ships under sail into the Black Sea at this time of year; that the efficiency of the squadrons might, in his judgment, be impaired by exposure to that risk; and

that Admiral Dundas concurs in opinion with his colleague, although he has declared his readiness to go out with his squadron, if required.

My reasons for wishing the squadrons to cruize, notwithstanding the chances to be apprehended in navigating the Black Sea at this season, are fully stated to your Lordship in another part of my correspondence. They are not diminished. On the contrary, the complete ascendancy of Russia in the Black Sea, and its effect in paralyzing every movement and enterprize of the Turkish Government in that quarter, become more palpable and embarrassing with each successive day. It is even reported, within the last eight-and-forty hours, that three Russian sail-of-the-line have been seen off the entrance of the Bosphorus; but of this report I cannot speak with any degree of certainty. My reasons for not having issued a peremptory instruction are, first, my unwillingness to proclaim either a marked dissent from our allies, or an offensive confidence in our naval superiority; secondly, a reluctance to expose our squadron to the hazard of encountering, single-handed, the whole fleet of Sevastopol; and thirdly, a natural regard for the joint opinion declared by the two Admirals.

The result of my latter communications with the French Ambassador is still incomplete. Though his Excellency appears to have made up his mind as to the inexpediency of sending out the French line-of-battle ships, he is ready to join in sending out a combined force of steam-frigates, and he would also send out a single vessel under French colours with any ships of ours in order to give public evidence of agreement. He proposes at the same time that single steam-vessels of each nation should be stationed in turn at Sinope on the one side, and at Varna or Bourgas on the other.

To the latter very limited precaution I am far from objecting, provided it be not meant to supersede a more efficient arrangement of the forces.

Nor do I object to sending out the steamers alone, if the Admirals declare their opinion that a force of that description would suffice to accomplish the object of your Lordship's instructions, I mean, the protection of the Ottoman territory against any act of direct aggression or overt hostility on the part of Russia. The measure, even if it were satisfactory in that respect, would, however, be attended with the disadvantage of taking from the Bosphorus exactly that part of each squadron which is most likely to be wanted there. At all events I have submitted the question, which is a purely professional one, to Vice-Admiral Dundas, and I wait his reply.

Whatever resolution may finally be taken here, it will be highly desirable for me to learn as soon as possible the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the several points which I have mentioned as causing a divergence of opinion between me and my colleagues. Circumstances have compelled us to moot them, and I greatly doubt the possibility of our arriving at any agreement calculated to meet the exigencies of the case. I have reason to believe that General Baraguay has already written home for instructions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 563.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 399.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 26, 1853.*

AT an early hour to-day I sent to Reshid Pasha requesting that no further delay might take place, now that order was restored through the capital, in coming to a decision on the subject of the proposed negotiation. I invited my colleagues to send a message of similar purport to his Highness. The result of the several applications addressed to him, is, that to-morrow, if possible, or a day or two later if necessary, the proposals sent in to him by the Four Representatives on the 15th instant shall be taken into consideration by the Council of Ministers.

The Pasha excused his inability to meet our wishes to-day on the ground of some remaining apprehension as to the tranquillity of the capital. It appears

that although 170 of the Softas were shipped off for Candia yesterday, those who remain have ventured to express their discontent. It has consequently been deemed prudent to keep a part of the troops under arms and to extend the number of arrests. The Ministers were to assemble forthwith at the Porte, and certain known ringleaders, six in number, were to be placed under arrest and brought before the Council.

Upon the whole, I see no reason to apprehend any disturbance of a more serious kind, and if the Ministers accept our proposals and the Sultan takes measures to reform his Ministry, I hope a more steady and cheerful state of things will ensue. For the moment there is much to regret in the general interruption of business which has attended the disorderly manœuvres of the last three days. Not only is the matter of paramount importance retarded, but every kind of pending affair has undergone a total stoppage.

The French Ambassador, who saw Reshid Pasha this morning, has sent me word that appearances are less favourable to our views than before the late disturbance; but M. Pisani, who saw his Highness and other members of the Government after the Ambassador's departure, assures me that he entertains little or no doubt that our proposals will be accepted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 564.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 400.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 24, 1853.*

I HAVE received from M. Pisani the report, dated yesterday, of which a copy is inclosed herewith. Its object is important, and the interests of peace are perhaps involved in its accomplishment. It serves to set in a strong light the disadvantages accruing to Turkey from the undisputed ascendancy enjoyed by Russia in the Black Sea. I am extremely anxious to relieve the Porte from an embarrassment which presses so heavily on her means of defence, and exposes her to more than one kind of danger. But as at present advised, I cannot perceive any mode, unless it be that of sending out the squadrons in full force, by which the Porte can be enabled to transfer her suspected troops to Trebizond without an imminent danger of having them taken in the course of their voyage by a Russian squadron. If British ships were to convey, or to convoy them to the place of disembarkation, Her Majesty's Government would incur the charge of taking a hostile part against Russia without a declaration of war; and if they went out with a force unequal to meet the fleet at Sevastopol, they might be obliged to witness the destruction or capture of their friends, without being able to make an effort for their escape.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 564.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, December 23, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Reshid Pasha informs me that there are at present in the barracks of Daoud Pasha and Ramis Tchiftlik, about 10,000 redifs, and 1,500 irregulars, who were inclined to join the Softas: these troops are destined to go to the camp of Asia. The Government is very anxious to send them to Trebizond, and it is very urgent, under present circumstances, that they should leave the capital without delay; but, unfortunately, the Black Sea being left entirely in the hands of the Russians, it becomes almost impossible for the Turkish steamers to venture into the Black Sea without running a certain chance

of being attacked by the enemy. Consequently, the Pasha thinks, that unless a portion of the combined squadrons were to go out, which would, in his opinion, afford a sufficient protection for the safe conveyance of the said troops to their destination, the Turkish steamers will not be able to perform this task.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 565.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 401.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 24, 1853.*

THE despatches which your Lordship sent to me a short time ago to the respective addresses of Her Majesty's Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest are still in my possession. My latest advices from Mr. Colquhoun and Mr. Gardner leave it quite uncertain what course they will finally take in pursuance of my instructions respecting their departure, and I am waiting for fresh information before I repeat the experiment of sending to embark them at Varna. The instructions which I addressed to them were returned upon my hands, and they could not have reached their respective destinations until after the commencement of the present month.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 566.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 403.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 25, 1853, 3 P.M.*

THE French Ambassador called here an hour ago to say that he had received yesterday a telegraphic instruction from Paris, dated the 14th instant, ordering him to send the French squadron into the Black Sea upon an understanding with Her Majesty's Government. The instruction uses the terms "paraître" and "ravitailler," as the objects of the squadron's cruize along the Asiatic coasts.

I have no such instruction yet; but I refer your Lordship to my public correspondence for the reasons which called, in my judgment, for the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Euxine, without any delay at all, and the difficulties which have hitherto prevented my giving complete effect to them.

It is my present intention to act as fully in concert with my French colleague, whose objections, of course, disappear before the commands of his Government, as the spirit of my older instructions will allow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 567.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 752. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 26, 1853.*

AS your Lordship is aware, the difficulty of obtaining certain intelligence in this country is such, that it seldom happens to me to be able to state to your Lordship that I am positive as to the correctness of the information which I submit to you.

Nevertheless I think it right to state to your Lordship, upon the authority of a person whose friendly feelings are not doubtful, and who has seldom led me into error, that the Russian Government not only contemplates encouraging the system of foreign privateering in the event of war with England, but may be assumed to have taken some preliminary steps in that direction.

Supposing my informant's intelligence to be well founded, it is to the South American States that the Russian Government is looking for the employment of corsairs, employed to distress the mercantile shipping of Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 568.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 4, 1854.)

(No. 754. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 26, 1853.*

THE French Minister has shown me in strict confidence a very important despatch, dated the 15th instant, which he has received from his Government, respecting the effect produced in France by the news of the destruction of the Turkish ships at Sinope, and the resolution taken in consequence of despatching the fleet into the Black Sea. The measure has for its object the security to be afforded to the Turkish ships destined to carry supplies (ravitailler) to the Turkish fortresses on the coast, and its necessity is explained to be the more urgent from the disregard of the national feeling of England and France evinced by the late attack of the Russians upon a squadron in its own waters, and those understood to be placed under the allied protection.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatches contained an extract of that addressed by him to Count Walewski on the 12th instant, and the copy of another addressed to Baron Bourqueney, the last manifesting the warm satisfaction of the Emperor Napoleon at the concurrence of the Austrian Cabinet in the policy of France on the Eastern question.

I allude to these despatches chiefly for the purpose of remarking that, far from offering any evidence of an intention on the part of the French Cabinet to separate their interests from those of Her Majesty's Government, they afford satisfactory proof of the unity of purpose which animates the two Governments.

This circumstance confirms my original notion as to the letter of congratulation addressed by General Castelbajac to the Chancellor having been an act of personal indiscretion not to be considered as indicative of a change of policy on the part of the French Cabinet.

It was not difficult to perceive that the intention of entering the Black Sea, announced to my colleague, and which, I may observe, he is not directed to notice to the Russian Government, was very unwelcome intelligence; this feeling being created, first, by an honest belief in the statement of the Russian authorities, according to which the attack upon the Turkish ships was a defensive act, destined to prevent the conveyance of military stores to the mountaineers of the Caucasus; and secondly, by the apprehension that no armed resistance offered to Russia by France and England will be supported eventually by the two German Governments.

To these motives may be added another: the conviction entertained by General Castelbajac that the fullest confidence may be placed in the Emperor's assurances of seeking neither territorial aggrandizement or extension of influence.

This confidence, as I have repeatedly explained to my colleague, it is not in my power to share.

Extension of influence is the point avowedly aimed at; extension of territory has not uncommonly been obtained by Russia in the face of very positive declarations.

I will only add that, in speaking as I have spoken of late of the French Envoy, I have, as I beg your Lordship to believe, done great violence to my own feelings.

I may safely assert that I should prefer being removed from my post to

running the risk of injuring a very worthy man, with whom I am living upon terms of amity and confidence; but the magnitude of the interests at stake have left me no choice of conduct.

The difficulties of the moment are immense, and all the zeal and hearty cooperation which can be given by their servants to the Governments of Her Majesty and of France are required for giving a fair chance of their views being carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 569.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 755. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1853.

A PERSON thoroughly attached to English interests sends me word that I may take for certain that orders have been sent to General Grünewald to use every exertion for the purchase, in the United States, of eighteen screw steamers (vaisseaux à hélice), which are required, with the least possible delay, for service in the Black Sea.

These vessels are to be dispatched, under American colours, to the Mediterranean. According to my informant, this order, which it will, I apprehend, be found difficult to execute in the United States, is independent of that given here for the construction of six first-class screw ships.

I further learn that the supply of lead is found to be very deficient in the Russian arsenals, and that orders have been issued for the immediate purchase of 45,000 poods.

These and many other indications all tend to confirm my belief of warlike preparations being made quietly, but upon a very extensive scale, by this country.

They equally confirm my notion that a war which would only break out in the course of three or four months would be much less formidable to Russia than a war which should burst forth at present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 570.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 756. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1853.

ACCORDING to information which has reached me from a private source, a Russian secret agent, of the name of Khovalkoff, has been sent into the Principalities, for the purpose of ascertaining the political opinions of all the more influential persons; and, as it is added, for that of endeavouring to call forth some demonstration of attachment to Russia.

The means of exciting the gratitude of the Danubian provinces are within the Emperor's reach, and are of the simplest order; His Imperial Majesty has but to put an end to an oppressive occupation of some of the finest provinces of the Turkish dominions, and to restore a peaceful population to a rule which will appear all the more paternal when contrasted with the hateful despotism to which military force has subjected them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 571.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 760.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1853.

YOUR Lordship's wishes as to the frankness to be observed towards the Russian Government at a juncture of this importance are so well known to me, that I have not hesitated to state to Count Nesselrode the feelings excited in England by the intelligence of the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope.

The language which I held to his Excellency when I waited upon him the day before yesterday, was as follows:

Dismiss, I entreat of you, from your mind the unfounded notion of the existence on the part of Her Majesty's Government of a desire to humiliate Russia; no feeling of the sort exists. Do not imagine either that it can be for our interests that Russia should be injured—quite the contrary. Her Majesty's Government consider that they have reason to complain of Russia; that the unlimited confidence placed in her assurances has been ill-repaid; but the feeling does not alter their policy, or inspire the Government with the wish of returning evil for evil. The case is plainly this: Her Majesty's Government have a British interest and a European interest in maintaining the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and they hold that the first would have been virtually destroyed if Prince Menchikoff's demand had been successful; and that the second is placed in great danger by the occupation of the Principalities, which is moreover a precedent and example against which it behoves all the Great Powers of Europe to enter a protest. Her Majesty's Government accordingly have duties to perform—duties not voluntarily undertaken, but imposed upon them by Russia; and from the discharge of these duties Her Majesty's Government cannot and will not shrink. Turkey must be defended from aggression; Her Majesty's Government are pledged to defend her, and the obligation must be discharged. Now as to the application of this. The victory over the Turks has produced a very painful effect in England; it may be regarded as an intentional insult to the maritime Powers, for the statement which has been made respecting the affair is incorrect. It is not true that the Turkish squadron had on board troops destined to attack Secoum-Kalé; these ships were charged with provisions for Batoum, and they have been destroyed in a Turkish harbour, which is Turkish territory, which England is bound to protect.

Before I had concluded this last sentence, Count Nesselrode interrupted me by strong assurances that nothing could be more unfounded than the supposition of its having been the wish of the Russian Government to offer any affront to England and France; that which had happened was, he observed the unavoidable consequence of the position taken by the Two Powers and by that assigned to Russia. Turkey, said Count Nesselrode, declares war upon us, she opens the campaign before the term laid down by herself, she invades our territory, she takes a small fortress which she still holds, and then you find fault with us because we oppose hostilities by hostilities; but remember, I beg, that we are at war with Turkey, and that no one ever heard of a war which was not attended by acts such as you complain of: our attack too was a defensive act—the Turkish ships were notoriously laden with military stores, intended for the tribes who are fighting up war on our borders.

As to the last point, M. le Comte, I said, it is a question of fact, and our two versions differ; I am prepared to maintain, as I before stated, that the Turkish ships were conveying stores to a Turkish town. As regards what you say respecting the practices of war, I must repeat what I once before observed—if the present war is anomalous, it is not we who brought about this extraordinary state of things. However I am now not so much complaining as I am pointing out what is to be expected, and I do dot wish to conceal from you that whilst great forbearance as to the entrance by our ships of the Black Sea has been observed and might have been continued, this, after what has lately occurred, is no longer possible.

The Chancellor only replied that, as he had before stated, he could well understand the public feeling excited in England and France; that his intelligence gave him no reason to believe that Her Majesty's ships had entered the Black Sea, or even that their despatch thither had been finally resolved upon; and that as to the intended bombardment of Varna, which had been spoken of, no such intention had existed on the part of the Russian Government.

After this, as I believe, salutary notice had been given to the Russian Minister, we spoke of other points.

Count Nesselrode complained of the conduct which was pursued towards the Russian Cabinet: it was unheard of; the Sultan was consulted as to the conditions upon which he was disposed to make peace, and when these were ascertained and arranged, of course with exclusive reference to Turkish interests, he supposed Russia would be called upon to sign what had been prepared for her. Then again the idea of asking Russia to send a Plenipotentiary to meet a Turkish Plenipotentiary under the auspices of the allied Ministers was perfectly novel, was an indignity which would be offered only to one of the smallest of the European States, was a course which during the last hundred years Russia had never submitted to in her intercourse with Turkey, and to which she could not now be expected to lend herself.

I fastened upon these latter expressions, and entreated Count Nesselrode to bear in mind that if her relations with Turkey were of importance to Russia, our interest in Turkey was not less important; that her weakness and decrepitude, of which so much had been said, were but additional motives for the support of her friends not being withheld. Then, I added, as to the feeling which you profess of being humiliated by our policy, although, as you admit, it may not be our wish that you should be humiliated, I protest to you that it is in vain that I endeavour to comprehend the statement; here is a question of avowed general European interest, and you are to be hurt because Europe chooses to attend to that interest. I must again say that I find it quite impossible to understand the objection which you are raising.

This comes, replied Count Nesselrode, from your not choosing to put yourselves into our situation.

On the contrary, I said, that is the way in which, but to little purpose, I am endeavouring to judge of your objections. I suppose England engaged in an altercation or a war with Turkey, and I can easily understand other European States desiring to take part in the settlement of the affair: what I cannot realize is the idea of England feeling insulted by the wish of other States to participate in an adjustment in which their interests should be immediately concerned.

Count Nesselrode would only ask what the feelings of England would have been if some of the Great Powers had come forward to take part in the settlement of her difference with China.

It appeared to me, I said, very easy to understand what the English policy would have been: in the first place the question was one in which no great European interests, other than our own, were engaged; and secondly, any such offer on the part of the leading Powers to assist in the promotion of a settlement of differences would have been gladly received by Her Majesty's Government; these were, I said, the feelings not professed officially, but honestly entertained and expressed by an individual who offered his word in pledge of his sincerity.

The above, my Lord, is a correct outline of my last conversation with the Chancellor, and I will venture to submit to your Lordship with equal fidelity the impressions which it has left upon my mind.

I will first remark, that it has tended to confirm my own opinions, and among them those which upon more than one occasion I have made known to Her Majesty's Government.

The language held to me and to others would have justified the expectation that my announcement respecting the entrance of the Black Sea by Her Majesty's ships (although not officially made) would have been followed by the immediate delivery to me of my passports; however, I expected nothing of the kind, and, instead of endeavouring to obtain precise information upon the point, it appeared to me that the Chancellor was only eager to close his ears to my communication, and to pay the slightest possible attention to what I had to announce. On the other hand, I looked in vain for any indication on the part of the Russian Government giving up those objects which, if insisted upon, must lead to the most serious consequences.

I infer consequently that, although of course preferring to gain her ends by peaceable means, Russia is prepared to seek them, if needs must, by force of arms; but at the same time that she is sensible that the present moment is unfavourable for military and naval exertions.

So long as her armaments are not completed in the south, and as the larger half of her fleet shall remain blocked up in the ice, the desire of Russia to avoid giving or taking unnecessary offence may, if I am not mistaken, be reckoned upon; but the same confidence is, I think, not to be felt from the moment that the invading armies shall receive their reinforcements, a portion of which is already on its way to the south, and as the return of spring shall enable the numerous ships now frozen in at Cronstadt and Helsingfors to afford a powerful diversion to the large naval force already prepared at Sevastopol.

In expressing these opinions I would however add, that the disposition of Russia to abstain for the present from war would probably not be proof against the protection afforded by the allied fleets to Turkish vessels destined to carry succour to the Circassians and the neighbouring tribes.

That a fire might be lighted up in those regions which half the military power of Russia might be unable to extinguish is, I think, to be inferred from the fact of some 100,000 men being required in the most peaceable times for keeping in check Schaunyl and his hardy mountaineers.

Whilst impelling Persia to take up arms against her unoffending neighbour, Russia may probably have overlooked the facility with which reprisals might be exercised at the expense of her own outlying provinces. That which I am the most desirous of expressing to your Lordship as my conviction is, that Russia, whilst continuing to advance towards her object, is anxious not to strike the first blow, so as, if possible, to leave to England and France the responsibility of aggression.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 572.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 4, 1854.)

(No. 763. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December* 26, 1853.

I HAVE just learned upon excellent authority that the Government have ordered the construction of eighty gun-boats, which are to be ready for delivery at Cronstadt, if the river is open, in the month of April.

It has been intimated to the contractors that a further number may be required.

Each boat is to be armed with two pieces of cannon, one forward, the other at the stern.

Any measures taken for the security of the Russian coasts and harbours of Russia may, I think, be viewed with indifference, except in so far as that invasion is hardly to be apprehended, except under circumstances which may justify an attack on the part of foreign Powers; the case, however, is widely different with regard to the large steam force which it is undoubtedly the purpose of Russia to form, and which, as she possesses neither foreign trade or colonies, can hardly be destined for other than offensive purposes.

The creation of an immense steam fleet is the object upon which the Grand Duke Constantine is the most intent, and the great influence which he has of late established over the Emperor renders it probable, if not certain, that the object will be carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 573.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 7.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1854.*

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on Eastern affairs, in the conversation with his Excellency of which you give an account in your despatch No. 760 of the 26th ultimo.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 574.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 10.) *Paris, January 4, 1854.*

My Lord,

AFTER perusing Lord Stratford's despatches, brought by the "Caradoc," and forwarded to your Lordship yesterday evening, I wrote to M. Drouyn de Lhuys to request him to see me immediately, as I was anxious that he should be in possession of the intelligence which I had to communicate before the usual meeting of the Council this morning. He received me in the course of the evening, and I informed him of the opposition made by Admiral Hamelin to the entry of the French fleet into the Black Sea, and of the immobility to which the combined squadrons were condemned in consequence. "I was not," I said, "about to impugn Admiral Hamelin's judgment, or the decision to which he had come. It was a maritime question, with which I had nothing to do. But I could not help remarking," I added, "on the incongruity which was manifest between the wishes of the French Government, as expressed in Paris and London, and the acts of the French Representative and Admiral at Constantinople. While on the one side the Emperor's Government were urging the adoption of measures in the Black Sea which would possibly lead to hostilities with Russia, and were proclaiming their intention of undertaking them alone, should Her Majesty's Government refuse the co-operation of the British fleet; on the other side, the Admiral in command of the French fleet in the Levant demurred to entering the Black Sea at all, and seemed to have been approved by the Emperor's Ambassador. Either, therefore, the French Government had urged Her Majesty's Ministers to adopt measures which they ought to have known from their Admiral were not practicable, or there was not a proper understanding between the Government at home and its officers abroad. It appeared, moreover," I continued, "that the Russian fleet had kept the sea during very tempestuous weather, and that they had at this moment the entire command of the Black Sea. It was impossible that a comparison should not be made in the minds of the Turks between the conduct of their enemies and that of their reputed friends, which might lead hereafter to serious consequences."

I trust that your Lordship will approve my having said as much. I spoke purposely with warmth, though without any irritation, because I thought it right to show M. Drouyn de Lhuys the inconsistency of French proceedings, and because I am not without apprehension, knowing how impressionable the Ottoman character is to facts and events, that the appearance of disunion at Constantinople, sure to be known as it is, may do mischief to our united interests in the East.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys professed to be totally ignorant of the circumstances to which I had called his attention. He declared that General Baraguay had not, in his correspondence, alluded even to the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea, much less to a difference of opinion upon the subject with his British colleague. He read me a long report from the General, dated the 24th ultimo, which had been brought by the "Caradoc," and which, if it is the only report

received by the French Government, refers solely to the pending negotiations between the Porte and the Four Powers, and to the disturbances which had interrupted the progress of them. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, however, was evidently ill at ease while conversing with me. He read me various passages from his own instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and from those of the Minister of Marine to Admiral Hamelin, in order to prove that the intentions of the French Government could not be doubtful, and that the French fleet ought to have entered the Black Sea. He frankly admitted that the proceedings at Constantinople were inconsistent with the language of the Government at Paris, and he seemed aware of the false construction which might be placed in the East, on the conduct of the combined squadrons. In fact, my Lord, I gathered from M. Drouyn de Lhuys' observations, that he was deeply mortified at what had occurred, but that he had neither the Ambassador nor the Admiral under his control.

Your Lordship will naturally inquire how this can be, and I can only answer, that it proceeds from the natural defects of the French Government and of the French character. There is no unity of action among the members of the Government, no concert, no interchange of opinions; each department acts for itself, without reference to others; and each Minister is as jealous of an interference with what he considers his prerogatives, as he is determined to make use of them. Hence, when two or more departments are concerned in the same business, all is confusion. It is probable that General Baraguay d'Hilliers, besides the instructions which he received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, had orders from the Emperor, from the Minister of War, and from the Minister of Marine, each of them drawn up with some difference of expression and colouring. Admiral Hamelin, without doubt, is in the same position. Then comes into play the vanity of the French character, the rivalry of the military and naval professions at Constantinople, and the dislike of both to be under the direction of a civilian. In short, if your Lordship saw behind the scenes, as I sometimes do, you would be astonished that, in complicated questions with the French Government, any progress is made at all.

The report, which I mentioned above as having been received from General Baraguay d'Hilliers, agrees, in all essential points, with the report of Lord Stratford upon the same subject; but it makes mention of a change in the Ottoman Ministry to which Lord Stratford does not advert, unless, in the hurry under which I was necessitated to read the Constantinople despatches, I overlooked a passage concerning it. General Baraguay says that Riza Pasha had been made Capitan Pasha, and Halil Pasha admitted into the Sultan's Councils.

In a postscript the General acknowledges a receipt of a telegraphic despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the 14th ultimo, which was written after the news of the disaster of Sinope, and reiterated the order for the French fleet to enter the Black Sea. It does not appear, however, to have had any effect, as a telegraphic despatch from Constantinople of the 26th announces the acceptance by the Porte of the propositions of the Four Powers, but does not mention the fleets.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I have seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys again. He informed me that he made the Emperor acquainted with the intelligence brought by the "Caradoc," and that His Majesty had expressed great regret at it. All that could now be hoped for was that the more stringent instructions sent from hence on the 29th instant, would be punctually obeyed. In answer to a question which I put to him, M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that the Minister of Marine had received no despatches from Admiral Hamelin bearing upon the subject under discussion between the two Ambassadors.

C.

No. 575.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 11.)
Paris, January 4, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DE BOURQUENEY has inquired by telegraph of M. Drouyn de Lhuys what attitude he is to take on the arrival at Vienna of the answer of the Porte, which is now known to be favourable, and is expected in a few days. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has replied that he has no fresh instructions to give. If the answer is conformable to the propositions of the Conference, it is to be transmitted to St. Petersburgh in the same way in which it was transmitted to the Porte; but no alterations are to be made by the Conference without the previous sanction of the Governments represented at it.

When M. de Bourqueney wrote on the 2nd instant, he had not abandoned all hope of bringing Count Buol round to the idea of a collective note.

It appears, from a further telegraphic despatch from the same quarter, dated yesterday, that the communication of the instructions respecting the fleets had created great consternation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 576.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 11. Confidential.)
Foreign Office, January 6, 1854.

My Lord,

YOUR Excellency will thank M. Drouyn de Lhuys for the confidential communication, which you reported in your despatch No. 1002, that his Excellency made to you respecting the information given to General Castelbajac on the position of France with regard to Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 577.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 16.)
Foreign Office, January 6, 1854.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve of the language which your Excellency held to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as reported in your despatch No. 10, relative to the opposition made by the French Ambassador and Admiral to the French fleet being sent into the Black Sea.

I have to inform you that Admiral Hamelin's objections to entering the Black Sea with the French fleet were altogether of a nautical character, and that he has placed those objections on record in a letter to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, a copy of which letter was communicated by Admiral Dundas to the Board of Admiralty.

Admiral Dundas has informed Her Majesty's Government that he is prepared at once to act upon any instructions he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador, but that he entirely concurs in the views of Admiral Hamelin.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 578.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 2.)
Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED on the night of the 4th instant, and I have laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatches from No. 390 to No. 403, both inclusive, the last of the 25th instant. I have not yet received your despatches from No. 375 to No. 389 inclusive.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 390 of the 17th of December, with a view of bringing about a negotiation between the Porte and the Russian Government.

I am, &c,
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 579.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 3.)
Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that, with reference to the circumstances stated in your despatch No. 390 of the 17th ultimo, and to the reasons assigned in your despatch No. 391 of the same day, Her Majesty's Government consider that you exercised a sound discretion in withholding from the Porte the collective note transmitted from Vienna.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 580.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 4.)
Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 392 of the 17th of December, upon the question of the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea.

The several despatches which I have addressed to your Excellency since the news of the disastrous affair at Sinope reached this country, will have shown you how entirely the views of Her Majesty's Government are in concurrence with your own, as to the necessity of the combined fleets entering the Black Sea. Your Excellency is quite right in considering that the instructions of which you have long since been in possession, fully justified the request you addressed to Vice-Admiral Dundas, on the 11th of December, to take measures, in concert with Admiral Hamelin, for the entrance of the whole or of an adequate portion of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea.

In the confident expectation that the more recent instructions have been fully carried out, I shall now confine myself to expressing the deep concern of Her Majesty's Government that any circumstances should have arisen which may throw doubt on the sincerity of England and France, and lead to a belief that Russian aggression would be attended with impunity.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 581.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 5.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your proceedings, as reported in your despatch No. 396 of the 23rd of December, with reference to the insurrectionary movement by which Constantinople had been threatened a few days before.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 582.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 6.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your intentions, as announced in your despatch No. 403 of the 25th of December, to act in concert with the French Ambassador in carrying out the orders which he had on that day received from his Government for the entrance of the French squadron into the Black Sea.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 583.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 11.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

IN your despatch No. 398 of the 23rd ultimo, your Excellency desires to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government upon the divergence of opinion which exists between the French Ambassador and yourself with respect to the combined fleets entering the Black Sea; but in your despatch No. 403 of the 25th ultimo, you state that General Baraguay d'Hilliers had announced to you that on that day he had received by telegraph instructions from his Government, dated the 14th, directing that the French fleet should be sent into the Black Sea.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, see reason to hope that all difference of opinion will have ceased to exist, and that no instructions are necessary upon the several points adverted to by your Excellency.

It appears, moreover, that the French Ambassador fully concurred with you as to the expediency of sending out the fleets, but declined to give effect to his opinion in consequence of the objections raised by Admiral Hamelin. These objections were altogether of a nautical character, and were concurred in by Admiral Dundas, who was, however, prepared to go out with the British squadron, if required.

Her Majesty Government attach due weight to such high professional authority, but they do not think it would justify the continued inaction of the fleets. If it were ascertained that no Russian ships of war were in the Black Sea, unnecessary cruizing should be avoided at this season by a large number of ships; but if, on the other hand, the Russian fleet were to come out in full force from Sevastopol, it could only be for the purpose of attacking the Turkish territory, or in defiance of the British and French fleets; and in either case I need hardly say that the fleets ought to sail.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 584.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 12.)

Foreign Office, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 400 of the 22nd of December, stating the embarrassments under which the Porte labours as to removing to Trebizond 10,000 Rediffs and 1,500 irregulars whose presence in the capital appears dangerous to the public peace, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that if the instructions of which your Excellency is in possession are carried out, and the British and French fleets have the command of the Black Sea, these troops may safely be conveyed in Turkish vessels; but it must be distinctly understood that they are to go to Trebizond, and are not to commit any act of aggression in the Russian territory.

If the Turkish Government desire that their vessels while employed on this duty should receive further protection than that which I have indicated above, your Excellency in conjunction with the French Ambassador and the Admirals will make such arrangements for the purpose as the good of the service will permit; or if a sufficient British and French force should not be available for this special duty, your Excellency will inform the Sultan's Ministers of the reasons which prevent your complying with their request.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 585.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 20.)

Paris, January 6, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the copy of a circular despatch respecting the present state of the Eastern question, addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the French Diplomatic Agents at foreign Courts, which it has been thought advisable to publish in the "Moniteur."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 585.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of January 5, 1854.

Paris, le 30 Décembre, 1853.

Monsieur,

LES affaires d'Orient prennent une tournure trop grave pour que je ne veuille pas, au moment même où les circonstances imposent de nouveaux devoirs au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, vous rappeler les efforts que nous n'avons cessé de faire dans le but de prévenir les complications dont l'Europe est si sérieusement menacée.

La question des lieux saints, mal présentée ou mal comprise, avait excité les alarmes du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg; nous avons essayé de calmer ces inquiétudes par de loyales et complètes explications. Il nous avait paru que, tout en réservant les droits de la Porte, un débat de cette nature gagnerait à être éclairci loin du théâtre où il était né. Notre opinion n'a pas été partagée par la Russie, et M. le Prince Menchikoff a reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Constantinople. Je me bornerai à dire que, si nous avions eu les vues exclusives que l'on nous supposait, que si la revendication de nos anciens et incontestables priviléges n'eût pas été soutenue avec autant de modération, la mission de cet Ambassadeur Extraordinaire serait tout de suite devenue l'objet d'un conflit que nous avons su éviter.

L'affaire des sanctuaires de Jérusalem assoupie et, d'après le témoignage de

M. le Comte de Nesselrode lui-même, réglée d'une manière satisfaisante, une autre difficulté s'est élevée. M. le Prince Menchikoff a réclamé des garanties pour le maintien des privilèges de l'Eglise Grecque. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg n'établissait, par aucun fait particulier, que ces privilèges eussent été violés, et la Porte, au contraire, confirmait solennellement les immunités religieuses de ses sujets Chrétiens.

Animé du désir d'apaiser un différend qui, s'il concernait d'un côté les droits souverains du Sultan, de l'autre touchait à la conscience de Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, de concert avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, a recherché avec soin le moyen de concilier les intérêts, à la fois si délicats et si complexes, qui s'y trouvaient engagés. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg ne peut avoir oublié le zèle et la loyauté que nous avons mis à remplir cette tâche difficile; il ne saurait davantage disconvenir que la résistance de la Porte à accéder à un premier plan de transaction, émané de la Conférence de Vienne, n'a pas été la seule cause de notre insuccès.

Pendant le cours de ces diverses négociations, des faits graves s'étaient produits: une armée Russe avait franchi le Pruth et envahi, en pleine paix, deux provinces de l'Empire Ottoman. Les escadres de France et d'Angleterre avaient dû se rapprocher des Dardanelles, et, dès cette époque, si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale l'eût voulu, ses forces navales auraient mouillé dans les eaux de Constantinople. Cependant, s'il a jugé nécessaire d'établir son droit, ce n'a été en quelque sorte que pour faire ressortir davantage sa modération. La nature des rapports de la Russie avec la Sublime Porte était devenue trop anormale pour que l'état de guerre ne succédât point à l'état de paix, ou, pour mieux dire, il fallait que les choses reprissent leur véritable nom et que l'agression dont le territoire Turc avait été l'objet produisît ses conséquences. Ce changement dans la situation a nécessité un nouveau mouvement de notre escadre, et, à la demande du Sultan, le pavillon Français a paru dans le Bosphore en même temps que le pavillon Britannique.

Toutefois, M. , nous n'avions pas renoncé à l'espoir d'un arrangement, et, d'accord avec l'Autriche et la Prusse, comme déjà nous l'étions avec l'Angleterre, nous poursuivions encore un but pacifique. Des propositions nouvelles, au succès desquelles nous ce cesserons d'employer nos efforts, ont été adressés à la Porte par les Représentants des Quatre Puissances.

Aucun Traité conclu avec la Russie n'interdisait à nos vaisseaux de guerre la navigation de la Mer Noire. Le Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, en fermant, en temps de paix, les passages des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, réservait au Sultan la faculté de les ouvrir en temps de guerre, et, du jour où Sa Hautesse nous avait laissé le libre accès des Détroits, celui de l'Euxin nous était légalement acquis. Les mêmes motifs qui nous avaient retenus si longtemps dans la Baie de Besika arrêtaient notre escadre dans la rade de Beïkos. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale avait à cœur de témoigner jusqu'au bout des sentiments d'amitié qu'il professe pour la Russie, et de rejeter aux yeux du monde la responsabilité d'une aggravation dans un état de choses que tous ses ménagements n'étaient point parvenus à modifier. Il se plaisait à penser, d'ailleurs, d'après le contenu de plus récentes dépêches de M. le Général de Castelbajac, que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, satisfait d'une prise de possession qu'il considérait comme un gage, ne prendrait nulle part l'offensive dans la lutte qu'il a si malheureusement commencée avec la Turquie. Il nous paraissait suffire que la présence de notre pavillon dans les eaux de Constantinople attestât notre ferme intention de protéger cette capitale contre un danger soudain, et nous ne voulions pas que son apparition prématurée dans les parages plus rapprochés du territoire Russe risquât de passer pour une provocation.

L'état de guerre rendait, sans doute, une collision possible sur mer comme sur terre entre les parties belligérentes; mais nous avions été autorisés à croire que notre réserve serait imitée par la Russie, et que ses amiraux éviteraient avec le même soin que les nôtres les occasions d'une rencontre, en s'abstenant de procéder à des mesures d'agression dans des limites où, si nous avions pu supposer le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg animé d'intentions différentes, notre escadre aurait certainement exercé une surveillance plus active.

L'événement de Sinope, M. , s'est donc produit en dehors de toutes nos prévisions, et ce fait déplorable modifie également l'attitude que nous aurions désiré garder.

L'accord qui s'est opéré récemment à Vienne entre la France, l'Autriche, l'Angleterre et la Prusse, a établi le caractère Européen du différend qui existe entre la Russie et la Porte. Les quatre Cours ont solennellement reconnu que l'intégrité territoriale de l'Empire Ottoman était une des conditions de leur équilibre politique. L'occupation de la Moldavie et de la Valachie constitue une première atteinte à cette intégrité, et il n'est pas douteux que les chances de la guerre ne puissent encore l'entamer davantage.

M. le Comte de Nesselrode, il y a quelques mois, représentait comme une compensation nécessaire à ce qu'il appelait dès lors notre occupation maritime l'envahissement des Principautés du Danube. A notre tour, M. , nous croyons qu'il est devenu indispensable de mesurer nous-mêmes l'étendue de la compensation à laquelle nous donnent droit et notre titre de Puissance intéressée à l'existence de la Turquie et les positions militaires déjà prises par l'armée Russe. Il nous faut un gage qui nous assure le rétablissement de la paix en Orient à des conditions qui ne changent pas la distribution des forces respectives des Grands Etats de l'Europe.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ont, en conséquence, décidé que leurs escadres entreraient dans la Mer Noire et combineraient leurs mouvements de façon à empêcher le territoire où le pavillon Ottoman d'être en butte à une nouvelle attaque de la part des forces navales de la Russie.

MM. les Vice-Amiraux Hamelin et Dundas vont recevoir l'ordre de communiquer à qui de droit l'objet de leur mission, et nous nous plaisons à espérer que cette démarche loyale préviendra des conflits que nous ne verrions éclater qu'avec le plus vif regret. Le Gouvernement de l'Empereur, je le répète, n'a qu'un but, celui de contribuer à opérer, à des conditions honorables, un rapprochement entre les deux parties belligérantes; et, si les circonstances l'obligent à se prémunir contre des éventualités redoutables, il conserve la confiance que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, qui a donné de si nombreux exemples de sa sagesse, ne voudra pas exposer l'Europe, à peine remise de ses secousses, à des épreuves que la haute raison des souverains a su lui épargner depuis de si longues années.

Je vous autorise à donner lecture de cette dépêche à M. ———.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 586.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Paris, January* 8, 1854.

I HAD a few days ago some further conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as to the course to be adopted by the Conference at Vienna whenever the answer of the Porte to the communication sent from Vienna on the 5th ultimo should be received.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that, in his opinion, something must depend upon the proceedings of the Four Representatives at Constantinople. According to the information which we had received at the present moment, they, having commenced a negotiation with the Porte before the receipt of the Vienna propositions, had judged it advisable to leave those propositions in abeyance; but circumstances might since have occurred to render, in their opinion, the presentation of the collective note necessary. In that case, he continued to think that a similar mode of communicating with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh should be adopted. If, on the other hand, the Representatives at Constantinople had transmitted to Vienna the result of their negotiations with the Porte, as an answer to the propositions of the Conference, without having presented the collective note, he was of opinion that the Conference should accept it as an answer, consign it to a protocol, in which they should declare that it ought to satisfy the Russian Government, and leave Count Buol, if he wished it, to be the channel of communicating the opinion of the Conference to Count Nesselrode.

I observed that another course might be taken by the Representatives at Constantinople. As they had not acted on behalf of the Conference, they might make no answer to the overtures of that body, but might address the result of

their proceedings each to his own Government. M. Drouyn de Lhuys said that in that case he should wish the different Governments to refrain from acting separately. They should empower the Conference afresh to pursue the course which had originally been agreed upon, and by referring the answer to that body, enable it to make the contemplated communication to St. Petersburgh. A protocol of the tenour alluded to above might here again be resorted to with advantage. This great object, he continued, was to obtain from Austria and Prussia an official declaration that Russia ought to be satisfied with the offers of the Porte.

I suggested to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he should draw up such a protocol as he deemed desirable, and send it to London for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

I learn from subsequent communications from your Lordship and from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that this course has been followed; that a draft of protocol, of which, for form's sake, I do myself the honour to inclose a copy, has been agreed to by the two Governments; and have only further to add that it was sent from hence on the evening of the 7th with directions to M. de Bourqueney to propose it for the signature of the Conference, whenever the expected answer of the Porte should be received at Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S. *January* 9.—I received last night your Lordship's telegraphic despatch expressing the desire of Her Majesty's Government to be made acquainted with the Porte's answer before it is transmitted by the Conference of St. Petersburgh. M. Drouyn de Lhuys will instruct M. de Bourqueney in this sense by telegraph

C.

Inclosure in No. 586.

Projet de Protocole.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne et de Prusse, s'étant réun s en Conférence, le , ont pris connaissance de la note remise par la Sublime Porte à , et ont unanimement trouvé qu'elle répondait au but qu'ils s'étaient proposé dans leur réunion du 5 Décembre dernier.

Les conditions auxquelles la Sublime Porte se déclare prête à traiter du rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, paraissent aux Soussignés conformes aux vœux de leurs Gouvernements, et ils jugent en conséquence qu'elles doivent être communiquées sans rétard au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Pénétrés, de plus en plus, de la gravité de la situation et de la nécessité d'y mettre un terme, les Soussignés expriment la confiance que la Russie acceptera la reprise des négociations sur des bases qui dans leur opinion en assurent le succès et offrent aux deux parties belligérantes l'occasion de se rapprocher, d'une manière digne et honorable, sans que l'Europe soit plus longtemps attristée par le spectacle de la guerre.

Les Représentants de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'en remettent au Représentant d'Autriche du soin de faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'opinion consignée dans le présent Protocole.

No. 587.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 27.)
Paris, January 9, 1854.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, dated the 3rd instant, mentioning the extreme susceptibility shown by the Emperor of Austria at not having been informed of the intentions

of England and France to send their squadrons into the Black Sea, previously to the execution of that measure. His Majesty appears to have said that this mark of confidence was due to him, considering that since the 5th December the Four Powers had been acting in concert.

In a telegraphic despatch of the 5th instant, M. de Bourqueney announces that his own instructions relative to the movement of the fleets had at length reached him, and that he had communicated them to Count Buol, and that he could assure M. Drouyn de Lhuys that the Austrian Government, although not prepared for the lengths to which the two Governments had gone, would not separate from them in consequence.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys purposes answering the Emperor of Austria's reproachful observations, by remarking that every deference had been shown to the Austrian Government by communicating to them the instructions sent to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople, on the very day on which they were expedited; that there were two sides to the Eastern question, the diplomatic and the military; that France was engaged in the one with Austria, England and Prussia—in the other with England alone; that the object of the one was to restore peace between Russia and Turkey, the object of the other, the defence of the Turkish territory from Russian aggression; and that until Austria declared herself ready to aid in the latter, she could not expect to be consulted on the measures necessary to insure its success.

I observed that he might add that the instructions now sent were but a complement to those which had been issued long before the establishment of a Conference at Vienna, and which, if they had been acted upon, would have produced nearly the same state of affairs as existed now; besides, what was the use of consulting other Governments, unless we intended to listen to their advice, a course clearly impossible so long as the intentions of the Conference were pacific only? Moreover, unless the statement had been made too confidentially to allow of its mention in an official despatch, Count Buol might be reminded that both he and M. de Hübner had insinuated that the inactivity of the fleets was serving the war party in Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 588.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 5.)
Vienna, January 4, 1854.

My Lord,

UPON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 420, I waited upon Count Buol in pursuance of the instructions contained in it, and I read to him first the despatch No. 345 addressed to Sir H. Seymour, and next the one addressed to Lord Stratford No. 329.

Count Buol remarked upon the language of the former, particularly the expression "taking command of the Black Sea and requiring, and, if necessary compelling, the Russian ships of war to return to Sevastopol, or the nearest Russian port." He expressed surprise at these strong declarations, and stated that although he was fully prepared for the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, with a view of establishing a state of neutrality between the belligerents, he was not prepared to expect that they would be directed to use coercion against the Russian ships of war while navigating upon their own coasts in the manner described.

With respect to the despatch addressed to Lord Stratford, Count Buol observed that while the same language was adopted as to the operations of the fleets, yet he saw with satisfaction that the Governments of England and France adhered to the position in which they were at present placed with respect to Austria and Prussia, and that by the words, "It was the duty of the English and French Governments, and their right, to demand the acceptance by the Porte of the proposals recently made by the Four Powers," they gave undoubted assurances that the two Governments still looked to the re-establishment of peace, and to the maintenance of the union which now existed between the Four Powers.

Count Buol stated that he cordially adopted these views. He looked upon the continuance of that union as most essential to the best interests of the Powers engaged in it, and he would use every effort to maintain it and to secure its success.

I stated to Count Buol that in judging of the measures which the Governments of England and France had now adopted, he must bear in mind that they considered the attack upon the Turkish squadron in Sinope as an offence which they were called upon to resent, and it was because the Austrian and Prussian Governments had not the same cause for action, that they had abstained from seeking to make them a party to the measures which had now been adopted, but he might rely upon it that both those Governments were as little desirous of going to war at present, as they had been at any time since the commencement of the unfortunate discussions between the Governments of Russia and the Porte.

Count Buol acknowledged the explanation which I had thus given for not calling upon the Austrian and Prussian Governments to be parties to the decisions which had been taken; but he thought that it might have been considered as an understanding between the Four Powers, that while they were engaged in a mediation for peace, which appeared at present to promise some success, time should have been given to ascertain its result, without endangering the common action by any act which might be construed by Russia as an operation of war.

Count Buol felt that the more decided and menacing position which the Governments of England and France had now taken by their declarations to Russia would render it more essential that any pacific offers which might be transmitted from Constantinople, should in the first instance be recommended by Austria as the channel through which the proposal to treat for peace had been transmitted from Russia. He was satisfied, from the reports he had received from the Internuncio, that no reply from the Porte would be directed to the Conference, but that it would be addressed to the Representatives at Constantinople, who would transmit it to their Governments. He should therefore, upon the receipt of this communication, and as the mode which would offer the greatest chance of success, submit it to the Conference; and if it was judged of such a nature as to be recommended, he should consult with them as to the nature of the announcement he should make to the Russian Cabinet, but he should transmit it without delay to St. Petersburgh, and he would employ every means in his power to obtain its acceptation.

I had yesterday a second interview with Count Buol at which I read to him the statements I have thus given to your Lordship of his remarks, and he said that so soon as he received the communication of a similar nature which he was expecting from Baron Bourqueney, he would instruct Count Colloredo to convey to your Lordship the same sentiments.

Upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch on Monday, before I waited upon Count Buol, I saw M. de Bourqueney and informed him of the nature of the communications I was directed to make; and immediately after my interview with Count Buol, I reported to him the observations which his Excellency had made with regard to them. M. de Bourqueney had not then received his instructions from Paris. He has been in hourly expectation of them ever since, more particularly as their general purport is in the newspapers; and although the delay is explained by the non-arrival of the French post, it causes him considerable annoyance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 589.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 9.)

(No. 7.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 5, 1854.

THE French Minister, Baron Bourqueney, has this day received the despatches from his Government of the 29th ultimo, which he has been expecting, and which he has communicated to me. Your Lordship will be already aware of the analogy of the instructions to General Baraguay d'Hilliers with those addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to me No. 420.

Baron Bourqueney will immediately submit this document, together with the despatches which accompany it, to Count Buol, whose opinions with regard to it he is already aware of, and has reported to his Government, in consequence of the conversations he has held with him upon the similar documents which I had communicated to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

P.S.—Amongst the documents transmitted by his Government to Baron Bourqueney, the instructions to General Castelbajac are not included. I have just seen Baron Bourqueney after his interview with Count Buol, which he represents to have been satisfactory.

No. 590.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 7, 1854.

BARON MANTEUFFEL has informed me that on receiving a report from Baron Wildenbruch, the Prussian Representative at Constantinople, detailing the circumstances under which he had signed, in conjunction with his colleagues, the note lately addressed by the Representatives of the Four Powers to Reshid Pasha, and had subsequently concurred with them in suspending the presentation of the Vienna note, he had conveyed to him his entire approval of his conduct.

Baron Manteuffel further expressed to me the satisfaction with which he had learnt from the Chevalier Bunsen that his views and opinions on this subject had entirely coincided with those of your Lordship.

The despatch to Baron Wildenbruch, conveying the approval of his Government, has already been forwarded to him under flying seal through Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 591.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 10.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Berlin, January* 7, 1854.

AT the risk of intruding on your Lordship on a subject which has already been so amply dilated upon, I think it my duty to inform your Lordship of the impression lately conveyed from St. Petersburgh, and entertained here, of the present disposition of the Emperor of Russia.

Baron Manteuffel informs me that in two reports addressed by General Rochow, he states that the Emperor of Russia is not at the present moment pre-

pared, or rather has not made up his mind, to take any decided steps on the subject of a settlement. He describes His Imperial Majesty as in an expectant state, and from what I can gather, the General does not seem to regard the Emperor personally as indisposed to peace. He states that Count Nesselrode is calm, and anxious to discover some means of escaping out of the present difficulties in a satisfactory and honourable mode.

Baron Manteuffel appears to be of opinion that too much stress must not be laid on the Emperor's preparations for war; that these measures are dictated by pride, and a desire to gratify the public feeling of his nation; perhaps likewise with a hope to be enabled to make a more honourable retreat.

I remarked to his Excellency, that even allowing this to be the case, of which I ventured very humbly to express my doubts, it must be allowed that these very warlike preparations were producing a most unfortunate effect on Europe; they not only gave rise to animosity, to a spirit of war and dissension, but they created, and very naturally so, a mistrust of Russia and her policy. They were detrimental to industry and commerce, the evil effects of which were already felt; whilst they were discouraging to those European Powers who, during six months, had been labouring in the cause of peace.

I observed further to his Excellency, that independently of what the Emperor's ulterior intentions might be, he had actually commenced aggressive hostilities; that he had from the very commencement of the affair proceeded from one act of aggression to another, without giving one single proof of a pacific policy, without receding one iota from his original unjust demands.

If, therefore, the Emperor Nicholas was what General Rochow had represented him, the moment, and the very last moment, has arrived to put his disposition to the test.

Baron Manteuffel confessed that His Imperial Majesty had given ample grounds for mistrust on the part of the Western Powers; but still he was of opinion that the Emperor Nicholas was not really desirous of war; that all he wanted was to restore his influence and supremacy at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 592.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 8. Most Confidential.)

Berlin, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received most confidentially from a private friend the substance of a conversation he had two days ago with a Russian general who is in the favour and confidence of the Emperor, and who is known to be well informed of the intentions and policy of his Government.

The conversation turned on the Oriental question; the General began by saying, "que le sang coulera au printems." He then expressed his opinion that any arrangement had become impracticable, inasmuch as the Emperor neither could nor would recede from his demands.

He stated that in the early part of May the Russians would cross the Danube with 180,000 men, and that at the same time operations in Asia would be vigorously conducted, and an advance be made on Kars if not previously taken.

My informant states that Kars is a very important place, as it serves as a key to the position of that country.

The General then added that, when in possession of Kars, the Russians would advance to Erzeroom.

He stated that for these operations in Asia they would be able to assemble a force of 35,000 men.

In stating these intentions the General expressed the greatest confidence in their success, nor did he give the smallest reason to think that they were only problematical. He stated them as if they had been privately decided upon.

I remarked on the apparent paucity of 35,000 men for a campaign on such a scale; but my informant, who is well versed in Oriental matters, states that, although he estimates that the army at the Caucasus will, at the period mentioned, amount to *circa* 130,000 men, the extent of country to be occupied is very large, and that this force would amount to double the numerical force which had been operated with in similar operations in 1828 and 1829, and that it would be a formidable opponent in those parts.

The source from which this information is derived being most undeniable, from the high and official position which the General fills, I have thought it right to report it to your Lordship; but I have to request that your Lordship will provide for the secrecy of this despatch, in order that the person from whom I received this information may not be betrayed as having divulged it to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 593.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 9.)

Berlin, January 7, 1854.

My Lord,

WITH reference to the Earl of Westmorland's telegraphic despatch No. 422, in which he states that Count Arnim had communicated to him a despatch authorizing him to agree entirely to the proposal to entrust the transmission of the answers to St. Petersburgh to Count Buol; I inquired from Baron Manteuffel whether this instruction had been so intended, as his Excellency had informed me that it was only provisional.

Baron Manteuffel immediately said that Count Arnim had been instructed to agree to that proposal, "provided that it received the unanimous assent of the Conference."

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 594.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 11.)

Berlin, January 8, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Marquis de Moustier, the French Minister at this Court, has lately communicated to Baron Manteuffel, as also to myself, various despatches which he has received from his Government relating to the Eastern question.

Some of these despatches referred to the communication which had taken place between the French and Austrian Cabinets with respect to the mode of negotiation between Russia and Turkey, and were explanatory of a divergence of opinion which had apparently existed as to the necessity of those differences being regulated in a joint Conference of the Six Powers; or in a negotiation between Russia and Turkey at some given place, under the auspices of the present Conference now sitting at Vienna.

It is not necessary that I should refer more minutely to these documents, as your Lordship will have had cognizance of them from other quarters.

Other despatches have been communicated by M. de Moustier to Baron Manteuffel pourtraying the cordial union and understanding existing between England and France, giving assurances to Prussia that she had no reason to fear the policy of France towards herself; stating that France would not abandon her; and declaring, if not in the following very precise terms, in language almost analogous, "que la France et l'Angleterre iront ensemble jusqu'au bout, et se trouveront alors avec tous ceux qui n'auraient pas arrêtés moitié chemin."

The Marquis de Moustier has stated to me his satisfaction at the language which Baron Manteuffel has on each occasion held to him. He has, likewise, communicated to his Excellency copy of the instructions which have been forwarded to General Baraguay d'Hilliers, and which he states are identical with those which are transmitted to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe by your Lordship.

His Excellency remarked on the absence of the term, "to take command of the Black Sea." The Marquis of Moustier explained that this term referred probably to the instruction to Sir H. Seymour, a similar instruction having been also addressed to General Castelbajac, but of which he had not a copy. He then informed his Excellency that the instruction to General Baraguay d'Hilliers which he was communicating was identical with that addressed by your Lordship to Lord Stratford.

His Excellency received this communication without offering any opinion, and confined himself to stating that the policy of Prussia would be to maintain her neutrality.

I take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that the language held by the Marquis de Moustier and the line pursued by him has been most frank and straightforward, and that we have acted throughout in perfect confidence and union.

The opinions he has expressed, and the policy he has pursued, have been in entire accordance with the views and instructions which I have had the honour to receive from your Lordship at different stages of this complicated question.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 595.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10, 1854.)

(No. 767. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 31, 1853.*

THE immense importance to the Russians of the free navigation of the Black Sea, as a means of recruiting their armies, is proved by the advantage derived from the reinforcements of 12,000 men conveyed, some few weeks ago, from Sevastopol to the coast of Mingrelia.

For this piece of service the Emperor, as I am informed, is indebted to General Grabbe, who, assuming a responsibility which might have cost him very dear, hurried as soon as the troops had been landed to St. Petersburgh, and waiting upon His Imperial Majesty, told him that he was ready to serve in the ranks; the military fault which he had committed rendering him liable to this punishment.

The Emperor, it is further stated, after a little reflection, replied that there was no doubt that a military offence had been committed, but that it was one which would be punished by an injunction to wear an order which he took from his own breast.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 596.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10, 1854.)

(No. 770.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 31, 1853.*

MANY of the statements which are made to me respecting the movements of troops so much require confirmation, that I do not venture to submit them to your Lordship.

What I can state upon unquestionable authority is that of the 6th corps d'armée, lately quartered in and about Moscow, one division is sent to the Caucasus, one to the Crimea, and the remaining division to Odessa and its environs.

The troops at present in Wallachia and Moldavia are the 3rd and 4th corps of infantry, two and a half divisions of cavalry, seven regiments of Cossacks, and about 250 pieces of artillery.

General de Lüders, commander of the 5th corps d'armée, occupies Galatz

and Ismail with one and a half divisions of infantry; one division was sent in October to the Caucasus; and half of a division remains at Odessa.

The Guards and the Grenadiers will remain, according to the intentions which now prevail, at St. Petersburgh and Novogorod, and the 1st and 2nd corps d'armée are still in the kingdom of Poland.

This much may be looked upon as certain intelligence. What I have heard upon less good authority, but am still disposed to believe, is that General Schilders, with two battalions of Sappers, has been sent from Warsaw to the Principalities.

According to a statement which I submit with more hesitation, the great effort which will be made in the event of the war being pushed, will be in Asia Minor. I am inclined, however, to suspect, that if an attempt be made upon Constantinople, it will be more probably undertaken from that quarter than by an army marching south from the Danube.

The intelligence contained in my despatch No. 763 is fully confirmed, and I may observe that the wood required for the construction of the gun-boats has been supplied from the Imperial arsenals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 597.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10, 1854.)

(No. 771.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, December 31, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 22nd instant desires me to "endeavour to find out whether the instructions to the British Admiral, which I communicated to Count Nesselrode on the 20th of October, were made known to the Russian Admiral in the Black Sea."

I must candidly admit to your Lordship my inability to reply to this inquiry. The secrecy observed in the public offices of this country is such that not only is one department kept in ignorance of what is passing in another, to a degree which is constantly injurious to the service, but the employés of the same department or office are prohibited from communicating to one another the business in which they are severally engaged.

My belief is, that it would be contrary to Russian practice that the Government should make known to their Admirals the information which they receive from foreign Missions with regard to the orders sent to the Commanders of foreign fleets; but I do not doubt that such information would materially influence the orders dispatched by the Government to these their own servants.

Your Lordship may have observed that my prepossessions in favour of the Russian Government are not strong; that I am not prone to take the defence of their acts; but I may take this opportunity for stating my belief that, upon the present occasion, more blame has been awarded to them than is their due.

As the Russian Government is very anxious to avoid, more especially for the present moment, the chance of a collision with England and France, I can hardly believe that the destruction of the Turkish ships at Sinope was intended as a bravado, the object of which was to bring the intentions of the allied fleets to a test; and I am much more disposed to believe that the Russian Government were intent upon preventing supplies being afforded to a warlike population in districts in which, as Russia may find to her cost, she is very assailable. Unless I grossly err, the Russian Government are still under the conviction of the Turkish squadron having been engaged in the conveyance of such supplies to the tribes of the Caucasus; but even supposing this belief to be erroneous, I would submit to your Lordship that the Russians are rather to be regarded as having been reckless in their wish to inflict injury upon an enemy, than as having sought an occasion for converting doubtful friends into open opponents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 598.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1854.

My Lord,

IT will be highly agreeable to me to find that I am mistaken, but I feel called upon to state to your Lordship that I have considerable reason for doubting whether in her late intimation to the allied Cabinets as to the dispositions of the Russian Cabinet, Austria will not be seen to have taken upon herself an engagement which she will have considerable difficulty in making good.

Whether in her eagerness to maintain peace, Austria may have magnified to herself the influence which she possesses at St. Petersburgh, or whethershes may have speculated upon the chances of such an answer from the Porte a would in some measure have absolved her from responsibility, I am unable to say; but I can hardly I think be mistaken when I again state to your Lordship that the idea of a "Conference à six," (to employ the expression now so much in use) is extremely repugnant to the feelings of His Imperial Majesty.

I know of this feeling having been expressed a few days since by His Majesty to Count Nesselrode, and I suspect that it may have been intimated in an autograph letter from His Majesty to the Emperor of Austria, which was despatched to Vienna by the young Baron Meyendorff on the night of the 26th ultimo.

I am eager to take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship that a person for whose opinion I have a great value has informed me, in strict confidence, that he has reason for believing that the Chancellor is far from having played of late the conciliatory part which has been ascribed to him.

The assertion a little shook my confidence, but I am bound to say that after consulting those persons who are the most versed in the affairs which are passing around me, I find it impossible to depart from the opinion which I have often ventured to express confidently to your Lordship.

It may be I think safely assumed that Count Nesselrode, according to the measure of his diminished influence, exerts himself honourably in the cause of moderation, and except him, and in a less degree Count Orloff and Count Kisseleff, I should be perplexed to name any Russian whose voice is raised in the same sense.

It is to this very circumstance which is to be ascribed the remarkable unpopularity which now attaches to Count Nesselrode, and the intrigues which are set on foot against him.

Nothing is more difficult than to reconcile public opinion in different countries, and at moments of excitement like the present, with regard to measures and with regard to those by whom they are conducted.

To speak only of the latter, it is seen that both in England and France the Emperor and Count Nesselrode are looked upon by many as representing the ambition and violence of Russia, while I hold it to be certain that if peace still exists, it is in great measure attributable to the Chancellor, and that the Emperor is at present infinitely more moderate than the immense bulk of his subjects.

This fact, and such I esteem it, does not exculpate His Majesty from having lent himself to plans which have led to this state of things.

I long since stated to your Lordship my conviction that a spirit would be evoked by the Russian policy which it would be found very difficult to lay; but now that the spirit has come forth, so far from the Emperor being among those the most eager to obey its mandates, it is very apparent that already his popularity is shaken by the resistance which he opposes to public opinion; while as for the Chancellor, he is openly spoken of as an alien, a traitor, a man bought by English gold.

The feeling to which I allude is especially acted upon by the rumours which are in circulation of the entrance of the allied fleets into the Black Sea: and a person of my acquaintance who lives almost entirely in Russian society,

acquaints me that the language which he now hears around him is, that Russia will be humiliated, and that the Emperor will show that he has lost all sense of dignity, if he defers marking his resentment by sending off the French and English Ministers, and by declaring war upon their two countries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 599.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 5. Most Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1854.

My Lord,

MY French colleague appears to disapprove highly of the measure taken by Her Majesty's Government and that of France, and has explained his views to me in a very long conversation, of which I feel myself the more called upon to give your Lordship an outline as he acquaints me that he has made known his opinions to his Cabinet.

General Castelbajac considers the dispatch of the combined fleets into the Black Sea to be unfortunate, because he regards the measure as directed against the intentions imputed to the Emperor of despoiling Turkey, intentions which he is convinced do not exist.

But even were it otherwise, General Castelbajac is of opinion that, as a measure either of intimidation or of offence, it will fail in its object.

The fleets might take any Russian ships that were found in the Black Sea; might ravage the coast; might possibly, but not probably, be able to destroy Sevastopol; but these reverses would not be felt sensibly by the Russian nation, and would not prevent the Emperor from continuing to occupy the Principalities.

To dislodge the Russian forces from these provinces an immense force would be required, and France and England cannot send the requisite number of troops to such a distant battle.

Were Austria and Prussia to join England and France in their armed exertions, then indeed General Castelbajac admits that the Russian troops would be compelled to withdraw within their frontiers, but no such cooperation is to be expected.

The two German Powers may unite with us in signing Notes and Protocols, but will never take the resolution of engaging with us in war against the Emperor Nicholas.

A schism then would be made between the West and the North of Europe; a war utterly destructive to Turkey, and injurious to the other Powers engaged, would then be carried on; and the evils of this war would press less heavily upon Russia than upon the other belligerents.

Russia, too, is now in a bad position, has lost all the "prestige" attached to the Emperor's reign, and is opposed, in greater or less degree, by the Four Great Powers: if war were to be carried on, it might have the result of retrieving a portion of her former character, and it might convert two of the Powers who now oppose her into close allies.

The conclusion at which General Castelbajac arrives is this, that Russia being in a bad position should be left there, and with this view that every exertion should be made for the conclusion of peace.

To obtain this result, he argues that slight ceremony should be observed towards the Turks; that instead of being as he terms it "à la remorque de la Turquie," the Allied Powers should signify very authoritatively what conditions they are willing to obtain for her, and that the great principle to be kept in view should be the fullest territorial guarantees to be given to the Porte, and some satisfaction as to the protection to be secured to the Greek subjects of the Porte to be given to the Emperor of Russia.

This satisfaction, which constitutes the real difficulty of the whole question, the French Envoy disposes of in an off-hand manner, describing it as something which may satisfy the subjects of His Imperial Majesty, high-sounding phrases

("des expressions rouflantes"), a something gratifying to Russian vanity, and not really injurious to Turkish interests.

Upon finding that General Castelbajac's views differed so much from my own, and that the arguments which I made use of had little effect in reconciling our opinions, I observed at last that, assuming even that he was quite right and myself equally in the wrong, he must see that his observations and objections were out of date, and that measures had been taken by our Governments which could not be receded from with honour.

To this my colleague replied, that he could only see with his eyes and judge according to his judgment; that the views which he had before glanced at and now more fully entered into, were those which he conscientiously held, and consequently that, whether they were to give satisfaction or offence, he could not do otherwise than submit them to his Government.

This he had already done; his despatch must by this time have been received at Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 600.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 6.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1854.*

WHEN I waited upon the Chancellor on the 30th ultimo, he inquired with some eagerness whether I had any communication to make to him upon the subject of the entry of the allied fleets into the Black Sea.

I replied that I had not, but that, as I had before stated, they were to be expected there.

Count Nesselrode inquired with what intent? To which I replied by adverting to the feeling which had been produced in England and France by the affair of Sinope, and by saying that it might be assumed that it was intended to take measures for preventing the recurrence of a similar catastrophe.

In the course of an amicable conversation which ensued, Count Nesselrode expressed his belief that the Russian fleet would in consequence of the advanced season be little likely to leave Sevastopol. He spoke likewise of the possible operations of the English and French ships, observing that if it were intended that their presence in the Black Sea should prevent the Turks from being attacked by the Russians, there would be little justice in the proceeding, unless it were likewise proposed that the Turks should be restrained from molesting the coast of Russia.

I replied that upon this and other points of the kind I had no information to offer, but that it was not likely that a Power so eager for peace as England, a Power which had recommended the Turks to conclude an armistice with a view to peace, should come forward to promote warlike operations, but certainly that the defence of Turkey was an object never lost sight of by Her Majesty's Government.

I proceeded to express my hope that the communications which might shortly be expected from Vienna, after the overtures made to the Porte, would be received in a friendly spirit at St. Petersburgh.

Till the Sultan's answer should be made known here, it was impossible, Count Nesselrode said, that he should express any opinion upon the subject. He would only say that the diplomatic papers lately made public did not in his opinion improve the chances of the Sultan being brought to such conditions as it would be in the power of the Emperor to accept.

Again the Chancellor adverted to the idea of a negotiation at which a Turkish negotiator should be admitted, and to the extreme repugnance of His Imperial Majesty to countenance a plan so much at variance with the established usage of Russia in her dealings with the Porte.

Why, he would ask, should Russia be called upon to do now what she had not done for one hundred years?

The objection, I said, was one, as was well known to his Excellency, which I found it absolutely impossible to understand. I conjectured, however, that it must arise from some false point of honour. Now, I said, this I might understand if Turkey were a Power of the same calibre as Russia; but when you tell me that her vitality is gone, that she is a Power only in name, and when you reflect that the interest which is felt by Europe in the preservation of this weakened Empire is greater than it ever was, again I must say that I am utterly at a loss to comprehend how the association of a Turkish negotiator to your compliance is to wound the dignity of Russia. A great Power may be jealous of its equal, but it is condescending to its inferior.

All this, I am aware, is mere fencing; but as I report everything which comes under my observation, I have thought it right to offer your Lordship some details of this conversation.

Before leaving the Chancellor, I observed that his Excellency had, I believed, spoken to one of my colleagues of the advantage which might be derived from the attention of the allied Ministers being turned to the object of obtaining, if possible, from the Porte the admission of its Christian subjects to full civil and religious rights.

Count Nesselrode remembered having thrown out such a suggestion; the plan was one which might have the effect, if fairly adopted, of putting an end to the complaints which foreign Governments had so constantly to make of the Porte—and none so often as the Russian Government—for this, continued the Chancellor, is the point to be attended to; we desire a security against the causes of complaint, and if this is not obtained, even if peace were to be established with Turkey, it would not be maintained for two years.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 601.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 3.)
Mo Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 2, 1854.*

ASSERTIONS made with confidence are too commonly accepted without hesitation, and this is strikingly the case with regard to the statements of the Russian Cabinet as to their relations with Turkey.

We cannot, says the Russian Cabinet, withdraw our troops from the Principalities until our difficulties with the Porte shall be settled; neither can we suffer any Power to intervene between us and the Porte, as it would be contrary to the practice which has prevailed for the last century were we to negotiate otherwise than directly with the Sultan's Government.

So little is this the real state of the case, that a reference to the Treaty of Tilsit will show that the signature of the Convention was the signal for the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Turkey; that the Russian troops were immediately withdrawn from Moldavia and Wallachia; and that the Emperor Alexander did not hesitate to accept Bonaparte's mediation for the purpose of negotiating a peace between the Russian and Turkish Empires.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 602.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 10.) *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode on Eastern affairs in the conversation with his Excellency, of which a report is contained in your despatch No. 6 of the 2nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 603.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 7.)

Paris, January 7, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

DROUYN accepts the addition to the Protocol. He sends to-night by telegraph to Vienna with directions to Bourqueney to adopt Porte's answer, if considered favourable, although it may not be addressed to the Conference, and to consign it if not (if possible ?) to the Protocol.

This to depend on your sending by telegraph similar instructions to Lord Westmorland.

No. 604.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, January 8, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

M. BOURQUENEY will receive a project of Protocol which you are authorized to sign. The answer of the Porte, if considered favourable, may be adopted, although it should not be addressed to the Conference, and its terms should be embodied in the Protocol. Immediately the answer arrives from Constantinople let me know its terms by the telegraph. This is necessary before a communication is made to St. Petersburgh, and the delay will be trifling.

No. 605.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

Foreign Office, January 8, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE authorized Westmorland to sign the Protocol that will be sent to M. de Bourqueney, and to adopt the Porte's answer, if considered favourable, although it may not be addressed to the Conference, and to embody it in the Protocol.

We think it necessary that we should know by telegraph the terms of the Porte's answer before a communication is made to St. Petersburgh.

This will prevent mistakes and the delay will be trifling.

No. 606.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 10.)

Vienna, January 10, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE received your Lordship's telegraphic message of the 8th, ordering me to sign the Protocol sent to the French Ambassador.

As your Lordship desires me to inform you by telegraph the terms of the answer from (mad*), (query, Constantinople?), am I to understand that the Protocol, after signature, is to be retained until receipts from you of further instructions with regard to it?† I think Buol, after communicating with the Conference, will think it right to send the Porte's answer at once to St. Petersburgh, as stated in his despatch to Count Colloredo.

No. 607.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12, 1854, 7 P.M.)

Constantinople, December 28, 1853.

(Telegraphic.)

LA Porte accepte les termes de négociation précisés dans la note des Quatre Représentants. Les instructions définitives pour faire sortir les deux escadres dans la Mer Noire ont été remises aux amiraux. Les mesures adoptées par la Porte pour rétablir le bon ordre à Constantinople ont eu un plein succès. La Porte, resolue de ne pas discontinuer ses opérations avant l'établissement formel d'un armistice, envoye des renforts et de munitions à Trébisonde. Les Russes attaquent les positions Turques par ci par là le long du Danube avec peu de succès, et les mouvements de troupes dans l'intérieur de la Russie menacent encore davantage la Turquie.

No. 608.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 12.)

Vienne, le 12 *Janvier*, 1854, 3 P.M.

(Telegraphic.)

LE Comte Buol a réuni la Conférence pour lui soumettre la réponse de la Porte à la note identique des Quatre Représentants. Cette réponse a été trouvée conforme aux opinions et aux vues exprimées dans les actes du 5 Décembre. Nous sommes convenu que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Autriche la porterait à Pétersbourg, en l'accompagnant de l'opinion unanime des Quatre Représentants. Demain à midi nous signerons le Protocole qui le constate. Je n'ai pas encore reçu votre réponse à ma dépêche télégraphique du 10.

No. 609.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

Foreign Office, January 12, 1854.

(Telegraphic.)

WE are satisfied with your communication, and with the course of proceeding that is to be adopted by Count Buol.

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* Wrong cyphers?

† Note of interrogation in cypher.

No. 609*a*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 12, 1854.)

(No. 382.) *Constantinople, December* 15, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE I had last the honour of addressing you, three matters, intimately connected with the great question still unhappily pending, have almost entirely occupied my thoughts and my time.

First, the acquirement of adequate means for setting on foot a winter negotiation calculated to restore peace on fair and durable grounds.

Secondly, the employment of the combined squadrons in such manner as may best redeem the pledges given to Turkey without exposing them unnecessarily either to the hazards of a cruise at this season in the Black Sea, or to collision with the naval forces of Russia.

Thirdly, a just appreciation of the ultimate arrangements which it will be desirable to keep in view, supposing the war to be unavoidably prolonged, and of the means or measures by which a result proportioned to its sacrifices might in due season be obtained.

On each of these subjects I propose to address your Lordship in a separate despatch as clearly and concisely as their delicate and complicated nature will permit.

For the moment I confine myself to stating, with respect to the first, that, in concert with the Austrian, French, and Prussian Representatives, I have framed a plan of proceeding which will be presented to Reshid Pasha collectively and officially in the course of the day; that the General Council is to be assembled the day after to-morrow under circumstances favourable to hopes of peace; and that the Sultan's Ministers are at length disposed, as it would seem, to take a more sober view of their prospects and difficulties.

With respect to the united squadrons, I am decidedly of opinion that moral and political considerations of much weight require their appearance in the Black Sea; and that, if my opinion continues to prevail, professional objections, suggested by the season, will alone prevent the execution of that measure.

On the wider question of future contingencies which might arise out of a protracted and extended war, I have submitted some notions to your Lordship in earlier parts of my correspondence. What remains to be brought under consideration may easily be found to require more time than the present occasion offers. At all events, whenever I perform that part of my duty, I shall stand even more than usually in need of your Lordship's indulgence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 609*b*.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 12, 1854.)

(No. 387.) *Constantinople, December* 17, 1853.

My Lord,

THE General Council is deliberating at this moment on the question of continuing the war without relaxation, or opening a door for the negotiation of peace. If a final decision be taken to-day, it will not be known till a late hour of the evening. Appearances thus far warrant the hope of a pacific vote.

The basis of pacification proposed by me, in concert with my three colleagues, was delivered officially to Reshid Pasha the day before yesterday, and it will be submitted to the Council of Ministers to-morrow or next day.

I inclose a copy of it herewith for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have ascertained, in private, that Reshid Pasha sees no objection, in so far as his personal opinion is concerned, to its acceptance.

My despatch, explaining the manner in which this preliminary result has been effected, will be forwarded by express.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 609*b*.

Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives.

Péra, le 12 *Décembre*, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, d'accord avec les Représentants de l'Autriche, de la France, et de la Prusse, a l'honneur de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte que leurs Gouvernements ayant encore lieu de croire que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie n'envisage pas le fil des négociations comme rompu par la déclaration de guerre et les faits qui en ont été la conséquence; et sachant, de plus, d'après les propres déclarations de Sa Majesté Impériale, qu'elle désire seulement voir assurer une égalité parfaite des droits et des immunités octroyés par Sa Majesté le Sultan et ses glorieux ancêtres aux communautés Chrétiennes sujettes de la Porte;

Et de son côté la Sublime Porte répondant à cette déclaration par la déclaration qu'elle regarde comme étant de son honneur de continuer à maintenir les susdits droits et immunités, et qu'elle est toujours disposée à mettre un terme au différend survenu entre les deux Empires;

La négociation à suivre serait basée:

1. Sur l'évacuation la plus prompte possible des Principautés.

2. Sur le renouvellement des anciens Traités.

3. Sur la communication des firmans relatifs aux privilèges spirituels octroyés par la Sublime Porte à tous ses sujets non-Musulmans; communication qui, faite aux Puissances, serait accompagnée d'assurances convenables données à chacune d'elles.

L'arrangement déjà faite pour compléter l'accord relatif aux saints lieux et aux établissements religieux à Jérusalem serait définitivement adopté.

La Porte déclarerait aux Représentants des Quatre Puissances qu'elle est prête à nommer un Plénipotentiaire, à établir un armistice, et à négocier sur les bases ci-dessus énoncées, avec le concours des Puissances, et dans une ville neutre dont elles conviendraient.

Les déclarations faites par les Puissances dans le préambule du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841, seraient solennellement confirmées par ces mêmes Puissances, dans l'intérêt de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et de celui du concert Européen.

Et la Porte, de son côté, déclarerait dans le même intérêt sa ferme résolution de développer plus efficacement son système administratif et les améliorations intérieures qui devraient satisfaire aux besoins et à la juste attente de ses sujets de toutes les classes.

No. 610.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 13.)

(Telegraphic.) *Le 12 Janvier*, 1854.

JE viens de recevoir de Lord Stratford la réponse qu'il a reçue de Reshid Pasha. Voici le resumé des conditions: 1. Négocier d'abord l'évacuation des Principautés le plutôt possible. 2. Le renouvellement des Traités. La Porte annoncera aux Puissances ainsi qu'à la Russie son intention de maintenir à jamais les privilèges spirituelles des communautés composés de ses propres sujets et de les mettre toutes sur un pied d'égalité. L'arrangement décidé pour les lieux saints sera complètement adopté. Si le Cabinet de Pétersbourg accepte ces bases, la Porte enverra un Plénipotentiaire d'un congrès à être tenu dans une ville neutre désignée par les Quatre Puissances, et auquel les délégués des Quatre Puissances assisteront, et alors on conclura une armistice temporaire, et pour un delai déterminé; pour la Porte croit avoir le droit de se trouver dans le cercle d'une sureté collective, et d'être comprise dans le concert Européen, et pour cela il faudrait confirmer et compléter dans ce sens le Traité de 1841. Le Sultan a à cœur de faire les reformes nécessaires dans le système administratif.

No. 611.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received Janaury* 13.)

Telegraphic.)

WE have just signed the Protocol in Conference. Buol transmits this day the substance of it, through Baron Lebzeltern, to Count Nesselrode, with the strongest and most friendly advice that the terms of the negotiation, as recommended by the Four Powers, be accepted.

No. 612.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14, 1854.)

(No. 405.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1853.

I AVAIL myself of an express dispatched by the French Embassy, to inform your Lordship that the Ottoman Ministers assemble in Council to-day, for the purpose of deliberating, and, I hope, deciding favourably, on the proposals of negotiation submitted to them by the Four Representatives.

I have to add that no fresh cause of disturbance has shown itself in the capital, and that the French Ambassador is once more agreed with me to send into the Black Sea such portions of the combined squadrons as may be required to carry out the existing instructions.

Your Lordship will at once understand that with every solicitude to guard against unnecessary collision, the squadrons cannot enter the Black Sea for protective purposes without incurring that hazard.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 613.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 14, 1854.)

(No. 410.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, in copy and translation, the Porte's official answer to the identic note of the Four Representatives, dated the 12th instant, and presented collectively to Reshid Pasha on the 15th.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Porte's note confirms entirely what I have already announced by means of a telegraphic message. It is addressed not only to me, but to each of my three colleagues respectively. Our proposals are formally accepted under the Sultan's sanction, and it now remains with the Four Powers to obtain the assent of Russia, and to set on foot the negotiation which they have expressed their desire to obtain, and which, if the Court of St. Petersburgh be sincere in its professions, ought to terminate at an early period in peace.

I venture to congratulate your Lordship on the prospect of that consummation. The hope which it encourages may not, indeed, be realized; but it will always be gratifying to remember, that the injured and by no means unsuccessful party was the first to give proof of its pacific views, and to accede, with almost unlimited confidence, to the suggestion of its European Allies.

The Porte has intimated an expectation that the answer from Russia shall not be more than forty days from the present date in reaching Constantinople. It is also her intention that the armistice, proposed to be established on both sides during the negotiation, should be of limited, though sufficient extent.

It appears to me that in both particulars the Porte takes a just view of what is required alike by her interests and by her duties. Exposed to the attacks of Russia even at this season, and obliged, therefore, to continue her defensive operations at great cost, it is very desirable that the present uncertainty should not be indefinitely prolonged. An armistice, it is true, would suspend the prosecution of hostilities on either side; but it would also leave undiminished whatever disadvantage results from continued preparations against the contingency of their renewal, and it would operate at once as a damp on military ardour, and as a motive for popular discontent.

Whether in substance or in form, the Porte, I verily believe, has reached the utmost verge of concession with respect to spiritual privileges. Nothing short of prostration, the consequence of military reverses, could, to all appearance, induce her to overstep the line traced out in the plan of negotiation proposed by the Four Representatives, and now accepted by her.

With respect to the last two paragraphs of the Ottoman reply, I conceive that the Porte does not so much pretend to a positive technical guarantee against future encroachments, as a formal admission into the circle of Europe's international law and system of mutual respect for each other's rights, established among its independent States. I am further of opinion, that with a view to the condition of the non-Mussulman communities in this Empire, and the development of those resources on which the Porte's independence must ever mainly rest, it would not be safe to hedge round the Ottoman Empire with European guarantees, unless the Porte engaged at the same time to realize and extend her system of improved administration in good earnest.

It was under this conviction that I urged the adoption of the paragraph which concludes the identic note of the Four Representatives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 613.

Reshid Pasha to the Four Representatives.

1 *Rebiul-akhir*, 1270. (*Le 31 Décembre*, 1853.)

SA Majesté le Sultan a vu la note que votre Excellence nous a envoyée, note identique avec celles de l'Ambassadeur de France et des Ministres d'Autriche et de Prusse, vos collégues, en date du 12 Décembre, N. S., relativement à la paix.

Comme on relève par ces communications collectives les intentions pacifiques de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie; que si la Sublime Porte s'est trouvée dans la nécessité d'entrependre la guerre, c'est uniquement pour le maintien de ses droits souverains; qu'il n'y a rien dans le projet d'arrangement qui vient d'être proposé, que porte atteinte aux droits sacrés de l'Empire Ottoman; et que les égards tout particuliers et la parfaite confiance de Sa Majesté le Sultan envers les Quatre Puissances, ses hautes alliées, réclament son adhésion à leurs vœux pour l'œuvre de la paix, la Sublime Porte a trouvé le projet d'arrangement qui vient de lui être proposé, acceptable.

Il faut donc que l'évacuation des Principautés de la Valachie et de la Moldavie, évacuation à avoir lieu avec toute la célérité possible, soit le premier point des négociations. Et comme, pour ne pas s'écarter de son système de modération, et pour ne pas s'éloigner des conseils de ses alliés, la Sublime Porte consentira au renouvellement des Traités, cela doit être le second point des Conférences.

Quant aux privilèges spirituels des communautés composées de toutes les classes de sujets non-Musulmans de l'Empire Ottoman, comme ces privilèges ont été octroyés, il y a déjà très longtemps, par les augustes ancêtres de Sa Majesté le Sultan; qu'il y a peu de temps encore sa Hautesse les a confirmés par un firman décoré de son khatti-humayoun (autographe Impérial); et que le Gouvernement de sa Hautesse considère comme étant de sa dignité de les maintenir toujours, la Sublime Porte ne fera pas difficulté d'annoncer à toutes les Puissances, comme elle l'a fait par le passé et dernièrement encore, et comme elle l'a déclaré à toute l'Europe, lorsque elle a établi les Tanzimat, que son intention ferme et loyale est de maintenir à jamais les privilèges spirituels des communautés composées de ses propres sujets: et que, si quelqu'une de ces communautés se trouve avoir, en fait de privilèges spirituels, quelque chose de plus que les autres, elle accordera à celles-ci, si elles demandent d'en jouir également, la faveur d'être mises à cet égard aussi sur un pied d'égalité. Cela étant, il n'y aura pas la moindre hésitation à ce qu'il soit remis au Cabinet Russe aussi, comme il en sera donné à chacune des Quatre Puissances, copie des ordres de la Sublime Porte à cet égard, accompagnée d'une note identique comme dans ce sens.

Le mode d'arrangement pour ce qui concerne les lieux saints, et pour la mise à exécution de ce qui a été décidé par rapport à l'érection de certains édifices religieux à Jerusalem, sera complètement adopté.

Ainsi, voilà que la Sublime Porte est prête à conclure une paix de la manière que ses alliés viennent de lui indiquer: et si l'on apprend que le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg aussi a accepté ces bases, elle nommera et enverra un Plénipotentiaire à un Congrès à être tenu dans une ville neutre qui sera désignée par les Quatre Puissances, et auquel les délégués des Quatre Puissances assisteront afin qu'il arrange les affaires avec le Plénipotentiaire de la Cour de Russie. Et alors, comme cela est naturel, on conclura un armistice temporaire, et pour un délai déterminé.

Vû les grandes relations de cet Empire avec les Gouvernements d'Europe, la Sublime Porte a pleinement le droit de se trouver dans le cercle d'une sûreté collective et d'être comprise dans le concert Européen. Et pour cela, il sera nécessaire de confirmer et de compléter, dans ce sens, le Traité de l'an 1841. Ainsi, on a la confiance que les Cours alliées voudront bien employer leurs bons offices à cet égard.

Comme on calcule que quarante jours suffisent pour faire parvenir cette décision à St. Pétersbourg et recevoir une réponse, les Puissances sont priées de mettre tous leurs soins à cet égard aussi.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a particulièrement à cœur que chaque classe de ses sujets ait à jouir de cette sécurité et de cette justice que les Tanzimat, réellement et complètement mis à exécution, lui promet; et en un mot, qu'en faisant dans le système administratif les réformes nécessaires, il soit par là donné une grande force aux principes de la justice et de l'équité en faveur de tous.

Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant ordonné que l'on mette la plus grand soin à mettre en pratique ces maximes sublimes, je m'empresse de l'annoncer aussi, de pareils ordres ne pouvant que faire du plaisir aux Puissances.

(Signé) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

No. 614.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)

(No. 411. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 31, 1853.*

I HAVE just obtained confidentially a copy of an instruction addressed by M. de Wildenbruch to his interpreter, and left by the latter with Reshid Pasha. It relates to the combined squadrons and their intended cruize in the Black Sea.

I have made no communication on the subject either to the Prussian Envoy or to the Internuncio, because they have never been parties to any naval demonstration in support of Turkish independence, and an uncalled-for and idle communication could have served no purpose but that of raising a question and embarrassing the parties.

M. de Bruck has spoken to me upon the subject in private, with something like a tone of remonstrance; but I am not aware of his having taken any step like that which has been hazarded by M. de Wildenbruch.

I told Baron de Bruck, in reply to his remarks, that although the Four Representatives had an object and a principle in common, their positions differed in some respects, and I only concurred with my French colleague in adopting a measure which had been rendered necessary not more by our instructions than by the aggressions of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 614.

Baron Wildenbruch to his Interpreter.

Monsieur, *Kouron-Tchesmé, ce 20 Décembre*, 1853.

VOUS vous rendrez chez son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et lui ferez la communication suivante, dont vous êtes autorisé à lui laisser copie.

Sur mon invitation vous avez été, dans la journée d'hier, voir son Altesse Reshid Pasha, dans l'unique but de lui demander des informations officielles sur ce qui m'était revenu de sources non-officielles par rapport au projet de faire entrer une escadre Anglo-Française dans la Mer Noire. Reshid Pasha a reconnu la réalité d'un pareil projet. Ma démarche doit donc avoir convaincu son Altesse de ce que je suis resté complètement étranger à la mesure en question, qu'elle n'a pas été concertée avec moi, et que je n'en ai pas été informé par les Ambassadeurs de France et de la Grande Bretagne.

Cependant en égard aux conséquences que cette mesure pourrait avoir et à la fausse interprétation qu'on pourrait donner à mon silence, je crois de mon devoir de déclarer d'une manière officielle qu'en attendant des ordres ultérieurs de mon Gouvernement, je ne puis, à l'heure qu'il est, envisager la mesure sur laquelle, au dire de son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, MM. les Ambassadeurs de France et de la Grande Bretagne se sont arrêtés, que comme en

dehors de l'entente qui a eu lieu entre leurs Gouvernements et celui du Roi mon Auguste Maître, relativement à l'action commune, constatée par la note identique du 12 Décembre.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)

(No. 412.) *Constantinople, December 31, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith the series of my ostensible correspondence with Vice-Admiral Dundas concerning the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea. It will serve substantially to afford your Lordship full information of all that has occurred between us on that subject since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship thereon.

Any remarks which I may have to submit respecting any part of it must be reserved for the messenger, as the present opportunity afforded me by a French express steamer to Marseilles, is limited to a very short time.

It was on Christmas-day that General Baraguay d'Hilliers communicated to me the telegraphic message inclosed in copy with this despatch. Although I have not received from your Lordship the instruction which it contains, I could not hesitate to receive it as a distinct confirmation of the manner in which I was already prepared to act on my original instructions respecting the squadrons.

Your Lordship will observe that the last despatch which I received, only a few minutes ago, from Admiral Dundas, states that a sudden change of wind and weather had detained him when weighing for a start, but that he intended to enter the Black Sea as soon as the elements would permit.

We have had a more than usual quantity of fine weather within the last fortnight, and of southerly wind within the last four days.

The Porte is preparing to send 4,000 or 5,000 troops with supplies of ammunition, I believe, to Trebizond and Batoom.

I am, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 26, 1853.

Sir,

I INCLOSE herewith for your information several statements and opinions respecting the harbour or roadstead of Sinope, derived from sources worthy of more or less attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

(Confidential.) *Pera, December 26, 1853.*

Sir,

I BEG your attention to the accompanying extract of a letter which I received to-day from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 615.

Consul-General Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Odessa, December 13, 1853.*

THERE is much vulgar exasperation here against the English. I feel it necessary and prudent to keep within doors.

The danger to a maritime expedition by the Turks from the Bosphorus to the most distant coast of the Black Sea was to be foreseen, and I should be unhappy to know that a squadron of our own should come into this sea, insufficiently strong to command respect; for the moment may be at hand when all scruples cease.

Inclosure 4 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir. *Constantinople, December 27, 1853.*

RESUMING the subject of my previous correspondence, I have now to instruct you as follows.

It being desirable that the combined squadrons should appear forthwith in the Black Sea, you will give the orders necessary for that purpose to the vessels under your command.

The French Ambassador addresses a similar instruction to Admiral Hamelin, with whom you will therefore continue to act in concert.

The object of the squadrons in going to sea is to protect the Ottoman territory against every aggression on the part of the Sultan's enemies.

Should you have to communicate with any Russian ships you will not lose sight of the peaceful relations existing between the two countries. But if such ships were in a position to threaten the Ottoman territory with any disembarkation or other act of direct hostility, you would make known your intentions to their commanding officer, enjoining him in friendly terms to retire, and you would resort to coercive measures only in the event of his declining to comply with your demand.

In the performance of this service you are not called upon to respect any blockade established by the Russians against a Turkish port.

If any Ottoman vessel attacked or pursued by a Russian ship were to take refuge under your guns, you would not withhold your protection.

In the event of your falling in with a captured vessel, belonging to either of the two belligerents, at a greater distance than three miles from the coast, you will consider the case as one which does not call for your interference.

It is to be understood that these instructions apply to the whole extent of the Ottoman territory in the Black Sea.

To avoid any appearance of exciting revolt, the ships under your command will not approach the Russian coast without some motive of paramount obligation.

You will send a steam-vessel to visit the coast of Roumelia as far as Kavarna. It will be replaced by a French steamer at such times as may be concerted between you and Admiral Hamelin.

In the execution of these instructions, weather permitting, you will show your flag, and Admiral Hamelin is instructed to show his, at Trebizond, Samsoun, Sinope, and Heraclea, where there is a depôt of coal; and you will communicate with Her Majesty's Consular Agents at the two former places.

You will also take measures to ascertain, by actual examination, whether the port of Sinope possesses all the requisites of a safe anchorage for the whole fleet, or for any fixed number of ships, and, according to the result, it will rest with you either to station your squadron there for the present, or return with it, as circumstances may permit, to the Bosphorus.

If you decide on the latter alternative, you will leave a vessel to observe the movements of the Russian fleet in the eastern latitude of the Black Sea; and if you adopt the former, you will send to inform me of that determination.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 27, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to send you herewith the letters addressed respectively to the Inspector of the Ottoman coal mines at Heraclea, and to the officers stationed there on the part of the Turkish Admiralty, with the view of enabling the steam-vessels under your command to obtain any supplies of coal which they may require.

The orders are peremptory as to supplying the coal without delay or hindrance of any kind, and the officer receiving it will only be expected to give a receipt for the quantity obtained by him on each occasion.

I avail myself of this opportunity to state that the Capitan Pasha is prepared to supply your squadron with any number of pilots that you may require for navigating the Black Sea.

If you think proper to take advantage of his offer, you have only to send an officer to the Admiral with an interpreter to explain the object of his visit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 6 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 27, 1853.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador having communicated to me a telegraphic despatch received recently from his Government, and announcing intentions concerted, as it is stated therein, with Her Majesty's Government, I send you the copy of it inclosed herewith for your information and guidance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 27, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith for your information a note, translated into English from the original Turkish, received by me from the Porte, announcing the grant of a piece of land for the interment of any individual under your command who may happen to die while the squadrons are here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 8 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 28, 1853.

Sir,

I SEND you herewith three firmans, addressed to the Turkish Governors at Trebizond, Samsoon, and Sinope, directing them to afford Her Majesty's ships under your command every assistance they may require for provisioning and other objects.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 9 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, December 28, 1853.

Sir,

WISHING to communicate by a safe channel with Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa, I have to request that the steamer charged with your letter for the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol may be directed to return by Odessa, unless you have need of its services with the squadron.

In the event of its returning by Odessa, I beg to suggest the expediency of its touching at Varna, and receiving on board Her Majesty's Consuls at Jassy and Bucharest, for the purpose of conveying them to Constantinople, in case the execution of their instructions, subject under present circumstances to many obstacles, should have brought them at length to that place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 10 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, December 28, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's former correspondence (to which you refer me to-day), and the conferences that had been held on the subject of a part of the squadron under my command proceeding, in conjunction with that of the French, into the Black Sea, I have the honour to state that it does not appear to me at all clear, by your Excellency's despatch of the 27th instant (received this evening), if it is intended that the whole of the combined squadrons should leave the Bosphorus unprotected, and proceed in execution of the service pointed out in that despatch.

Admiral Hamelin called upon me this evening, when I had proceeded thus far in my letter to your Excellency, and informed me that the despatch he had received from his Ambassador left him equally in doubt with myself on this point. Under these circumstances, I have to request your Excellency will inform me whether you intend the whole of my squadron, or the part of it hitherto contemplated, to proceed to sea, in order that your instructions may be carried out without delay.

And I beg to acquaint you that the draft of your letter, which your Excellency has instructed me to copy, sign, and forward to the superior officer in command at Sevastopol, shall be sent by the "Retribution" as soon as I receive your reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 11 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, December* 28, 1853.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Excellency's despatches dated the 27th and 28th instant; and I shall consult with Admiral Hamelin as to future proceedings.

Her Majesty's ship "Retribution" I have selected to go to Sevastopol, and she will sail whenever the officer selected by his Excellency the French Ambassador is ready to embark in her.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 12 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, December* 29, 1853.

I LOSE no time in replying to your despatch dated yesterday, and received by me this morning.

You inquire, with reference to my correspondence respecting the appearance of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea, whether I mean that a part or the whole should be now sent out.

I have the honour to state in reply, that I mean such portion or the whole of them to be sent as you and Admiral Hamelin may agree in thinking sufficient for the protection of the Ottoman territory against any amount of force which the Russian authorities may be able to send out from Sebastopol, according to the information which I have already communicated to you.

With respect to the Bosphorus I shall be glad to find that after providing for the requirements of the service, as repeated above, you feel yourself at liberty to leave the rest of your force auxiliary to its protection.

It will, perhaps, be advisable not to dispatch the "Retribution" with your letter to the Russian Commander-in-chief of the naval service at Sevastopol, until your ships are actually entering the Black Sea.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 13 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, December* 30, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 27th instant, with its inclosure, announcing the grant of a piece of land for the interment of any individuals under my command who may happen to die while the squadron is here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 14 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," Bosphorus, December* 30, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 28th instant, together with the three firmans inclosed therein addressed to the Governors of Trebizond, Samsoon, and Sinope.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 15 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, December* 30, 1853.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 29th instant yesterday evening, and it is my intention to put to sea with five sail-of-the-line and six steam-vessels as soon as possible, in execution of the instructions I have received from you to that effect.

Vice-Admiral Hamelin will accompany me with the same, or nearly the same force; and the "Retribution" will proceed to Sevastopol as soon as the squadrons shall have entered the Black Sea.

I inclose for your Excellency's information a copy of a minute of a letter I had purposed sending to you, pointing out my intentions, and in which Admiral Hamelin entirely coincided; but as he received early this morning an express intimation from his Ambassador that a larger force than the one proposed should be sent to sea, I have necessarily been obliged also to send an increased and mixed force of sailing and steam-ships, which cannot but embarrass our operations at this season.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 16 in No. 615.

Draft of a Letter proposed to have been sent by Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," Bosphorus, December* 29, 1853.

IT appearing by your Excellency's despatch of the 27th instant, that the object of the squadrons in going to sea is to protect the Ottoman territory against every aggression on the part of the Sultan's enemies, and also by your letter to me of the 29th instant, in answer to one from me of the day before, that you mean that Vice-Admiral Hamelin and myself should send the whole or such portion of the squadrons as we "may agree in thinking sufficient for the protection of the Ottoman territory against any amount of force which the Russian authorities may be able to send out from Sevastopol, according to the information which I have already communicated to you," I now beg to acquaint your Excellency, that on account of the very extensive line of coast (upwards of 800 miles) to be protected and watched over, especially at this season; and considering the great force that Russia could send forth from Sevastopol on any given point at very short notice, not only from the great advantages it possesses from its weatherly and central position, but from the great superiority of its information on every movement that takes place at Constantinople and elsewhere, while we are completely deprived of similar advantages, we cannot undertake with the forces we command to ensure the full object proposed in your Excellency's despatch of the 27th instant, but we are of opinion that the plan which appears to us to afford the best chance of success is to send occasionally a strong steam squadron, consisting of three screw line-of-battle ships and eight powerful steamers, to run along the coast of the Ottoman territory, with a view to its protection, and by means of despatch vessels left on observation at Varna and Sinope, to give instant information of any hostile attempt to the main body of the combined squadrons in the Bosphorus, which could then proceed to any known point that might be attacked or threatened, either in Europe or Asia, and the force thus remaining in the Bosphorus would also secure Constantinople, as well as the important command of the Dardanelles.

I confidently believe that by adopting these measures we should more effectually protect the Ottoman territory than by sending a force of heavy sailing ships to sea in the winter, without a precise object or destination, and liable to certain damage, more or less serious, by which their real efficiency in the time of need would be materially impaired; and I have therefore in obedience to your Lordship's instructions, and in full accordance with my colleague, Vice-

Admiral Hamelin, decided on sending a steam force to sea to endeavour to effect the object proposed, which force would have the means of avoiding unnecessary collision, be sufficient to show that France and England are in earnest in their determination to protect the Sultan's dominions from hostile aggression, and could return to the Bosphorus to convey with much greater rapidity the sailing ships of the squadrons to any menaced point where their presence might be desirable.

I have further to add, that as your Excellency considers it of great importance that the squadrons should not approach the Russian dominions, the object could be fully carried out by a steam squadron, while the employment of sailing vessels would render it a matter of very great doubt and considerable difficulty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 17 in No. 615.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Pera, December 30, 1853.

Sir,

IN consequence of what you have done me the honour to state in your letter addressed to me under date of to-day, I have thought it desirable that I should see the French Ambassador, and having called upon his Excellency, I learn from him that he wrote to Admiral Hamelin, saying in substance that his orders from Paris were that the whole squadron should go out, but that if he (the Admiral) agreed with you to send out a combined squadron of ten sail-of-the-line, half under each flag, he would be content to share the responsibility.

Now, Sir, I wish it to be clearly understood that I take part in no responsibility. I have instructed you to order the ships under your command into the Black Sea, and I have stated the object for which they are to go, the amount of the Russian naval forces, as far as I know of them in that Sea, and the eventualities, as far as I can foresee them, which may expose you, notwithstanding our pacific relations with Russia and our desire to preserve them, to a collision with a part or the whole of those forces. It is for you in concert with the French Admiral, according to your professional judgment, to make such arrangements out of the means at your disposal as may best accomplish the object in view, and enable you to meet with effect the eventualities which it involves.

With respect to the minute of an intended despatch, which you have done me the honour to communicate, I receive it as a memorandum of your opinions at the time when it was written, and as such shall forward it to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with any remarks which it may occur to me to offer upon any part of its contents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

Inclosure 18 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, December* 31, 1853.

I HAD the honour to receive at 11 o'clock last night your Excellency's letter of yesterday's date, and I acquaint you that I shall, agreeably to your Excellency's instructions, proceed into the Black Sea in company with Vice-Admiral Hamelin and his squadron as soon as the weather will permit.

The "Trafalgar," "Arethusa," and "Niger," are the only ships of my squadron that I shall leave in the Bosphorus.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 19 in No. 615.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," in Beicos Bay, December* 31, 1853.

REFERRING to my letter of this morning to your Excellency announcing the departure, for the Black Sea, of the combined squadrons of England and France as soon as the weather would permit, I beg now to inform you that, when on the point of weighing, a sudden change of wind to the north-east, with thick raining weather, rendered it necessary to again secure the ships at this anchorage, but the squadrons will proceed to sea the instant it may be practicable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 20 in No. 615.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Baraguay d'Hilliers.

(Télégraphique.) *Paris, le* 14 *Décembre,* 1853.

ENTENDEZ-VOUS avec Lord Stratford pour faire paraître les deux escadres dans la Mer Noire, et pour ravitailler et protéger les côtes d'Anatolie. Nous sommes d'accord avec Londres.

No. 616.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)

(No. 413. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1853.

INCLOSED herewith are copies of two confidential letters which passed between Vice-Admiral Dundas and myself a few days ago respecting the squadrons before the telegraphic message from Paris had been communicated to me by the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 616.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *British Embassy, December* 25, 1853.

CIRCUMSTANCES, with which I need not trouble you, have suspended a final decision as to a cruize of the combined squadrons. It is my present object to submit the following points to your professional judgment, requesting the favour of a distinct and early reply.

Would any number of ships which, in concert with the French Admiral, you would send into the Black Sea suffice to ensure the protection of the Ottoman territory from Russian aggression?

Should you feel justified in now taking out the squadron under your command for that purpose, and alone, either on a cruize or to occupy the stations of Sinope, in the present presumed condition as to number and efficiency of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea?

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 616.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"Britannia," in the Bosphorus, December 25, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAD the honour to receive at 4·30 P.M. yesterday your Excellency's confidential depatch of the 23rd instant, and on the points to which you have requested a distinct and early reply, I beg to state:

1. It appears by the list of the Russian fleet, inclosed in your letter, that it consists of fifteen or sixteen sail-of-the-line, seven frigates, ten or twelve steam-vessels, and numerous corvettes, brigs, &c., &c., and I do not consider that the steam forces of the combined squadrons could ensure the Ottoman territory in Europe and Asia from any Russian hostile aggression, as the screw line-of-battle-ships, and many of the steamers, cannot carry coals to last for any extended period, and, therefore, could not move speedily from coast to coast in search of an invading force.

2. I have frequently stated by letter, and at the various conferences which have been held, and in which Admiral Hamelin perfectly coincided, that a cruize in the Black Sea would at this season too probably impair the efficiency of the fleet; but I am ready to proceed to sea, even alone, with my squadron, if called upon by your Excellency to do so by precise instructions to that effect, and I have no hesitation in saying, that should we be at war with Russia, I will do my best to bring the Russian fleet to action, notwithstanding the superiority of their force.

I must, however, again suggest to your Excellency that two steamers stationed at Varna could bring us rapid intelligence of any aggression on European Turkey, and enable the combined forces to act with promptitude on any known point, as the steamers would then have sufficient coals for extended operations, and the ships of the line be efficient for any service.

With reference to anchoring my squadron in Sinope Bay, as your Excellency suggests, I gather from the opinion of Captain the Honourable J. Drummond, that the anchorage is not safe for heavy vessels at this season, especially now that it is encumbered with the anchors, chains, and wrecks of the Turkish squadron; therefore, I should not be justified in exposing Her Majesty's ships there, even should it be deemed advisable to remove the British squadron to a point so distant from Varna and the Bosphorus.

The French Admiral fully accords with me in my reply to your Excellency's first question, and you can readily conceive that I have not even alluded to the second, which contemplates a separation of the combined forces of France and England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

No. 617.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 14, 1854.)

(No. 414.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 31, 1853.

HER Majesty's steam-frigate "Retribution" proceeds to Sevastopol with orders to claim the release of two British engineers captured by a Russian ship-of-war when serving on board a Turkish trading-vessel, and detained in Russia as prisoners of war.

The Honourable Captain Drummond, who commands the "Retribution," is directed at the same time to give notice to the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol, of the instructions under which the combined squadrons are called upon to act.

The "Retribution" conveys a French officer charged to make a similar communication.

The correspondence relative to each of the objects mentioned above is inclosed herewith.

I trust, my Lord, that you will not overlook the constant anxiety with which I have endeavoured to carry out your Lordship's instructions in a spirit of peace and corresponding respect for the authorities of a Power with whom we are still entertaining pacific relations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 617.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

British Embassy, December 23, 1853.

Sir,

APPLICATION has been made to me on behalf of two engineers, subjects of Her Majesty, who were on board a Turkish steam-vessel at the time of its capture by a Russian steamer-of-war in the Black Sea, and who appear to be detained in Russia as prisoners of war. For particulars I refer you to the accompanying memorial.

I have now to request that you will send one of the steam-vessels under your command to claim the release of the individuals in question, whose names, you will perceive, are Alexander Cleland and Archibald Morrison, their service on board a trading-vessel not appearing to warrant their detention, the more so, as there is reason to believe that the vessel itself was taken during the term allowed reciprocally for exemption from capture.

By applying first at Odessa the officer, charged with your orders, will be able to act under the advice of Her Majesty's Consul-General, Mr. Yeames, whose knowledge of the country and large acquaintance with the local authorities entitle his opinions to much consideration. Should the object of the application not be attainable at Odessa, it would, I conceive, be necessary to repeat it at Sevastopol, and Mr. Yeames, or some one properly qualified on his part, might with advantage accompany your officer to that port.

The object of the application, whether at the one place or at the other, will be first to recover the men, and if that be refused to obtain, as far as it may be practicable, official evidence of the refusal together with a statement of its grounds.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I will send you a letter for Mr. Yeames as soon as I know what vessel you send, and when.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 2 in No. 617.

Memorandum.

ON the 18th November the "Medari Tidjaret," an Ottoman steamer, was seized by a Russian steamer and carried away a prize. On board the captured vessel were two Englishmen, serving as engineers; the one is my brother-in-law, Alex. Cleland, the other, Archibald Morrison, is a friend. As the vessel was a trader without guns and completely unarmed, bringing a freight from one Turkish port to another, there can be no legal grounds for detaining these men, more especially as the English nation, to which they belong, is at peace with Russia, and no notice has been yet given by the Consulate to the English engineers serving in the Ottoman Steam Navigation Company.

The very name of the vessel implies its commercial character; and it appears to have been employed, when taken, solely in commercial objects. Some mistake may have occurred, owing to its wearing a pennon; but this distinction is enjoyed in common with the steamers employed in Austrian Lloyd Company's service.

Inclosure 3 in No. 617.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, December* 28, 1853.

I HAD prepared a despatch for Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa, in pursuance of which I wrote to you on the 26th instant, respecting two British engineers detained as prisoners of war in Russia. I have since learnt from Mr. Yeames that the local authorities had rejected his application for their release.

Such being the present state of the case I am opinion that it will be advisable to send the steamer, destined in the first instance for Odessa, direct to Sevastopol, and to apply to the superior naval authority there for the delivery of the men in question. The capture of the Turkish trading-vessel, "Medari Tidjaret," on board of which the two engineers served, having been effected by a Russian steam-frigate, it is presumable that the commanding officer of this vessel depended on the Admiral at Sevastopol, and that the prize was carried into that harbour.

I have in consequence to request that you will direct the officer in command of the steam-vessel selected by you for the service in question to apply at Sevastopol for the release and delivery to him, if they are willing to embark, of the engineers, named Alexander Cleland and Archibald Morrison, taken prisoners, as stated above; and in the event of his demand not being complied with, to obtain an official statement of the grounds of refusal for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have already communicated to you the particulars of the case, and I repeat that the detention of the men appears to be an arbitrary act; and even that the capture of the vessel in which they served, was not warranted by circumstances at the time when that occurrence took place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 617.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Sir, *Pera, December* 28, 1853.

AS the squadrons are directed to go into the Black Sea it is necessary to execute an instruction provided by Her Majesty's Government for that contingency, namely, to notify the general object of their movement at Sevastopol. The French Ambassador acts on the occasion in concert with me, and will cause a communication identical with mine to be addressed to the proper authority there, who, I presume, is the Admiral commanding in chief the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea.

You will, therefore, take advantage of the steam-vessel ordered to Sevastopol for another purpose to address that commander in the terms adopted by General Baraguay and myself in pursuance of our respective instructions, and now inclosed to you herewith. The draft has been drawn up in French as a convenient means of communication between two commanders-in-chief not likely to be acquainted with each other's native language. An officer, appointed by General Baraguay d'Hilliers, will be charged with the delivery of Admiral Hamelin's letter, and I have to request that you will direct him to be received and entertained on board the steam-vessel dispatched to Sevastopol. The officer in command of the vessel will, of course, take charge of any answer which the Russian Admiral may think proper to return to your letter of notification.

I have, &c.
STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 5 in No. 617.

Note addressed by the Commanders-in-chief of the Combined Fleets to the Russian Commander-in-chief at Sevastopol.

L'ESCADRE sous mes ordres étant sur le point de paraître dans la Mer Noire, de concert avec celle de la France, et l'objet de ce mouvement étant de protéger le territoire Ottoman contre toute agression ou acte d'hostilité, j'en avertis votre Excellence dans le but de prévenir toute collision pouvant nuire aux relations amicales qui existent entre mon Gouvernement et le votre, relations que nous désirons conserver et que vous tenez aussi, sans doute, à maintenir.

Je serais heureux d'apprendre que votre Excellence, animée des mêmes intentions pacifiques, a bien voulu donner aux commandants des forces Russes dans la Mer Noire des instructions destinées à prévenir tout inconvénient qui pourrait compromettre la paix.

No. 618.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 1, 1854.

THE Prussian Envoy sent a Secretary to me this morning with a copy of an instruction respecting the combined squadrons, as forwarded to your Lordship confidentially with one of my preceding despatches. I asked whether the communication was meant to be official, observing that I was not aware of any title which his Excellency had to interfere with the movements of the squadrons. The Secretary said that the communication was private (particulière). I replied, that if he would have the goodness to leave the paper, I would read it at my leisure. He said that he was directed to read it to me, and not to leave it. I answered that in that case I should decline receiving the communication, not from any want of respect towards the Envoy and his Court—far from it; but because I thought it desirable to avoid a position which might require the expression of remarks less consonant than I could wish to the harmony which had prevailed in all that related to our recent negotiations for peace. He persisted in not leaving the paper, and went away.

In the course of the morning a Secretary arrived with a similar communication from the Internuncio. I gave the same answer, and a similar result ensued.

The manner in which I explained myself, was intended to avoid, though I know not how successfully, every cause of offence or misunderstanding, and I hope your Lordship will think that I took a suitable course under the circumstances.

I am ignorant whether similar communications have been proposed to the French Ambassador, and if so, whether or in what manner they have been received by his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—*January* 2. I have just learnt from the French Ambassador that, although he read the instructions communicated to him by the Austrian and Prussian Secretaries, he gave, in substance, to each an answer similar to mine.

S. DE R.

No. 619.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)

Constantinople, January 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of the instruction addressed by Baron de Bruck to his interpreter, and delivered by the latter to Reshid Pasha, as mentioned in another part of my correspondence. It relates to the intended cruise of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea. They have not yet left their anchorage in the Bosphorus; but as the wind at this end of the channel is southerly and the weather is perfectly fine, I expect shortly to hear of their departure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 619.

Baron Wildenbruch to his Interpreter.

Constantinople, le 31 *Décembre*, 1853.

PAR les observations que vous avez déjà été dans le cas de faire à son Altesse Reshid Pasha relativement à l'intention de MM. les Ambassadeurs de France et de la Grande Bretagne d'envoyer une partie de leurs flottes dans la Mer Noire, son Altesse aura pu se convaincre que je suis complétement étranger à une mesure qui même n'est venu à ma connaissance qu'indirectement.

Néanmoins, pour empêcher toute fausse interprétation à cet égard, vous êtes chargé, Monsieur, de déclarer officiellement à Reshid Pasha, que quoique pour le moment dépourvu d'instructions par rapport à la mesure dont il s'agit, je ne saurais le considérer que comme étant tout-à-fait en dehors de l'entente entre ma Cour et les Gouvernements de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de la Prusse, relativement à l'action commune constatée par la note identique du 12 Décembre.

Vous êtes invité, Monsieur, de laisser copie de la présente instruction entre les mains de son Altesse le Ministre de Affaires Etrangères.

No. 620.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 15.)

(No. 15.)

Vienna, January 12, 1854.

My Lord,

THE Conference of this day called by Count Buol, that he might communicate the answer of Reshid Pasha to the note addressed to him by the Internuncio, which was identical with those presented by the other Representatives at Constantinople, was perfectly satisfactory to M. de Bourqueney and to myself. Count Buol, after comparing the note he had received with the copies which had been transmitted to M. de Bourqueney and myself, and having found them identical in meaning although not so in language (which is supposed to have arisen from a difference of translation), recommended that the terms for a negotiation proposed by the Porte should be recognized by the Conference as answering to the object they had in view in the proposition which had been transmitted to Constantinople on the 5th of December; and that this should be stated in a Protocol which he was ready to sign. He likewise declared his intention, in undertaking to communicate these terms to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, to enforce their acceptance by all the means in his power, and engaged to convey punctually to the Russian Government the sentiments and recommendation of the Conference.

After this declaration the draft of the Protocol was drawn up, being a copy

of the one transmitted to M. de Bourqueney from the French Government, and it was left to be transcribed and prepared for signature at the Conference which is to take place to-morrow.

As there is hardly any difference in this document from the one which I have received your Lordship's orders to sign, I shall not hesitate to put my name to it; and as I consider the document as most important and as entirely fulfilling your Lordship's intentions, I shall not put any impediments to Count Buol's transmitting his communications to St. Petersburgh, notwithstanding that I have not as yet received your Lordship's answer to my telegraphic message of the 10th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 621.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 23.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the course which you took, as reported in your despatch No. 1 of the 1st instant, with reference to the communication which the Austrian and Prussian Ministers proposed to make to you of their instructions to their dragomans, respecting the entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 622.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 26.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the communication which your Excellency and the French Ambassador have directed the respective Admirals to make to the Russian naval authorities at Sevastopol, on the subject of the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 414 of the 31st of December.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 623.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 28.)

Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED on the 14th instant your Excellency's despatch No. 410 of the 31st of December, inclosing the answer of the Porte to the propositions made to it by your Excellency and your colleagues on the 12th of that month, with the view of bringing about a negotiation between Turkey and Russia; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that the manner in which the negotiation on this point between your Excellency and your colleagues on the one side, and the Ottoman Government on the other, has been brought to a successful issue, reflects the highest credit on your Excellency, and I have the pleasure to convey to you the entire approbation of Her Majesty's Government for the zeal and judgment which you have displayed.

Her Majesty's Government consider the answer of the Porte to the identic notes of the Four Representatives to be quite satisfactory. It fully maintains the dignity and independence of the Sultan; while, on the other hand, it meets every demand that Russia is entitled to make, and all that she has professed to desire. It presents the bases of a just and honourable peace, and of a guarantee of the Sultan's rights, together with a formal pledge on the part of the Porte to carry out the measures of internal reform upon which must mainly depend the future welfare and prosperity of Turkey.

It is to be hoped that Russia, alive to her own interests and to those of Europe, will agree to the reasonable terms now offered for her acceptance, with the approbation of the Four Powers, and thus put an end to the further effusion of blood, and to a state of things which endangers the peace of the world.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 624.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 29.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1854.*

YOUR Excellency will have learned from my previous despatches the extreme anxiety felt by Her Majesty's Government that a British and French naval force should enter the Black Sea to guard against the recurrence of a disaster like that of Sinope, and to give effectual protection to the Sultan's territory in Europe and in Asia.

Your Excellency, in your despatch No. 368 of the 4th of December, informed me that the fleets would probably be ordered to proceed on this service, and that the two Admirals did not think it would be prudent to send out a part only of the combined squadrons, in the present state, as far as you know, of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol; and I stated to you in reply, in my despatch No. 318 of the 20th of December, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approved of the combined fleets being sent into the Black Sea, and also of the whole of the combined fleets being ordered on that service.

But Her Majesty's Government, having now carefully considered the correspondence which has passed between your Excellency and Vice-Admiral Dundas, are of opinion that the important objects which they have in view would have been fully secured, with diminished risks, by the plan of operations proposed by Vice-Admiral Dundas' draft of letter dated December 29, which forms inclosure No. 12 in your Excellency's despatch No. 412 of the 31st of December.

This plan, moreover, which appears to have met with the concurrence of the French Admiral, would have left a more adequate force for the protection of Constantinople; and Her Majesty's Government under all the circumstances would have been well pleased if it had been acted upon.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 625.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 14, 1853.*

I HAVE been privately informed that a proposition has been made to the Prussian Government in the form of a note by the Austrian Cabinet stating that, in consequence of the active measures lately taken by the Western Powers, it was highly necessary and desirable that Austria and Prussia should concert and agree upon a collective neutrality to be observed by Germany in the event of war.

In conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel, his Excellency confirmed this information, stating, in very few words, the object Austria had in

view, and her wish that the smaller States should be informed of the present critical state of the Oriental question, and should be invited to associate themselves with the two leading German Powers in a declaration of neutrality. The Austrian Cabinet appear to have urged the necessity, in the event of hostilities between England and France with Russia, of consolidating the whole of central Europe in one neutral body, whose numerical military force would be enabled to withstand any attack from any quarter.

Baron Manteuffel informed me that he had declined this invitation, stating that the concert and union which was most efficacious was that of the Four Powers, and which was at present most completely attained in the Conference at Vienna; that in his opinion this union of the Four Powers was the surest way to preserve peace, and that nothing should be done which could, in any way, separate their collective action; and that on these grounds he did not consider it necessary or advisable to assent to the proposition of the Austrian Cabinet.

Baron Manteuffel (who was little discursive upon this subject further than communicating to me the simple facts) told me that a despatch which he had written this day in the above sense had been approved by the King, and would be immediately transmitted to Vienna.

His Excellency remarked to me that the object of the Austrian Cabinet was of similar purpose and intent as the invitation submitted some months ago to invite a declaration of neutrality on the part of the Germanic Diet.

I think that I may safely inform your Lordship that the decision of the Prussian Government on this subject is a fixed one, and that it is not likely to be recalled.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 626.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 25.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 14, 1854.*

THE Marquis de Moustier has communicated to Baron Manteuffel the Protocol which is to be signed at Vienna on the arrival there of the Turkish communication.

His Excellency informed me this evening that he had not received as yet intimation from Count Arnim that it had been signed.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he had received a copy of the Turkish reply to the note of the Four Representatives at Constantinople.

He considered it moderate and well drawn up. He remarked to me on the absence of any direct reference therein to the Orthodox Church, saying that the concessions made were generally for all subjects of the Sultan not of the Mahomedan faith.

I could perceive that his Excellency is by no means sanguine that the pacific endeavours of the Four Powers will meet with success.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 627.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 11, 1854.*

I MENTIONED to Count Buol the report of which your Lordship speaks in your despatch No. 425, as to the Austrian Consul at Sinope having made telegraphic signals to the Russian fleet at the moment of its entry into that harbour. Count Buol said he considered this report could have its origin only in an attempted calumny against the Austrian Government, and he could not

therefore take any notice of it. He was happy to find that Her Majesty's Government had expressed their disbelief in it, being convinced that the story was wholly undeserving of credit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 628.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 11, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL has received a telegraphic message from Semlin, announcing the arrival in that place of the communications he has been expecting from Constantinople, and which have been forwarded from thence by messenger, who is expected to arrive to-morrow.

He mentioned the hope he entertained, from the telegraphic communication he had received from the Internuncio, that the reply of the Porte to the Representatives, which was now transmitted, might be of a satisfactory nature; he intended, therefore, as I have reported in my despatch No. 5, to communicate it immediately to the Conference, and, after consultation, and in accordance with them, to transmit it by Count Esterhazy to St. Petersburgh, with directions to make every possible effort to obtain its acceptance.

I told Count Buol that your Lordship felt that some collective form of communication would be necessary, as otherwise the action of the Four Powers in this important transaction would be set aside; and as the first step which had been taken in this negotiation had been made known to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh by the communication through Baron Meyendorff of the note to Reshid Pasha, and the Protocol, it would be naturally expected by Russia that the opinion of the Four Governments upon the present propositions should be made known to her.

Count Buol concurred entirely in this view; he was anxious the opinions of the Four Powers should be communicated to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and he intended to employ the decision the Conference might come to as the strongest argument in favour of the proposals he should advocate. He stated that, with respect to the line he meant to adopt in transmitting, without delay, the communications he should receive from the Internuncio, he had fully explained it in his communications to Count Colloredo for your Lordship's information, by a messenger he had forwarded on Sunday last to Paris and London.

After I had held this conversation with Count Buol, I learnt from M. de Bourqueney that he had received a telegraphic despatch, transmitting to him a form of Protocol, which he was directed to sign after the Conference should have approved of the communications from Constantinople, and which should be placed in the hands of Count Buol, and shortly afterwards I received your Lordship's instruction to sign the same document. Baron de Bourqueney has not thought it advisable to communicate this Protocol to Count Buol until he shall have called the Conference together for the purpose of taking into consideration the answer from the Porte; and as I consider this document to be subject to his control, I have not taken any steps with regard to it, except to inquire of your Lordship, by my telegraphic message of yesterday, whether I was to retain it, after signature, till I had received from your Lordship your further instructions with respect to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 629.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 13.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 11, 1854.*

ACCORDING to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 426, I stated to Count Buol the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the presence of the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at a religious ceremony performed at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburgh, to celebrate a victory attained by the Russians over the Turks, and the bad effect that such presence might produce. Count Buol replied, that this had taken place in the absence of any instructions on the subject from the Government at Vienna, and simply as complying with an invitation received by M. de Lebzeltern from the Russian Court. Under the circumstances he had not thought it necessary to make any particular remark with regard to M. de Lebzeltern's conduct.

The Turkish Ambassador here has not made any representation upon this subject, and it is probable that (as Sir H. Seymour remarks) the Government of the Sultan may be too sensible to regard any trifling circumstances of this kind with suspicion, as they are aware that the Austrian Government are using their best efforts for the attainment of a just and honourable settlement of the differences now existing between themselves and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 630.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 16.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 12, 1854.*

AT the Conference held this day, Count Arnim stated that he had received a despatch from M. de Wildenbruch, the Prussian Minister at Constantinople, by which it appears that Reshid Pasha had made to him a communication to the effect that the entry of the allied fleets into the Black Sea had been decided upon with the approbation of the Four Powers. M. de Wildenbruch had consequently though it his duty to address a note to Reshid Pasha, declaring that the Prussian Government was in no way a party to that measure.

Count Buol stated, that he also had received a despatch from the Internuncio, informing him he had received the same communication from Reshid Pasha, and that he had equally declared to that Minister that his Government had had no share in the adoption of the orders to the fleets, and that he did not consider them to be in accordance with the arrangements agreed upon by the Representatives, his colleagues, on the 12th of December.

January 13th.— Count Buol read this day to the Conference the despatch above referred to, which the Internuncio had addressed to Reshid Pasha, a copy of which he will transmit to Count Colloredo for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 631.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 17.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January 13, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of inclosing the copy of a despatch which I have received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated from Constantinople, the 28th ultimo, returning to me (for the reasons he states) the sealed letter addressed to

Reshid Pasha by the Conference at Vienna, which I had, at the request of my colleagues, forwarded to him for presentation on the 5th of December last.

Lord Stratford states that this manner of dealing with the letter (its object having been obtained by the identic note of the Representatives at Constantinople) had been concurred in by his three colleagues.

I took this returned letter to the Conference yesterday. Count Buol declined receiving it, as he had already written to the Internuncio disapproving its not having been presented to Reshid Pasha; and he had likewise communicated his sentiments upon the subject of its retention to Count Colloredo, with a view to their being submitted to your Lordship. He therefore requested me to retain the letter; and my other colleagues having concurred in this wish, the letter remains for the present in my possession.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure in No. 631.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Westmorland.

My Lord, *Constantinople, December* 31, 1853.

FINDING myself at liberty to send back the messenger Capel by Trieste and Vienna, I gladly take advantage of the opportunity to inform your Lordship that the plan of negotiation arranged by the four Representatives here, and presented officially to the Turkish Ministry by them, has obtained the formal acceptance of the Sultan and his Government.

The arrangement in question, of which a copy is herewith inclosed, together with a copy of the Porte's reply, had so completely anticipated whatever is known of the intentions of the Four Cabinets, that the presentation of the sealed letter addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Conference at Vienna, and forwarded to me by your Lordship, would only have been an idle form, accompanied with the hazard of disturbing, or rather, as I had reason to believe, with the certainty of extinguishing for the time, those favourable impressions which had been fortunately created.

The letter did not arrive at Constantinople till a day or two after the identic note had been officially sent in to the Porte; and my own opinion as to the most advisable mode of dealing with it was fully confirmed by the opinions of my three colleagues. I kept it, nevertheless, in my possession, so long as there was any doubt as to the acceptance of the proposed terms. I have now the honour to return it herewith; and I entertain no doubt that your Lordship will view with satisfaction the circumstances which authorize me to return it unopened.

I have &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 632.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 18.)
My Lord, *Vienna, January* 13, 1854.

I HAVE already reported to your Lordship by telegraph that I, this day, in conjunction with the other members of the Conference, signed the Protocol which was (with the addition of a preamble) drawn up in accordance with the one proposed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys and transmitted to M. de Bourqueney. I have the honour of inclosing a copy of this document, as well as of the note of Reshid Pasha which is annexed to it. This Protocol is marked No. 2, for the purpose of showing that it is a continuation of the acts of the Conference as recorded in the first Protocol, which had been signed on the 5th of December.

After this document had been agreed upon, Count Buol read to the Conference the despatch he had drawn up, and which he intended to address to Baron Lebzeltern, with an order to place a copy of it in the hands of Count Nesselrode.

He at the same stated, that his first intention had been to transmit this document by Count Valentin Esterhazy, the newly-appointed Minister to the Court of St. Petersburgh; but that, as he was too unwell to be able immediately to undertake the journey, and as he thought it was of the utmost consequence that the communication should not be delayed, he had determined to send it at once by a messenger, who would leave Vienna this evening.

This despatch to Baron Lebzeltern will, without delay, be communicated to Count Colloredo for your Lordship's information, but in the mean time I feel it my duty to state, that it was most highly approved by the members of the Conference; that it was considered as doing full justice to the anxiety with which the Four Powers had laboured to obtain from the Government of the Sultan such proposals for the re-establishment of peace, as, while honourable to themselves, would equally be so to the Emperor Nicholas; as explaining that, in consequence of the non-arrival in time of the propositions by the Conference of of Vienna, those which, in the same sense, had been proposed to Reshid Pasha by the Representatives at Constantinople had been adhered to; and lastly, as bringing before the Imperial Government the opinion of the allied Governments as contained in their Protocol, that the proposals of the Porte were conformable to the views they entertained, as stated in the Acts of the Conference of the 5th of December, and consequently, that they were such as they confidently expected the Emperor of Russia would accept as the basis of a negotiation which offered to both parties the mode of terminating with honour the unfortunate state of war at present existing, and which, in the unanimous conviction of the Four Powers, is so deeply to be deplored.

The tone of this despatch is full of friendly interest for the Emperor Nicholas, but it does not fail to point out to him the anxious expectation of the Austrian Government that, in pursuance of that respect for the maintenance of the tranquillity and independence of the States of Europe by which his policy has been distinguished, he will seize this opportunity of putting an end to a state of things which, by being prolonged, might compromise all those interests which he has hitherto so eminently cooperated in maintaining.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

Inclosure 1 in No. 632.

Reshid Pasha to Baron Bruck.

L. *Rebi-Elashir*, 1270. (*Le* 31 *Décembre*, 1853.)

LA note de votre Excellence en date du 12 Décembre de l'année courante (n. s.), d'une teneur identique à celles que m'ont adressées ses collégues d'Angleterre, de France et de Prusse, a été placée sous les yeux de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Comme ces ouvertures communes témoignent des sentiments pacifiques de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, et comme pour la Porte la nécessité de faire la guerre se fonde uniquement sur son intention de sauvegarder ses droits de souveraineté, et que le projet qui vient de lui être soumis ne renferme rien qui puisse porter atteinte aux droits sacrés du Gouvernement du Grand Seigneur; comme, enfin, Sa Majesté le Sultan, guidée par les égards particuliers et la parfaite confiance qu'elle voue aux Quatre Cours, ses augustes alliés, a voulu qu'il fût adhéré en substance au vœu qu'elles avaient énoncé, la Sublime Porte a résolu d'adopter le projet en question dans les termes suivans:

Le premier point devra porter sur les délibérations ayant pour objet l'évacuation de la Valachie et de la Moldavie dans le plus bref délai possible.

La Sublime Porte, dans l'intention de ne point se départir de son système de modération ni des conseils de ses alliées, donnera son assentiment à ce que les Traités (avec la Russie) soient renouvellés, et cet objet sera en conséquence la seconde question à traiter dans les Conférences.

Quant aux privilèges religieux de tous les sujets du Sultan qui ne professent point l'Islamisme, ils ont été concédés dans le cours des siècles par la grâce des glorieux ancêtres de Sa Majesté le Sultan actuellement régnant et confirmés par elle récemment encore, moyennant des firmans du chiffre Impérial. En outre, la Sublime Porte regarde comme une question d'honneur

de maintenir ces privilèges à tout jamais, et de même qu'elle l'a fait connaître à l'Europe entière lors de la publication du Tanzimat, elle n'hésitera pas non plus dans la présente occasion à adresser à tous les Etats une déclaration portant qu'elle est animée de l'intention sincère et ferme de maintenir à perpétuité les privilèges religieux des différentes communautés de ses sujets, et, dans le cas où l'une de ces communautés posséderait un privilège de plus que les autres et que celles-ci demanderaient à y participer, la Sublime Porte, suivant ses sentimens de justice, consentira aussi à accorder l'égalité. Aussi la Sublime Porte ne fera aucune difficulté de communiquer, en les accompagnant de notes identiques conçues dans ce sens, des exemplaires des firmans susmentionnés à chacune des quatre Cours, et dans la même forme à la Cour de Russie.

La projet redigé pour compléter la décision prise au sujet de la Terre Sainte et de la construction de quelques bâtisses destinées au culte, sera définitivement adopté.

La Sublime Porte est prête, ensuite, à conclure la paix dans les voies que lui indiquent ses alliés. Il s'en suit tout naturellement qu'aussitôt après l'arrivée de la nouvelle que la Russie a accepté cette base, un Plénipotentiaire sera nommé et envoyé par la Porte afin de conclure l'arrangement avec le Plénipotentiaire Russe dans une ville neutre à désigner par les quatre Puissances, et dans une Conférence à laquelle assisteront également les Représentants des quatre Puissances, et qu'il sera alors aussi conclu un armistice temporaire et pour un terme fixé.

La multiplicité des relations et des alliances de la Sublime Porte avec les Etats Européens lui donnant d'ailleurs, sous tous les rapports, le droit et la faculté de participer à la solidarité qui lie ces Etats entre eux, et à la sécurité qu'ils y puisent, on reconnaîtra la nécessité de confirmer et de compléter dans ce sens le Traité de 1841, et elle se repose à cet égard sur les efforts amicaux des Cours Alliées.

Un délai de quarante jours pouvant, d'après tous les calculs, suffire pour faire connaître à St. Pétersbourg la présente détermination et pour recevoir la réponse de cette capitale, on a, sous ce rapport aussi, recours à la bonté des Quatre Cours.

Enfin, Sa Majesté le Sultan, animé du désir particulier de faire participer toutes les classes de ses sujets des principes de sécurité et de justice dont le Tanzimat contient l'assurance, en faisant complétement appliquer les dispositions de cet Acte, comme aussi d'assurer à tous le bénéfice des lois, en avisant à introduire dans l'administration les améliorations nécessaires, a ordonné par une résolution Impériale de vouer à cet objet toute l'attention qu'il mérite; ce qui ne peut manquer d'être accueillie avec satisfaction par les Cours, et ce que l'on se fait, par conséquent, un devoir de déclarer ici également.

Inclosure 2 in No. 632.

Protocol of a Conference held at Vienna, January 13, 1854.

Présens: Les Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, s'étant réunis en conférence, le Représentant d'Autriche a donné lecture d'une note adressée par Reshid Pasha à l'Internonce en réponse à celle qu'il lui aurait remise sous la date du 12 Décembre dernier, et qui était identique à la communication faite en même temps à la Porte par les Représentants des trois autres Cours à Constantinople. En réponse de Reshid Pasha étant le résultat d'une démarche faite par les Quatre Représentants, avant que la note collective signée dans la Conférence du 5 Décembre fût arrivée à Constantinople, le Représentant d'Autriche a invité la Conférence à examiner avec lui si le contenu de cette pièce était en accord avec les vues et les intentions énoncées dans le Protocole de la même date.

Après mûre délibération, les Soussignés ont été unanimement d'avis que les conditions auxquelles la Sublime Porte se déclare prête à traiter du rétablissement de la paix avec la Russie, sont conformes aux vœux de leurs Gouvernements et de nature à être communiquées au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg. De plus en

plus pénétrés de la gravité de la situation et de l'urgence d'y mettre un terme, les Soussignés expriment la confiance que la Russie acceptera la réprise des négociations sur les bases qui dans leur opinion en assurent le succès, et offrent aux deux parties belligérantes l'occasion de se rapprocher d'une manière digne et honorable, sans que l'Europe soit plus longtemps attristée par le spectacle de la guerre.

Les Représentants de la Grande Bretagne, de la France, et de la Prusse s'en remettent au Représentant de l'Autriche du soin de faire connaître au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg l'opinion consignée dans le présent Protocole, auquel est annexé copie de la note adressée dans une forme identique par Reshid Pasha aux Quatres Représentants à Constantinople.

(Signé) BUOL-SCHAUENSTEIN.
BOURQUENEY.
WESTMORLAND.
ARNIM.

No. 633.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January* 13, 1854.

JUST before the assembly of the Conference this day, I received your Lordship's telegraphic despatch of the 12th instant, and I communicated its contents to Count Buol, who expressed his great satisfaction at your Lordship's adherence to the course of proceedings he intended to adopt with regard to the transmission to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh of the answer from Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 634.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1854.

ON the 14th instant Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that your Lordship had communicated to him the instructions addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Sir Hamilton Seymour, and expressing his regret that the combined fleets should have entered the Black Sea, and that no notice should have been given to the Austrian Government of a measure which might be injurious to the pending negotiation, and was calculated to impair the united action of the Four Powers for a termination of the differences between Russia and the Porte.

I told Count Colloredo that the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea without the previous knowledge of the Austrian Government gave no just cause for complaint, for, although England and France were united with Austria in negotiation, they acted independently of her in protecting the Sultan's territory from aggression. Count Buol, I said, was well aware that the English and French Governments had no wish to precipitate matters, and that they would have been satisfied to leave the combined fleets in the Bosphorus until the negotiation now pending had, in one way or another, been brought to a conclusion; but that this had been rendered impossible by the disastrous affair at Sinope. Further inaction would thus, for reasons that had already been stated to Count Buol, have been dishonourable to England and France, who alone were the competent judges of the duty that their honour prescribed, and who, upon

such a question, could certainly not be expected to take counsel with any other Power; but as soon as their decision was come to, no time was lost in making it known to Count Buol.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 635.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 19.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1854.

I TRANSMIT to your Lordship copies of despatches* which I have received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting the course pursued by the Austrian and Prussian Representatives with respect to the entry of the combined English and French fleets into the Black Sea; and I have to instruct your Lordship to request explanations as to the course pursued by the Austrian Representatives in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 636.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 20.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1854.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 16 of the 12th instant, reporting the substance of the replies returned by the Austrian and Prussian Representatives at Constantinople to the communication made to them with respect to the entry of the combined English and French fleets into the Black Sea; and I have to inform you that, as the circumstances of the case are altered by the communication made to the above-named Representatives by Reshid Pasha, your Lordship need not for the present act upon the instructions conveyed in my despatch No. 19 of yesterday's date.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 637.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 21.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 17 of the 13th instant, inclosing a copy of the despatch addressed to your Lordship by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, explaining his Excellency's reasons for returning to you the sealed letter addressed to Reshid Pasha by the Representatives of the Four Powers in Conference at Vienna, I have to inform your Lordship that Count Colloredo has read to me a despatch from Count Buol, stating that he had disapproved of the collective note not having been delivered to Reshid Pasha.

I stated to Count Colloredo the grounds upon which Her Majesty's Government considered that the Four Representatives had exercised a sound discretion in this matter. An identic note had been sent to Reshid Pasha by each of the Representatives two days before the arrival of the collective note from Vienna, and if the latter had then been delivered it would probably have disturbed the arrangement which the Porte was about to agree to, and certainly would have caused delay.

* See Nos. 618 and 619.

This arrangement, embodied in the note of Reshid Pasha, has been approved by the Four Powers as being in conformity with the instructions drawn up at Vienna, and Her Majesty's Government were, therefore, confirmed in the opinion they some time since conveyed through your Lordship to Count Buol as to the expediency and prudence of the course adopted by the Four Representatives.

I added that, as a collective note had not been presented to the Porte, the necessity for addressing one to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh no longer existed, and Count Buol was thus enabled to convey the Porte's answer to the Russian Government in the manner which he considered most likely to insure its favourable reception.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 638.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 22.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1854.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 18 of the 13th instant, inclosing copies of the Protocol which had been signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers at the Conference held at Vienna on that day, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve your proceedings on this occasion, and that Count Buol's despatch to Baron Lebzeltern transmitting the Protocol to St. Petersburgh, the substance of which is reported in your despatch, has given much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 639.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 21.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1854.

HER Majesty's Government learn with satisfaction the answer given by Baron Manteuffel to the proposition made by the Austrian Government for a declaration of neutrality on the part of Germany in the event of war, as reported in your Lordship's despatch No. 23 of the 14th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 640.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord A. Loftus.

(No. 23.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 18, 1854.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of yesterday's date, instructing you to request explanations as to the course pursued by the Prussian Representative at Constantinople with respect to the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, I transmit to your Lordship a copy of a despatch* from Her Majesty's Minister at Vienna, by which you will perceive that the circumstances of the case are altered by the communication made to the Austrian and Prussian Representatives at Constantinople by Reshid Pasha, and your Lordship will therefore not for the present act upon the instructions conveyed in my despatch No. 18.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* See No. 660.

No. 641.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 15.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1854.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 22 of the 9th instant inclusive.

I inclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch* from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe transmitting a copy of the answer returned by the Porte to the propositions made to it by the Representatives of the Four Powers on the 12th of December, with the view of bringing about a negotiation between Turkey and Russia, and a copy of a despatch† which I have addressed to his Excellency in reply.

I also inclose a copy of a despatch‡ from Lord Westmorland, reporting the proceedings of the Conference at Vienna with reference to the Porte's note; and a copy of the Protocol§ alluded to by his Lordship as to be signed at Vienna on the 13th instant. I have to inform you that the terms proposed by the Porte are considered to be just and reasonable by Her Majesty's Government, and that they fairly meet the objects that Russia has throughout professed to have in view; you will, therefore, use your best endeavours to promote the acceptance of these terms by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, and you will express to Count Nesselrode the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the painful state of excitement and suspense which now prevails in Sinope may thus be terminated, and that all cause of difference between England and Russia may disappear.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 613. † No. 623. ‡ No. 620. § Inclosure in No. 586.

No. 642.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 7, 1854.*

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 345 of the 27th ultimo, which was delivered to me on the morning of the 4th instant by the messenger Haviland.

Your Lordship will, I trust, allow me to express the warm satisfaction with which I have learned the measures which have been concerted between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor of the French for preventing a repetition of such acts as that which occurred at Sinope—from putting an end to the naval resources of Turkey.

No impartial judge can, I apprehend, be of opinion that either of the Allied Powers have been wanting in conciliatory conduct towards Russia, and if their pacific dispositions are not proof against any further trials, it is only to be ascribed to the insolent and pernicious policy of a State which, while constantly declaring its eagerness to preserve the existence and independence of a weakened neighbour, is only endeavouring to endanger the one, and to annihilate the other.

In the midst of the excitement which recent transactions must have occasioned to all those who have been in any way connected with them, I have endeavoured to preserve that impartiality which is so essential for a right judgment of affairs, and although I am the first to admit that the information which I have transmitted to your Lordship may have been occasionally incorrect, as it has been, I am certain, constantly incomplete, I can safely assert that I have neither sought to exaggerate or to extenuate the circumstances which have come under my observation.

With this preface I will again state to your Lordship, that with regard to the late dreadful catastrophe at Sinope, all that comes to my knowledge tends to strengthen my belief of the Russian Government being chargeable rather with a reckless pursuit of their own object than with any wish to set at defiance those of England and France.

The Imperial Government are perfectly aware that a fire may readily be lighted up on their south-eastern frontiers which months and years of costly exertion may be insufficient to extinguish; and looking to this danger, I believe that the attention of the naval officers at Sevastopol had been especially directed to the attempt which would be made from Constantinople for affording assistance to those hardy tribes which under the most adverse circumstances have so long maintained their independence against the whole might of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 643.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 7, 1854.*

AS decided opinions may be expressed in very few words, I am desirous of stating to your Lordship that I am more than ever convinced that the Emperor of Russia has no thoughts of securing peace at the price of abandoning the demands which he has made upon Turkey.

My expectation is—as it long has been—that His Majesty has made up his mind to preserve a waiting position, and to retain possession of the Principalities until the Porte shall come in to his terms.

His Majesty's further objects will be, on the one hand, to disunite England and France; on the other, to bring the Turks to the belief of its being more to their advantage to treat directly with Russia than to confide in the mediation of their allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 644.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1854.*

SUCH is the gross ignorance with regard to England which prevails here, even among comparatively well-educated persons, that it is commonly received that we are unable to engage in war with Russia; and that, were such a misfortune to befall us, it could hardly fail of reducing England to a state of bankruptcy.

I hear of this opinion being held by persons who, from the position which they hold, ought to be supposed possessed of at least some rudimentary knowledge of finance and commerce.

What the financial state of England may be after a war with Russia remains to be proved; but that the financial difficulties of Russia have commenced before she has exchanged a shot with a Power of her own magnitude is very evident. She may possibly be able to satisfy her religious prejudices and her ambitious designs, but it is very certain that she will pay dearly for the gratification.

The want of funds is already sensibly felt by the Government; and, as I understand, the Finance Minister has it in contemplation to cover the difficulties of the moment by the issue of exchequer bills to the amount of 60,000,000 of silver roubles, or about 10,000,000*l.* sterling.

I am assured that the Government intend to treat this as a currency question, and to state that as, as in other countries, the deposits of gold do not exceed a fifth of the circulation, the immense stores of specie in the fortress admit of a very extended paper issue.

This may possibly be so. It is easily proved that very large sums have been deposited at the fortress, but it would be very difficult for any one not initiated in the secrets of the Finance Department to state with precision what amount has been withdrawn from the deposit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 645.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1854.*

I AM so well aware that it is at once the wish of the Russian Government to gain time, and to the interest of Her Majesty's Government that the object should be defeated, that it has been with great regret that I have found myself unable to execute the instructions given to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 345 of the 27th ultimo, which reached me on the 4th instant.

Your Lordship will, however, I am convinced, approve of my having determined not to communicate with Count Nesselrode on the subject of the orders sent to the allied fleets until the French Minister shall be enabled to make a similar and simultaneous communication.

I am willing that the fair half of the responsibility should be incurred by Her Majesty's Government, but I am desirous that the other should be borne by the French Cabinet, and the more so in consequence of information which has reached me respecting the tenour of the last despatch under date of the

28th ultimo received here from M. de Kisseleff. M. de Kisseleff, as I understand, does not refer to the orders sent to the English and French Admirals in the Bosphorus; but in allusion to a late conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, reports that Minister to have given him to understand that Her Majesty's Government were continually urging him forward, and that some measure was in consequence likely to be taken with regard to the two fleets.

It is so much the object of the Russians to sow mistrust between the English and French Cabinets, that I look with some suspicion upon M. Kisseleff's statement.

With regard to the last accounts from Baron Brunnow, I do not scruple to say, either that he is imperfectly informed as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, or that he is chargeable with a suppression of a part of the truth. Writing on the 27th or 28th ultimo, M. de Brunnow acquaints Count Nesselrode that it is the intention of the allied forces to prevent Turkish vessels of war from putting to sea, but he makes no allusion to the restraint which it is intended to put upon Russian ships of war.

The report accordingly has given pleasure here, and will increase the feelings of soreness with which the communication which I am charged to make to Count Nesselrode will be received.

It is with considerable surprise that I have read in the Prussian "Staats Anzeiger," I believe in the number of the first day of the year, a very faithful account of the orders despatched to the English and French Admirals. This announcement increases the difficulties of the moment, and makes it the more essential that the communication to be made to Count Nesselrode should be delayed as little as possible.

The non-arrival of the Paris despatches is in all probability to be ascribed to the accumulation of snow in Belgium and France. The communications appear to be interrupted, the latest intelligence received here from Paris and London being of the date of the 28th ultimo.

I have settled with General Castelbajac that as soon as he receives his instructions we shall write to Count Nesselrode to ask for an interview, at which will be made respectively the communication respecting the orders sent to the French and English Admirals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 646.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1854.*

MUCH more satisfactory accounts having been received within the last three days of the state of Prince Woronzow's health, it has been decided that he is to retain his post with the understanding that he is to receive six months' leave of absence as soon as peace shall be restored.

It is now well known that Prince Woronzow had asked for reinforcements some months ago, and that he had been placed in a very critical position from not having received them. Little doubt exists that if the Turkish Generals had acted with more energy, Tiflis and the whole of Georgia must have been evacuated by the Russian forces.

It is only fair to state, that there is considerable reason for believing that the Emperor had not been insensible to the risks to which Tiflis and the adjacent country was exposed, but that the fear of alarming Europe by the extent of military preparation had, in his view, outweighed other considerations; probably too the amount of resistance which the Turks were capable of making had been miscalculated.

I am unable to say whether the criticism is well founded, but I may state to your Lordship, as the opinion of some of the leading military men of Russia, that, like his colleague in Asia, Omer Pasha has been deficient in enterprise, and

that with a little more activity it was at one moment in his power to have pushed on to Bucharest and to have compelled Prince Gortchakoff to recross the Pruth.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Prince Woronzow's Lieutenants, Prince Béboutoff, Prince Andronikoff, and Prince Bariatinsky, are all three skilful Generals; the last mentioned perhaps the most rising officer in the Russian army.

G. H. S.

No. 647.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 21.)
St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1854.

My Lord,

THE following information respecting the Russian armies, although somewhat incomplete, and in some points only confirmatory of the statements already made to your Lordship, may be entirely depended upon.

The 1st and 2nd infantry corps are in Poland and Lithuania; the reserve battalions of these corps are in course of being formed. Two battalions being raised for each regiment, twenty-four will be added to each corps d'armée.

It is stated that no additions have been made yet to the artillery and cavalry of these two corps, but here a slight explanation becomes necessary; the horses have not yet been purchased, but as regards men the number required have already been assembled.

The 3rd, 4th, and 5th corps have already been placed on the full war footing, and the same statement may be made respecting their cavalry and artillery.

The 6th corps is in course of being put upon a footing of war. One division proceeds to the Crimea, one to the Caucasus, and the 3rd to the Government of Cherson.

These troops, not already marching, will proceed shortly to their destinations.

The half of the cavalry of this corps is ordered to the Crimea, the other half to the Government of Cherson.

The Corps de Dragons is equally in course of being put upon the war footing. Two regiments have already been sent off to the Caucasus, the other six are to proceed next week to the Principalities.

The Corps des Gardes, and the Grenadier corps, have likewise received orders for being placed upon the footing of war. The Guards are to be increased by a fresh battalion and squadron for each regiment; the Grenadiers by two battalions and one squadron for each regiment.

I should here observe that the battalion, when upon the war footing, numbers 1000 men, and the squadron 130 horses, while the reserve battalions are 600 or 700 men strong, and the reserve squadrons here each 150 horses.

As regards the army of the Caucasus under the command of Prince Woronzow, its numbers cannot be less than 150,000 men, and may amount to 170,000 or 180,000.

I will take the liberty of remarking to your Lordship, that the third volume of Baron Haxthausen's work, "Etudes sur la Russie," besides much servile adulation of this country, contains a great deal of information respecting the Russian army which is of great interest at a moment when the Emperor appears to be bent upon putting forth the whole of his military power.

I will not conclude my despatch without observing to your Lordship, that a military acquaintance of mine who has examined the works of Sevastopol and Cronstadt, considers them such as to render these two places all but impregnable.

With regard to Sevastopol, he is of opinion that it might have been taken early in last summer from the land side, but that the fresh works which have been thrown up, and the addition made to the garrison, would at present render any attempt upon it unavailing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 648.

Baron Manteuffel to Count Arnim.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Chevalier Bunsen, January 19.)

(Confidentielle.)

M. le Comte,

Berlin, le 13 Janvier, 1854.

C'EST avec le plus vif intérêt que nous avons pris connaissance de la communication importante ci-jointe en copie que M. le Comte de Thun a été chargé de nous faire, et à laquelle étaient jointes comme annexes et sous la même date du 8 Janvier, plusieurs pièces adressées aux Représentants Impériaux à Paris et à Londres. Vous n'ignorez pas, M. le Comte, le haut prix que nous attachons à la confiance dont le Cabinet de Vienne vient de nous donner une nouvelle preuve. Nous serons heureux de nous rencontrer avec lui sur la ligne politique qui se trouve indiquée dans les pièces susmentionnées, auxquelles nous avons voué, en conséquence, l'attention sérieuse et l'intérêt qu'elles méritent à tant de titres.

En face des graves événements dont l'Orient est malheureusement le théâtre, et des complications plus sérieuses encore qui peuvent en resulter, et dont personne ne peut dès à présent prévoir la durée et la portée, nous regardons l'entente suivie et l'accord des deux Puissances Allemandes comme un des moyens les plus puissans de conjurer, ou tout au moins de restreindre, les dangers de la crise actuelle. Nous voyons dans l'attitude neutre et impartiale de la Prusse et de l'Autriche, dans les efforts désintéressés qu'elles n'ont cessé de faire pour épargner à l'Europe, à peine remise des commotions dangéreuses qu'elle avait traversées depuis 1848, les maux d'une guerre générale; et enfin dans l'empressement que l'une et l'autre ont mis à se prêter à toute négociation qui pouvait mettre un terme à un regrettable différend, nous voyons, dis-je, dans tout cela la base et le point de départ les plus assurés d'une pacification qui, quelque éloignée qu'elle paraisse dans ce moment, ne cessera cependant pas d'être l'objet de tous nos vœux et de nos plus constants efforts.

Cette neutralité des deux Cours Allemandes, M. le Comte, existe, à notre sincère satisfaction, de fait, et comme elle n'a point été contestée, elle peut, ce nous semble, se passer, dans les circonstances présentes, d'une déclaration explicite et de décision qui, dans la phase dans laquelle nous nous trouvons encore, pourraient même, en compromettant les bases posées par la Conférence de Vienne, suspendre ou affaiblir l'effet des mesures qui y ont été concertées et qui n'ont reçu qu'une exécution partielle. Nous craindrions d'agir en quelque sorte prématurément, si nous prenions dès-à-présent une espèce d'initiative qu'aucun symptôme et moins encore aucune injonction, soit de la part des Cours Maritimes, soit de la part de la Cour de St. Pétersbourg, ne nous paraît motiver, et de montrer ainsi une défiance que rien ne paraîtrait justifier. Nous sommes plutôt disposés à croire que l'attitude libre, franche et conciliante que nous avons, aussi bien que l'Autriche, adoptée en face de la lutte engagée entre la Russie et la Turquie, suffira longtems encore pour laisser le champ libre aux négociations pacifiques, pour offrir un point d'appui aux travaux de la diplomatie et pour préserver en même temps efficacement l'Allemagne des maux et des périls d'une guerre que nos communs efforts tendent à circonscire et à limiter.

Nous prenons toutefois avec un sentiment de satisfaction toute particulière acte des dispositions loyales et cordiales de la Cour de Vienne à notre égard, en nous réservant de revenir sur les propositions qu'indique ou que pourrait nous suggérer la dépêche de M. le Comte de Buol. Si, contre tout espoir, les événements nous contraignaient dans l'intérêt de notre dignité et du repos de l'Allemagne, que nous désirons sauvegarder au travers des commotions qui

peuvent découler de la crise Orientale, à nous écarter de l'attitude à la fois expectante et conciliante que nous avons adoptée ; si surtout, soit d'un côté, soit de l'autre, on cherchait à exercer sur nos décisions une pression quelconque, nous n'hésiterons point à répondre à de pareils indices par des mesures conformes à la situation et une attitude forte importante, propre à éloigner des frontières de la Confédération tout danger d'une ingérence étrangère.

Mais dans l'intérêt même de la pacification qui, nous l'espérons, couronnera les efforts sincères que, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique, nous avons faits et faisons encore, et nous semble de la plus haute importance de ne point paraître nous écarter de la base sur laquelle nous nous trouvons par suite du Protocole de Vienne. Quoique les instructions transmises aux Amiraux Anglais et Français à Constantinople ne portent pas ce caractère de conciliation auquel nous attachons le plus haut prix, il nous semble néanmoins que les Puissances maritimes, ayant dès le principe suivi une marche différente de la nôtre et adopté des mesures auxquelles, ainsi que la Cour de Vienne, nous devions rester étrangers,—n'ont point de leur côté renoncé à la voie sur laquelle les Puissances Allemandes se sont rencontrés avec elle, et qu'il nous semble essentiel de conserver intacte. Nous considérons les mesures adoptées dans la Mer Noire comme un incident qu'on peut regretter, mais qui ne nous dispense pas de l'obligation d'employer tous nos efforts, tant à St. Pétersbourg qu'à Constantinople, pour y continuer les démarches que les quatre Puissances avaient résolues d'un commun accord, et qui viennent déjà d'obtenir auprès du Sultan un premier et important succès.

C'est en nous plaçant à ce point de vue, que nous nous abstenons de discuter l'opportunité des ordres transmis aux flottes Anglo-Françaises, démarche à laquelle la France et l'Angleterre n'ont point prétendu nous associer, et que nous n'avons apprise qu'après qu'elle avait été convenue entre Paris et Londres, et par conséquent en dehors du concert établi à Vienne entre les Quatre Cours.

La forme collective agréée par la Conférence de Vienne n'ayant point été suivie à Constantinople, nous devons présumer qu'elle ne sera pas adoptée à l'égard du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, et qu'on trouvera un mode de procéder qui remplisse le but proposé, tout en maintenant, dans l'exécution des résolutions arrêtées à quatre, cet accord si essentiel à l'effet moral, et par conséquent au succès, des démarches qui découlent du Protocole du 5 Décembre. Nous pensons, de même que M. le Comte de Buol, que l'abandon de la forme collective, à laquelle on ne saurait d'ailleurs attacher qu'une importance secondaire, n'entraînera point l'abandon d'une action diplomatique commune qui, au contraire, devra continuer de former l'objet des délibérations et des résolutions des quatre Cours.

En résumé, de même que l'Autriche, la Prusse est fermement résolue à reserver pleinement son entière liberté d'action, et à sauvegarder ainsi ses intérêts et sa dignité ; elle compte avec une égale confiance sur le scrupuleuse exécution des assurances formelles que Sa Majesté l'Empereur Nicolas a données, à plusieurs reprises, de ne point vouloir porter atteinte aux droits souverains du Sultan et à l'intégrité de ses Etats ; elle est décidée enfin à se soustraire à toute pression qu'on tenterait d'exercer ou dehors sur l'Allemagne pour l'entraîner dans une lutte Européenne, du pour contraindre le Gouvernement du Roi à se départir d'une neutralité que lui conseillent à la fois sa position et la situation actuelle de l'Europe. Mais ces résolutions, qui nous sont communes avec le Gouvernement Autrichienne, ne nous paraissent pas réclamer dès à présent des déclarations et des engagements réciproques, qui pourraient, sans doute, bien à tort, être interprêtées dans un sens peu favorable aux efforts que nous faisons dans le moment actuel pour réunir les Quatre Puissances dans une œuvre commune de pacification, et jeter ainsi une apparence de désunion ou de scission sur la Conférence réunie à Vienne.

L'Allemagne peut compter non-seulement sur notre sollicitude vigilante, mais sur notre coopération active et énergique, du moment où il s'agirait de la préserver des exigences d'une ingérence étrangère, qui chercherait à l'entraîner dans une voie que ses intérêts et son repos lui déconseillent également. C'est là pour nous un devoir que garantissent au surplus des engagements fédéraux formels et explicites, et auxquels de nouvelles déclarations n'ajouteraient ni valeur ni force obligatoire, soit à nos propres yeux, soit à ceux de l'Europe. Nous ne doutons pas qu'à cet égard encore nos vues se rencontrent pleinement

avec celles de l'Autriche. Nous n'en sommes par moins disposés à accueillir et à examiner avec l'intérêt le plus sérieux les propositions éventuelles que pourrait nous adresser dans ce sens et pour la sûreté de nos intérêts communs, le Cabinet de Vienne, lorsque les conséquences du Protocole du 5 Décembre auront été réalisées, et qu'il s'agira d'établir une entente sur de nouvelles bases et dans la prévision d'autres complications que celles que l'accord entre les Quatre Puissances est appelé à résoudre.

Voilà, M. le Comte, les considérations qui nous ont été suggérées par les dernières communications du Cabinet de Vienne.

Veuillez les porter, avec l'expression sincère de nos remercimens, à la connaissance de M. le Comte de Buol, qui y trouvera, nous l'espérons, un nouveau motif pour alimenter de son côté, cet échange d'idées auquel nous attachons le plus haut prix, et qui nous semble si conforme aux rapports intimes qui subsistent entre nos deux augustes Souverains et entre leurs Cabinets.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 649.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 28. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, January 15, 1854.*

I LEARN from a secret source (having cognisance of official papers) that the latest intelligence received from St. Petersburgh here gives reason to believe that the Emperor of Russia will not immediately break with the Western Powers in consequence of the entry of the fleets into the Black Sea; and that he will previously await some act which may bear the character of offensive hostility towards him.

These reports represent Count Nesselrode as having stated that he had not yet been able to decide the Emperor for peace, and it is surmised that this indecision of the Emperor, coupled with the desire of Count Nesselrode for a termination of these unfortunate differences, may offer a reasonable expectation that the Emperor, still hesitating between two courses, may be finally induced to accept terms for an honourable arrangement.

This expectation is also apparently based on the supposition that, if the Emperor had irrevocably decided on war, the language of Count Nesselrode would be more precise and less discursive on the hopes of maintaining peace.

Baron Manteuffel to a certain degree corroborated this information to me this evening. He told me that General Rochow had inquired of Count Nesselrode what notice would be taken of the entry of the combined fleets into the Black Sea? The Chancellor replied that he was not prepared to say, but that in his opinion, if the notification was a verbal one, there would be no answer made, and no notice taken of it unless some act in the Black Sea should render it imperative to do so.

Baron Manteuffel in stating this remarked that it must be received rather as the private expression of Count Nesselrode to a friend than the opinion of the Chancellor of the Empire to the Prussian Minister.

I feel it to be my duty to report this to your Lordship, but on account of the private nature of this communication, I have to request that your Lordship will provide against the publicity of this despatch.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 650.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 34.)
Berlin, January 18, 1854.

My Lord,

A COPY of the Austrian note addressed to Baron Lebzeltern at St. Petersburgh, embodying the answer of the Porte to the invitation submitted by the Four Powers, has been communicated to the Prussian Government.

Baron Manteuffel has expressed to me his satisfaction at the language of these instructions, and a despatch will be forwarded this evening to General Rochow couched in as strong and expressive terms, with orders to place a copy of it in Count Nesselrode's hands.

These documents will probably be communicated to your Lordship by Count Colloredo and the Chevalier Bunsen.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 651.

Lord A. Loftus to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 35.)
Berlin, January 18, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE not been able to see Baron Manteuffel to-day, but am privately informed that the reports received from General Rochow state that the Emperor Nicholas, accompanied by the Grand Duke Hereditary of Russia, had had a protracted conference with Count Nesselrode subsequently to the communications which had been made to his Excellency by Sir Hamilton Seymour and the French Minister, but that the result of this conference had not transpired. He is evidently of opinion that these communications will not be followed by any abrupt measure on the part of His Imperial Majesty. He appears to think that they will be replied to verbally at Paris and in London, and that the Emperor will await some demonstrative act of hostility in the Black Sea previous to recalling his Ministers from London and Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 652.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 23.)
St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1854.

My Lord,

IN looking over my correspondence of last year I find the following sentence in a despatch marked No. 640 of the 19th November last, in which I had the honour of giving your Lordship an account of a conversation which I had held with the Chancellor.

"His Excellency said that Baron Brunnow had been informed both by your Lordship and by the Earl of Aberdeen of the eventual orders sent to the Admiral commanding Her Majesty's fleet in the Bosphorus, and notice of this communication had already been sent from hence to Prince Menchikoff."

This quotation, which I bring under your Lordship's notice with reference to the inquiry made in your despatch No. 349 of the 27th ultimo, establishes a worse case for the Russian Government than I had desired to make out for them; but I would still venture to submit that it is readily to be conceived that

the paramount object of the Government and of their Black Sea fleet must be to prevent supplies being furnished to the Circassian tribes, where hostilities are seldom discontinued except from a want of arms and ammunition.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 653.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 24.)
St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1854.

My Lord,

YESTERDAY, at an early hour, Count de Reizet, the First Secretary of the French Legation, reached St. Petersburgh with the instructions for General Castelbajac, which we have been anxiously expecting for the last six days.

M. de Reizet had been detained on the road by the heavy snows which have fallen lately in Belgium and Germany.

In the course of the same morning I called upon General Castelbajac, who was good enough to show me the two despatches which he has received, together with a copy of the instructions sent to Admiral Hamelin.

These papers offer a most satisfactory proof of the incorrectness of the reports which have been spread here as to the relations between England and France, and show that the two Governments, after having given proof of very uncommon patience and forbearance under singular provocation, are united heart and soul in the pursuit of a common object—common to the two countries; common as regards the interests of the whole of Western and Southern Europe.

With regard to the instruction sent to General Castelbajac, I need only say that it is the exact counterpart of that addressed to me by your Lordship in your despatch No. 345. The one might have been substituted for the other. The only differences which I could observe are, that the French Minister is desired to concert with his English colleague before communicating to Count Nesselrode the substance of the instructions sent to the allied fleets at Constantinople; that he is empowered either to read the despatch to his Excellency, or to state to him its substance; and that no expression is to be found in the French despatch like that with which your Lordship's despatch concludes: "It is considered that the Turkish fleet should undertake no aggressive operations by sea, so long as matters remain in their present state."

As your Lordship does not authorise me to read your despatch to the Chancellor, General Castelbajac has determined not to communicate his instruction to his Excellency, but merely to give him its substance, and that this may be done faithfully we made notes of the points upon which particular stress is to be laid.

Before separating, General Castelbajac and myself agreed that we should, without loss of time, write severally to Count Nesselrode to say that, having a communication to make to him, we beg to be informed on what day and at what hour it will suit his convenience to receive us.

This I did as soon as I returned home.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 654.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 25. Secret and Confidential.)
St. Petersburgh, January 12, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE learned from a private but certain source that M. Thurneisen, a confidential employé in the house of Stieglitz, who has just returned from Paris, has rendered good service by making the Government understand that they have been misled as to the state of public feeling in France, and that the

excitement occasioned by the late acts of the Imperial navy in the Black Sea, is quite as strong in France as it can be in England. Count Orloff has held a private conversation with M. Thurneisen, who I believe had been charged with some financial operations of the Government, and stated to him in strict confidence that the Emperor had determined not to accept the propositions which might be made to him on behalf of the Conference of Vienna.

By this my informant understands Count Orloff to have meant that it is the purpose of His Imperial Majesty not to acquiesce in any intervention in Turkish affairs, but to insist upon being allowed to settle his differences with the Sultan by direct negotiation with the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 655.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 27.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 12, 1854.*

I WOULD venture to submit to your Lordship that if Russia should persevere in her efforts to destroy a country, the independent existence of which has lately been declared by the Great Powers to be essential to general interests; that if wholly abandoning those conservative principles which the Emperor professed during a quarter of a century, he should be entering upon a course of such aggressive policy as is indicated by the late wanton conduct towards Turkey; that if, already possessing an army of a million of soldiers, His Imperial Majesty is bent upon establishing a naval force of corresponding magnitude, whilst the absence of colonies and of foreign trade renders it clear that such a navy can only be required for aggressive purposes, and that these maritime forces can find secure shelter in two ports, which, while they are threatening to the north and south of Europe are safe from all attack; that it becomes evident that a Power has been allowed to establish itself which is incompatible with the safety of Europe.

Almost the greatest men which this or any other age has produced foretold, not many years since, that in half a century the continent would become either republican or Russian.

One of these dangers was narrowly escaped being within the term laid down, and now the other in its turn presents itself, at an earlier period than was contemplated by the person who has been seen to take so sagacious a view of coming events.

It is, however, to be hoped that both the words and the example of this great man will be held in European recollection, and that the remedy which was found so efficacious against the encroachments of France may be in time resorted to against the ambition of Russia.

It will be of the last importance that before it is too late Governments should combine against a colossus which already bestrides the space comprised between the frontiers of Germany and the shores of the Pacific; it will not be less desirable that the energies of those parties in Europe which are now only directed to bringing about revolution in comparatively well-governed countries, should be turned to resistance to a Power whose ultimate triumph would be the extinction of all liberty, civil and religious.

'The works of a distinguished author who has written upon this country bears for its motto a Russian saying, very expressive of the popular aspirations of Russia. "Je suis assise sur le rivage, et j'attends le vent."

I will only observe that the late acts of the Imperial Cabinet lead to the inference of its being considered that the wind is already becoming favourable for Russian enterprise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 656.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 12, 1854.*

AS I have no knowledge of military matters, it is always with some reluctance that I address your Lordship any observations relating to such affairs. I would, however, venture to remark, that as it is assumed by the Russian Government that the Ottoman Empire, after a gradual decay, has reached that stage of decrepitude which renders the dissolution of the Empire inevitable (in spite of the wishes sincerely entertained by Russia for its preservation), it appears strange that an attack upon Turkey having been considered requisite, a larger force should have been poured into the country than was judged necessary for a similar invasion in 1828.

In 1828 the forces sent into the Principalities consisted of,—

The 3rd	corps d'armée - -	30,000
" 6th	ditto - -	20,000
" 7th	ditto - -	15,000
	Or	65,000

This force being subsequently reinforced by the 2nd corps d'armée and part of the Guards, in numbers 32,000, which brought the whole available force to 97,000.

In the autumn of 1853, Prince Gortchakoff crossed the Pruth with—

The 4th corps d'armée, or - - - - - - - -	60,000
A division of the 5th corps d'armée under General Lüders	12,000
To which are to be added some 10,000 Cossacks of the 80,000 always available - - - -	10,000
And the 3rd corps under General Osten-Sacken, 55,000 or 60,000 strong, say - - - - - -	55,000
	137,000

These facts being established, the dilemma at once presents itself: either the Turkish Empire instead of being weaker must be considered capable of much more resistance now than it was in 1828, or that more extensive and permanent plans are entertained now than had been indulged in by Russia at that period.

Your Lordship will observe that I do not endeavour to establish a comparison between the amount of Russian forces employed in Asia Minor during the two years, although there the difference would be more striking than with regard to those sent into Wallachia and Moldavia.

I take the numbers of the Russian troops employed in 1828 from De Moltke's work, which is considered a high authority.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 657.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 33. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1854.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC has had the kindness to read to me an important despatch, dated the 2nd instant, which he received yesterday from M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys states that the French Government have reason for knowing that Count Buol has been much less hurt and surprised than had been anticipated by the tenor of the instructions sent to the French and English Missions at St. Petersburgh; that he (Count Buol) is aware that the inactivity

of the allied fleets at Constantinople had only had the effect of increasing the ardour of the war-party in Russia; and that there were additional indications of its being the intention of the Austrian Government to shape their policy upon that of England and France.

There, indeed, would be the true wisdom: and in this manner the fearful shock, which—be its result what it may—would be so perilous to Austria, would, in all human probability, be avoided.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 658.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 20.)

(No. 35. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1854.

My Lord,

THAT the Emperor should be very much excited by the turn which affairs have taken of late, is hardly to be wondered at; and that the excitement under which he is labouring should find vent in hasty expressions and violent resolutions, is equally to be expected. His Majesty has been spoiled by exalted position, unlimited power, and never-failing good fortune; and being wholly unaccustomed to opposition, attributes that which he now meets with from the maritime Powers, to hostile feelings towards himself and his country. Setting out indeed from the assumption of right and moderation being entirely on his side, and injustice and the violence of intentions on the part of the allied Governments, nothing can be more intelligible than that all his conclusions should be incorrect.

It is reported accordingly, and appears to be believed, that upon reading in the public papers the orders which were to be given by England and France to their fleets, the Emperor declared to those about him that nothing should prevent his marching, as soon as the spring arrived, upon Constantinople: and that, by sending one immense army across the Danube, and another from Kars and Erzeroum to Scutari, not only would the capture of the town be certain, but that the allied fleets would be intercepted, and if not captured, at all events starved out.

All this is probably only the ebullition of a violent temper, unaccustomed to self or any other control, and powerfully acted upon by an opposition which, from its novelty, is almost unintelligible; but it is not the less certain that I have heard it given as the opinion of military men here that, by a double advance upon Constantinople, the situation of the allied fleets might be rendered very critical, and that this advance may be made with much more facility through Asia than from the Danube. I venture to make known to your Lordship a well-accredited report, which, though not to be taken as indicating a fixed purpose, is, however, not to be disregarded.

I will only observe, that if any doubts have hitherto existed as to the unmitigated evils of unbounded power, when vested in the hands of one erring mortal, they must have been effectually dispelled by the late conduct of the Emperor Nicholas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 659.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 20.)

(No. 36.)

St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1854.

My Lord,

TO my surprise I received a note yesterday from the Chancellor, whom I knew to be ill, to say that he should be ready to receive me at half-past 12 o'clock. I found his Excellency very imperfectly recovered, and evidently still weak and unfit for exertion.

I expressed my regret at having a painful communication to make to him, observing however that what I had remarked, as soon as I heard of the disaster at Sinope, as to the feeling which that event would produce in England would have prepared his Excellency for what I had now to state.

Her Majesty's fleet, I said, had been sent to Constantinople, not with the intention of attacking Russia, but certainly with that of defending Turkey. Her Majesty's Government would have been well pleased that no necessity for naval exertion should have presented itself, and this very probably would have been the case but for the catastrophe to which I had alluded.

The intimation which I had made to his Excellency on the 27th October would have had, it had been hoped, the effect of preventing an attack upon the Turkish coast, an attack which, had it been made when the English ships had been at hand, they would have assisted in repelling. These hopes were found to have been illusory: an attack upon a Turkish squadron anchored peaceably in a Turkish port had been made, and a dreadful slaughter had ensued.

I here entered into some particulars of the horrors of Sinope, and dwelt upon the effect which the account of these misfortunes must have produced upon the public mind in England; the upshot, I said, was a conviction on the part of Her Majesty's Government that more stringent measures were required; sufficient account had not been taken of the conciliatory dispositions of Her Majesty's Government, of the notice which had been given in an amicable spirit, and it had been determined to take measures which should guard against the recurrence of such scenes as Sinope had witnessed.

Her Majesty' ships, and those of the Emperor of the French as well—for there was an entire uniformity in the orders sent to the two fleets as in the intentions with which they had been drawn up—will, I said, enter the Black Sea and will require (réquerir) every Russian ship which they may meet with to re-enter a Russian port. It is painful to me, I continued, M. le Comte, to make such an allusion, but if the summons is not attended to it will be enforced (l'on aura recours à la force). On the other hand, as Her Majesty's Government are not less intent than they were before upon effecting a peaceful settlement of difficulties, measures will be taken for preventing Turkish ships of war from making descents upon the coasts of Russia.

Are you sure, Count Nesselrode said, that this intention is expressed in your instruction? I was, I replied, quite sure; if I were not I should certainly not have made the statement; in fact, M. le Comte, I said, I like truth and should feel to be wanting in duty both to Her Majesty's Government and to yourself if I either held back any part of the communication which I am charged with for you, or endeavoured to give it another colour.

In proof of this, I continued, I was about to remark to you that my instruction dwells more upon the coercive measures which will be employed towards Russian vessels than upon those which will be used against those of Turkey.

In a word, I said, England has promised assistance and support to the Turkish Government, and she will keep her engagements with fidelity. Her ships have been ordered into the Black Sea for the protection of the Turkish territory and of the Turkish flag.

Count Nesselrode inquired whether I had been directed to make any written communication to him upon the subject. I replied that I had not: that I had been ordered to communicate to him the substance of your Lordship's despatch, had endeavoured to do so faithfully, and was quite ready to clear up, as far as I was able, any point which might appear doubtful.

His Excellency desired to read me a despatch which had reached him from Baron Brunnow, in which he gives an account of a conversation which he had held with your Lordship as to the instructions which had been sent to Her Majesty's Admiral in the Bosphorus. I could only say that I felt sure that Baron Brunnow's was a very faithful one, as the language ascribed to your Lordship corresponded closely with that of the despatch which I had received.

After a short controversy respecting the right of Her Majesty's Government to feel aggrieved by the affair of Sinope, Count Nesselrode said that he felt obliged to observe that it was most unfortunate (à regretter) that Her Majesty's Government should have determined upon taking measures of so decided a character at the precise moment when strenuous efforts were being made at Vienna for coming to a peaceable arrangement.

This opinion, I replied, was entirely shared by Her Majesty's Government, and, as I had before stated, nothing of the sort would have happened but for the attack upon Sinope and the dreadful incidents by which this attack had been attended; Her Majesty's Government were nevertheless still intent upon peace if it were attainable.

As I saw that Count Nesselrode was too ill to carry on a longer conversation, I rose to take leave of him, when he said that he could not at present make any reply to my communication beyond this, that it would be his duty to bring it as soon as possible to the Emperor's knowledge, and to take His Majesty's orders upon the subject.

I said, M. le Comte, allow me then to take this opportunity of saying that, whatever comes of this affair, I shall leave St. Petersburgh, when the time arrives for doing so, with a feeling of sincere good-will towards you—a feeling which I am willing to believe will in some measure be corresponded to on your side. Let me however add that private feelings of this nature have nothing to do with the conduct of public affairs; all that your Government, like my own, have to look to is its own interests and dignity.

Upon public grounds I am most anxious that everything should be arranged amicably, but at the same time I will not conceal from you that my position here has been so long a painful one that personally the decision about to be taken will very little affect me.

I have only to add that, in consequence of a slight misunderstanding, General Castelbajac was introduced into the Chancellor's sick-room on the 11th instant, when his Excellency was still so indisposed as to be unable to speak to him upon public business. Last night his Excellency apprised my colleague, by a note, that he would see him as soon as he was capable of the exertion; but he is aware that the communication he is to receive is a matter of form, as it is a mere repetition of that already made on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 660.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 37. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1854.*

I LEARN upon unquestionable authority that a very warm altercation took place on the 7th instant between the Emperor and Count Nesselrode, who was reproached sharply by His Imperial Master with the manner in which he had conducted himself during the late transactions with the English and French Governments.

This much may be considered as certain; that which is less so, but which there is reason for believing is, that at the same conversation the Emperor alluded to the instructions which the English Minister was known to have received, whilst none of the same kind had reached the French Mission.

From this fact His Imperial Majesty deduced the proof of his having been correct in his opinion that there was no cordiality of feeling between England and France, and that the latter would not take the resolution which appeared to have been adopted by Her Majesty's Government with regard to the Black Sea.

It is further understood that Count Nesselrode did not give up his opinion, and expressed his confidence that France and England were about to act upon a common system.

I apprehend that this painful conversation has contributed to bring on the indisposition from which Count Nesselrode has since been suffering.

In consequence of a sort of misunderstanding the French Minister was admitted on the 11th instant to Count Nesselrode's sick room, and the Chancellor, after observing that he felt too ill to enter upon a discussion of political affairs, added, "The fact is, that this Eastern question will be the cause of my death."

When I waited upon the Chancellor I found him so weak and reduced that it was manifestly painful to him to converse, and the Emperor, who had been anxious to know what had passed at the interview which I had just had of his Excellency, went to his hotel for the purpose of hearing his report.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 661.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1854.*

AS I was closing the despatch bag the French Minister called here to acquaint me that he was suddenly summoned yesterday evening by Count Nesselrode, to whom he made the communication respecting the orders sent to the French Admiral in the Bosphorus.

At night, as it appears, a Council of the Ministers was held.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR

No. 662.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21, 1854.)

(No. 417.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 31, 1853.*

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's information is a letter which I have recently received from Her Majesty's Consul-General at Odessa. It contains some intelligence from Russia which may have interest for your Lordship under present circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 662.

Consul-General Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Odessa, December 13, 1853.*

I BELIEVE that the whole military force of this Empire is about to be placed on the war-footing. Large masses of troops are in motion, and I am told that the 6th corps d'armée always stationed about Moscow, and considered as a reserve, will soon be on its march, not as I should have supposed towards the Caucasus, but directed to this quarter. To my surprise I learn that one of the divisions of infantry of the 1st corps d'armée now in Poland, is destined for the Caucasus, and I know that the reserve division of infantry stationed at the head of the Asoph is to break up its cantonments on the 1st day of January for its march to Sevastopol. Your Excellency is already aware of the advance of the 3rd corps d'armée under the command of General Osten-Sacken, and the head of its first column of infantry was on the 5th or 6th instant to have reached Soulani on the Pruth. I have not yet heard that an extraordinary conscription has been ordered, which if present operations be continued will become indispensable. If such a measure has been rumoured, it arises no doubt from the severity with which the conscription in arrear has been enforced.

Great exultation has been created here by the Russian victory, or, to speak more correctly, of the Turkish disaster in the roads of Sinope. No vessel was on that occasion carried away, and but a very few prisoners. Osman Pasha

and other wounded are in Sevastopol, and on Saturday the 10th instant were brought here 297 prisoners that had been taken off Sinope, and in the two steamers previously captured. There are three English engineers, Bell, Morrison, and Cleland among them. The first was on the Egyptian war-steamer "Parvis Bahri," and the others in the merchant-steamer "Medari Tidjaret." The capture of the last vessel may be qualified as an act of piracy if the Ministerial Russian proclamation means anything, when the term is stated to be the 22nd November, before which no Turkish merchant ships met at sea, are to be seized. I have, however, applied to the Acting Governor-General fruitlessly in favour of our countrymen, and they with two Maltese stokers, and two Ionians, are to be marched up far into the country. Five Egyptian officers were sent off this morning for St. Petersburgh, where no doubt much will be made of them; all the prisoners are in truth well treated.

I have a letter from Sir Hamilton Seymour of the 2nd in which he alludes to the fresh attempt now made at Constantinople for a pacific adjustment, for the success of which it is impossible to feel sanguine. "We are," he says, "very conciliatory, as we have been, Heaven knows, throughout; but there are limits which we shall not and cannot pass by one hair's breadth."

There is much vulgar exasperation here against the English, while the French seem not to be named. A fray with England is an astounding novelty. I feel it necessary and prudent to keep within doors, notwithstanding which I have acquired a bad name, and am indirectly threatened that my Government is to be required to call me away from here. My correspondence by post is of course seen, and displeases however circumspect it may be.

The danger to a maritime expedition by the Turks from the Bosphorus to the most distant coast of the Black Sea was to be foreseen, and I should be unhappy to know that a squadron of our own should come into this Sea insufficiently strong to command respect; for the moment may be at hand when all scruples cease.

We have news here of a battle fought on the 26th ultimo near Akhalchik, which appears to have been obstinately contested, having commenced at sunrise and continued the whole of the day. We are told that it terminated in the defeat of the Turks, whose loss is reported to have been about 1,000 killed, 120 prisoners, among whom, it is boasted, there were a Mullah and a Pasha's Secretary, 10 field-pieces, 2 mountain guns, and 2 cannon of position, and a large quantity of provisions found in their captured camp. Of the forces on either side there is no enumeration; the Russians were under the command of Lieutenant-General Prince Andronikoff.

There are rumours of other affairs in the Caucasus and at sea, of which we have no explanation and that are too vague to be repeated.

The public prints have of late said much of the invasion of Khiva. I myself know of no further progress of the Russians than to Ak-Meelich on the Syr-Daria. I beg leave to refer to my letter of the 22nd October, 1851, on that subject. In the vain expectation of further accounts I have not written so much to the Foreign Office, which I do now regret; for my vigilance will be accused to have been at fault.

The winter has set in with early severity, and to day we have a snow-storm, which upon these steppe lands are perilous to travellers and to troops on their march.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 663.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21, 1854.)

(No. 418.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, December 31, 1853.*

REFERRING to Vice-Admiral Dundas' minute of a letter, dated 29th of December, proposed for transmission to me as a despatch, but never sent to me in that shape, I have to remark for your Lordship's consideration, first, that

the extent of Turkish Asiatic coast in the Black Sea, stated by the Admiral at 800 miles, may for purposes of protection be reduced to three or four points, where alone, I believe, the Russians could have any conceivable motive for establishing a blockade or committing an aggression; secondly, that the force proposed by him as most advisable to be sent to sea would be exposed to the risk of having to retire before a superior force exactly when it was most wanted for practical purposes; thirdly, that although steam frigates might give early information of any movements of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol, the Russians would have the advantage of the prevailing winds, and to judge from the difficulties experienced in moving from Besika Bay, and in now proceeding into the Black Sea, the object of their expedition would probably be achieved before the combined squadrons could possibly arrive to prevent them.

When Admiral Dundas observes upon his going to sea at present without "any precise object or destination," I presume that his meaning is to point out the want of any particular spot at which an attack may be expected on the coasts of Turkey; but surely the object of his taking out the squadron is declared with unmistakeable clearness in my instructions him.

With respect to the defence of Constantinople, I am under an impression that there is no well-founded reason for apprehending an attack for the present. Were the Russians to undertake the enterprize they would find, in addition to the batteries and the Turkish squadron, four sail-of-the-line, between French and English, ready to contest their passage; and if they succeeded in reaching Constantinople, they would have but slender chance of ever returning in safety.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 664.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 3, 1854.*

THE combined squadrons left their anchorage in Beicos Bay at an early hour this morning, and, towed by the steamers, were proceeding towards the Black Sea, when a sudden change of wind and weather obliged them to remain in the Channel.

I have the honour to inclose herewith copies of two official letters, addressed to me in the course of the day by Vice-Admiral Dundas, whose latest advices from England had induced him to take his entire squadron into the Black Sea.

The tenour of your Lordship's instructions to me, received on the same day, left me but little room for doubt as to the course which I had to pursue on learning from the French Ambassador that he was instructed by his Government to extend the protection of the French squadron to the flag, as well as to the territories of Turkey.

A copy of my despatch to Admiral Dundas on this subject is inclosed herewith, and a corresponding alteration has been made in the letter to be addressed by each of the Admirals to the chief naval authority at Sevastopol. This I conceive to have been indispensable. The obligation of giving notice increases with the risk of having to enforce the instructions under which the Admirals are acting; and a notice not fully corresponding with the instructions might become a just subject of embarrassment and reproach.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 664.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *in the Bosphorus, noon, January* 2, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE just had the honour to receive your Excellency's confidential despatch of the 1st instant, with a translated copy of the Police Station, Pera, Report, dated the 31st December, 1853, which I will immediately communicate to my colleague Vice-Admiral Hamelin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 664.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

"*Britannia*," *off Buyukdéré, January* 3, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that the wind having suddenly changed to the north-east, with thick, rainy weather, Vice-Admiral Hamelin anchored in Buyuk-Liman Bay; and the squadron under my command have also anchored off Büyukdéré, and between that place and Beicos, ready to start the moment the weather will permit.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 3 in No 664.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, January 3, 1854.

Sir,

IN consequence of fresh advices from England, I instruct you to extend the protection of your squadron to the shipping as well as to the territory of Turkey throughout the Black Sea, not only under the circumstances specified in my preceding despatches, but wherever you may find it necessary to secure those objects from danger of aggression or capture.

It is only by obtaining the complete command of the Black Sea that the policy of Her Majesty's Government and that of France can be effectually carried out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 4 in No. 664.

Amended Draft of Letter to be addressed by the British and French Admirals to the Russian Admiral at Sevastopol.

L'ESCADRE sous mes ordres étant sur le point de paraître dans la Mer Noire, de concert avec celle de la France, et l'objet de ce mouvement étant de protéger le territoire et le pavillon Ottoman contre toute agression ou acte d'hostilité, j'en avertis votre Excellence dans le but de prévenir toute collision pouvant nuire aux relations amicales qui existent entre mon Gouvernement et le votre, relations que nous désirons conserver, et que vous tenez aussi, sans doute, à maintenir.

Je serais heureux d'apprendre que votre Excellence, animée des mêmes intentions pacifiques, a bien voulu donner aux commandants des forces Russes dans la Mer Noire des instructions destinées à prévenir toute événement qui pourrait compromettre la paix.

No. 665.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 4, 1854.

I WAS surprised the day before yesterday by receiving the official note of which a copy is herewith inclosed, from the Prussian Envoy here. Your Lordship will perceive that it relates to the subject of my despatch No. 1 of this year. I have made a point of replying to it with a degree of moderation ill deserved, though it is evident that M. de Wildenbruch's interference with the movements of the squadron was as injudicious as it was "spontaneous" and uncalled-for.

A copy of my answer to his note is inclosed herewith.

Baron de Bruck received from me exactly the same answer which I had sent to the Prussian Envoy, but I am not aware that he has taken it amiss; at least he has sent me no retort.

The step taken at the Porte by his Excellency and his Prussian colleague occasioned a report that the combined squadrons had been restrained from going into the Black Sea by the remonstrances of those two Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I am informed on good authority that the Internuncio carried his anxiety on the subject of the squadrons so far as to request that Reshid Pasha would use his influence with me and the French Ambassador to dissuade us from sending them out! I am the more surprised at this palpable absurdity, as it is generally believed that the Austrian Government will be glad to know that the combined squadrons are in the Black Sea.

Inclosure 1 in No. 665.

Baron Wildenbruch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Kouron-Tschesme, ce 2 *Janvier*, 1854.

LE Secrétaire de la Légation du Roi m'a rendu compte de la manière dont votre Excellence a jugé à propos de recevoir une communication confidentielle dont je l'avais chargé dans la journée d'hier.

Loin de vouloir entrer en discussion à ce sujet, sur lequel je dois laisser au Gouvernement que j'ai l'honneur de représenter le soin de se prononcer, je crois uniquement devoir porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les motifs pour lesquels j'ai été guidé, dans la communication d'une démarche que je devais au caractère dont je suis revêtu et à la position de mon Gouvernement.

J'ai choisi le mode de communication contre lequel votre Excellence a cru devoir objecter précisément parcequ'il me paraissait devoir remplir le but d'éviter à votre Excellence la nécessité de faire des observations; observations que le porteur de mon instruction n'aurait pas été autorisé à discuter.

Si votre Excellence a préféré éviter cette nécessité par un moyen sur lequel, je le répète, mon Gouvernement sera appelé à se prononcer, je ne saurais admettre que la raison en eût été dans la nature même des observations que votre Excellence aurait eu à faire.

J'ai—pour toucher la question elle-même—cru de mon devoir de ne point laisser ignorer à votre Excellence la démarche que j'ai faite spontanément auprès de la Porte, pour vous fournir, M. l'Ambassadeur, une preuve de ma ferme réso-

ution de ne point cacher à MM. mes collégues aucun de mes actes relatifs à la question qui occupe l'Europe, tant que je serai chargé de poursuivrede concert avec eux le même but, celui du rétablissement de la paix.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 665.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Baron Wildenbruch.

M. l'Envoyé, *Péra, le 4 Janvier*, 1854.

L'OFFICE que vous avez jugé à propos de m'adresser avant-hier, semble avoir pour objet de formuler une plainte contre moi, accompagnée d'explications de la démarche par laquelle vous m'avez "spontanément" mis dans la position de vous déplaire, sans le vouloir.

L'avis que votre Excellence m'a en même temps donné de son intention d'en appeler au jugement de sa Cour pourrait me dispenser d'y répondre autrement que par un simple accusé de réception. Mais le respect que je porte au caractère public dont elle est revêtue, m'engage à lui observer que, le but de sa communication ayant été remplie par l'offre seule de la faire, je crois ne lui avoir donné aucun droit de se formuliser en déclinant la recevoir d'une manière qui, d'après mon appréciation de la circonstance, m'aurait imposé une pénible alternative.

(Signé) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 666.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received January* 21, 1854.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January* 5, 1853.

THE combined squadrons succeeded at length in making good their entrance into the Black Sea at an early hour yesterday morning.

Vice-Admiral Dundas' last letter to me is inclosed, in copy, herewith. I add, for your Lordship's more complete information, a list of the ships of each squadron, as now at sea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 666.

Vice-Admiral Dundas to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *"Britannia," off Buyukdéré, January* 4, 1854.

THE weather has cleared up, and the fleet is getting under weigh.

If we meet a strong east wind, I have proposed to Admiral Hamelin to go to Kavarna; if west, to Sinope.

I shall send the "Fury" in after twenty-four hours.

The inclosed despatch I beg may be forwarded to the Secretary of the Admiralty by the French packet.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. W. D. DUNDAS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 666.

List of Vessels composing British and French Squadrons in the Black Sea.

3 Decks.	Britannia.			3 Decks.	Ville de Paris.
	Trafalgar.	Terrible	21		Valmy.
	Queen.	Retribution	28		Friedland.
	Agamemnon.	Furious	16		Jena.
90	Albion.	Tiger	16	90	Jupiter.
	Rodney.	Samson	6		Bayard.
	London.	Firebrand	6		
		Inflexible	6	100	Henri Quatre.
84	Vengeance.			84	Charlemagne.
78	Bellerophon.				Gomer.
70	Sans Pareil.				Mogador.
70	Leander.				Magellan.
		Arethusa	50	14	Sané.
		Triton			Descartes.
		Niger	14		Promethée.
		Fury	6		
					Héron.
					Ajaccio.

No. 667.

Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(*Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, January* 20.)

Londres, 3 *Rebiul-Akhir*, 1270. (*Le* 3 *Janvier*, 1854.)

LES Représentants des Quatre Puissances ayant adressé dernièrement à la Sublime Porte des notes officielles identiques, relatives à un projet d'arrangement pacifique, et le Gouvernement Impérial leur ayant remis, de son côté, une note responsive par laquelle il leur communique son adhésion, je vous envoie ci-jointes, pour votre information, les copies des pièces échangées.

Ainsi que vous le remarquerez par la lecture de notre réponse, les notes à adresser aux Puissances, conjointement avec les firmans Impériaux confirmatifs des privilèges spirituels des communautés de tous les sujets non-Mussulmans de la Sublime Porte, seront rédigées dans des termes généraux et uniformes; c'est à dire, qu'elles auront pour objet de communiquer à chacune de ces Puissances l'ensemble de l'état de choses sans qu'il y soit fait mention des noms d'aucune communauté ou religion quelconque, et sans que rien de plus y soit ajouté par les Puissances en faveur d'une de ces communautés.

Si, en cas de non-adhésion de la Russie à ce projet d'arrangement, des modifications de certains passages étaient de nouveau proposées à la Sublime Porte, le Gouvernement Impérial est décidé d'avance à n'en accepter aucune. De même, si, par exemple, après l'adhésion du Cabinet de Russie aux bases de cet arrangement, des propositions tendantes à donner à cette Puissance quelques assurances spéciales quant à la question des privilèges spirituels, et à faire, sous quelque forme que ce soit, dans la note à adresser à ce sujet, une mention quelconque de la religion Grecque, étaient mises en avant dans la Conférence durant les négociations, il est évident que ces négociations seraient rompues.

En effet, s'il ne s'agit que du maintien perpétuel des privilèges spirituels, il n'y a pas de doute que ce but ne soit obtenu tout de même par l'insertion de termes généraux. Mais faire de cette question une question spéciale, ce serait vouloir absolument donner gain de cause à la Russie ; ce à quoi la Sublime Porte ne saurait jamais consenter. Or, le projet d'arrangement consigné dans les notes que les Représentants des Quatre Puissances ont signées et remises à la Sublime Porte, étant aussi conçu en termes généraux, et l'adhésion du Gouvernement Impérial au renouvellement des anciens Traités ayant été donné uniquement dans l'intention d'en accorder à la Russie rien de spécial quant à la question des privilèges, toute proposition contraire aux bases déjà acceptées ne saurait certes se concilier avec l'honneur et la dignité des Puissances Alliées. En un mot, la Sublime Porte a la ferme conviction que les Puissances, en circonscrivant la question dans les limites tracées par elles-mêmes, mettront leur honneur et leur sollicitude à réaliser un arrangement qui est leur œuvre. Quoiqu'il en soit, la Sublime Porte, forcée de faire ses réserves dans une question si délicate, est dans l'impossibilité d'admettre aucune idée de spécialité dans la question spirituelle. Enfin, puisque la Sublime Porte a indiqué dans sa note responsive l'esprit qui présidera à la rédaction de la note à adresser, conjointement avec les firmans Impériaux, aux Puissances, y comprise même la Russie, il lui sera de toute impossibilité d'en changer le sens et les termes.

Cette décision ayant été adoptée unanimement et conformément aux ordres de Sa Majesté Impérial le Sultan, la Sublime Porte, fidèle à ses principes de loyauté et de franchise, en fait part dès ce moment aux Puissances Alliées, et espère fermement que ces Puissances, appréciant l'empressement du Gouvernement Impérial à aller au-devant de leurs vœux pour le rétablissement de la paix, emploieront d'autant plus leur sollicitude pour préserver de toute atteinte les droits de souveraineté du Sultan.

Je vous invite à donner lecture de cette dépêche à son Excellence Lord Clarendon, et vous autorise à lui en laisser copie.

No. 668.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord, *Vienna, January 16, 1854.*

COUNT BUOL assembled the Conference this day, for the purpose of stating that the Turkish Ambassador had yesterday communicated to him a letter from Reshid Pasha, dated the 3rd instant, which recapitulated the terms of negotiation upon which the Porte was ready to treat for peace, and which were detailed in the letter he had addressed to the Four Representatives at Constantinople. Count Buol had caused a translation to be made of this document, which he read to the Conference; the original, in the Turkish language, he had returned to the Ambassador.

Count Buol characterized this despatch as being entirely inopportune; it puts such a limit to negotiation as almost to invalidate the consent to treat, which was consigned in the answer to the Four Powers; for it decided beforehand almost every question which might be brought into discussion. But his great objection to it was the peremptory manner in which it refuses ever to admit the indication of the Greek religion; this had never before been refused by the Government of the Sultan, and it was, therefore, putting forward a pretension beyond the engagements which had been taken by the Four Powers in the Protocol of the 5th of December last, by which the Porte should not be required to agree to any stipulation which she had already refused.

Count Buol also objected to the passage in which it was stated that the honour of the Four Powers was engaged to obtain all the pretensions which were put forward in this despatch.

Count Buol looked upon this document as likely to create the most unfavourable impression if it was known at St. Petersburgh, and it might prevent the acceptance of the negotiation which had now been proposed. He therefore requested the members of the Conference, as he had done the Turkish Ambassador, to keep it entirely secret.

He also requested that the members of the Conference would consult their Governments, whether it would not be advisable that they should take this document into deliberation, in order to examine whether it accorded with the intentions and decisions of the Four Governments as stated in the Protocol of the 5th of December last; and if (as Count Buol believes) it did not do so, that the Conference should be authorized to state this in a Protocol, and should declare that they did not, in consequence, consider it as a document which could be recognized as being in accordance with, or as bearing upon the negotiation which they hoped might shortly be established.

As, at the end of this despatch to the Turkish Ambassador, it is stated that it will be communicated to the Governments of the Allied Powers, I have no doubt it is already in your Lordship's hands; and I have only to add, that Count Buol hopes that your Lordship's reply to this communication may not be delayed.

Count Buol conceives that this document, if it become known, would have as disastrous an effect upon the pending negotiations as the despatch of Count Nesselrode on the Turkish modifications of the Vienna note had exercised upon a former occasion in preventing the adoption of that document.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 669.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland

(No. 24.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.*

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch No. 20, reporting that on the 16th instant Count Buol had read to the Conference a translation of a letter from Reshid Pasha, which had been communicated to him by the Turkish Ambassador, and had requested the members of the Conference to consult their Governments as to whether it would not be advisable that they should take this document into consideration in order to examine whether it accorded with the intentions and decisions of the Four Powers as stated in the Protocol of the 5th of December last.

M. Musurus has since communicated to me an identical letter of which I inclose a copy*.

I have in reply to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not be desirable for the Conference to take any step with regard to this letter, and they recommend that instructions should be sent to the Four Representatives at Constantinople to declare to the Porte in identical terms that all the elements of the future negotiations between Russia and the Porte are comprised in the answer which the Porte has made to their overtures: that they cannot be further modified; and that, with respect to questions of detail, their discussion must be deferred until the period when the consent of Russia shall have been received to treat upon the bases proposed.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 670.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 5, 1854.*

INCLOSED herewith in copy are an instruction addressed by me to M. Pisani, and his report in answer.

Your Lordship will perceive that I have acted on this occasion in pursuance of what I understood to be the intention of Her Majesty's Government.

* See No. 667.

The Porte has availed itself of the entrance of the united squadrons into the Black Sea to send a small squadron of steamers with troops and ammunition on board to Trebizond.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 670.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to M. E. Pisani.

Pera, January 4, 1854.

Sir,

YOU will inform Reshid Pasha that I have instructed Admiral Dundas to protect the Porte's shipping as well as territory in the Black Sea. I expect, in return, that the Porte will send no vessels to sea in that direction without my knowledge and the Admiral's concurrence.

A similar communication will be made to his Highness by the French Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 670.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, January 4, 1854.

My Lord,

IN conformity with your Excellency's instruction of this day's date, I waited upon Reshid Pasha and informed him that you have instructed Admiral Dundas to protect the Porte's shipping as well as territory in the Black Sea. His Highness told me that a similar communication has also been received from the French Embassy, and requested me to express his heartfelt gratitude for this important information, and acquaint your Excellency that he will lose no time in conveying the same to his Imperial master.

The five Turkish war-steamers, which for some days were preparing to go into the Black Sea, left this morning with a number of troops and with ammunition for Trebizond. Should any more Turkish ships go in that direction, the Porte will not fail to acquaint the Embassy beforehand of such an intention. The Capoudan Pasha has been accordingly officially directed to abstain from any steps whatever without the previous knowledge of the Embassy, and without the concurrence of the British and French Admirals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 671.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 31.)

Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 6 of the 4th instant, inclosing copies of a correspondence with the Prussian Minister on the subject of your refusal, reported in your despatch No. 1 of the 1st, to receive from his Secretary the unofficial communication of a letter which he had written to the Porte respecting the entrance of the combined squadrons into the Black Sea. The Internuncio, it would seem, did not regard in the same light with his Prussian colleague a similar refusal on your Excellency's part as applied to himself.

Her Majesty's Goverement have learnt with regret the steps taken by the Internuncio and the Prussian Minister, as reported in your several despatches, which they apprehend may impair that union and friendly feeling between the

Representatives at Constantinople which exist between their respective Courts, and which it is of essential importance to maintain.

On the receipt of your first reports on this subject, I directed the Earl of Westmorland and Lord Augustus Loftus to request explanations of the Austrian and Prussian Governments as to the course pursued by their Representatives; but I was subsequently led by the despatch from the Earl of Westmorland, of which I inclose a copy,* to direct them to suspend acting upon the instruction. It appeared from Count Buol's statement to the Earl of Westmorland, that the notes of the Austrian and Prussian Representatives to the Porte were called forth by a communication made to them respectively by Reshid Pasha, to the effect that the entry of the allied fleets into the Black Sea had been decided upon with the approbation of the Four Powers.

But it would seem from M. de Wildenbruch's letter, inclosed in your despatch No. 6, that his communication, and it may be inferred that of the Internuncio also, originated entirely with themselves; and, therefore, in transmitting to Lord Bloomfield a copy of that despatch, I have directed him to express to Baron Manteuffel the regret of Her Majesty's Government that M. de Wildenbruch should have thought it his duty to interfere respecting the entrance of the combined fleets into the Black Sea, which was a measure rendered indispensable by the disaster at Sinope, and the danger of aggression upon the Turkish territory, which England and France had declared their determination to protect.

Lord Westmorland will be instructed to make a communication to the same effect to Count Buol; and both Lord Bloomfield and Lord Westmorland will be directed to express the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the same cordiality of feeling which exists between England and the Courts to which they are respectively accredited, should be maintained by their Representatives at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 672.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, in reply to your despatch No. 4 of the 3rd instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the alteration which you made, as stated in that despatch, in the letter to be addressed by Vice-Admiral Dundas to the Russian naval authorities at Sevastopol; the effect of that alteration being, that the protection to be afforded by the presence of the combined squadrons in the Black Sea was to apply as well to the Ottoman flag as to the Ottoman territory.

I conclude that a similar course has been taken by General Baraguay d'Hilliers in regard to the communication to be made by the French Admiral to the Russian authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

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* No. 630.

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No. 673.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 19.)

Foreign Office, January 24, 1854.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 38 of the 13th instant inclusive.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Goverument entirely approve the manner in which, as reported in your despatch No. 36 of the 13th instant, you executed the instructions respecting the entrance of the combined English and French fleets into the Black Sea, contained in my despatch No. 345 of the 27th of December.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.